

Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics

Edited by Pedro Ramet

Duke Press Policy Studies *Revised and expanded edition*

Duke University Press Durham and London 1989

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Printed in the United States of America

on acid-free paper ∞

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
appear on the last printed page of this book.

For Sebastian and Ida Maria Ramet,
as a token of love and great respect.

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Preface to the Second Edition

Five of the chapters in this edition are new, viz., Peter Sugar's chapter on religious institutions, Zvi Gitelman's chapter on Jews, Stephen Jones's chapter on Georgia and Armenia, Dan Beck's chapter on East Germany, and my chapter on Czechoslovakia. Several of these were presented at the 1987 meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (Boston), and I am indebted to Robert F. Goeckel (SUNY, Geneseo) for his helpful comments on earlier drafts of the Jewish and East German chapters.

In addition, all the other chapters have been updated. In some cases revision and updating have been considerable; in other cases, the changes are relatively minor.

Pedro Ramet
Seattle, April 5, 1988

Preface to the First Edition

This book is the product of a conference on "Religion and Nationalism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe" held at the University of California, Los Angeles, and at the University of California, Santa Barbara, October 29–30, 1982. The conference was sponsored by the Center for Russian and East European Studies (UCLA) and supported by grants from UCSB Chancellor Robert A. Huttenback, UCSB Associate Vice Chancellor for Research Marvin Marcus, and UCSB Dean of the College of Letters and Science David A. Sprecher.

The collaborators in this volume are deeply indebted to Professor Bariša Krekić, then director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies, and to Professor John E. Moore, chairman of the Department of Political Science (UCSB), for their strong interest in the project, and for their encouragement and support.

The following persons are also to be thanked for having reviewed the papers included herein and for suggesting areas of improvement: Annette Aronowicz (Stanford University), David T. Cattell (UCLA), Dimitrije Djordjević (UCSB), Peter H. Merkl (UCSB), Azade Ayse-Rorlich (University of Southern California), and Ronald Wixman (University of Oregon). Andrzej Korbonski (UCLA) also participated in the conference, and Alan Scarfe (Keston College) also reviewed certain papers in this volume.

I am grateful to *Soviet Studies* for permission to include a revised version of the article by Pospelovsky which originally appeared in that journal.

Pedro Ramet
Seattle, April 30, 1984

Part I Comparative Analysis

The Interplay of Religious Policy and Nationalities Policy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Pedro Ramet

Religion is not merely a set of beliefs about a "world beyond" but also, and perhaps more importantly, a set of beliefs about how the present world—its law, its authority, its hierarchical relations—should be organized. Liturgy and ritual, valued by participants for the feelings of rapture and spirituality they impart, serve another function, clearly more important from the organizational point of view, viz., that of communal reaffirmation of the authority of ecclesiastical leaders. The breadth of that authority may be narrow, limited essentially to social behavior (morality), or it may extend to prescriptions about attire, culture (as in the proscription of certain kinds of music), civil codes, and political behavior. Religion, as Talcott Parsons recognized, "is the point of articulation between the cultural system and the social system, where values from the former are embodied in the latter."¹

The claims of the great monotheistic religions (Christianity, Islam, Judaism) were traditionally absolute, not relative; the appearance in recent decades of "nondenominational churches" is one sign of an attenuation of this absoluteness, but even now, the moral injunctions of most, if not all, religions are certainly intended to have absolute and universal validity, and they are backed by the authority of a putative being said to be omnipotent and omnibenevolent. More generally, no religion has ever allowed that its doctrines might be only relatively true—not even the polytheist Olympian religion of ancient Greece and Rome. Moreover, the relative toleration found in many modern societies probably has more to do with compromise born in the mix of religions rather than with the content of any one religion, and with the diminishing ability of many religions to compel conformity among their own mem-

bers (as seen in the widespread acceptance of contraceptives among American Catholics). At the same time religion has always looked back to its sources and read into those sources a particular meaning: that meaning constitutes itself as a claim upon the loyalty of a community as a community—Irish and Poles are expected to be Catholic, Russians and Bulgarians are expected to be Orthodox, Arabs and Turks are expected to be Muslim. The Orthodox Pole, the Baptist Russian, and the Protestant Turk are all, in a very real sense, viewed as nationally disloyal.

Theocracy was one of the earliest forms of government, and perhaps the first form of government to become institutionally developed. The papal states, the caliphate, and the Orthodox churches under the Ottoman *millet* system all exemplify this principle in different forms. Regardless of what religious organizations may profess to be today, their incunabula were quintessentially *political*, and churches may, accordingly, be regarded as vestigial political organizations par excellence. Shorn of their governing function and, in recent centuries, increasingly shorn of their monopoly in spheres of socialization (education, historiography, literature, music, and the arts), the churches have retained their political character by adopting a new countenance as the guardians of discrete interests, even as interest groups. When we say, then, that religion's claims are absolute, we perceive that religion has always played a powerful role in cementing the loyalty of citizens toward their national collectivities.²

This is only half the picture, however. To describe religion merely as an epiphenomenon of political development would obscure the organic nexus between religion and nation (*Volk* in German, *narod* in Russian). Religion was, in its origin, tribal and then national, and its gods were the gods of the tribe and nation. Wars waged between ancient peoples were assumed to have a supernatural dimension as the divine protectors of warring peoples were presumed to contest among themselves. And even when, in Greece, a polytheist universe became generally accepted, the individual city-states retained their favorites (Athena for Athens, for example). Religion, thus, was national before it was universal.

An early attempt by the Egyptian pharaoh Ikhnaton (Amenhotep III) to establish universalist ethics based on a monotheist creed fell through for lack of support; when one of his followers, Moses, organized the escape of Jewish captives and brought the universalist creed to them,³ it

soon became, in their hands, a *national* religion, and Adonai (Jehovah) reverted to the traditional role of protector of his "chosen people."

Christianity was the first religion to make the transition from being a national religion to being a universal religion to which national borders are meaningless. But even for Christianity, the transition was incomplete. There are two chief reasons for this. The first is that in the eastern Mediterranean basin, where Christianity first established its roots, it evolved a network of national patriarchs who, as spiritual leaders of their nations, were inevitably cast also in the roles of national leaders or potential national leaders. Second, in the West, where the bishop of Rome established unchallenged primacy even before the demise of the West Roman Empire, the fragmentation produced by the Protestant Reformation allowed religion to once more become a source and exacerbant of international discord. The principle of *cuius regio eius religio* codified a principle which only increased the likelihood that Spaniards should think of themselves as Catholics, Genevans as Calvinists, Dutchmen as Protestant-Reformed, and so on.

This identification of sundry religious affiliations with various ethnic and national identities has, however, made the self-appointed task of the communist authorities everywhere more difficult. On the one hand, religious organizations can less easily be tamed, suppressed, or destroyed outright insofar as they are widely viewed as *national* institutions. And on the other hand, among those regimes which either deny ethnic heterogeneity (Bulgaria) or seek to assimilate and denationalize the ethnic minorities (the Soviet Union and Romania), the religious element infuses national survival with spiritual values, making assimilation—perhaps especially where Muslims are concerned—a threat to the religious community itself. Even in countries which have abandoned earlier assimilation programs (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), the churches (in these cases, the Catholic church chiefly) are identified in the popular memory with truncated national states and are viewed by some as hotbeds of ethnic secessionism.

Military conquerors and separatists alike have recognized the political potency of national churches and their utility in weaning populations from earlier allegiances. Thus, the Germans allowed believers in occupied Belorussia to organize a Belorussian Autocephalous Orthodox church in 1941, with Metropolitan Panteleimon at its head,⁴ and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church, revived the follow-

ing year, was to play an active role in fomenting anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism in German-occupied Ukraine during World War II.⁵ Similarly, Ante Pavelić, *poglavnik* of the wartime Independent State of Croatia, established an autocephalous Croatian Orthodox church in April 1942, placing the old Russian bishop, Germogen, at its head, in hopes of convincing some Orthodox believers that they were Croats.⁶

If the endeavor to break a people's link with its own past can take the form of the establishment of new and "autocephalous" churches, it can also manifest itself in the suppression of native liturgies. The Russian tsars wanted to sap Polish and Lithuanian nationalism and thus demanded that the Catholic church in Polish and Lithuanian districts substitute Russian for Latin as the official church language and language of the liturgy: a Russianized Catholic church was supposed to serve as the vehicle of the Russification of these non-Russian lands.⁷ The Austrian emperor Franz Josef adopted the opposite tactic for the same end, persuading the pope to withhold approval for the introduction of Slavic-language liturgy in Croatia, in the belief that the Latin rite was one of the most effective obstacles to Croatian-Serbian rapprochement. Contemporary Bulgaria affords a more radical example of the same tendency; instead of merely suppressing a liturgy, however, the regime set out to efface cultural heterogeneity at a blow. Muslims in Bulgaria were ordered to adopt Christian names and to "adapt" to Bulgarian culture. In 1980 Turkish sources claimed that tens of thousands of recalcitrant Bulgarian Muslims, including many of Turkish ethnicity, had been drugged and tortured at mental institutions for resisting Bulgarianization.⁸ The Bulgarian ruling party, like most communist parties, places a premium on homogenization: it views religious culture within this context.

Thus, if "national" churches can tangibly buttress the position of a government, they can also undermine its stability where they advocate the rights of ethnic minorities in multiethnic states. The examples of the Catholic church in Slovakia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Croatia, and Romania, of the Lutheran church in Estonia, and of the Orthodox churches of Serbia and Georgia all illustrate oppositionist politics in defense of national minorities. By contrast, the Orthodox churches of Russia, Bulgaria, and Romania and the Catholic church of Hungary have all managed to accommodate themselves to the political status quo, and church-state relations in these four instances are uni-

formly described by the authorities as good. It is worth noting that three of these countries—Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary—are ethnically essentially homogeneous, with no large national minorities.⁹

This chapter will outline the differences in the policies of European communist regimes toward the Orthodox churches, the Greek Catholic (Uniate) churches, the Roman Catholic church, and the Muslim community, and it will argue that these differences are, at least in part, explicable in terms of considerations of nationalism. The chapter will also highlight the interplay of religious policy and nationalities policy in multiethnic states and will suggest some ways in which nationalities policy, conversely, is affected by considerations of religious policy.

CHURCHES AND NATIONALISM

Religion may be understood as an interrelated set of assumptions about the nature and meaning of human existence, which are thought to have absolute validity and which are actively propagated by an institution or organized sect. Accordingly, the defense of national culture by religious organizations implies some superordinate value or right enjoyed by the nation. And because the validity of religious assumptions is usually taken as a given—beyond scrutiny—religion, like national culture, contains within itself the possibility of intolerance. At least until recently, those holding other assumptions have been generally viewed as errant and mistaken at best, as cursed and reprehensible at worst. Following Dimitry Pospelovsky, nationalism is defined here as collective affectivity focused on the cultural-linguistic group, manifested in the attribution of central importance to the national culture—including its religion—and in the aspiration to promote the national culture.¹⁰ Thus, when a religious organization becomes involved in nationalism, there is a strong tendency to “spiritualize” the concept of national destiny and to infuse the preservation of ethnic culture with intrinsic value. At its most extreme this tendency is manifested in the neotribal revival—consciously or unconsciously—of the primeval myth of the “chosen people,” a myth inextricably bound up with the concept of a historical task entrusted to the “chosen people.” Sarajevo archbishop Ivan Šarić, for instance, told Croatian nationalists and *Ustaše* sympathizers in 1936 that “God sides with the Croats,”¹¹ later adding in defense of the *Ustaše* program that it was “stupid and unworthy of Christ’s disci-

ples to think that the struggle against evil could be waged in a noble way and with gloves on."¹² More recently, in a widely advertised book published by the Serbian Orthodox church in the early 1970s, Orthodox priest Dr. Lazar Milin claimed this special place for the Serbs, associating it, however, with prolonged suffering. "The Serbian people is Christ's people," wrote Milin, adding that "the Serbian people as a whole has suffered more for the faith of Christ than many, many other peoples."¹³ Among the Poles, Stanisław Staszic (1775–1826), a Catholic priest, claimed for Poland a special civilizing mission and argued for the unification of Europe in a federation under Russian political leadership and Polish cultural guidance. Similarly, the sixteenth-century Russian monk Filofei (Philotheus) linked the fate of Christianity to the fate of Russia, which he called the Third, and last, Rome.¹⁴ This conviction of Russia's unique religiosity and special destiny would later inspire the nineteenth-century Russian Slavophiles, for whom the purity of Russian Orthodoxy constituted evidence of Russian chosenness. And finally, the pattern repeated itself in fifteenth-century (Hussite) Czechoslovakia, where, as Joseph Zacek has noted, "Catholic Europe's characterization of the Czechs as 'a nation of heretics' provoked a feeling of defensive solidarity permeated with a national religious messianism, a mystical conviction that the Czech nation was the most Christian of all and had been elected by God to revive the fallen Church."¹⁵

National-religious messianism, which links religious "orthodoxy" to a God-given national mission, appears to arise in contexts of confrontation with external foes of rival religious affiliation. The consequences of national-religious messianism are the reinforcement of the linkage between national identity and a particular religion and the compulsion of state authorities to deal with certain religious organizations as ethnic spokesmen.

SUPPRESSED GROUPS

Communist religious policy is adjusted to specific churches, and hence within any given communist country one can expect to find differences in policy, depending on which religious group is being examined. Since there are some uniformities discrete to specific confessional groups, it also becomes possible to identify patterns in communist religious

policy, across the region. Accordingly, I shall organize my discussion by religious group, rather than on a country-by-country basis.

Communist religious policy is determined by at least six important factors: (1) the size of the religious organization in question, (2) the organization's disposition to subordinate itself to political authority and its amenability to infiltration and control by the secret police, (3) the question of allegiance to a foreign authority, (4) the loyalty or disloyalty of the particular body during World War II, (5) the ethnic configuration of the respective country, and (6) the dominant political culture of the country.

What is clear from this listing is that although it will be argued here that there are general patterns differentiating communist policies toward Orthodoxy from those toward Uniates, toward Roman Catholicism, and again toward Islam, there will be some variation from country to country, as determined chiefly by factors 1, 4, 5, and 6. The Catholic church in Poland, thus, with more than 30 million adherents, is understandably less vulnerable than the Catholic church proved to be in Bulgaria, where it numbers only sixty thousand believers (less than 1 percent of the population). Again, while the Catholic church in Slovakia and the Uniate (Greek Catholic) church in Ukraine are susceptible to the charge of collaboration with the Nazis in World War II, the Catholic church in Poland was active in anti-Nazi resistance, as were many churches in Germany. Again, where the ethnic heterogeneity of the USSR and Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent of Czechoslovakia and Romania as well, increase the likelihood that ethnically based confessional groups will prove to be destabilizing factors, the relative ethnic homogeneity of Poland and Bulgaria permits the Catholic church in Poland and the Bulgarian Orthodox church to play integrative roles—even if the former has been associated with opposition to the regime, while the latter has been co-opted into a kind of “partnership.” And finally, where the political culture is both more quiescent and more anticlerical (as in the Czech lands), the church will be more vulnerable than in countries with a culture of defiance and religiosity (e.g., Poland).

In the USSR this differentiated policy is facilitated by the presence within the Council of Religious Affairs (CRA) of different departments for Orthodox, Catholic, and Islamic affairs.¹⁶ In Yugoslavia the exis-

tence of individual offices for religious affairs in each federal unit means that certain republican offices (Slovenia and Croatia) will be dealing almost exclusively with the Catholic church, while others (Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro) will be dealing chiefly with Orthodoxy.¹⁷

Uniates

To refer to Uniates and Jews as "suppressed groups" is not to deny that other religious groups in the Soviet–East European area are oppressed; but it will be argued that these groups are *more oppressed* than others. Indeed, they are virtually unique in having been targeted already in the late 1940s for suppression and institutional extirpation. Only the Catholic church in Bulgaria, the short-lived autocephalous Orthodox churches of Ukraine and Belorussia (which functioned during the 1920s and again during World War II), and all religious organizations in Albania have been so completely suppressed in communist Europe.

At the end of World War II the Greek-rite Catholic church numbered about 4 million adherents in western Ukraine, 1.57 million adherents in Romania, 320,000 adherents in eastern Slovakia, and smaller numbers of believers in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary.¹⁸ The larger churches (Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia) were targeted for suppression and forced into the Orthodox fold; Hungary's Uniate church was allowed to continue to function, however, as it presented no political threat, and Miklós Dudas, the Hungarian Uniate bishop of Hajdudorog, was even allowed to attend the Vatican II council.¹⁹ Bulgaria's 15,000 Eastern-rite Catholics (1975) and Yugoslavia's 60,000 (1980), most of whom are Ruthenes or Ukrainians, continue to enjoy toleration, though the situation of Poland's 150,000 Uniates may be fairly described as difficult. The essential feature which distinguished the Uniate churches of Ukraine, Romania, and Slovakia from other churches in communist lands including the Hungarian and Yugoslav Uniate churches (though not from the Roman Catholic church in Slovakia or, arguably, in Croatia) was their strong identification with the nationalism of their respective peoples and, in the case of Ukraine and Slovakia, with separatist projects feasible only within the framework of cooperation with the Nazis.

Created through the Union of Brest in 1596, which drew a number of hitherto Ukrainian Orthodox into union with Rome, the Uniate church had acquired standing as a national Ukrainian church by the end of

the nineteenth century, and came to play a significant role in the cultural and social development of Ukraine. The Soviets have always been especially hostile toward the Uniate church, which they have accused of promoting "the denationalization of the Ukrainian people [through] their separation from the fraternal Russian people."²⁰ Even before the war the Soviets drew up plans for the liquidation of the Ukrainian Uniate church;²¹ these plans were quickened by the addition of Galicia and White Ruthenia to the Soviet Union in 1939, which had large congregations of Uniates. As the Nazis rolled into the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet secret police rounded up a large number of Uniate priests and variously murdered them or deported them to the Soviet Far East. The Nazi occupation did not bring an end to the arrests of Uniate clergy, and the Ukrainian church hoped ultimately to establish an independent state free from both the USSR and Germany. Soviet repression of the Uniates was resumed immediately with reoccupation in 1944, and in March 1946 an orchestrated pseudosynod of the Ukrainian Uniate church, attended by 214 clergy, abrogated the Union of Brest and subordinated the church to the Russian Orthodox church.²² Since then, those Uniate clergy who have refused to be coerced into submission to a Russian Orthodox church heavily infiltrated by the KGB²³ have had to operate clandestinely, outside the law. Remarkably, under the circumstances, the Uniates managed to hold an illegal congress in Lvov in 1965, drawing delegates from all over Ukraine, as well as from Belorussia and Moldavia.

Romania was next to ban the Uniates. Although decree no. 243, issued September 18, 1948, had expressly recognized the Greek-rite Catholic church in Romania and had accorded it the right to organize two eparchies, a subsequent decree issued less than three months later (no. 358, December 1, 1948) placed the Uniate church under ban.²⁴ Its clergy were imprisoned, along with recalcitrant believers. Following the Soviet model, the authorities endeavored to replace Uniate personnel with party loyalists and then convoked a pseudocongress in Cluj on October 1, 1948, which, predictably, voted "unanimously and with great enthusiasm . . . the reentry into the bosom of the Romanian Orthodox Church," as one communist party paper put it.²⁵ Although the regime used pay incentives to attempt to bribe the Uniate clergy into cooperation, some two-thirds of Uniate priests, together with three-quarters of the Uniate believers, resisted implementation of this decision.²⁶ The

authorities responded with force, and by the end of November, even before the Uniate church was formally banned, some six hundred Uniate clergy were in Romanian jails, including Bishop Ion Suci, vicar of the Blaj metropolitan see, and Bishop Valeriu Traian Frentziu of Oradea.

As in the case of the Ukrainian Uniates, the determination and brutality with which the regime suppressed the Romanian Uniates was a reflection of the obstacle posed by that church to the Russificatory or Slavicizing dimension of Stalinization. The Romanian Greek Catholic church, which had come into being in 1698, on the strength of promises of concessions in education and elsewhere on the part of Austrian emperor Leopold II, evolved into a cultural leader in Transylvania. The Uniate clergy, remarking on the profound similarity of Romanian and Latin, began to urge that Romanian was a Latin language and traced Romanian lineage to the Roman colonization of Dacia in A.D. 106.²⁷ In the early postwar period, however, this "Latinist" theory was distinctly out of favor, as Stalin wanted the Romanian party to stress the Slavic content and Slavic origin of Romanians, and to portray Romanian as a Slavic language. Anything that drew attention to differences separating Romanians and Russians was branded "reactionary bourgeois nationalism."

Though the *Roman* Catholic church is still tolerated in Romania, its adherents are mostly Hungarians and Swabians (Germans); it was the Uniate church which had catered to ethnic Romanians (mostly of Transylvanian extraction). The suppression of the Uniates was thus aimed specifically at cutting the links between ethnic Romanians and the Vatican, between Romanian national identity and Catholicism. Romanian Communist party chief Gheorghiu-Dej's subsequent defiance of the Soviets in economic planning and the independent stance adopted by his successor, Nicolae Ceaușescu, encouraged underground Uniates to hope for change. More particularly, Ceaușescu's exuberant nationalism and his rehabilitation of the Latinist theory of Romanian ethnogenesis encouraged Uniates to press for relegalization. An early such petition was one submitted by Reverend V. Vorobchievici to Ceaușescu in 1968,²⁸ but similar petitions have continued to be presented (thirty-two by August 1977). The regime has refused to budge, however.

The Uniate church met a similar fate in Czechoslovakia, where its union with Rome was abolished by order of the state on April 28, 1950, and its adherents were pronounced Orthodox. The more than 300,000

Uniate believers of Slovakia's Prešov diocese far outnumbered the 35,000 Orthodox believers scattered across three dioceses, and when the Dubček government began to discuss various liberal reforms in 1968, some 135 Uniate clergymen organized a committee which sought and obtained the annulment of the pseudocouncil of Prešov (which had abrogated the union with Rome) and the rehabilitation of the Uniate church. Though the revival of this church excited Uniate currents in neighboring Ukraine, contributing to a renewal of Ukrainian nationalism and to the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia,²⁹ the return to the Uniate church in 1968–69 was so overwhelming and the symbiosis of religion and nationalism so potent that the authorities have been loathe to attempt a second suppression.³⁰ Despite this formal legality, the Czechoslovak Uniates have had to endure severe pressure at the hands of the authorities since 1970, and in the early 1980s Prague targeted the Slovak villages for atheization campaigns.

In the late 1940s communists in several East European countries, including Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, assumed that they would very shortly be absorbed into an expanded Soviet Union. In a typical expression of this anticipation Gustáv Husák, current president of Czechoslovakia, wrote in *Nové Slovo* (October 15, 1944):

Six years of the existence of the Slovak state have weakened the will of the Slovak nation to live in one state with the Czech nation. . . . The Slovak working masses have in recent years moved politically and nationally in the direction of the Soviet Union and the call for the incorporation of Slovakia into the Soviet Union has frequently been heard.³¹

It is conceivable that the coercion of the Uniates into Orthodoxy was designed to serve as a preparatory stage for Soviet annexation of Slovakia, in the conviction that the Orthodox church would be both less nationalist and more pliable, and thus coincided with the suppression of the Uniates in neighboring Ukraine.

Jews

Prejudice against Jews is endemic in the region. Jews, like Gypsies, have traditionally been viewed as outsiders, and anti-Semitism remains strong in the ranks of the Soviet, Polish, and other East European parties. The etymological similarity of the Russian words for peasant (*kre-*

styanin) and Christian (*khristiyanin*) already provided a preconscious bedrock for excluding the Jews from national life, and most experts concur that Judaism is far worse off than any other "legal" religious group in the USSR.³²

In Russia, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Jewish community council (the *kehillah*) was traditionally the chief body responsible for ritual baths, cemeteries, and the maintenance of the synagogue itself. In the summer of 1919 Stalin, then commissar of nationalities, decreed the abolition of the *kehillahs*. A special section of the CPSU known as the *Yevseksiia* (Jewish section) was entrusted with the task of assailing and ridiculing the Jewish clergy and religion: the section was finally abolished only in 1930. Between 1948 and 1949 all secular Jewish institutions in the USSR, including Jewish theaters, were destroyed; authorities even melted down the type in the USSR's last remaining Yiddish publishing house.³³ In the 1950s Soviet propaganda exprobrated Judaism as "the most harmful and most reactionary of all religious cults."³⁴ Traditional Slavic anti-Semitism was reinforced by the creation of Israel. Stalin had already created a "Jewish homeland" in 1934 when the town of Birobidjan, in the Soviet Far East, together with the surrounding area, was designated the Jewish Autonomous Region: this, for the Soviets, was the "solution" of the Jewish question. That few Jews migrated there and that so many have been interested in Israel have provoked Soviet doubts about the divided loyalty of Soviet Jews. In a well-known episode Stalin exiled the wife (Polina Zemschuzina) of his close colleague, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, after she had shown too much interest in Israel during conversation at a diplomatic party.

The training of rabbis is impossible in the USSR. There are no Hebrew-language publications and, since 1961, only one Yiddish periodical publication, the monthly *Sovetish haimland*. Within the Soviet Union, only the Jews and the Uniates lack legal facilities for the training of clergy. Hebrew, because of its connection with Israel, is taught only at the diplomatic schools of Leningrad and Moscow universities and otherwise is identified as the language of Zionism. Hence, in the USSR, even the newspaper of the Israeli Communist party can be purchased only in its Arabic and Yiddish editions, not in Hebrew. However, in the summer of 1987 it was reported that a new Soviet law encouraging self-employment would permit private tutoring in Hebrew.³⁵

During Khrushchev's antireligious campaign, 1959–64, large numbers of synagogues were closed, and the practice of Judaism has become all but impossible in the USSR. As in the case of the Uniates, the strong linkage of Judaism with non-Russian nationalism (in this case identification with Israel) has marked out Soviet Jews for special repression.

Anti-Semitism has also been more or less constant in Eastern Europe, playing a role in the factional infighting of the early 1950s in Czechoslovakia (the Slansky trial) and in Romania (the purge of Ana Pauker). Later, when East European elites were compelled to revise their policies in the light of Khrushchevite de-Stalinization, the Stalinist excesses were occasionally, if spuriously, blamed on the Jews. There were reports of anti-Semitic incidents in Hungary in the 1960s, including the removal of some high-ranking Jews from the party, and in Romania the regime began encouraging Jews to emigrate to Israel around 1958. Some 650 Romanian rabbis emigrated by 1970, leaving only nine behind and compelling the rabbinical seminary in Arad to close.³⁶ By late 1982 there were no more than 30,000 Jews left in Romania, out of an initial postwar population of 400,000. Hungary, with some 80,000 Jews as of 1988, is the only East European country today with a rabbinical seminary.³⁷

In Bulgaria there are fewer than 5,000 Jews left today (compared with an estimated 51,500 on the eve of the communist takeover in 1944). The only legal Jewish cultural organization is the Social Cultural-Educational Organization of Jews of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which functions under the direct surveillance of the Central Committee Propaganda Department. The organization publishes a fortnightly newspaper, *Evreyski vesti* (Jewish News), which promotes the regime's concept of the creation of "a single socialist nation," and serves as a forum for routine attacks on the state of Israel. A February 1985 plenum of the Social Cultural-Educational Organization blandly endorsed the assimilation of Bulgarian Jews into the Bulgarian nation, with not even a glimmer of dissent.³⁸

But it is Poland which has ironically demonstrated the most resilient official policy of anti-Semitism—"ironically" because as of 1982 only 8,000 Jews remained in Poland out of a prewar community of 3.5 million. In 1956 the Polish Communist party blamed "Zionists and Jews" for workers' unrest, inciting large numbers of Jews to emigrate. Twelve years later, General Mieczysław Moczar fanned the flames of an offi-

cial anti-Semitic campaign in a bid for power. More than 9,000 Polish Jews were forced from public office and the Jewish population precipitously dropped from 16,000 in 1968 to its present level. More recently, the political instability produced by Poland's economic chaos and the refusal of Polish authorities to accept the independent trade union Solidarity provided the occasion for yet another scapegoating of Polish Jews. The regime sanctioned the establishment of an overtly anti-Semitic organization known as the Grünwald Patriotic Union, speedily approved publication of a new newspaper, *Rzeczywistosc*, which has been loudly anti-Jewish, and, within a week of the declaration of martial law (December 13, 1981), launched a series of anti-Semitic broadcasts on Radio Warsaw in which the handful of remaining Polish Jews, whose average age was seventy-one, were tarnished as the chief culprits responsible for Poland's myriad of economic, political, and social problems.³⁹

The roots of anti-Semitism are complex, and anti-Semitism is no creation of communism. But the persistence of officially condoned anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and Poland, if not elsewhere, requires an explanation in terms of policy. The availability of Jews as scapegoats can only be part of the answer, since numerous other scapegoats are readily available. The traditional anti-Semitism of the Slavic world and the symbiosis of ethnic and religious identity in the case of the Jews, conveniently embodied in the pariah state of Israel, appear to provide a fuller answer. Domestically, anti-Semitism is also useful in rallying Russian nationalists of various political hues, as in buttressing traditional chauvinistic nationalism in the East European states.

CO-OPTED GROUPS

Orthodoxy

A complete enumeration of Chalcedonian Orthodox churches would include six "co-opted" churches (Russian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Polish, Czechoslovak, and, to an extent, the Georgian), four independent churches (Cypriot, Greek, Serbian, and Sinai), two schismatic churches (Macedonian [since 1967] and Croatian [1942-45]), and three suppressed churches (Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Albanian). (To these one might

add the schismatic émigré wings of the Serbian, Albanian, Belorussian, and Russian Orthodox churches, and the Orthodox church in America.)⁴⁰

The impact of nationalism on religious policy is most directly seen in the schismatic and suppressed categories. In the case of the Croatian Orthodox church, its creation by order of Croatian *poglavnik* Ante Pavelić in 1942 was designed to denationalize Croatia's Serbs and convert them into "Orthodox Croats." The establishment of the Macedonian Orthodox church in 1967 similarly enjoyed the strong endorsement of the Yugoslav communist regime, which saw in the move a validation of its claim that Macedonians are a distinct nationality group and not Bulgarians, as both the Sofia regime and the Bulgarian Orthodox church insist. As for the suppressed churches, both the Ukrainian and Belorussian autocephalous Orthodox churches compromised themselves in Soviet eyes by their linkage with nationalist and anti-Soviet currents during the war. Both the Ukrainian and Belorussian churches were actually suppressed twice by Soviet authorities—once at the end of the 1920s, when the cultural and social relaxation of the NEP (New Economic Policy) period was terminated, and again in 1944, as the Red Army reconquered the western borderlands. In the case of the Belorussian Orthodox church, some two thousand clergymen were shot or sent to concentration camps in the wake of the post-NEP retrenchment, and by 1937 the Belorussian church had been completely destroyed.⁴¹ The Albanian Orthodox church was suppressed in 1967, along with all other religious organizations in Albania, with the explanation that Orthodoxy, like Catholicism and Islam, was a foreign import and that the authentic and autochthonous Albanian *weltanschauung* was atheism—thus hypothesizing an antagonism between religion and Albanian nationalism.

Of the remaining Orthodox churches, two (the Polish and Czechoslovak) number only a few thousand adherents each and have therefore played a negligible role in their countries' politics. These, together with the Cypriot and Greek Orthodox churches, the Church of the Sinai, and the Orthodox church in America, will thus be excluded from the ensuing discussion. Those with which we shall be concerned here can be divided into two groups, based on ethnic considerations. The Russian (50 million believers in 1984), Romanian (15–17 million in 1983), and

Bulgarian (3 million in 1978) Orthodox churches are the principal confessional organizations of dominant nationality groups.⁴² By contrast, the Serbian (10 million nominal adherents in 1987)⁴³ and Georgian (5 million in 1979)⁴⁴ Orthodox churches are the principal confessional organizations of minority groups (though with 36.3 percent of the population in 1981, the Serbs constitute the largest group in multiethnic Yugoslavia).

In the Soviet Union, Romania, and Bulgaria the communist parties set out with two clear objectives: in the short run to tame and control the Orthodox churches and exploit them for their own purposes, and in the long run to destroy them altogether. In the first five years of the new revolutionary order (1917–22) the Bolsheviks executed twenty-eight Russian Orthodox bishops and 1,215 Orthodox priests.⁴⁵ The clergy were declared *déclassé* and deprived of civil rights, including even the rights to shelter and rationing (full citizenship was restored to them only in 1936). Many were imprisoned or exiled. Most of the theological schools were boarded up, and almost all religious publications were suspended. Between 1935 and 1943 there were almost no religious publications in the USSR. The number of places of worship of the Orthodox church also shriveled from a 1914 level of 54,174 to a mere five hundred on the eve of the Nazi invasion (excluding territories annexed 1939–41).⁴⁶ But in the regime's most critical hour the Russian Orthodox church now lent strong support to the war effort and even volunteered to sponsor a division to fight the invaders. At a time when Stalin embraced Russian nationalism to rally his people, the Russian Orthodox church showed that its nationalism was undiminished, even if the Soviets were in charge. The result was a truce, the resumption of church publishing activity, and a general revival of the church. Russian nationalism had revived an ailing institution.⁴⁷

More than 17,000 Orthodox churches were reopened between 1941 and the mid-1950s, church membership grew more than 50 percent, and by 1957 Russian Orthodoxy had 22,000 churches in operation. But there was no longer a foreign threat, and the armed guerrilla movements in Ukraine and Lithuania had been suppressed. In 1959 Khrushchev launched a determined antireligious campaign which, by the time he left office in 1964, had reduced the number of Orthodox churches to a mere ten thousand. His successors have continued to

whittle away at the Orthodox church, and, according to West German sources, that institution had no more than seven thousand churches left in operation by 1975. By 1986, the number had further shrunk to 6,500.⁴⁸

Even as the Soviets chipped away at the Russian Orthodox church, however, they co-opted its leadership by jailing those antagonistic toward the Soviet state, supporting those disposed to cooperation, and infiltrating the hierarchy itself with KGB agents. A secret report drafted sometime between 1975 and 1978 by V. Furov, deputy chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), set forth the CRA ideal in claiming that the CRA, itself heavily staffed by KGB operatives, effectively "controls the Synod [of the Russian Orthodox church]. The question of selection and appointment of permanent members used to be, and still is, completely in the hands of the Council."⁴⁹ This co-optive relationship provoked a backlash, in time, and since 1957 there has been an active movement of opposition within the Russian Orthodox church which finds itself at odds both with the regime and with its own hierarchy.

Despite this opposition, the Russian Orthodox church continues to be useful to the Soviet regime in at least two ways. First, the church is useful insofar as it supports Soviet foreign policy moves. The church's frequent endorsement of Soviet peace plans, its regular denunciations of the West for stimulating an arms race, and its unblushing approval of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968⁵⁰ have all been of some utility to the Kremlin. Second, the Soviet regime has for many years tried to use the Russian Orthodox Church to convince the outside world that there is freedom of religion in the USSR. The 1988 celebrations of the millenium of the Christianization of Kievan Rus, conducted amid signs of tangible liberalization, are a recent instance of this.⁵¹

The Romanian Communist party initially mimicked the Stalinist model, and mass purges decimated the Orthodox hierarchy. Three archbishops of the Romanian Orthodox church died suddenly, after expressing opposition to the policies of the communist-controlled government, and thirteen more "uncooperative" bishops and archbishops were arrested. By weeding out the anticommunists and setting up a pro-regime "Union of Democratic Priests," the party endeavored to secure the cooperation of the Orthodox hierarchy.⁵² By January 1953 some

three hundred to five hundred Orthodox priests were being held in Romanian concentration camps,⁵³ and after the death of Patriarch Nicodemus in May 1948, the party succeeded in having the ostensibly docile Justinian Marina elected to succeed him.

As a result of measures passed in 1947 and 1948, the twenty-three hundred elementary schools hitherto operated by the Romanian Orthodox church were closed, together with its twenty-four high schools, its academy of sacred music, three divinity schools, and thirteen of the fifteen theological seminaries it had operated.⁵⁴ A new campaign struck the church in the period 1958–62 when more than half of its remaining monasteries were closed, more than two thousand monks forced to take secular jobs, and about fifteen hundred clergy and lay activists arrested. Throughout this period Patriarch Justinian was careful to say the right things and to avoid giving offense to the government.

The situation of the Orthodox church in Romania began to improve in 1962, when church-state relations suddenly thawed. This thaw coincided with the blooming of Romania's independent course.⁵⁵ Hence, Romanian nationalism became indispensable to the Romanian elite in securing its position against Soviet pressure. The Romanian Orthodox church, as an intensely national body which had made great contributions to Romanian culture from the fourteenth century on, was a natural ally. The result of this second co-optation, now as ally, was that the church was able to stage a dramatic recovery. Its diocesan clergy numbered about twelve thousand in 1975, and it was, by then, already publishing eight theological reviews of high quality, including *Ortodoxia* and *Studii Teologice*.⁵⁶ Today, two Romanian Orthodox metropolitans, affiliated with the Grand National Front of Socialist Democracy, have seats in the National Assembly. Orthodox churchmen consistently support Bucharest's foreign policy, refrain from criticism of domestic policies, and, in what has evidently been most gratifying to the regime, periodically speak out on various historical debates, upholding the Romanian line against the Soviets (over Bessarabia) and the Hungarians (over Transylvania).⁵⁷

By contrast with the Russian and Romanian cases, Bulgaria's communists seem to have been content, from the start, with whittling down and controlling the Orthodox church and not to have sought its demolition. But the early postwar years were, all the same, unsettling to church hierarchs. During 1944–47 the Bulgarian Orthodox church

was deprived of jurisdiction in marriage, divorce, issuance of birth and death certificates, and other prerogatives. Catechism and church history were removed from school curricula. Antireligious propaganda was undertaken and some priests were persecuted. The years 1947–49 saw the height of the campaign to intimidate the church. Bishop Boris was assassinated; Egumenius Kalistrat, administrator of the Rila Monastery, was imprisoned; and sundry other clergy were either murdered or tried. In short order, the communists replaced all churchmen who refused to endorse the policies of the regime. Thus, Exarch Stefan, who had coauthored a book in 1948 which was considered anticommunist, was banished to a monastery in September of that year.⁵⁸

Since then, the Bulgarian Orthodox church and the Bulgarian communist party have coexisted in a closely symbiotic partnership, in which each supports the other. The party thus supported the elevation of the Bulgarian exarchate to the rank of patriarchate (in May 1953); profusely celebrated the two hundredth anniversary (in 1962) of the composition of *The Slavic-Bulgarian History* by Orthodox monk Father Paisii of Khilendar; commemorated the hundredth anniversary (in 1970) of the establishment of the Bulgarian exarchate, which it described as “a necessary step in our national-liberation revolution”;⁵⁹ and regularly celebrates May 24, the saints’ day of Saints Cyril and Methodius. At the same time the Bulgarian Orthodox church has been useful to the regime—by holding peace forums in Bulgaria and in other ways making good propaganda for church-state relations in Bulgaria. The very commemoration of the establishment of the exarchate served to recall that that exarchate (which retained its jurisdictional borders until after World War I) included not merely the territory of present-day Bulgaria but also the districts of Macedonia and Thrace. The Bulgarian Orthodox church for its own part has consistently refused to recognize either the ethnicity of the Macedonians or the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox church (the legitimacy of which depends on the distinctive ethnicity of the Macedonians) and has spoken out in defense of the Bulgarian interpretation of Macedonian history.⁶⁰

In each of these three cases co-optation has meant that Orthodox church leaders serve as surrogate spokesmen for regime foreign policy and as defenders of its internal policies. Co-optation has meant that, in contrast to other churches, the Orthodox churches have enjoyed a certain sufficiency of institutions and publications in Romania and

Bulgaria and that the Russian Orthodox church has enjoyed periods of respite and even institutional revival. In each case what the church in question has been able to offer the regime was its *nationalism*; in each case the price of co-optation was submission to a degree of control by the regime.

Developments in Yugoslavia might have followed a similar course but for two factors—the Soviet-Yugoslav rift in 1948 and the fact that the Serbs do not comprise a majority in Yugoslavia (as Russians, Romanians, and Bulgarians do in their respective countries). As a result of these two factors, the Serbian Orthodox church today enjoys independence and toleration unique among Orthodox churches in communist lands.

Initially, however, the Yugoslav communists were, if anything, more brutal toward the Orthodox clergy than their ideological bedfellows in other countries. The Partisans, according to an eyewitness, regularly made a practice of shooting down the priests in the villages they occupied.⁶¹ An official U.S. government publication estimates that some ninety-eight Serbian Orthodox priests were executed without trial in 1944–45 and that 90 percent of the Orthodox clergy were persecuted, with many being confined at Lepoglava, Stara Gradiška, Goli Otok, Sremska Mitrovica, and other concentration camps.⁶² A land reform act stripped the church of 90 percent of its lands, and government agents were dispatched to confiscate church valuables and place them in state museums. In addition, the state nationalized some 1,180 church buildings. While the Serbian Orthodox church had put out fifteen periodical publications prior to World War II, it was permitted just three by the communists, *Vesnik*, *Glasnik*, and *Misionar*—a situation that did not improve until the late 1960s. Moreover, during the entire period, 1944–64, the Serbian Orthodox church was able to publish only three liturgical/religious books and not a single theological tome.⁶³

Patriarch Gavriilo, the head of the Serbian Orthodox church, and Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, another leading Orthodox churchman, were both ill-disposed toward communism in the first place, and, their forebodings confirmed by the ensuing religious persecution, denounced the Tito regime from their exile in occupied Germany. Metropolitan Josip Cvijović, administrator of the Serbian Orthodox church from 1941 to November 1946 (when Patriarch Gavriilo finally returned to Serbia), was equally antagonistic toward the communists and, after comparing

communist rule unfavorably with the Ottoman imperium, was tortured and beaten.

This situation began to change quite soon after the Soviet-Yugoslav rift. Three considerations militated a change of policy vis-à-vis the Orthodox church: first, Tito's need to rally the people of Yugoslavia behind him to sustain his successful defiance of the Soviets; second, Tito's need to make a favorable impression in the West, to whom he now looked for economic aid, political support, and military hardware; and third, Tito's desire to enlist the support of the Serbian Orthodox church in the polemics over Macedonia which had abruptly begun with Bulgaria. Indeed, Tito now supported the Serbian Orthodox church in its quarrel with its Macedonian clergy. Rudolf Trofenik suggests that Tito continued to nurture his dream of annexing Bulgaria for a number of years and claims that it was this consideration which impelled Tito to oppose a Macedonian church schism which might alienate both the Bulgarian Orthodox church and the Bulgarian party elite.⁶⁴ Subsequently, when Tito realized that union with Bulgaria was quite out of question and when Bulgarian officials became more vocal about their belief (not voiced 1944-47) that Yugoslavia's Macedonians are simply Bulgarians, Tito reversed himself and found it useful to back Macedonian ecclesiastical autocephaly.

For its own part the Serbian Orthodox church remained strongly opposed to the communist regime until 1958 when, after the death of Patriarch Vikentije, German Djorić succeeded to the See of St. Sava. Under Patriarch German, there has been a truce of sorts, and German has since been chastised by Serbian émigré groups as "the red patriarch" or "Tito's patriarch"—charges which he firmly denied⁶⁵—but although reticent and cautious in his public statements, Patriarch German has never retreated on any fundamental points—not on his opposition to the Macedonian church, not on his belief that Serbian nationalism is legitimate and positive, not on his claims to protectorship over the interests of the Serbs in Kosovo, and not on his open dissatisfaction with the limitations on construction permits for Orthodox churches, though the latter situation has dramatically changed since late 1984.⁶⁶

The Serbian Orthodox church is a highly nationalistic church—probably more nationalistic than any other religious organization in Yugoslavia. Its clergy describes the church as a "bastion at the geographical frontier of true Orthodoxy, defending the Holy Sepulchre against the

false and barbarous Christianity of Rome," and sees itself as the most loyal advocate of Serbian interests. The clergy also has a sense of *destiny*, which is Serbian rather than Yugoslav. As one Serbian monk told me, "only Serbs and Jews have a history in which God's interference is obvious."⁶⁷

The Yugoslav regime has very little use for the nationalism of the Serbian Orthodox church, repeatedly complaining that its biweekly newspaper, *Pravoslavlje*, tends to treat Orthodoxy and Serbdom as synonymous, and has occasionally even charged that the Serbian Orthodox church has been infiltrated by Chetnik and antisocialist elements.⁶⁸ On one occasion, the Belgrade weekly magazine *NIN* even referred to the Serbian Orthodox church as one of the regime's "chief internal enemies"—a charge which elicited the reply from *Pravoslavlje*: "Lucky is the state if its greatest enemy is the Serbian Orthodox Church! In that case, it can sleep peacefully."⁶⁹

TOLERATED GROUPS

Roman Catholicism

Romanian party chief Gheorghiu-Dej expressed the sentiments of all the Stalinist elites of Eastern Europe when he identified the Catholic church, in a public statement of February 22, 1948, as one of the few institutional obstacles to communization.⁷⁰ Some of the parties, viz., the Czech,⁷¹ Yugoslav,⁷² Polish,⁷³ Hungarian,⁷⁴ Romanian,⁷⁵ and Albanian parties, tried to persuade their Catholic churches to break off ties with the Vatican and to reconstitute themselves as "national" churches. These attempts to isolate the churches, as a prelude to subjugating them, were rebuffed in all cases including in Albania, though the Albanian communist press succeeded in perpetrating the fiction that the Albanian clergy had agreed to the creation of an Albanian National Catholic church.⁷⁶ Subsequently, Catholicism was outlawed, along with other religions, in 1967, when Albania's rulers declared Albania the world's first atheist state.

Throughout the region, as World War II drew to a close, the communists proceeded with a campaign to decimate and intimidate the church. The highest prelates were sent to prison (Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński in Poland, Josef Cardinal Beran in Czechoslovakia, József Car-

dinal Mindszenty in Hungary, Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac in Yugoslavia, Archbishops Gaspër Thaçi and Vincenc Prennushi in Albania, and Bishop Vincentas Borisevičius in Lithuania), just as Archbishop Baron Eduard von der Ropp of Russia had been in 1919. Archbishop Alexander Cisar of Romania was fortunate: he was merely removed from office and forcibly retired. Monseigneur Evgenii Bosilkov of Bulgaria, on the other hand, was executed, after a show trial in 1952. Catholic priests in Lithuania, Latvia, Belorussia, and Bulgaria were sentenced and deported, and churches closed down. In every country in which the communist regimes took control after World War II, except East Germany,⁷⁷ the Catholic church lost its hospitals, its orphanages, its charitable facilities, most or all of its schools, and much of its press. In all but Hungary and Poland,⁷⁸ Catholic religious instruction in schools was banned. In Bulgaria permission to maintain higher schools of theology was granted on the condition that mandatory courses on Marxism be incorporated into their curriculum.⁷⁹ Several of the parties simultaneously offered to put the clergy on state salary, as a device to encourage ecclesiastical docility.

Catholic priests were harassed and arrested in all these countries, and murders of Catholic clergymen were reported in several of them. Clergy in Albania, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Lithuania were sentenced to hard labor in forced labor camps, the Lithuanians being deported to Soviet Central Asia for that purpose. In the case of Romania a 450-man labor brigade made up entirely of Catholic priests was detained to work on the Danube–Black Sea canal project; almost half the brigade died at the work site.⁸⁰

As of 1926, after the imprisonment and deportation of the church's highest clerics, there was not a single Roman Catholic bishop left in the USSR, and by May 1941 only two of the 1,195 churches operated by Catholic clergy in 1917 were still operating.⁸¹ After a series of imprisonments and even some executions, there were, according to one source, only about fifty Roman Catholic priests at liberty in the entire USSR by 1932.⁸² The annexation of the Baltic republics and the western Ukraine brought new Catholic populations under Soviet sovereignty, and the Kremlin quickly set about the business of imprisoning its upper clergy, closing some of its seminaries, and enrolling secret police agents in the remaining Catholic seminaries in order to infiltrate the church and destroy it from within. The subsequent post-Stalin

thaw eased church life briefly but proved to be only a tactical concession, and by 1957 the anti-Catholic pressure was resumed. Some five hundred clergy were removed from priestly work in Lithuania alone between 1944 and 1967.

In Bulgaria the jailing of the country's three Catholic bishops in 1952 and subsequent expulsion of large numbers of priests, monks, and nuns virtually obliterated the church. A 1965 source included an obituary for the Bulgarian Catholic church,⁸³ but after a visit by Bulgarian strongman Todor Zhivkov to the Vatican in the summer of 1975, church-state relations improved somewhat, and the pope was able to install two new bishops in Bulgaria, to replace two who had died in prison (one in 1952, the other in 1974).

In Albania, of the ninety-three Catholic priests active in 1945, twenty-four were murdered, thirty-five imprisoned or sentenced to hard labor, ten were missing, eleven were drafted, and three fled the country, leaving only ten by 1953. In the heat of Albania's anti-Catholic crusade, Albanian party chief Enver Hoxha denounced one of the leading figures in the Central Committee (in 1955) for not hating the Catholic clergy enough.⁸⁴

In Yugoslavia more than a third of the Catholic clergy were quickly removed from the scene. Out of a total of twenty-seven hundred Croatian priests, more than four hundred had been killed by the summer of 1946, another two hundred had fled abroad, and several hundred were in jail.⁸⁵ The same scenario repeated itself in Czechoslovakia and to a lesser extent in Hungary and Poland. In fact, in Czechoslovakia the party moved especially quickly, expropriating church property within a month of seizing power and suppressing both the Central Catholic Agency in Bratislava (the bishops' executive organ) and the League of Catholic Women by the end of the year. The Catholic church in Czechoslovakia lost its monasteries, seminaries, and theological colleges in 1950, and several bishops were either sentenced to life imprisonment or transferred to physical labor. The convents were closed and the nuns sent to labor camps, where 52.2 percent of them died, mostly of tuberculosis.⁸⁶ There, as elsewhere, a priests' association of fellow travelers was set up by the regime in order to provide a mechanism of control and in order to divide the church from within. The result in Czechoslovakia, as among the Uniates in Ukraine, was the devel-

opment of an underground ecclesiastical network which continues to endeavor to elude the authorities.

In Hungary the Catholic religious orders were banned, and several bishops were placed under house arrest. Seven of the church's thirteen seminaries were closed, and the new regime required that the church submit prospective hierarchical appointments to the State Office for the Church for approval. In the last two decades, thanks to state obstructionism and pressure, the number of priests in Hungary has dropped by two-thirds, dwindling to about 2,790 in 1982, and each successive year the number of priests declines by about fifty.⁸⁷

Only in Poland where a large and powerful Catholic church seemed inseparable from the people did the communist regime hesitate. Not until 1949 did the authorities create a "patriot priests" movement, and only in August 1949 were church-run hospitals, nursing homes, and orphanages belatedly nationalized.⁸⁸ This hesitation was the product of a combination of factors—chiefly, the initial weakness of the Polish communists (decimated by Stalin's prewar purge and dissolution), the strength of the church, and the fact that anticommunist Poles continued armed resistance against the communists for some two to three years after the war officially ended. Aside from the question of the newly acquired territories in the West, in connection with which the regime found itself sympathetic to the Polish hierarchy's efforts to have the Vatican transfer jurisdiction from the German Episcopate to the Polish, the regime viewed the church with essentially unmixed hostility. Indeed, until 1956 the regime aimed at no less than the obliteration of the church, to which end it employed a variety of means, including outright slander and the imprisonment of four bishops and Primate Wyszyński in 1953. With the accession of Władisław Gomułka to the party helm in 1956, the church's situation improved somewhat, though Gomułka was uneven and unpredictable in his religious policy.⁸⁹

In the German Democratic Republic, by contrast, where political development has been exceptional in other ways as well, the Catholic church, which claims only 1.2 million adherents out of a total population of 17 million, still maintains some forty hospitals and 167 nursing homes, freely offers religious instruction to children on church premises, publishes two weekly newspapers, and has even been able to broadcast Sunday services on state radio. With Poland's church under

considerable pressure since December 1981 (when Solidarity was suppressed),⁹⁰ the Catholic church in East Germany may well enjoy more freedom than any other Catholic church in Eastern Europe, aside from Yugoslavia.

The late 1960s—the era of *détente* and papal *Ostpolitik*—brought relief in a number of cases, reinforcing autochthonous liberalization trends that touched most of Eastern Europe in one way or another. Yet not all the East European states have experienced *religious* liberalization. Those countries in which the Catholic church finds itself distinctly oppressed in the 1980s, in Eastern Europe, are Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Albania; leaving aside ideologically fanatical Albania, all are countries in which the elites have been troubled by the presence of ethnic minorities whose interests have been championed by the church. Those countries in which the Catholic church enjoys greater security and in which the authorities show greater respect for the rights of the churches are the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia; with the exception of Yugoslavia, all are ethnically homogeneous states.⁹¹ However, where the Soviet Union is concerned, Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power has led to a series of initiatives which promise to improve the situation of believers in the country. And in June 1988, at regime prompting, Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev announced that he would open discussions with representatives of the Ukrainian Greek-Rite Catholic church about the latter's status in the USSR.

If we observe that official policy singles out the Roman Catholic church (i.e., among legal church organizations) for particular discrimination in Romania,⁹² and observe at the same time that this organization is more or less the exclusive preserve of Hungarians and Saxons, themselves the victims of a cultural Romanianization campaign, it is tempting to conclude that nationalities considerations have something to do with religious policy in Romania. One can presume that the Romanian elites are fully aware of the important role that the Catholic church has traditionally played for these people as a bulwark against denationalization.

Again, the brutal campaign launched in Czechoslovakia in 1980 specifically against the Catholic church is only partly explained by reference to Prague's fear of a "Polish model." The fact that the antichurch campaign has been especially strong in Slovakia, and that the Slo-

vak security forces had to be augmented by agents from Bohemia for the duration of the campaign, suggests that the traditional linkage of nationality and religion in Slovakia, made more potent by the 80 per cent attendance rate at Sunday mass in Slovakia, may also be a part of regime worries. It is clear that the regime remains very much concerned with relations between Slovaks and the numerically predominant Czechs.⁹³ Few Slovaks are really satisfied with their union with the Czechs, and this grudging reconciliation to what was imposed by force is no doubt shared by the Catholic clergy of Slovakia as well. It was, after all, Catholic clergy who promoted the Slovak language and Slovak consciousness in the first place, fashioning a local dialect into a national language. Autonomist sentiment remained strong among Catholic clergy in the First Czechoslovak Republic (1919–39), and the clerical Slovak People's party created by Fr. Andrej Hlinka ultimately became the vehicle for the establishment, in 1939, of a quasi-independent state of Slovakia, under Nazi protection. Although in keeping with communist hostility to all forms of nationalism the Prague regime has denigrated Msgr. Dr. Jozef Tiso, the president of Slovakia (1939–45), as a "clero-fascist" and Nazi stooge, certain church circles view him as a nationalist patriot and have sought to exculpate him.⁹⁴

In the Soviet Union as well, the Roman Catholic church, while legally *tolerated*, appears to be severely discriminated against. The Russian Orthodox church, the Evangelical church, the Baptists, the Pentecostals, and certain other denominations, for instance, all have been granted the prerogative of operating regional administrative centers; this prerogative has been withheld from both the Roman Catholics and the Jews. The situation is especially severe in Belorussia and Ukraine, where there is no local seminary and where KGB agents have attempted to infiltrate the ranks of the clergy.⁹⁵ The political logic here parallels that in the Slovak case in three important respects. First, the Soviet authorities believe that religiosity among Belorussian Catholics and Ukrainian Catholics is more "fanatical" and more "convinced" than among other groups.⁹⁶ Second, the Soviets perceive the link between nationalism and Catholicism in these areas.⁹⁷ And third, the Ukraine and Belorussia were, in Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's time, specifically "targeted" by nationalities policy formulators for speedier and more intense Russification than other regions.⁹⁸ As national churches, they

serve as bulwarks against Russification. If Ukraine and Belorussia stand at the top of the list of areas to be Russified, then the nationalistic Catholic churches of Ukraine and Belorussia require "special treatment."

The dilemma repeats itself also in Lithuania, where some 75 percent of the Lithuanian population is Catholic and where the church has reacquired its historical role of guardian of the national identity of the Lithuanians. The authorities have indicated quite openly that they view the campaign against Catholicism in Lithuania as a campaign against Lithuanian nationalism.⁹⁹ The underground *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania*, created in 1972, explained Soviet logic in this way:

By fighting religion in Lithuania, the atheists attempt to break the spirit of the Lithuanian nation, to deprive it of its spiritual values, to enslave the Lithuanians' personality and to denationalize the believing people. When Lithuanians will become atheists, start entering into mixed marriages, disparage their own Christian culture, then conditions will be achieved for them to submerge in a homogeneous mass of people who adopt Lenin's native language.¹⁰⁰

Catholic belief is Lithuanian. Atheism is Russian. To become an atheist is to draw closer to Russian/Soviet culture and to lose a vital part of the Lithuanian *Volksgeist*.

The Catholic church has been quite concretely involved in the defense of Lithuanian national identity since incorporation into the Soviet Union. During the national resistance movement, 1944–53, at least 250 of Lithuania's 1,300 Catholic clergy are said to have been actively involved in the anti-Soviet resistance, with two of them (Ylius and Lelesius) serving as brigade leaders. (In retribution, the Soviets deported about 30 percent of the priests, four bishops, and almost all monks and nuns to forced labor camps.)¹⁰¹ More recently, the *Chronicle*, which enjoys the tacit support of the Lithuanian church hierarchy, has eulogized Mindaugas Tamonis, who committed suicide in protest of Soviet occupation of Lithuania, after demanding a referendum on the reestablishment of an independent Lithuanian national state. *Chronicle* called Tamonis's protest "the cry of our generation."¹⁰² The Lithuanian Catholic church stands squarely against Soviet Russification efforts. For this

reason, as a Belorussian party organ put it, "it is not mere happenstance that Soviet Lithuania has become one of the principal centers of [communist] criticism of Catholicism."¹⁰³ Soviet authorities are deeply vexed by what they call the church's "fables about the alleged danger that is threatening Lithuanian culture,"¹⁰⁴ and determined to remove any obstacle to their nationalities policy. Thus, religious policy must be adjusted to serve the needs of nationalities policy.

The authorities regularly interfere in the operation of Lithuania's one remaining Catholic seminary. In 1980, for instance, Petras Anilionis, a CRA commissioner, disapproved admission of fourteen of thirty-six candidates accepted by the Kaunas seminary and subsequently forced the expulsion of seminarian Aloyzas Volskis on the grounds of "spreading anti-Soviet rumors among the clerics." That this charge signified Lithuanian nationalism on the part of Volskis seemed implicit in Anilionis's simultaneous attack on Radio Vatican for aiming to "convert Lithuania into a country of clerical domination and exploitation."¹⁰⁵

Various reports confirm that the election of Karol Wojtyła to the papacy in 1978 stirred Lithuanian religious consciousness and that the papal visit to Poland in 1979 both contributed to the explosion of workers' unrest the following summer and stimulated religious dissent in Lithuania. The Czechs, themselves worried about the influence that the Slavic pope was having in Slovakia, repeatedly denounced him for fostering "counter-revolution" and clericalism.¹⁰⁶ In the Soviet Union Pope John Paul II has been attacked in the Russian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian regional press. In May 1982 the Soviet literary journal *Literatura ir Menas* published an abrasive assault on the pope, charging him with supporting "religious extremism" in Lithuania and calling him "the hope of reactionaries all over the world."¹⁰⁷ For the Soviets the Catholic church is not merely a threat to their program of ideological socialization but also a threat to their policy of ethnic homogenization.

Soviet Muslims

Muslims can be found throughout Eastern Europe, including some two thousand in each Czechoslovakia and East Germany, at least two thousand in Poland, and 38,000 in Romania.¹⁰⁸ But it is in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union, which along with Albania have the largest concentrations of Muslims in the area, that Islam has become an eth-

nic, as well as a religious, question. But different nationalities considerations have resulted in widely differing policies among the three countries. In Yugoslavia, where the regime has a stake in fostering a separate Muslim ethnicity, Muslims (2 million in 1981) have enjoyed considerable freedom of action and operate eighty-five mosques in the city of Sarajevo alone (as compared with two hundred mosques in all of Soviet Central Asia). Yugoslavia's Muslims have had their own theological faculty since 1977, publish a biweekly newspaper, and, since early 1979, have been publishing as well a monthly theological journal, *Islamska misao*.

In Bulgaria, where Muslims make up around 15 percent of the population (700,000–900,000 Turks, 120,000 Pomaks, 5,000 Tatars, and 120,000 Muslim Gypsies), the regime's drive to Bulgarianize its population has dictated a very different policy toward the Muslims. A Keston College report reveals accordingly that "Muslim villages [in Bulgaria] are reported to have been pillaged, mosques and Koran schools demolished, and countless copies of the Koran burned, [while] men and women trying to remain loyal to their beliefs have been detained in camps."¹⁰⁹ Regime pressure on Bulgaria's Muslims to assimilate—Turk, Pomak, and Tatar alike—has a long history, with a 1971 Bulgarian publication explicitly describing atheization as a prerequisite to "Bulgarianization" of the Turkish, Pomak, and Tatar populations.¹¹⁰ As early as 1974 all Turkish language teaching was terminated. But in late 1984 the Bulgarian regime stepped up pressure on these peoples to assimilate. In early 1985, the longtime bilingual (Bulgarian/Turkish) newspaper *New Light* stopped publication in Turkish. Turks were ordered to adopt Bulgarian (Christian) names, and some Muslim villages were surrounded by tanks to compel "Bulgarianization."¹¹¹ By the end of 1985, Muslim culture in Bulgaria was shattered.

The Soviet Muslims enjoy a status somewhere between these two extremes. They are discouraged to practice their faith and have a grotesquely inadequate number of mosques, and they are certainly not encouraged, as Yugoslav Muslims are, to develop a sense of Muslim identity. But they are also far too numerous—44 million or 17 percent of the total Soviet population in 1979¹¹²—to be coercively assimilated in the Bulgarian style.

Imam Najmuddin of Gotzo and Sheikh Uzum Haji (who led the Daghestani revolt of 1920–21) and many leaders of the Basmachi revolt

in Central Asia (1918–29) were, like Sheikh Shamil (in the nineteenth century) and other leaders of anti-Russian revolts in the pre-Soviet era, *murshids* or *murids* of the Naqshbandi Sufi brotherhood. The Basmachi rebel movement of the 1920s reinforced Bolshevik apprehension of Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic currents and induced the Kremlin to attempt to solve its Muslim problem by depoliticizing Muslim consciousness. To accomplish this, the Soviets undertook the very opposite of what Marx had urged. Marx had considered it both natural and progressive for people to draw together into larger regional collectivities. Muslim leaders in Central Asia were overwhelmingly in favor of the creation of a unified, autonomous “Muslim” political unit, whether the basis for unification be religion or Turkic language.¹¹³ But instead, the Soviets established a series of smaller units and encouraged ethnic differentiation among the Muslim peoples. In 1919, though Muslim leaders pressed for the creation of a unified Tatar-Bashkir republic, Moscow divided the Muslims of the middle Volga into separate Tatar and Bashkir republics. Later, as Ronald Wixman notes, “although the Soviets could have created one unified *Turkestani* people, to be consolidated around the Uzbeks, who clearly dominated the region both culturally and linguistically, . . . they instead chose to create six distinct nationalities.”¹¹⁴ According to Bennigsen and Wimbush, “before the Revolution, the Tajiks were not conscious of forming a nation different from the Uzbeks, or of belonging to a specific Iranian culture.”¹¹⁵ Ethnic differentiation was the conscious goal of Soviet policymakers in Central Asia. The Soviets have encouraged ethnic identification based on language and have systematically combated ethnic identification based on religion.

Until 1941 the Soviets attempted to suppress Islam by force. With the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June of that year, however, came a reversal of policy and the legalization, in 1943, of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Although the party continues to rail against underground Muslim associations operating illegally, party policy since then has been one of toleration of “official Islam” (i.e., the officially registered Islamic institutions), combined with continued efforts at atheization.

The Soviets’ great concern here is the tangible anti-Russian strain in Central Asian Muslim nationalism. As one Soviet writer put it, the ideology of the “united Islamic nation” is “irreconcilable with true internationalism.”¹¹⁶ The difficulty is that even nonbelievers in Central

Asia are apt to identify themselves as "Muslims" and to view any assault on Islamic religious traditions as a threat to their ethnic and cultural identity. What Soviet propagandists believe they must do in order to accomplish their goals is thus to deny that their campaign against religion has anything to do with Muslim national identity (though that is the heart of the issue), to insist that their concern is only the obstacle constituted by Islam to the emancipation of women and other progressive programs,¹¹⁷ and to portray the identification of Islam with national identity as a "trick" of reactionary *ulema*.¹¹⁸ Having staked out this position, the Soviets have created commissions in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses for the introduction of new traditions and civil ceremonies (to displace religious traditions), organized atheism classes at the level of the collective throughout the region (eight thousand such centers in Kazakhstan alone), and tried to undermine various Islamic customs by tracing them to pagan origins. But various recent writings have indicated that this campaign has often been sloppily carried out and that it has made no real headway in disassociating ethnic identity and Islam, and thus in dissolving the specter of Muslim nationalism in Central Asia. The late M. G. Gapurov, then first secretary of the Turkmenistan Communist party, called in 1976 for "a stepped-up struggle against the religious psychology and especially against the Muslim cult," calling attention to the fact that "Islam, like any religion, often plays the role of 'custodian' of reactionary national customs and traditions and arouses feelings of national exclusiveness."¹¹⁹ The Soviets, on the other hand, would like to refocus national identity on language, permitting them to foster Sovietization by promoting the knowledge and use of Russian.

Efforts to detach the Central Asians from Islam have met with little success, however, and in 1987 *Pravda* declared, "We cannot simply brush aside the obvious fact that the overwhelming majority of believers were born in the Soviet period and were brought up in an atheist environment," and urged a "fundamental restructuring of the system of atheist propaganda."¹²⁰ A month after this article appeared, *Kommunist Tajikistana* admitted that the Turkmenistan state farm in Vakhsh district had come under the influence of a self-styled mullah—in fact, the brother of the local party committee's deputy secretary. As a result of the mullah's preaching, farm residents and workers had stopped listening to the state radio, watching state television, or reading state

newspapers. Religious revival was thus alienating them from Soviet society. Between January 1985 and June 1987 some 117 party members in Turkmenistan were issued warnings, and another fourteen were simply expelled from the party for participating in religious rites.¹²¹

DEVIANT CASES

The importance of the ethnic factor for religious policy is underlined by the two deviant cases in this region: the Georgian Orthodox church and the Catholic church in Hungary. The former, despite Orthodoxy's tradition of cooperation with political authority, has recently championed Georgian national rights against Soviet-Russian encroachment—behavior incongruous with co-optation. The latter, on the other hand, with no nationalist cause to champion except the persecution of Hungarians across the border in Romanian Transylvania, has, since the death of Cardinal Mindszenty, enjoyed a cooperative relationship with the regime unparalleled in Eastern Europe.

Georgian Orthodoxy

The Georgian Orthodox church, which had enjoyed autocephaly from the eighth century until 1811 and which regained de facto autocephaly in March 1917 (and de jure recognition by the Russian Orthodox church in 1943), has fared far worse under Soviet rule than has the Russian Orthodox church. For one thing, out of some twenty-five hundred Georgian Orthodox churches in operation in 1917, only about two hundred remained open in 1984.¹²² Second, Georgian Orthodox believers are unable to practise unmolested outside their republic. And third, the KGB rigged the election of the patriarch of the church in 1972, going so far as to destroy the will of his deceased predecessor, Eprem II Sidamonidze (which had endorsed Ilia Shiolashvili as his successor), and to forge a new will, thus ensuring the election of the more pliable David V Devdariani (1972–77) as patriarch.¹²³ Under Devdariani, services of the Georgian Orthodox church were increasingly being conducted in Old Church Slavonic, rather than in Georgian, and a Georgian source claimed that upon his enthronement as patriarch, Devdariani promised that he would eventually renounce the Georgian church's autocephaly.¹²⁴

But if the patriarchate seemed thus unmistakably co-opted by the

regime, the Georgian church itself was not, and the gathering movement to resist Russification of Georgia found some support within the church.¹²⁵ The corruption and moral depravity of the Georgian clergy came to public attention in the 1970s, stirring resentment, protests, and efforts to force reform upon the hierarchy. Increasingly, Georgian nationalists came to view the struggle for their church as a part of a more general effort to preserve Georgian culture. As the Georgian dissident nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia put it, "the struggle against the Georgian Church is a struggle against the Georgian language and culture. . . . Surely it must be clear that atheist propaganda today . . . fights the very idea of Georgia."¹²⁶

Ultimately, Ilia Shiolashvili, whom the Soviets had tried to keep out of office, became patriarch in 1977. Under his leadership, the Georgian church has become somewhat more assertive. In early 1980, for instance, Ilia II Shiolashvili defied both the Kremlin and the Moscow Patriarchate in signing a declaration of the World Council of Churches condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.¹²⁷ And in his Christmas message that year, the Georgian patriarch defiantly stated, "'without Christianity we would not be a distinctive nation, and we would die,' and went on to praise the Georgian language, warning his listeners that 'where language declines, so the nation falls.'"¹²⁸ Later, in August 1981, the Georgian Orthodox church held a memorial service in the Cathedral of Mtskheta, the ancient capital of Georgia, to commemorate the third anniversary of the 1978 demonstrations, when Georgians successfully forced retraction of an amendment to remove a constitutional clause designating Georgian the official language of Georgia and demanded cultural, religious, and national autonomy. More than five hundred persons (and perhaps as many as a thousand) participated in the church service, which ended with the singing of Georgian national songs.¹²⁹

Hungarian Catholicism

Hungary, where some two-thirds of the population is Catholic,¹³⁰ is an even more exceptional case, in that Cardinal László Léka (who died in July 1986) showed himself willing to come to terms with the Kádár regime. In 1964, even before Léka's accession (in 1976), the Vatican had signed an agreement with the Hungarian People's Republic accepting Budapest's demand that the state Presidential Council's consent be

required for the nomination of bishops. This was followed in 1977 by the ground-breaking visit of János Kádár, first secretary of the Hungarian party, to the Vatican for talks with Pope Paul VI. Since then, the Catholic church has been able to reestablish a full hierarchy, to operate some eight Catholic high schools, to send priests to Rome for studies, to open a Catholic Academy of Theology in Budapest, and, in 1986, to establish a new order of nuns, the Sisters of Our Lady of Hungary. In return for these concessions, the church has been compliant and has kept a low profile. Some charge that the Hungarian church has been co-opted on the model of the Orthodox churches—an exaggeration that nonetheless highlights the distinctive relationship established in Hungary.¹³¹ Three elements have made this *modus vivendi* possible: papal *Ostpolitik* under Paul VI, Kádár's brand of liberalization, and Hungary's ethnic homogeneity, which relieves the church of the necessity of defending imperiled minorities. However, the price of this *modus vivendi* for the church has been high. In particular, the church in time adopted the practice of promoting and honoring those priests who would advance the interests of the state, even if at the expense of the church.¹³²

Lekai's successor as primate of Hungary is Archbishop László Paskai, the former coadjutor archbishop of Kalocsa and head of the "peace priests" organization, *Opus Pacis*. In the latter capacity, Paskai had earned the government's trust by mobilizing the clergy's support for the foreign policy of the Warsaw Pact. Within months of his elevation to the primacy, Paskai issued a statement deploring the oppression of the Hungarian minority in Romania.¹³³ Imre Miklós, chairman of the State Office for Church Affairs, praised Paskai for this statement; ecclesiastical nationalism here was fully in tune with Budapest's new policy of being more critical of Romanian treatment of its ethnic Hungarians. Shortly thereafter, in June 1987, Rezso Banyasz, chairman of the Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers, congratulated journalists of the religious press for being even more supportive of government policy than those of the secular press and reminded them that all Hungarian journalists "are expected to represent and explain the standpoint of the party and the measures the government is taking; they should propagate experiences that are favorable and take us ahead, argue with wrong points and faint-heartedness, and criticize [any] practice which is in opposition to party policy."¹³⁴

RELIGIOUS POLICY AND NATIONALITIES POLICY

For Marxists, religious policy and nationalities policy are parts of an organic whole and neither should be thought to be autonomous or independently elaborated. There is a considerable area in which they overlap, in which issues and problems arising in the one sphere have consequences in the other, in which policies undertaken at one level can yield a payoff at the other. Moreover, in the communist view, both are but aspects of the process of the formation of the "new man," and hence, for communism, the "resolution" of the religious "question" (i.e., the liquidation of religion) is "closely linked" with the "resolution" of the national "question" (i.e., with ethnic homogenization).¹³⁵ This chapter has been concerned specifically with delineating the way in which nationalities considerations affect religious policy and identifying broad patterns in this policy linkage in the region.

The conjunction of religious and national culture is a particular prism through which the past may be refracted into the present. As such, the religious figures of the past offer possibilities for reinterpretation by either church or state, and reintegration into present consciousness on a new basis. Sofia's glorification of Fr. Paisii has already been mentioned. Likewise, one might mention the attempt by the Czechoslovak regime to reinterpret St. Methodius in terms of his contribution to "cultural" life and state-building. For *Rolnicky noviny*, for example, "the Cyril-Methodius tradition represents a significant cultural-historical fact in the cultural history of the Slav peoples. However, it can fulfill its socially progressive function only if it is cleansed of the sediments of pseudohistoric and unscientific deliberate misinterpretations."¹³⁶

Similarly, the East German regime's rehabilitation of Martin Luther illustrates continued communist interest in the religious past.¹³⁷ Not only could Luther's rehabilitation play its role in the regime's recent reclaiming of its German past—and thus of its Germanness—but it could also provide a kind of historical anchor for present policy insofar as Luther could be portrayed as "the initiator of a great revolutionary movement," suggesting that he was a kind of forerunner to socialism.¹³⁸ Further, the rehabilitation of Luther also plays a role in the regime's strategy vis-à-vis the independent peace movement. That movement, which has to some extent been nurtured and sustained by

the Evangelical-Lutheran church's annual "Peace Decades" each November, has in fact been engaged in a project of redefining German identity: if pacifism can become a "national task," then the nation can overcome the guilt of militarism which is rooted above all in the Nazi epoch.¹³⁹ East and West German pacifists have even talked of reunification and the creation of a new *Heimatsgefühl*, ending the postwar "hostage consciousness."¹⁴⁰ The East German regime now plays its new "nationalist" card against this pacifism and insists that "on the question of peace, Martin Luther always adopted a militant partisan position. Neutralism or pacifism were foreign to him. He called the danger to and the opponents of peace by name and placed them in the dock of public opinion."¹⁴¹ Nor is Luther the only religious figure available for reinterpretation: the sixteenth-century religious reformer Thomas Müntzer is now warmly remembered for his calls for the "radical and total restructuring of society."¹⁴² In this way both Luther and Müntzer are reinterpreted as forerunners of SED rule and thus as part of a distinctly *East German* history.

Earlier in this chapter I identified six factors affecting communist religious policy. The first mentioned, the size of the religious organization in question, insofar as size translates into power of resistance, quite simply provides a kind of insurance against suppression; hence, while the Bulgarian Muslims are being subjected to forcible Bulgarianization, a similar policy in the USSR is obviously ruled out. The religious organization's disposition to subordinate itself to political authority and its amenability to infiltration and control by the authorities (factor 2) define the broad patterns of church-state interaction. In practice, Orthodox churches have been far more amenable to infiltration and far more disposed to subordination than Catholic churches, though the fiery Serbian Orthodox church, which in the interwar period had exercised considerable influence over state policy,¹⁴³ remains an important exception. This is the explanation for the fact that Orthodoxy has proven more apt to serve as an *instrument* of nationalities policy than has Catholicism. In other cases (Judaism, Islam), the identification of religion and nationalism, of cult and culture, is so close that except where the collective identity thus produced has been viewed with favor (as in the case of the Yugoslav Muslims), the religious institutions have been viewed as impediments to socialist construction and, depending on the size of the community, subjected to one degree or another of

persecution. Allegiance to a foreign authority (factor 3) arises principally in connection with the Roman Catholic church and, as a guarantee of institutional autonomy, reinforces differences already outlined in factor 2. Such allegiance is automatically viewed as anathema by the Soviets and their East European imitators.

Disloyalty and support of secession and of armed resistance to re-incorporation (factor 4) connect a religious body directly to secessionist nationalism. The Ukrainian Uniates and the Roman Catholic church in Lithuania have suffered the most as a result of their wartime nationalism, and the cooperation of some of the Franciscans with the *Ustaše* in war-torn Yugoslavia has since been cited as a basis for charging virtually the entire Croatian Catholic church with wartime collaboration with the Axis. The Ukrainian Orthodox and Belorussian Orthodox churches certainly cooperated with the Nazis. But these two churches, like the Ukrainian Uniate Catholic church, cooperated with the Nazis *because* they had been persecuted by the Soviets, rather than the other way around.

Again, the ethnic configuration of each given country (factor 5) affects the religious policy which is apt to be adopted. Communist elites of ethnically homogeneous states can embrace the church leaders of the past as national heroes (e.g., Martin Luther in the GDR and Fr. Paisii in Bulgaria) and find it useful to do so to reinforce national pride, communal solidarity, and "socialist patriotism." Communist elites in multiethnic states are faced with a very different situation, and vaunting religious leaders of the dominant group could prove dangerous by inciting religious organizations of minority groups to revive their own religious leaders of the past, thus stirring up ecclesiastical involvement in nationalist politics—the very thing elites in multiethnic societies want most to avoid.

Finally, the political culture of a country (factor 6) has a direct impact on popular attitudes and behavioral responses to activities and policies of either church or state. An ever-evolving blend of past historical memory and new influences, political culture is the sum total of popular beliefs about politics and society and may affect attitudes toward pacifism (the East German case being illustrative), ecclesiastical co-optation, and the role of the church in relation to national culture. The presence and degree of religio-national symbiosis is likewise an aspect of the political culture.

While multiethnic societies are not *necessarily* unstable, illegitimate regimes in multiethnic states *are*, because the illegitimacy of their rule reinforces the natural desire of peoples to live apart from those of other languages, religions, and cultures (what is sometimes called the "right of self-determination"). Religious organizations, as vestigial political organizations, are by nature disposed to involve themselves in politics. Indeed, a Serbian monk confessed to me that when it comes to being "satisfied" with the religious situation in Yugoslavia, the church would only be "fully satisfied" if it *ran* the state, if it reestablished the theocracy.¹⁴⁴ Religious organizations thus constitute, insofar as they manifest themselves as guardians of particular peoples, a particularly acute threat to communist regimes in multiethnic states. One might even put this conclusion in propositional form and suggest that the greater the ethnic heterogeneity of a society, the more threatening the nationally linked religious organizations of minority groups will be to illegitimate regimes.¹⁴⁵

The Historical Role of Religious Institutions in Eastern Europe and Their Place in the Communist Party-State

Peter F. Sugar

According to Karl Marx, religion "is the 'opium of the people,' because it holds out hopes of an illusory happiness and thereby diverts them from the struggle for their real happiness."¹ Happiness in this life is achievable and superior to the "illusory" happiness in the afterlife. I doubt very much that this issue of real happiness bothers any communist, let alone the leaders of the various ruling communist parties in Eastern Europe today. Bothered by the "materialism" and "hooliganism" in their societies, especially among the younger generations, they would certainly have no objections if these people lived in accordance with principles like those stipulated by the Ten Commandments. Christ's command, love thy neighbor as thyself, was repeated although in different words by the communists' principle, from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. There is no reason why a follower of any of the monotheistic creeds could not live in accordance with its commands, hoping to save his or her soul and, at the same time, be a model member of a communist society.

Feuerbach and all those who followed him, including Marx, Engels, and their disciples, were atheists on philosophical grounds in a world which, until 1917, did not force them to test their principles in the "real world." By that time they had a tradition and a vast literature which they could quote or misquote, interpret or misinterpret, in their efforts to make themselves masters of states in which they achieved supremacy irrespective of the manner in which they came to power. It was, therefore, the easiest to base action on this material and, among other things, turn atheism into something like the religion of the communist state.

Atheism, a denial of the existence of God, is not what interests communist regimes. They are not even antireligion or anticlerical when practical considerations supplant theoretical ones, as they do when the parties become governing parties; what they are under these circumstances is antichurch. This statement requires some clarification.

Religion has several explanations in our dictionaries. The one I have in mind, "one of the systems of faith and worship,"² demands more from a religious person than simply a belief in God or gods; it demands an intelligent and deep understanding of the basic tenets, the dogmas, on which faith rests and, equally important, the proper interpretation of the services. A true Christian must not only accept on faith but understand the dogmas of Virgin Birth, the nature of the Trinity, etc., and the meaning of transubstantiation and other aspects of the services. To be truly religious, in this sense, demands not only faith but a certain insight of which relatively few people are capable and which religious instruction and catechism classes alone cannot provide. Without this understanding, religion becomes folk religion, a combination of half-understood or misunderstood tenets and practices, local traditions, and even superstitions, and—at least in some cases—the survival of premonotheistic traditions survive. Folk religion is based on the fear of God's anger and on the hope of eternal life in paradise; it has little to do with the true understanding of the essence of any given religion to which its practioners theoretically belong. The great peasant masses of Eastern Europe lived out their spiritual lives on this level. It presented no real danger to anybody or to communism, because by its very nature it is adaptable to local circumstances and demands. An intelligent communist would not and could not be afraid of it.

Anticlericalism is much older than Voltaire's famous battle cry, *Écrasez l'infâme!* The infamous thing which Voltaire attacked was in part folk religion, "bigotry, intolerance and superstition," but it was mainly what he saw as upholding these horrible things: "the power of the organized clergy."³ The power of the organized clergy that challenged the state, forcing the emperor Henry IV to go to Canossa in 1077, that dominated education and publishing in Voltaire's day, and that, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, brought the emergence of Christian Socialism and numerous other political parties was always resented by the laity. Bismarck based his entire Kulturkampf on the

assumption that the Center party would obey the orders of the pope and not those of the emperor.

Where were the limits of the clergy's legitimate concern? Did they use their influence over the faithful, people whose understanding seldom went beyond the described folk religious level, and the strength which their organization gave them to become dominant in fields which had nothing to do with their legitimate concern, the saving of the souls? What was, for that matter, the limit of anybody's legitimate activity? The ancient Romans already gave their answer: *ne sutor supra crepidam*.⁴ Clearly the clergy went too far for the liking of modern political man, who invented the principle of the separation of church and state. This is the answer to successful anticlericalism; it defines the role of the priest, minister, rabbi, etc., as the old Romans defined the shoemaker's. In this sense the communists are anticlerical too, but not more so than numerous other political parties were and are.

Any religion claims to have "the truth" and, therefore, to be able to tell those who are willing to listen how to live on this earth to earn or hopefully be predestined to eternal happiness in the thereafter. This "truth" is absolute and demands the undivided loyalty of those who accept it. What Bismarck asked from members of the Center party was not undivided loyalty to emperor and state; he asked that they give to Caesar what belonged to him, and he was quite willing to allow them to give to God what was his. The Second Reich was not totalitarian in the sense that it demanded the undivided, total devotion of its citizens. The communist party and any state in which it gains power is totalitarian in this sense. The party's "truth" demands undivided loyalty. This is the reason for its antichurch stand irrespective of which church is involved. Party, state (dominated by the party), and church are *institutions* claiming total loyalty and, therefore, they are inevitably in conflict. The church does not ask, Are you truly religious or do you follow a version of folk religion? It simply says, You are officially a member of this church, you must give it your undivided loyalty unless you want to end up in hell, purgatory, limbo, or some other similarly pleasant place. The party does not ask, Do you understand and believe in what is today the officially sanctioned version of Marxism (Marxism-Leninism, communism, bolshevism, etc.)? It simply says, Unless you cooperate with us you are an outlaw and must suffer the consequences. The problem is that nobody can owe undivided loyalty simultaneously

to two institutions. Probably most people would like to owe such loyalty to nobody, but this is an alternative unacceptable to those who make claims on their devotion.

As far as successful communist parties are concerned, they can tolerate no organization or institution that might possibly offer an alternative focus of loyalty—even if it were not the primary one—in the countries in which they govern. Other institutions must either be eliminated altogether, as were the Boy Scouts, or they must be transformed and absorbed by the party apparatus in a manner for which the German National Socialists invented a perfect term: *Gleichschaltung*. Only the Albanians claim to have abolished religion, meaning that they have abolished all religious organizations, institutions, and manifestations, and even their claim must be questioned when taken literally. True believers in Albania are still true believers. The other East European communist regimes recognize that the various churches could neither be eliminated by fiat nor be *gleichgeschaltet* and must, therefore, be constantly watched and disciplined.⁵

In Eastern Europe at present the party is the institution that has enough power to enforce its will, threatening the very existence of all other institutions, and the church is the one resisting *Gleichschaltung*, asking this modern political shoemaker to stick to his last. The church—irrespective of which one it is—has to strive, before anything else, to safeguard its existence, dogmatic base and unity, contact with the believers, and the freedom of those functions that make this contact possible and meaningful. Only if it is able to achieve this primary function can the church get interested in protecting other principles and rights in which its members and the population at large might be interested. When it tries to do this, any church acts in a manner which the communist party will consider an intervention into affairs which are none of the church's business. The churches are not the only institutions or organizations capable of challenging the party-state in this manner—Solidarity played this role in Poland for sixteen months in 1980–81—but they have been the most important ones in Eastern Europe since World War II. Their roles and effectiveness vary greatly. Historical development is one of the factors which account for this difference, and the following pages of this chapter will be devoted to a summary overview of the churches' place in East European society.

ORTHODOXY

Nationalism is the tradition or ideology which created the greatest difficulties for the novel and internationalist creed which the communists tried to introduce into Eastern Europe. It would be a logical expectation to see the various Eastern Orthodox churches in the forefront of nation-centered resistance to communism, with Roman Catholicism and the various Protestant churches playing a less important role. While the final break between the Eastern and Western church occurred in 1054, the developments which separated the two were much older and, besides theological differences, rested on church-state relations which were very different. At the famous and important Council of Nicaea, in 325, Emperor Constantine I (305-37) played an important role and laid the basis for his successors' dominance of the Eastern church. He was a strong and effective ruler who deserved being called the Great by historians. At the same time the rulers of the West were weak. When, in 452, the Huns of Attila neared Rome, the defense was not organized by Emperor Valentinian III (425-54), but by Pope Leo I (the Great) (440-61). In the East the emperor protected the church, in the West the pope protected the emperor. The Attila episode can be placed in the broader context of the centuries-long Great Migration of People (*Völkerwanderung*). It sapped the strength of the Western Roman Empire, which gradually lost its provinces and then even Italy to the newcomers before the Herulian king, Odoacer, deposed the last emperor in 476, leaving only the church as a universal institution in Europe outside the borders of the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire. The Western (Roman Catholic) church did not give up its claim to supremacy and universality even after Pope Leo III (795-816) crowned the king of the Franks, Charles the Great (771-814), emperor in 800. Because of this universalist claim that never recognized national differences or boundaries, it is rather surprising that the Catholic church became the "most nationalistic" of churches in states under communist rule; the Protestants and Orthodox were—in theory—better suited to play this role.

The Byzantine emperors not only increased the influence which Constantine the Great established over the church, but they were much more successful in dealing with the various new elements streaming into Europe from Asia. They either defended their borders success-

fully or allowed the wandering people—in their case mainly the future southern Slavs—to settle in their domain as their subjects or vassals. The first major influence that changed the life of the new arrivals was Christianity. By the end of the tenth century most Serbs had become Eastern Christians, while the Bulgarians date their conversion from even earlier, the end of the ninth century. The Croats lived outside Byzantium and, therefore, became Western Christians.⁶ What these people saw was a powerful ruler who was also master of his church. Thus, when they attempted to break away from Byzantium, they not only called their rulers emperor (tsar), but to prove their might and independence established national churches. The first Bulgarian tsar, Simeon (893–927), assumed this title in 924 and to justify it changed the title of the head of the Bulgarian church from archbishop to patriarch (Preslav patriarchate). At the same time Ohrid (in Yugoslavia today) became an important center of Bulgarian culture. This city became the site of the second Bulgarian patriarchate in 1232 during the reign of Ivan Assen II (1218–41).⁷ These two patriarchates are the prime indicators that under Simeon and Ivan Assen the Bulgarians had important, independent states of their own. The story of the Serb Orthodox church is also closely connected with Serbia's most glorious moments in the late Middle Ages. Stefan Nemanja I (1168–96) established a strong, united state, and his son, Stefan Nemanja II (1196–1223), completed his work. The brother of the latter, Saint Sava, became the head of the Serbian church with a traditional center at Peć (Ipek).⁸ The somewhat similar relationship between Muscovite (later Russian) rulers and the church is well known.

The Byzantine (Greek), Bulgarian, and Serbian lands were gradually absorbed into the Ottoman Empire between 1354 and 1453. The religious institutions of these people also had to adjust to the dictates of the new political masters. After several steps taken by earlier sultans, the full-fledged "Ottoman system" emerged after 1453 when Mehmed II (the Conqueror) (1444–46; 1451–81) gave it its final form.⁹ He followed, in many ways, the Byzantine model, considering himself the new emperor whose capital city he had just conquered. Not bound by Christian tenets, dogmas, customs, and traditions, it was even easier for him than it had been for the rulers of Eastern Rome to consider clergymen who were inferior to himself to be members of a branch of government. His Muslim worldview forced him, in a sense at least, to pay attention to

the clergy, religious "functionaries" whom he had to recognize and respect following the Prophet's dictum, while he not only could disregard but also strove to eliminate lay officeholders and hereditary masters, who could lead the various conquered people against him.¹⁰ The resulting *millet* system recognized no nationality, only differences between the sultan's subjects along religious lines. One of these *millets* was the Orthodox whose head, the patriarch of Constantinople (Istanbul), whom the sultans considered to be an administrative functionary, was responsible to them for the good behavior of all Orthodox.¹¹

This well-known development in the life of the Balkan Christians reinforced the already established rank order—emperor (sultan) followed by the patriarch. The *millet* system did not differentiate between ethnic groups; it recognized only Orthodox people who had to obey one religious leader, whose powers went way beyond the traditional and the purely religious. A stronger institution emerged that was clearly acting in the name of the state.

Unity of dogma, organizations, and even ceremony are basic considerations for ecclesiastic leaders at the best of times and even more so when the lay authority to which they owe allegiance is of a different faith. The patriarchs of Constantinople always resented the establishment of other patriarchates by the Balkan peoples and in the name of safeguarding church and faith used the power given to them by the *millet* system to recentralize the Orthodox church, eliminating even the usage of Church Slavonic in the services.¹² The church became "Greek" to the point that modern Serb, as well as Bulgarian, historians speak of the double "Ottoman-Greek yoke." The reemergence of the independent Balkan states was either followed by the establishment of their own "national" churches (Serbia) or followed the reestablishment of independent ecclesiastical institutions (Bulgaria).¹³ Clearly, this Greek-dominated establishment did not lend itself to "nationalistic" movements by Slavs. That some of the early nationalists were clergymen is understandable because one had to be literate to become familiar with new ideas.¹⁴ The Greeks also established their own national church as soon as they gained their independence because Constantinople remained subject to a foreign ruler. These new Balkan Orthodox churches became what they had been prior to the arrival of the Ottomans—state institutions.

The Romanian story reflects this "eastern tradition," although the

Romanians were neither Slavs nor subjects of Byzantium. They retained their internal independence as vassals of the Ottomans. The formation of the Wallachian state is usually dated from the reign of Basarab (ca. 1330–52) and that of Moldavia from roughly the same time, when King Lajos I (the Great) of Hungary (1342–82) liberated the territory of the future state from the Mongols' rule and established a march district there.¹⁵ Following the by then well-established practice of Orthodox rulers, the princes of these states organized their own churches. More interesting is the story of Transylvania. In this multinational region, under Hungarian rule since the early tenth century, Hungarians, Germans known as Saxons, and Székelys were "political nations" with full and equal rights. The Orthodox faith was not "recognized" but only tolerated, and its followers had no freedoms. In Transylvania, the Uniate church was formally established by the Act of Union of 1698.¹⁶ Orthodox clergymen who joined the new church became the most privileged and best educated Romanians of Transylvania and, by the eighteenth century, the main spokesmen demanding equal treatment for their conationals. The Orthodox, still the majority of Transylvania's Romanians, had to do something to produce a "national church" of their own, independent from the Serb-dominated archbishopric of S. Karlovci. This they achieved in 1865. There were now "two Romanian national churches" working for the equality of Romanians in the Habsburg Empire and after 1867 in Hungary.

Just as the Constantinople patriarchate was considered the "Greek church," so all other Orthodox establishments were "national churches." Ironically, this very fact made them relatively ineffective as centers of national (or any other) opposition to communism. They were considered to be institutions of the "ruling establishment" of which they were a part. This view was not simply something "taken for granted," but—with few notable exceptions prior to and since the communist takeover—corresponded to reality. While the Bolsheviks in Russia were much too weak and preoccupied with other affairs when the Russian patriarchate, in abeyance since 1700, was reestablished on October 30, 1917, they did not abolish it subsequently but tried to make it, once again, a governmental institution. After World War II the successful East European communists did the same in Orthodox lands.

The only seeming contradiction, the popularity of the Orthodox church in Macedonia, does not negate but rather confirms the evalua-

tion presented. Macedonia, a republic in the Yugoslav Federation, the first Macedonian state in modern times, had to ward off both Bulgarian and Serb claims and propaganda after Tito established it at the end of World War II. In the roughly twenty years that followed, something like a true Macedonian self-identity developed in this republic whose citizens must have looked at the establishment of the Macedonian Orthodox church in 1967 as a confirmation and legitimation of their existence as a separate nation. Now they too had their national church, although this should not have been important to them, as true communists.

The populations of countries with Orthodox majorities have become accustomed to equating the "national church" with the "church of the establishment." When the establishment fell into communist and thus theoretically antireligious hands, the Orthodox clergy, with few notable exceptions, did not know how to act as members of a nonestablishment institution and did not take the stance that would have made them the leaders of national resistance to either communist internationalism or Soviet domination.

ROMAN CATHOLICISM

The Roman Catholic prelates were even more a part of the establishment than were their Orthodox colleagues. Anybody even vaguely familiar with the role the clergy played during the Middle Ages and the early modern period anywhere in Catholic and later Catholic/Protestant Europe knows this too well to require any argument. The archbishop of Esztergom was not only the primate of the church in Hungary, but also was entitled to the rank of prince and the position of first baron (*zászlósúr*) of the realm. The position of the primate in Poland, the archbishop of Gniezno (later Gniezno/Warsaw) was comparable. Both states considered themselves the *regnum marianum* and the savior of western Christendom, facing the Orthodox and the Muslims threatening from the East. While the position of the church was seriously challenged during the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation was successful in both states and reestablished the eminent position of the Catholic church. The clergy's role in administration and politics was always of primary importance.¹⁷ Therefore, the most important bishoprics, if not all of them, were usually entrusted to those segments of the

aristocracy that those in power favored whenever a given see became vacant. When the role and importance of the church in the history of these two countries is considered, the conclusion cannot be avoided that they were an integral part of the establishment; but at the same time it should be remembered that the church always stressed its supra-nationality and universality and strongly resisted any attempt aiming to create national Catholic churches.

The situation in Croatia comes closest to that in Poland and Hungary. This is the case not only because of the long period during which Croatia was a land of St. Stephen's Crown—although not an integral part of Hungary—worn for some four hundred years by the members of the House of Habsburg, but also because most of those heading its most important dioceses (Split, Zagreb, and later also Djakovo) were aristocrats and very active in politics. It is, therefore, of some interest to compare the position of these three churches in their respective lands in their communist period.

Without any doubt, the Polish Catholic church offered the most formidable opposition to a communist government anywhere since 1945. This has several reasons, but the historical is the one that is discussed in this chapter. It was after the partitions that the Polish church became the symbol of Polishness in the eyes of practically all Poles. Massive Russification following the uprising in 1832 practically eliminated all Polish institutions and made Russian dominance of public life in the Russian areas practically universal. What was left was the Catholic church. It became the symbol of Polishness and Polish resistance, with every move taken by St. Petersburg to weaken it interpreted as a further attempt to eradicate the Polish nation from the face of the earth. After the insurrection of 1863 the situation became even worse. The establishment of an Orthodox archbishopric in Warsaw and the transfer of the Roman Catholic seminary to St. Petersburg were deeply resented by everybody, not only the clergy. Under these circumstances, being a Catholic was not only a religious but also a nationalistic "duty."

The Catholic church became the symbol of Polishness in Prussian held lands also. Here the "enemy" was not Orthodox but Lutheran. This was made obvious to the Poles by Bismarck's Kulturkampf. This "struggle" was political not religious in essence, and while it could be considered anti-Catholic it was certainly not anti-Polish. Yet, having watched the events in Russian Poland, by the 1870s the Poles saw in

every anti-Catholic move an anti-Polish one. The church was, here too, the persecuted victim of anti-Polish sentiments and thus the living symbol of Polishness.

In the Austrian part of Poland, Catholicism was not persecuted. The growing liberalism of the Austrians, especially after 1867, made possible the growth of Jewish emancipation and the emergence of Ukrainian nationalism (often associated with the Uniate church), two manifestations which threatened the Polishness of the Galician lands. Again, the Roman Catholic church emerged as the bulwark of pure Polishness. To these local developments must be added another, very important fact. After the Third Partition, the only Polish institution that remained intact and could unite all Poles was the church, despite its universalist claim. If for no other reason than this, it had to develop into the national symbol which it had become by 1918 when Poland was reborn as a united state.¹⁸ After the Fourth Partition, in 1939, the Catholic church was, once again, the only surviving "Polish" institution and quickly reverted to the role which it ceased to play only some twenty years earlier. It continued to see itself in this light once the hostilities ended in 1945, and many Poles agreed with this assumption. Thus the Polish Catholic church had a strong historical base on which it could base its struggle and the Poles a long-established symbol of resistance.

The Croatian Catholic church has to be ranked in second place should anybody try to rank Catholic churches in terms of effectiveness as national symbols. Here the long-term historical factors are less important than they were in the Polish case, but the shorter-range events play a more important role. In Croatia Catholicism became important after the modern ideology of nationalism made its entry into the Balkans and, especially, after the Illyrian movement set in motion the Yugoslav movement.¹⁹ In a united southern Slav political unit (irrespective of its location in or outside the Habsburg domain) Catholics were in the minority. Catholicism, as both a religion and a cultural orientation, differentiated Croat and Slovene from the Orthodox, mainly Serb, brethren. Croatianism became equated with Catholicism. True enough, the Slovenes were Catholics too, but they did not have the long history of independence and political activity which the Croats had, and when they entered politics, in the second half of the nineteenth century, their parties were clerical and, thus, usually pro-Habsburg. This left the Croats to carry the national/religious banner both before and

after the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later renamed Yugoslavia. A Serbo-Croat-speaking Catholic is still automatically considered to be a Croat, and the Croats have still not settled their differences with the Serbs. Yet the Catholic church plays a less important role as a symbol and institution of resistance here than in Poland. I believe that two major factors account for this. First, the great nineteenth-century leaders of the church, including bishops Josip Stadler (1843–1918) and especially Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815–1905), were not followed by similarly outstanding people with true leadership quality in the interwar period. Second, the role of the Catholic church, or at least some of its priests, during World War II made the position of this institution as a Croat—and not *Ustaše*—symbol somewhat questionable. Consequently, the church was forced on the defensive for too long to be able to play a leadership role.

The fact that the Hungarian Catholic church is the least prominent today of the three churches being compared has its historical reason too. Three important events took place almost simultaneously in Hungarian history. The great defeat of Mohács and the beginning of uninterrupted Habsburg rule both occurred in 1526, and the beginning of the Reformation in the country came soon thereafter. It should also be remembered that from 1526—when a Habsburg and a non-Habsburg were both elected as king—until 1699, the Hungarian nobility, the politically important segment of the population, had a choice: they could support the ruler in Vienna or the one in Cluj (Koložsvár, Klausenburg)—the successor of the second king elected in 1526, the prince of Transylvania. The nobility, therefore, had a choice, something which nobles elsewhere did not have.

Two of the major goals of the Habsburgs were the creation of a centralized empire and the support of the Counter-Reformation. Therefore, in the mind of the Hungarian nobility, Catholicism and the elimination of Hungary's special status within the Habsburg domain became two undistinguishable entities associated with Habsburg, that is, "foreign" rule. When they adopted and fought for the principle of religious equality and freedom, they fought the Habsburg-supported Roman Catholic church and, most importantly, they fought for the rights and privileges of their country, that is, their estates. This is why both before and after 1699, princes of Transylvania, even those who were Catholics themselves, fought for the rights of Protestants as an impor-

tant part of the national liberties which they wanted to safeguard.²⁰ In this manner protonationalism became identified with anti-Habsburg sentiments and a distrust of the Habsburg-protected and, therefore, Habsburg-loyal Catholic church. This opposition centered east of the Tisza river, where the largest city, Debrecen, became known as the Calvinist Rome. The Reformed church became the symbol of opposition and of national independence because the nobility of eastern Hungary, and to some extent Transylvania, followed it.

Today there are far too few members of the Reformed church in Hungary to make it the institution that can challenge the supremacy of the Communist party. The Catholic church was always the establishment church, even after the Habsburgs had to relinquish the throne of Hungary after World War I, and the role played by Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty (1892–1975), especially after 1956, certainly did nothing to change the population's image of its role in society.

Czechoslovakia is the one remaining country in which the overwhelming majority of the population is, at least nominally, Roman Catholic. The masters of Prague certainly do their best to make the activities of the Catholic church as difficult as possible, and Josef Cardinal Beran (1889–1969) more than earned his reputation as the defender of his church and human rights. Yet, the Czech nation does not look at the Catholic church as the institution that symbolizes its historical or present identity. The most glorious days in Czech history are connected with the Hussite-Táborite period.²¹ This fifteenth-century movement was not only a forerunner of the Reformation but also a true social revolution at the same time. It was defeated after a long struggle, as was the Reformation a century later, at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620. The Counter-Reformation made the Czech lands practically solidly Roman Catholic but failed to eradicate what many experts have called the "Hussite spirit" of the people. Even if this spirit, which supposedly dominates even the Czech Catholic church, has become nothing more than a myth by now, it is hardly possible for a people which sees the moments of its most glorious national greatness in a reformist movement to transfer this feeling to an institution that rests on the defeat of this historical event.

While the Táborite forces of Jan Žižka (d. 1424) operated in Slovak territory too, the religious development and, consequently, the position

of the Catholic church to the present was very different. As has been mentioned, the Croats had important bishoprics usually occupied by Croat bishops. When the Uniates in Transylvania became the spokesmen of the Romanians in this principality, the Orthodox, the majority, successfully fought for an independent church of their own and, once they got it, joined the Uniates in fighting for their people. The real importance for a people in having its "own church" is not so much this very fact, but the ability of this institution to maintain schools, hospitals, and other social institutions through which it can influence its flocks' every weekday also. The Slovaks never had a Catholic church—or any other church—of their own during the roughly one thousand years they spent under Hungarian rule. After Žižka's troops disappeared, the mastery of the Catholic church was only slightly challenged by Lutheranism, which was adopted by the German-speaking minority in Slovak lands and also by a small proportion of the Slovaks. The Lutherans had their church and, therefore, their schools. In these, Lutheran Slovaks also studied, with the result that most of the early Slovak "modernizers" and "nationalists" from Jan Kollár (1793–1852) to Ľudevít Štúr (1815–56) and Pavel Jozef Šafařík (1795–1861) were Lutherans. The mainly illiterate masses, religious in the folk-religious sense, distrusted if not these "heretics" then at least their church, which could not become the symbol of Slovak revival. There were Roman Catholic reformers too, beginning with Anton Bernolák (1762–1856) and ending with the first truly popular political leader Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938). They too had to struggle against the uneducated, superstitious attitude of their people, and while these clergymen became very well known and liked, their church could not profit from their eminence because the hierarchy remained Hungarian and, therefore, anti-Slovak until the end of World War I. Thus, prior to 1918 the Catholic church, while popular in the folk-religious sense, did not emerge as a "national" institution. The symbol and major culprit (to some extent, at least, unjustifiably) of the World War II period was another clergyman, Jozef Tiso (1887–1947), placing the Slovak Roman Catholic church in the same defensive position which the Croatian faced after 1945. It was another Catholic church which could not function successfully as an alternate institution facing the Communist party.

THE MUSLIMS OF BOSNIA

So far, the "major churches" of the "major nations" have been covered. This does not mean that the other religious or ethnic groups are less important, interesting, or—at least to some extent—historically influenced by their attitude toward their leading religious institutions. The Roman Catholics of Bosnia and Slovenia easily come to mind, if for no other reason than because they are members of a faith that has been covered. I will not deal with these people because their ecclesiastical leadership since 1945 has been relatively weak and because their position within Yugoslavia makes any stand they might take secondary to the resolution of conflicts emerging from the Croato-Serb controversy, the country's major "national" problem. Jewish and Protestant communities are too small in Eastern Europe today to offer any challenge to the communist-dominated state. More numerous than these are the Muslims in the Balkans. A few words should be said about these, although chapter 16 will discuss them in detail.

Muslims can offer a position of their own anywhere, but not as a "church," although members of the *ulema* might be prominent among the leaders. It should be remembered that while Islam is a very important religion, it has no clergy, only learned men (*ulema*), and no official "church." Islam came to the Balkans with the conquering Ottomans. With the exception of some of the Muslims living in southeastern Bulgaria, the Balkan Muslims, although often called Turks, were not and are not Turks but converted members of the local population.²² They had no reason for seeking an independent identity until the end of Ottoman rule at various times in the nineteenth century. Even then they did little because their leaders, including the important members of the *ulema*, withdrew together with the Ottoman army and administration. Thus, no Muslim community emerged capable of political action as a distinct group. The followers of this religion became involved, often prominently, in Albanian and Macedonian movements as members of these nations, not as Muslims. If they oppose the ruling establishment today as religious minorities—Albania, Bulgaria—then they do so because the regimes' decision to move against them for whatever reasons prompted their actions. The one exception is that of the Bosnian Muslims.

The Muslims of Bosnia were numerous and powerful enough even under Ottoman rule to govern their own province, although nominally as appointees of the sultan. When Bosnia-Herzegovina was first occupied (1878) and then annexed (1908) by Austria-Hungary, the position of the Muslims was not altered because Vienna understood that it needed their cooperation to rule the province without difficulty. Benjámín Kállay (1839–1903), who as Austro-Hungarian common minister of finance administered Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1882 to 1903, was especially favorable to them because he was aware of the Yugoslav problem and favored a group that called itself Muslim and not Serb or Croat. It was he who foreshadowed, in a sense, what occurred in Tito's Yugoslavia when the Muslims were recognized as a separate "nation." Kállay wanted to create a Bosnian nation separate from Serbs and Croats and for this needed the Muslims. When Serb and Croat national movements and parties surfaced in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims moved also, but their leadership was not clerical but laic. They moved as a separate ethnic, not as a religious, group to safeguard their position in Bosnia-Herzegovina.²³ In acting in this manner, they stressed the socioeconomic separation more than the religious one, justifying Kállay's policy to some extent and foreshadowing the developments under Tito. Thus, for something like one hundred years the Bosnian Muslims acted as a separate group identified by its religion, but not for religious reasons and not through an organized religious institution.

CONCLUSION

The number of factors and circumstances that have determined the interaction since 1945 of two major institutions, church (irrespective of the denomination) and party-state, are numerous. Timing is important, as are personalities, the policy of the Soviet Union, the international situation, correct or faulty assessment and tactics on either the party's or the church's part, economic conditions, and reaction to unforeseen occurrences. Thus, history and historically determined circumstances are not crucial and decisive by themselves. Yet without taking them into consideration some of the differences we observe in church-party-state relations cannot be explained fully. Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński (1901–81), a personality of heroic proportions, could not have played in Hungary or Croatia the part that he played in Poland because in

these countries the populations' assessment of the importance of their church, for them and for their nations, was and is drastically different from that of the Poles. It was not and is not simply the contemporary party and ecclesiastic leadership that determines the relationship between the institutions which they supervise; they cannot operate without a certain popular acceptance, the "legitimation" which communist leaders tried hard to gain and prove at least since 1956. The churches too need a certain national "legitimation" to act effectively as spokesmen of a great variety of ideals contradicting those of the party. In striving for this popular recognition the historical tradition plays a very significant role, and it was this role which was presented in outline form in this chapter.

Jewish Nationality and Religion in the USSR and Eastern Europe

Zvi Gitelman

Among many of the peoples of Eastern Europe there is a strong connection between religion and nationality. As Pedro Ramet points out, "Poles are expected to be Catholic, Russians and Bulgarians are expected to be Orthodox, Arabs and Turks are expected to be Muslim. The Orthodox Pole, the Baptist Russian, and the Protestant Turk are all . . . viewed as nationally disloyal."¹ For Jews, the connection between religion and nationality is even stronger. While Christianity and Islam are "universal" religions, Judaism is a "tribal" one. That means that the only ethnic group which practices Judaism is the Jews, whereas many different nationalities practice Christianity or Islam. Therefore, policies which affect the Jewish religion ipso facto affect the Jews, and vice versa, despite the fact that not all Jews practice their religion.

The oldest of Western religions, Judaism developed in the ancient Near East at a time when no differentiation was made between religion and ethnicity. The biblical account of the founding of Judaism is simultaneously an account of the genesis of the Jewish people. Abraham is told by God, in the same breath, as it were, that he will be the father of a great people and that this people shall worship the one and only God. Abraham's descendants maintain their separate identity in Egypt even before they emerge with a fully developed religious system, one whose basic principles are established only at Sinai. Some have commented that the fact that Judaism was fundamentally shaped in the no-man's-land of the Sinai desert *before* they reached what was to become their homeland symbolizes the nature of Judaism as independent of a particular locale, unlike the other ancient Near Eastern religions, even though it is linked exclusively to one people. More importantly,

the historical survival of Judaism after the Temples of Jerusalem were captured and destroyed proved that this religion is "portable." One of the turning points of Jewish history was the request made of the Roman conquerors of Palestine by Rabbi Yohanan Ben Zakkai that he be allowed to establish a rabbinical academy in the small provincial Palestinian town of Yavneh, thereby perpetuating religious learning and authoritative religious leadership even after the center of worship had been destroyed and the religious leadership of the priests rendered irrelevant. At the same time synagogues had developed outside of Jerusalem. This decentralization of worship was another factor in the survival of Judaism and of the Jewish people.

In the lands of their dispersal, whether in Europe or in Asia and North Africa, Jews were generally isolated from the rest of the population on religious grounds, whether by their own volition or, more often, as a consequence of policies made by the majority religions and nations. The denial of equality to Jews was generally more pronounced in Christian than in Muslim countries, but, in general, Jewish separateness was the norm.² This reinforced Jewish identity and strengthened the sense of Jewish distinctiveness, especially when dominant religions and nations insisted that Jews wear distinctive dress, live in ghettos, practice only certain vocations, and follow certain regulations which applied to them alone. Thus, Jews could not consider themselves as part of the general population, differing only in religion, because their status was so radically different. Their separateness also perpetuated their use of distinctive languages, musical and art forms, and social mores. Therefore, when emancipation came to European Jewry following the French Revolution—it was to come to Jews in Africa and Asia only much later or never at all—the Jews discovered that they had many of the characteristics which the new theories of the time attributed to nations. Of course, they lacked one seemingly essential ingredient, a territory and state of their own.

Not all Jews were pleased by this discovery. Emancipation offered them the chance to escape their minority and subordinate status and many eagerly seized the opportunity. Jews confronted four basic options: (1) assimilate completely through conversion to Christianity, (2) assimilate as a nationality but maintain their religious identity, (3) maintain their religion but assert themselves as a modern nation, (4) abandon religion but assert their Jewishness as an ethnic or national

category. At first, many took the first option and converted to Christianity, especially in Western Europe, because despite the evolution of secular nationalist ideas, most West European societies were still undeniably Christian in their character. A second form of escape was to adopt the ways of the general society in all ways but religion, and to reform the religion so that it would conform to "respectable" practices, i.e., prevailing Christian ones. Thus, the Reform movement in Germany, and later in the rest of Western Europe and the United States, adopted the vernacular as the language of prayer, introduced the organ into the synagogue, and abrogated the dietary laws and other restrictive practices. Its more radical adherents shifted the Sabbath from Saturday to Sunday to conform with Christian practice. The idea was to become, for example, "German citizens of the Mosaic persuasion." Jewish nationality was denied, the local nationality was proclaimed as the Jews' own, and the conception of Jewishness was narrowed to a strictly religious one. Thus, all references to Zion and Jerusalem in the prayers were expunged, and it was claimed that Jews no longer had any aspirations to return to Zion and reconstitute themselves as a nation-state in the modern sense. Jews were very eager to prove their patriotism and loyalty to the states in which they lived, and they were careful not to give any reason for suspicion of divided loyalties.

Illusions of integration into West European society were shattered by repeated rejections of Jewish advances. Theodor Herzl was a highly assimilated Viennese journalist (born in Budapest) who gave up the notion that Jews would be accepted into European society when he covered the trial of Captain Dreyfus in France. The shock of mass French anti-Semitism led him to develop the idea of the establishment of a Jewish state, an idea which he propagated so successfully that he is regarded as the founder of political Zionism.

In Eastern Europe there were parallel assimilatory trends in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and even Poland, though they were of more modest dimensions. In the Russian Empire there was a much weaker assimilationist or even conversionary movement, largely because the Jews were never emancipated there. The Pale of Settlement can be thought of as a huge ghetto, isolating the Jews from the rest of society and thereby perpetuating their distinctiveness. Attempts to bring "enlightenment," that is, Russian culture, to the Jews generally failed, because most Jews regarded these, not without reason, as but covert attempts at proselyti-

zation. Reform Judaism never established itself in the Russian Empire, and in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania it was much less radical and innovative than in Western Europe.

But with nationalist movements arising all around them, the Jews of Eastern Europe began to sense a new option for the resolution of their subordinate status. They began to consider the possibility of leaving Europe—whose societies, many had come to believe, could never accept the Jews—and reconstitute themselves as a nation in the ancestral homeland of Palestine. The comparative advantage of the Zionist idea over others competing for the allegiance of the Jews was that it combined traditional values and aspirations with modern ones. Whereas assimilation and religious reform required Jews to give up cherished values and familiar ways, Zionism could be understood as the modern-day expression of the age-old yearning to “return to Zion,” one which religious Jews repeated three times every day in their prayers. Those who were not so observant but who had an intellectual, cultural, or emotional attachment to some form of Jewishness could share in the aspiration of returning to Zion because for them it would be an economic, cultural, or political solution. Thus, there was a confluence of religious and pragmatic desires which broadened the base of the Zionist movement. The movement founded by Herzl and supported by West European Zionists largely as a solution to the problems created by anti-Semitism was given a mass base by East Europeans spurred as much by religious considerations as by political ones. Of course, this movement horrified those whose greatest desire was to demonstrate to European (and later, American) society that the Jews wanted nothing more than to be recognized as full-fledged Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, etc.

Emancipation meant that Jews, for the first time, could *choose* to be Jewish, and they could choose different modes of being Jewish. In Eastern Europe that choice was not widely available, but Jews began to redefine themselves nevertheless. Aside from those attracted to Zionism, which explicitly proclaimed the nationhood of Israel in modern, secular terms but could be given a religious character as well, there was a minority which insisted that the only realistic solution for Jews, and to the “Jewish problem,” was for them to melt into the larger society and lose their identity. For some, integration into the larger society meant acceptance of its dominant religion as well, but others hoped that adoption of its language and customs would suffice. These choices

were more common in the Austro-Hungarian empire than in the Russian one. In the latter a different form of assimilation proved more attractive. Socialists, whether of the populist or Marxist variety, believed that the solution to the "Jewish problem" could be attained only as part of the solution to the greater problem of society as a whole, the political and economic exploitation of the oppressed. Socialism would solve the Jewish problem by abolishing all ethnic and religious discrimination. Moreover, since nations were a phenomenon of the capitalist epoch, they would disappear, along with religion, in the socialist one. The ultimate solution to the problems of the Jews, therefore, lay in their disappearance as either a religious or ethnic group. Thus, those who denied Jewish nationality, or at least the legitimacy of the Zionist program, ranged from Orthodox Jews who opposed Zionism on the grounds that it attempted to do what only God, working through the Messiah, would do; to Jewish assimilationists who rejected Jewish nationality; to socialists who predicted the disappearance of all nationalities.

LENIN ON THE JEWS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Lenin believed in the disappearance of all nationalities but also denied that the Jews were a nation even in the presocialist era: "The Jews have ceased to be a nation, for a nation without a territory is unthinkable. . . . The idea of a Jewish nationality runs counter to the interests of the Jewish proletariat, for it fosters among them, directly or indirectly, a spirit hostile to assimilation, the spirit of the 'ghetto.'"³ Lenin was not entirely consistent in his definition of the Jewish entity, referring to Jews in 1913 as "the most oppressed and persecuted *nation*," but in the same work defining the Jews of Russia and Galicia as a "caste" and the Jews of the rest of Europe as assimilated.⁴ He regarded the Jews as being in the vanguard of the assimilationists and showing the way to other ethnic groups. Assimilation, he felt, would benefit the Jews because they would no longer be treated as aliens. Stalin, in his *Marxism and the National Question*, also ridiculed the idea that Jews are a nation, and sharply criticized the anti-Zionist Bund as being nationalistic and separatist. Both Lenin and Stalin, as well as their Menshevik rivals, voted to expel the Bund from the Russian Social Democratic

Labor party (RSDLP) because of the Bund's insistence on organizational autonomy and on the special needs of the Jewish proletariat.

Nevertheless, following the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin agreed to the formation of a Commissariat for Jewish Affairs, part of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities headed by Stalin, and even allowed the formation of Jewish sections of the Communist party, organizationally reminiscent of the Bund within the RSDLP. These concessions were made in the face of the obvious lack of support for Bolshevism among the Jewish masses and the need to work among them in Yiddish if they were to be won over. These organizational changes were accompanied by a recognition of the Jews as an official nationality, but not a nation. This has remained their official classification in the USSR to this day. Needless to say, the Jewish religion got no privileged treatment, and there is evidence to suggest that at various times it was dealt with more harshly than was Islam or Russian Orthodoxy.

One of the unusual, perhaps unique, features of the relationship between religion and nationality among Soviet Jews is that though they have reinforced each other, they have also been pitted against one another. In the 1920s the Jewish sections of the Communist party struggled mightily against the Jewish religion in their attempt to make the "revolution on the Jewish street." The leadership of the sections had come mainly out of the prerevolutionary socialist parties, such as the Bund and the Poalai Zion. They had struggled against the religious establishment before the revolution, and their antireligious zeal was intensified by their perception that, as "latecomers" to Bolshevism, they had to prove their ideological and political mettle by showing that they were ruthless against other Jews who still adhered to tradition. The "bourgeois-clerical-Zionist" camp was attacked with ferocity. In contrast to the anti-Judaism campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s, those of the 1920s were conducted almost exclusively by Jews and in the Yiddish language. To a considerable extent, this was an internal Jewish battle. While Jews participated, often enthusiastically and out of proportion to their numbers, in the general party campaign against other religions, non-Jews did not take part in the anti-Judaism campaign. Any taint of anti-Semitism was thus avoided. The editor of the main Yiddish Communist daily, Moishe Litvakov, boasted that the antireligious campaign "was not the cantankerous atheism of the small-town anarchists against the small-town 'important Jews' . . . but a revolutionary demon-

stration of the entire Jewish working class . . . against the tarnished Assembly of Israel."⁵ The idea was that a Jewish nationality could and should exist without any religious character. Nearly 650 synagogues and over a thousand religious schools were closed in the 1920s, but at the same time hundreds of state-funded Yiddish schools, imbued with the spirit of the revolution, were being set up. Yiddish courts, trade unions, and even party cells were established, as were Jewish collective farms, theaters, publishing houses, academic institutes, newspapers, and the like. The idea was to create a new Jewish culture and a *Soviet* Jewish nationality, one which would be secular, socialist, and Yiddish. This nationality would have nothing in common with the religious, Hebraist, Zionist, bourgeois Jews in capitalist countries. In the view of most, this nationality would be only a transitory phenomenon, a way station on the approved path to assimilation.

For this reason the Jewish sections fought mightily against Zionism and Hebrew as well as religion. The Zionist movement had more members than any other Jewish one in 1917, and it had emerged victorious in elections to local Jewish self-governing bodies, a proposed All-Russian Jewish Congress, and the short-lived Constituent Assembly. Thus, it represented not only an ideological enemy but a strong competitor to the Jewish sections. With the help of the general party and the coercive instruments of the state, the Jewish sections harrassed the Zionists, arresting and exiling many, finally driving the organized movement underground or out of existence in 1928. The attack on Hebrew stemmed from several sources: the Kulturkampf between the two languages before the revolution, and the association of Hebrew with the Zionist movement and with religious ritual. The Jewish sections argued to a puzzled party leadership that Hebrew must be a "bourgeois" language because it was used almost exclusively by the class enemy, rabbis and Zionists. Yiddish, on the other hand, was the language commonly spoken by the Jewish workers, and hence was a "proletarian" language. Clearly, the Soviet regime would have to support Yiddish against Hebrew. This is how Hebrew came to be regarded as a pariah or semilegal language, while the Bolsheviks declared Yiddish to be the exclusive Jewish language. The Jewish communists went so far as to change the Yiddish orthography so as to eliminate Hebraic forms, tried to reduce the substantial Hebraic element in Yiddish vocabulary, and developed various terminologies which would replace traditional ones.⁶

In the 1920s an attempt was made to drive a wedge between the Jewish religion and Jewish nationality. By the 1930s, when the Jewish sections had been abolished, the major tendency was toward direct assimilation. As Jews streamed out of the *shtetlekh* (villages), ruined by war, revolution, civil war, and nationalization, and moved into the industrial centers springing up all over the country, they tended to abandon their Yiddish language, traditional mores, and habits of dress, mingle with non-Jews and marry them, and acculturate into the Russian culture. The proportion of Jews marrying non-Jews rose sharply, enrollment in Yiddish schools fell drastically, and Jews embraced Russian culture enthusiastically. Religion seemed to survive only among the older generation. Of course, the purges and the dangers of being accused of "petit bourgeois nationalism" accelerated the move away from positive and active identification with either religion or Jewish cultural activity. Many were convinced that the age of internationalism had really dawned and that the "Jewish problem" was being solved by *sbliizhenie* and *sliianie*, the drawing together and merging of the nationalities.⁷

Events of the 1940s rudely disrupted the dreams of acceptance and integration. The Holocaust saw not only the murder of 1.5 million Soviet Jews, but also the return of open anti-Semitism among sectors of the Slavic and Baltic populations. Even in the Red Army there were numerous incidents of anti-Semitism. A common canard was that "the Jews fought the war in Tashkent," though half a million Jews served in the Soviet armed forces and Jews were fourth among those who received decorations for wartime service. After the war came the campaign against "rootless cosmopolitans," the arrest of hundreds of Jewish cultural figures and the murder of the most prominent Yiddish writers and actors, the expulsion of Jews from institutions of higher learning, and the difficulty Jews had in obtaining employment commensurate with their skills and training. All these laid to rest beliefs about "internationalism." The "black years" (1948–53) saw a state-sponsored anti-Semitism that could hardly have been imagined twenty years earlier. Many Jews sought to protect themselves from the prevailing political and social winds by hiding their Jewish identity the best they could and assuming a generally low profile.

While Khrushchev abandoned the most egregious manifestations of anti-Semitism, he carefully avoided criticizing Stalin for his anti-Jewish

acts and policies and permitted only a symbolic revival of Yiddish culture. An antireligious campaign, lasting from 1957 to 1964, saw the closing of hundreds of synagogues and the public identification of those institutions with economic crimes and with espionage on behalf of the state of Israel. At the same time the more relaxed political atmosphere allowed some Jews, especially in the Baltic areas, to revive Jewish culture on an amateur basis. Choirs and theatrical groups were founded in Latvia and Lithuania, and other musical groups were formed elsewhere. Jews also took pride in eminent Soviet artists of Jewish origin, whose work was taken as evidence of the high cultural level of a people deprived of its original culture.

Ironically, the two strongest forces for the preservation of Jewish national identity were the official classification of Jews as a nationality and social anti-Semitism. Official identification marked every Jew as such, irrespective of wishes or self-perception. Anti-Semitism signaled Jews that however they might regard themselves, they were seen as Jews by others. Thus, the Soviet state and society succeeded in preserving Jewish identity while stripping it of much of its content. This left many Soviet Jews in an anomalous position: they were Jews officially and socially, but Russians culturally. They were acculturated without being assimilated.

By the 1960s, and especially after 1967, many Jews decided to resolve the tension between their official identity and their culture not by dropping their Jewish identity but by seeking to recapture their culture. If this could not be done in the Soviet Union, then it would have to be accomplished in a Jewish state. The June 1967 war, in which the Soviet Union was vociferously and actively on the side of the Arabs who seemed bent on eliminating a large segment of world Jewry just twenty years after the Holocaust, convinced many that Jewish existence in the USSR was untenable. Jewish national identity now began to take on forms which had nearly disappeared by the 1930s. Large numbers of people began applying to emigrate to Israel, thereby placing their Jewish nationality ahead of their Soviet citizenship, indeed, saying that they are willing to give up their Soviet identity for their Jewish one. This was not simply an emigration movement—though in the late 1970s it became largely that when most Jewish émigrés did not continue to Israel—but rather a conscious affirmation of national identity and culture. Hebrew study groups were organized; Jews delved into

the few remaining available works on Jewish history; Jewish songs, literature, and even cuisine were revived. By the late 1970s the national renaissance had resulted in the departure of more than 250,000 Jews from the land of their birth.

In the 1980s, just when the doors of emigration were closed, young Jews began to turn to religion. Several hundred people, mainly in the largest cities, began to study religion and became religiously observant. It is difficult to explain this phenomenon. Perhaps it arose as a result of their study of Jewish history and culture and the discovery that these were inextricably tied to the Jewish religion. Also, the closing down of emigration may have led these people to a kind of "internal emigration," where they "dropped out" of the mainstream of Soviet society. If one's Jewish life could not be lived in Israel, at least for the moment it could be put together in an alternative community within the USSR. Great ingenuity and determination led them to set up study circles, arrange for kosher food, prayer, and other religious requirements. The great majority of the newly religious have their sights set on emigration, and mostly to Israel. For the first time in many decades religion and national consciousness were reunited.

It is clear that the Soviet attempt to mold a new type of Jewish nationality—secular, Soviet, and socialist—has not succeeded. This leaves Soviet Jews with only two options: emigration, either "external" or "internal," or a high degree of acculturation, but in most cases no assimilation. Since the legitimate expression of Jewish identity has been so narrowed, the assertion of Jewish nationality, especially when coupled with religious commitment, becomes almost automatically an oppositionist statement. The attempt to drive a wedge between religious and national identification, one which preceded the revolution and was launched by Jews themselves, was quite successful for a while, but in recent years there has been a movement in the opposite direction. True, there are practitioners of religion who are not Zionists, especially among the older generation, and there are larger numbers of nationalistic Jews who are not religious. But the old antagonisms between nationalists and religionists have faded. While large numbers of Soviet Jews are so highly acculturated as to be uninterested in either the religion or an active national Jewish life, their passive identification as Jews, which exists not by their choice but as a consequence of state policy and social realities, preserves at least the form of national

identity. As the past two decades have shown, passive identity can be transformed into active assertiveness, and some form can be filled with content. Despite all the efforts of the Jewish sections and the regime as a whole, Jewish identification was not extinguished but has been forced into channels which the regime perceives as oppositionist.

JEWISH RELIGION AND NATIONALITY IN EASTERN EUROPE

Surprisingly, the policies of the East European states toward their Jewish populations have not followed Soviet precedents very closely, even during the Stalinist period. To be sure, one can discern the same fundamental hostility to Zionism, religion, and Hebrew, but the history of the regimes' relationship to the Jews is not a replication of Soviet precedents, nor are their present policies. It is not altogether clear why this is so, but it may be the result of a combination of relative Soviet unconcern with the way the East Europeans treat their Jewish populations; different cultural traditions and historical precedents; the generally less important place of the Jews in the East European countries following the Holocaust; and the mass emigration of the survivors. Within Eastern Europe, we can see quite different policies toward the Jews, so that not only is the Soviet model not replicated, but there seems to be no single model which guides each of the states. Nevertheless, the processes by which Communist domination of the surviving Jewish communities was achieved were remarkably similar, and also closely followed patterns established earlier in the USSR.

After 1945 the nationalities issue, one of the thorniest problems of the interwar period, was mitigated by the transfer of populations, the shifting of borders, and the physical elimination of whole peoples and communities. The wholesale destruction of the Jews and the rapid emigration of the survivors among them greatly reduced the dimensions of what many East Europeans had seen as the "Jewish problem" before the war. Moreover, the East European communists, following an initial policy of thoroughly subjugating the religious establishments, seemed to be less militantly atheistic than the Soviets, who, long after the churches had been cowed, insisted on mobilizing the "League of Militant Godless" and spending a great deal of money, personnel, and time on antireligious campaigns, even half a century after the revolution.

After the 1950s most East European regimes seemed willing to work out a *modus vivendi* with their churches and to allow people to pursue religious ways, albeit at the price of restricting their life chances.

Within the Jewish communities, the prewar *Kulturkampf* between religious and nonreligious elements was not as sharp as it had been before 1917 in the Russian Empire. In most of the East European countries, except Poland, the religious establishment was dominant, and Jewish identity was generally conceived of in confessional terms. In Poland there were significant socialist movements, both Zionist and anti-Zionist, which were hostile to religion. In most of the other countries there were significant differences *within* the religious community, as Orthodox were ranged against Reform and "Neolog," and within Orthodoxy there were rivalries between Hassidim and "Misnagdim" ("Opponents"). Thus, after the war there was less reason than there had been in the USSR to carry over pre-communist differences and settle old scores. In addition, the Holocaust had demonstrated the fragility of the Jewish people. Despite the brave words of some Jewish communists and assimilationists about rebuilding Jewish life in Eastern Europe, massive Jewish emigration made it clear that large numbers had given up on Europe and were prepared to risk starting over elsewhere. It was precisely the most Jewishly committed elements of the population—Zionists, the religious, cultural activists—who were most strongly represented among the emigrants. Thus, communal life declined due to emigration, but emigration was also spurred by the decline in communal life.

The process by which the communists subverted and took over the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe followed closely the overall pattern of the communist seizure of power. In the terminology of Hugh Seton-Watson, this was a pattern which began with genuine coalitions, followed by "bogus coalitions," which then gave way to communist takeovers and unilateral rule, one which resulted in the imposition of "dictatorships of the proletariat."⁸ In the Jewish communities the first organizations to be formed after the liberation were coalitions of Zionists, socialists, and communists, the last usually in a minority. In many cases prewar Jewish leaders resumed positions of influence. In Poland, for example, a Central Committee for Polish Jews was formed, and it included almost all Jewish political movements and parties. Even the

Union of Religious Communities, a more narrowly based organization, included representatives from three political movements, only two of which were distinctly religious in outlook.⁹ In Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania, both a national religious organization and a national communal one were formed, whereas in Czechoslovakia and Hungary only religious organizations were formed. These differences reflected prewar patterns to a considerable extent. For example, as a consequence of the recognition of Judaism as an "established" denomination in 1895 in the Habsburg Empire, Jewish life in Hungary came to be centered around religious congregations. "Jewry as a collectivity had only a religious and never a political existence. To influence Hungarian Jewish affairs meant to influence the congregations, the traditional and official centers of Jewish life."¹⁰ Because Jews living in Slovakia, the Vojvodina, and Transylvania tended to prefer Hungarian to other local languages, the Hungarian authorities preferred to regard them as a religious, not a national, group, thereby "increasing" the number of "Magyars" in the respective populations. By the same token the interwar regimes in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania encouraged the Zionist movement and Jewish nationality in order to reduce the number of people in their countries who could be classified as Magyars. This precedent was followed after the war in Hungary, resulting in the ironic spectacle of a communist government manipulating a religious body in order to unite Orthodox and Neolog Jews under one roof. The resulting organization, the only recognized one in the country, was a nominally religious body, but under the strict control of the Communist party. No secular socialist body was set up, in contrast to the USSR and several other East European states.

In Poland, the stage of "bogus coalition" saw the Central Jewish Committee's (CJC) representation system altered in such a way as to increase the influence of the communists and their collaborators. Then the Polish United Workers party (PZPR) proposed a merger of the CJC with the Jewish Cultural Society, a wholly communist organization. Such a merger took place in 1950 and resulted in the formation of a single secular communal organization, the Social and Cultural Society of the Jews (TSKZ). In 1949 the name of the Union of Jewish Religious Congregations was changed to Union of Congregations of the Mosaic Faith, a name it has kept to this day, in order to eliminate any possi-

ble national connotation which attached to "Jewish." This organization was subordinated to the government, but existed alongside the more powerful and more political tszk.

In Czechoslovakia only a religious organization was permitted, the Council of Jewish Religious Communities in Bohemia and Moravia (RŽNO), with a parallel organization in Slovakia. These organizations, too, were brought under tight government control. In Bulgaria a Central Jewish Committee of the Fatherland Front was formed and it controlled the Central Consistory of Jewish communities. The former organization was soon abolished, and the latter quickly subordinated to the government. In Romania, a religious organization with prewar antecedents, the Federation of the Unions of Jewish Communities, was the first organization to be formed, but it was soon followed by a Jewish Democratic Committee, based on the Communist and socialist parties. The tactics of "bogus coalition" included the purposive formation of splinter parties and then forced mergers with communist-controlled organizations. The religious Federation was reshaped and its name slightly altered. It merged all religious communities, but all religious services had to be approved by reorganized local Jewish communities dominated now by the Jewish Democratic Committee.¹¹

In contrast to the Soviet Union, where religious organizations were abolished very soon after the revolution and have never been allowed to reconstitute themselves, in Eastern Europe most regimes have permitted the continued existence of such organizations, in some instances to the exclusion of any other Jewish body. Moreover, unlike in the USSR, Jews are not registered by nationality in the East European countries. However, the policies of the East European states regarding Zionism, Hebrew, and Israel closely adhered to Soviet precedents and current policies. When the USSR supported the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, so did the East Europeans; when, a year later, the Soviet line changed, so did the East Europeans'. In all the countries a militant campaign was launched against Zionism, linking it to Western imperialism. The American Joint Distribution Committee, whose relief work had brought large amounts of hard currency to the region, was everywhere expelled on the grounds that it was an agent of Western secret services. The Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia, with its themes of Zionist conspiracies and Jewish plots to murder political leaders by deliberate medical malpractice, was a foreshadowing of the "Doctors

Plot" "uncovered" in the Soviet Union. Jewish cultural life was severely restricted in all the countries, though Yiddish newspapers appeared in Poland after the last one in the USSR had been closed down.

EAST EUROPEAN JEWRY IN THE SOCIALIST ERA

By the time socialism had been firmly established in Eastern Europe, even the remnants of the Holocaust had been further reduced by emigration. Nowhere in Eastern Europe could the Jewish population be a significant national or religious minority, though individual Jews did play significant public roles in most of the countries, at least until 1956. People "of Jewish origin" among the communist elites in Poland, Romania, and Hungary were completely estranged from the Jewish communities, and the latter usually feared them more than they did non-Jewish communists. Some secular institutions struggled to keep up publications, cultural events, and other activities, but their audience was diminishing and they were constantly nagged by the fear of heresy and political deviation.¹² In Poland and Romania Yiddish theaters were propped up by government subsidies, foreign audiences, and in the case of Poland, an increasing proportion of non-Jewish actors. The religious organizations, too, became skeletal remains of once viable communities. By the 1960s there was not a single rabbi in Bulgaria and Poland; the last rabbi in Czechoslovakia passed away in 1965 and was not replaced until nearly twenty years later. Only in Hungary and Romania were there sizable religious communities.

Yet, despite the relative absence of Jews, the "Jewish issue" did not disappear. Some communist regimes could not resist linking Jewish issues to their relations with the state of Israel. When the Polish population displayed embarrassing pleasure at the Israeli victory in the 1967 Middle East war, party secretary Władysław Gomułka publicly criticized not Poles but Jews who sympathized with Israel and who, in his view, constituted a "fifth column" within Poland. The issue was picked up by Gomułka's political rival, Mieczysław Moczar, who turned it against the Polish leader by accusing him of harboring many "Zionists" in the upper echelons of the Polish regime. The result was a massive purge of Jews and the emigration of all but about six thousand of the sixteen thousand or so who were still in Poland in 1968. Ironi-

cally, those purged were generally people with only the most tenuous links to Jewish culture or even Jewish nationality, and hardly a single one of them had Zionist inclinations. They were simply pawns in an intraparty struggle for power, one which exploited Polish anti-Semitic traditions.

In Czechoslovakia, too, Zionism became a domestic issue when some writers, Jewish and non-Jewish, condemned the Czechoslovak leadership for slavishly following the Soviet Union in breaking relations with Israel. This, they said, was but one manifestation of the bankruptcy of the Czechoslovak policy, for it was obvious that the sympathies of the population lay with Israel, not the Arabs. Not only was the Czechoslovak leadership rocked by the revolt of the writers, but following the overthrow of Dubček's reformist regime, anti-Zionism became a major theme in domestic Czechoslovak propaganda. From that time on the leadership of the Czechoslovak Jewish community has become perhaps the most cautious in Eastern Europe.

In Hungary great care has been taken not to allow the government's position on Middle Eastern issues to spill over to the domestic arena. While the Hungarians have generally been dutiful in following the Soviet line on the Middle East, nothing resembling the Soviet domestic anti-Zionist campaign has been observed in Hungary.

East European policies differed from Soviet ones also in the area of emigration. In 1957 the Polish authorities permitted large-scale emigration. The Jewish émigrés included several thousand former Soviet citizens who had held Polish citizenship before 1939, had been allowed to reclaim their Polish citizenship, and had used Poland as a revolving door through which to pass to Israel and other countries. In 1968 large numbers of Jews again left the country, this time mostly against their will. In Romania significant Jewish emigration from the community that survived the war better than any other in Eastern Europe began already in the mid-1950s. According to some reports, Romania permitted this emigration because Israel was paying a ransom of hard currency for each emigrant.¹³ Whatever the case, by the 1980s there were some 300,000 Jews of Romanian origin in Israel, making them the single largest group among the Ashkenazim. Of course, Romania was the only socialist country that did not break diplomatic relations with Israel following the 1967 war, though the absence of such relations did

not impede the USSR from allowing 270,000 Jews to emigrate in the 1970s, most of them going to Israel.

By the 1980s the organized secular Jewish communities had largely disappeared. In Hungary, where the estimates of Jewish population range between 35,000 and 85,000, the Jews have become increasingly invisible through cultural assimilation and intermarriage. In Romania large-scale emigration and high mortality rates have reduced the population to less than 25,000. According to Chief Rabbi Rosen, about a thousand Jews emigrate every year and a similar number die, so that the community is expected to shrink rapidly in the near future.¹⁴ In Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia the Jewish populations are probably less than 5,000 in each country.

Ironically, as the Jewish populations have begun to disappear, several states have taken steps to prop up the religious institutions that remain. Their motivation seems to be that the existence of Jewish communities is useful for the images of these states in the West and also has the potential for attracting tourism and other sources of hard currency. For example, the sole surviving synagogue in Warsaw, once a city of 300,000 Jews, was abandoned and neglected in the late 1960s. By 1976 a sign was erected near it which announced its imminent remodeling. Nothing was done until shortly before the fortieth anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising was commemorated, in the presence of numerous foreign delegations, in 1983. Since that time, the Polish authorities have permitted the restoration, with private Jewish funds from abroad, of Jewish cemeteries and other sites. They have been accommodating of foreign Jewish tour groups and have engaged in some limited cultural exchanges with institutions abroad, including in Israel. The study of the history of Polish Jewry had become quite fashionable in Poland, and institutions and individuals are vying to attract foreign visitors and invitations to conferences abroad. Of course, the fact that Poland, along with Hungary, has established an "interests section" in Israel will help in these efforts.

Czechoslovakia has long used the State Jewish Museum—actually a collection of Jewish sites in the former ghetto of Prague—as a tourist attraction, and not for Jews alone. After many years without religious leadership, the Prague community is now being served by a young rabbi, ordained at the Budapest Jewish Theological Seminary, the only such

institution in the socialist countries. (There are less than a score of students there, including the half dozen or so from Hungary itself.) A Yugoslav-born rabbi was called back to that country several years ago, giving Yugoslavia one more rabbi than Bulgaria. The main synagogue in Sofia is under restoration after many years of disuse and neglect.

In Hungary, aside from the seminary, there is a Jewish museum, a Jewish high school, and several old-age homes and other institutions. Most of them are designed for an aging population. In 1987, however, with the assistance of the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture, a Center for Jewish Studies was opened under the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. This is designed to serve not only scholars but a broader Hungarian public interest in Jewish matters. The Dohanyi Utca Temple, the second largest synagogue in the world, has been refurbished, and several Jewish publications of significance have been issued. All these activities have been made possible with external financial assistance.

The most spectacular use of foreign support has been made in Romania. Aside from the possible external subvention of emigration, the Joint Distribution Committee and the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture have long been sources of hard-currency income for Romania through their subsidization of the material and cultural needs of the community. The central figure in the community is Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen (at present there is only one other practicing rabbi in the country). As a member of parliament and with excellent connections to the highest echelons of party and government, Rabbi Rosen has been able to create and maintain a national network of educational institutions—admittedly, operating on a very elementary level for the most part—eleven kosher restaurants, a Jewish periodical which appears in Hebrew, Yiddish, and Romanian, synagogues in every city with even a modest Jewish population, and an extensive network of welfare institutions which provide health care, old-age homes, and material assistance to the needy. This network of institutions has become a showcase for foreign visitors and continues to attract external support in the millions of dollars even as the community continues to shrink. The Romanian authorities have reached the conclusion, long resisted by the Poles, that support for Jewish institutions brings in more benefit than any problems it might cause.

In sum, at the present time several of the East European states are trying to salvage what remains of their Jewish communities because they

realize that those communities pose no threat to them but rather represent potential sources of Western capital and goodwill. The Czechoslovak authorities are still holding to the policies of the 1960s, though they have great potential to attract Western support.¹⁵ In a word, the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe, if they survive at all, will survive largely as museum pieces. Neither the Jewish religion nor Jewish nationalism poses any threat to the East European systems, though one should not discount the possibility that in the future "anti-Semitism without Jews" could once again reappear in the region. As we have seen, the socialist regimes have adopted rather varied policies toward their Jewish populations, and that is another reason to allow for unexpected twists in the future.

Part II The Soviet Union

The "Russian Orientation" and the Orthodox Church: From the Early Slavophiles to the "Neo-Slavophiles" in the USSR

Dimitry Pospelovsky

"Neo-Slavophilism" as applied to the contemporary currents of thought or climate of emotions in the USSR is an umbrella term that may include the following categories:

1. *Rusity* or Russites, which in its turn is an umbrella term for the officially tolerated trends of Russian nationalism and patriotism. This can then be subdivided into: (a) Soviet-regime-oriented National Bolshevism, a secular anti-Christian orientation of aggressive state-nationalism with racist, i.e., neo-Nazi overtones; and (b) cultural-historical *pochvennichestvo* ("soil-boundism" or nativism) with at least a respect for the historical, cultural, and moral legacy and contribution of Orthodox Christianity to Russia past and present. It expresses itself in such phenomena, for instance, as the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical Monuments and the Ruralist school of Russian literature. In its midst there are many sincere religious believers, practicing members of the Orthodox church.

2. The above trend, in its turn, unofficially merges and overlaps with the unofficial Christian neo-Slavophilism or Christian *pochvennichestvo*. The distinctions between the two are not very clear-cut and are more a matter of degrees than categories, as will be shown in this chapter. But the difference between the tolerated "Russitism" and the openly and professedly Christian national orientations is that the former is found in the Soviet press, and is therefore censored and incomplete, while the latter is in samizdat alone and therefore much more fully reflects the proponents' genuine views and ideas. As I shall point out, there also have been samizdat expressions of the pro-Soviet national bolshevism.

When the term "Slavophilism" first appeared in the nineteenth century, it merely meant "a Russian orientation."¹ This orientation was not originally colored or shaped by adherence to the Orthodox church necessarily or, in fact, to any form of Christianity as a personal religion. The secular Decembrists, whom both Andrzej Walicki and Peter Christoff see as proto-Slavophiles of sorts,² while using Christianity in their propaganda for the soldiers, were mostly deists at best, treating Christianity as a convenient bridge between themselves and the masses. So it appears also to have been with the early Slavophiles per se. According to Aleksandr Koshelev, along with the young Ivan Kireevskii, who was a member of the Lovers of Wisdom Society (*Liubomudry*) and later one of the leading Slavophiles, members of the society "esteemed Spinoza particularly . . . and considered his works much superior to the Gospels."³ It was in the course of their intensive study of Russia's cultural heritage and values, that is, an Orthodox Christian culture and Orthodox Christian values, that the Slavophiles gradually became converted to a personal Christianity.

A similar process appears to have taken place in the course of the last twenty years or so. Individuals and groups of "a Russian orientation" first accepted the church in many instances as a part of Russia's historical-cultural past or as an instrument for mobilization of the nation, but then gradually became converted themselves. One of the most salient illustrations was the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of Peoples (*vskhson*), the largest known Russian conspiratorial organization of the post-Stalin period. There are parallels between them and the Decembrists: most *vskhson* members came from the "new aristocracy," that is, from well-established communist families, and had themselves been strong Stalinist communists in the past;⁴ like the Decembrists, they aimed at a military putsch against the regime; and the *vskhson* in its program, too, appealed to Christianity while most of its members had not been practicing Christians at the time.

It would not be correct to think that the *vskhson* saw the church only as a state-subordinated instrument under an *oberprokuror*. Their program ascribed to the church the function of moral supervisor over the government, with veto powers for a special body of church representatives.⁵ In fact, the *vskhson* program stressed that the church would have to be wholly independent of the government in order to act as a moral/ethical force in society. However, there were other

more self-serving attempts to use the church, e.g., the attempt by the Antonov-Fetisov National Bolshevik "Russian Party" to marry Leninism with Slavophilism; or the use of the document called "A Nation Speaks: A Manifesto of Russian Patriots," to achieve a compromise between Slavophilism and the racist National Bolshevism.⁶ As in the case of the vskhson, whose members later became practicing Christians, so also the ideologue of the Fetisov group, Mikhail Antonov, after a spell of tortures in psycho-prisons became a deeply religious Orthodox Christian and apparently has drifted away from his neo-Leninist theocratic theories.⁷ Even such outwardly secularist discussion on Russian culture and its past as that which took place in the Komsomol monthly *Molodaia gvardiia* in the late 1960s was in fact an expression in the only permissible terms of "the spiritual vacuum [of Soviet society] in search of spirituality. . . . We are in search of the lost ideal. Our youth cannot find this ideal." The author, an official Soviet literary critic, Anatolii Petrovich Lanshchikov, then says that this ideal is to be found in Dostoevsky, Berdiaev, and Leont'ev and concludes, "the role of Orthodoxy cannot be denied; I don't know what would have happened to Russia without Orthodoxy."⁸

There seems to be a repetition of Russian weltanschauung-like thought patterns: however much a nativist initially may regard religions as something to be used for secular purposes, the balance tends to tip eventually in favor of the church, of Christianity. They are seen as the essentials of any social construction, with all the other political, social, or economic elements merely derivative. It is in this sense that a parallel can be seen between the nativist patterns of thought in the 1960s and 1970s and the Russian or Slavophile orientation in the nineteenth century; or, even more directly, between the nativists and the thinkers of the religiophilosophical renaissance of the first decade of this century. They also had started out as Marxists but became converted to Orthodox Christianity.

Russian Westernism, at least since the 1840s, has been predominantly secular, materialistic, positivistic, and ahistorical in the sense of rejecting culturally Russian continuity and values. Westernism preached revolution, i.e., a break with the past.⁹ Therefore, a historical-religious tendency in Russian thought, a growth of interest in Russia's past and culture, necessarily meant a turn to some form of Slavophile, "soil-bound," or similar orientation. As opposed to the imitative char-

acter of Russian Westernism,¹⁰ the Slavophile tradition led to a wealth of more or less authentic Russian thought, drawing its inspiration not only from Schelling's philosophy and Goethe's poetry, but also from "the Russian folklore and traditions . . . the study of the thought of the Eastern Church Fathers with the subsequent concepts of *sobornost'*, *inner freedom and wisdom of heart*."¹¹ Slavophilism replaces the abstract idealism of the German philosophy with existentialism: the pragmatic observation of life as the starting point for philosophizing. "Russia's self-consciousness," in the words of Berdiaev, "begins only from the moment when Ivan Kireevskii and Alexei Khomiakov daringly posed the question: 'what is Russia, wherein lies her essence, her role and place in the world?'"¹²

The other motive driving many thinking Russians to a Slavophile orientation rather than to Westernist liberalism is the appreciation of Marxism as the manifestation of the impasse of the materialistic-utilitarian school of thought, in the final analysis as an impasse of the liberal tradition of thought and social construction, albeit in its extreme (and hence, perhaps, most logical) and utopian reduction. A person rejecting Marxism out of an existential experience of its application often also rejects liberalism, treating Marxism as a branch of the tree of liberalism, with its materialism, relativism, utilitarianism, and religion of progress.¹³

When we speak about the contemporary Slavophile or soil-bound orientation we must remember that it is the more religiously inclined, often those who formerly religiously believed in communism, who turn to religious interpretation of history and culture. Therefore they turn to the Slavophiles who "were the first to formulate clearly [the idea] that the core of Russian spiritual [*geistig*] life is religious, that concern for Russia and Russian ideals is in essence religious"¹⁴ (in the sense of being theological or value-oriented, tending toward an absolutization of the goal).¹⁵ It follows that a contemporary Russian *intelligent* in search of a nationally rooted conceptual framework, turning to the intellectual world of Khomiakov, Kireevskii, et al., would also enter the world of their Orthodoxy. In particular, Khomiakov's theology is opposed to the petrified, imitative Westernist, state-controlled church establishment, preaching instead broad participation of a free laity in a free communal-*sobornaia* church.¹⁶ This activist attitude to the church, by no means

displayed or shared by today's official church establishment, often leads the educated Soviet reader of Khomiakov to some of the following discoveries:

1. The Orthodoxy of Khomiakov and the church fathers is in sharp contrast to the enslaved and static official church and in this ideal Orthodoxy he or she can feel at home. This often leads to conversion.¹⁷
2. In the real church, however, he faces the frustrating contradiction between the ideal church and the reality. On entering the church he thus faces a new crisis.¹⁸
3. Very occasionally this leads to the neophyte's retreat from the church.¹⁹ More often familiarity with Khomiakov et al. invites the neophyte to be an active Christian, to contribute to the existing religiointellectual ferment or dissent within the church, or on the fringes, as it were, of the official church. Intellectually and spiritually, however, these fringes may be the very core of the church's existence and of its future, as was the case with the Slavophiles and with the religiophilosophical renaissance of the early twentieth century.

Such converts found or join unofficial missionary, religiophilosophical, theological, and social Christian circles, brotherhoods, and movements that are within or around the church, but structurally independent from it. This idea was formulated in a 1969–70 samizdat obviously written by Christian neophytes from a communist establishment background. This document blamed the current depressed condition of the established church, its subservience to the regime, on the apostasy of the radical intelligentsia who had been indifferent to the religious persecutions of the past fifty years:

Since we had turned our backs on her in her most difficult hour . . . we must now on our own regain a Christian way of thinking . . . without involving the church in our political struggle. Her current situation . . . precludes the Church from any form of activity. . . . We are for the Church, but we do not want our hands to be tied by the same rope as those of the Church. . . . Simultaneously we are against all forms of sectarianism which leads to an atomization of all Christian forces. The early Christians are our model:

risking only ourselves we are forming tiny fraternities, which will eventually merge together into a single Church Militant.²⁰

Four years later, two religiophilosophic seminars appeared independently of each other—one in Leningrad, the other in Moscow. Evidently, Khomiakov, V. Solov'ev, and *Vekhi* (Signposts) have been among the main influences in bringing these young people both to God and to an awareness of Russia.²¹

Whether the neophyte comes to Christianity via Khomiakov et al. or encounters the Slavophiles in all their forms after having joined the church in the above fashion, he draws historiosophic and conceptual lessons from Slavophile and other similar writings. The neophyte attempts to apply Slavophile models of thought, albeit in a revised form, to the Russia of the present and the future. He travels again the road of the liberal Russian intelligentsia later associated with *Vekhi* who, using the Slavophilism purged by Solov'ev of its extremist and parochial elements, moved "from legal Marxism to a Slavophile interpretation of Orthodoxy"²² and to a soil-bound appeal to the Russian intelligentsia.²³

In view of the recurrent interest in Slavophilism in Russia we can summarize those ideas that have far outlived the original Slavophiles and some of their utopian dreams and fantasies. These ideas are

1. the philosophical concept of *sobornost'*, i.e., the idea of a free interplay between the individual human being and society when both are sublimated by a common hierarchy of spiritual values;
2. an organic *weltanschauung*, partly inherited from the German romantics: rejection of revolutionary disruptions of the historical development of societies and acceptance of only evolutionary or "organic" progress, emanating from within the society and its evolving institutions.

These ideas and the belief that Russia and Slavdom or the Byzantine Orthodox world have an autonomous historical destiny, different from that of the Roman-Protestant West, have outlived the original Slavophilism.²⁴ The concept of the free person in an organic unity with society, in place of the Western notion of an isolated free individual, has already appeared in the works of Ivan Kireevskii.²⁵ Overshadowed by Khomiakov's lapses into collectivism,²⁶ it was revived by Dosto-

evsky, Konstantin Leont'ev, Vladimir Solov'ev, S. Trubetskoi, and, particularly, N. Berdiaev, Semën Ludvigovich Frank, and Nikolai Losskii of the Russian religiophilosophical school of this century. It was the "discovery of the Slavophiles as philosophers" that revived and preserved Slavophilism as a school of thought for the contemporary Russian,²⁷ despite the verdict of both Nikolai Berdiaev and Andrzej Walicki that Slavophilism was finished for good in the second half of the nineteenth century.²⁸ It is this revived Slavophilism that has come down to the neo-Slavophiles of our days, mainly via *Vekhi*.

THE OLD AND THE NEW

As early as 1905 the experience of the horrors of that year made Berdiaev say, "The Slavophiles . . . were idealists . . . influenced by the idyllic and *Schönseeligkeit*, whereas it has been our fate to become tragic realists. . . . The Slavophiles knew nothing . . . of this terror or sense of tragedy; the ground did not tremble under their feet, nor did the earth burst into flames as it did under us."²⁹ Today these words seem even more relevant, and this is precisely what makes contemporary neo-Slavophilism such an interesting phenomenon. After all the horrors of the twentieth century it still finds inspiration in the optimistic doctrines of the nineteenth-century Slavophiles—or is it because of the horrors? Is it a search for escape in dreams?

Elements of dreamy romanticism indeed occasionally can be found in some neo-Slavophile writings, dreams of a future re-Christianized Holy Russia, repurified through the bloody sufferings of a revived and regenerated Russian people.³⁰ But more typically, in contrast to the original Slavophiles' optimistic faith in the Russia and the Russian people they knew, there is realistic pessimism in the contemporary neo-Slavophiles. They fear that the Russian nation is disintegrating both physically and morally: witness the catastrophic decline in birth rates, the unprecedentedly high and still growing rate of alcoholism, and the disintegration of traditional morality and ethics under the impact of the relativist materialistic Marxist education. The only hope they express is in an eleventh-hour spiritual and national regeneration. Igor' Shafarevich believes that nothing short of a divine miracle will do and sees hope in the national and religious revival that is taking place.³¹ Others believe in the prior necessity of awakening patriotic awareness

of national traditions and culture that would then awaken an awareness of Christianity and its values as sources of the national culture.³²

Now these fears are expressed quite openly in the Soviet media. Witness, for instance, such works as V. Rasputin's *Fire*, V. Astafiev's *Sad Detective Story*, and his cycle of short stories under the title of *Place of Action*, which all depict a terrible state of moral decline of the nation and its intelligentsia under the impact of the godless materialistic upbringing.³³ Even Gorbachev in his informal talk with a group of Soviet writers on the eve of their All-Union Congress in June 1986 (characteristically unpublished but distributed through samizdat) appealed to them to help him "save the nation, especially the Slavs, . . . because no one is suffering [from alcoholism] as much as the Slavonic part of the nation."³⁴

What even the pessimistic "neo-Slavophiles" share with the original Slavophilism is the belief that salvation cannot come from the West, where religion has been reduced to a secular moral normativism,³⁵ and that the two-dimensional world of unprincipled, hedonistic, selfish politicking prevents the Western mind's penetration into and realization of the real depth of the contemporary crisis, a crisis requiring metapolitical solutions.³⁶ Thus the contemporary neo-Slavophiles see a certain fulfillment of the nineteenth-century Slavophiles' predictions regarding the West, much more so than did the generation of *Vekhi* and *Iz glubiny* (From the Depths), whose experiences of the Russian revolutions made them view the West much more optimistically than their own nation.³⁷

The original Slavophiles maintained that the Russian people were patriarchal, conservative, antirevolutionary, communal, deeply religious, and had very strong family ties and family life.³⁸ *Vekhi* still saw many of these characteristics in the Russian peasantry but warned that they were rapidly being destroyed by the secular and morally licentious Russian intelligentsia (who, as primary schoolteachers, were affecting the young peasants) and the revolutionary and/or popular scientific brochures for the people.³⁹ The neo-Slavophiles today regard the nation as being in a demoralized state, with the villages dying, the peasants disappearing, and the "strong patriarchal peasant family" practically nonexistent.

In contrast to the early Slavophiles, the neo-Slavophiles do not share their idealization of the commune. Similarly to their predecessors they

do not occupy themselves too much with economic problems, seeing these, just like the Polish Solidarity movement, as a derivative of the general state of society, soluble in the conditions of greater freedom and autonomy for the individual.⁴⁰ However, where the neo-Slavophiles differ considerably from the original Slavophiles is in their attitude toward the state. As children of the historical experiences of 1917 and its aftermath, they do not share Aksakov's optimistic anarchism; they are much closer to Danilevskii's and Leont'ev's etatist revision of Slavophilism. The typical attitude of the neo-Slavophile or *pochvennik* is a recognition of the state's necessity, a pragmatic acceptance of a strong authoritarian (not totalitarian) state as a pragmatically preferred alternative to chaos, and a recognition that democracy cannot appear like a phoenix out of the ruins of totalitarianism. This is the essence of Solzhenitsyn's message in his famous *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, so tragically and wrongly misinterpreted by Western liberal journalism as defense of dictatorship.⁴¹

In contrast to the "conditional authoritarianism" of the *pochvenniki* and the neo-Slavophiles, the National Bolsheviks or neo-Nazis are totalitarians. Among the earlier overt expressions of this trend had been the Fetisov-Antonov group and the wing in the Komsomol represented by Valerii Skurlatov and his like. The problem of affixing labels is that even within the National Bolshevik trend the important difference is between the pro-Christian and the heathen wings, as it were.⁴² Thus, the Fetisov-Antonov group and the so-called *A Nation Speaks* manifesto associated with that group had high regard for Christianity, in particular for the historical Orthodox church, but strictly as a national-cultural phenomenon, as a national ideology, i.e., subordinate to state interests; whereas the Komsomol National Bolsheviks have expressed themselves in racist terms combined with the cult of force, in the "best traditions" of National Socialism. Ivan Samolvin's samizdat letter to Solzhenitsyn with its condemnation of "Judeo-cosmopolitan" Christianity and praise for the allegedly Russian national paganism should be seen as belonging to that "school of thought."⁴³ It may, in fact, have originated from or been produced in collaboration with the professional Soviet atheistic establishment, alarmed by the growth of attraction of the nation toward the pre- and non-Marxist spiritual culture, Russia's history, and its religious art and architecture. Rightly fearing that these are but outward manifestations of a thirst for the

faith in God, Soviet antireligious publications have not only tried to separate religious art from Orthodox Christianity, but, particularly on the approaches toward the Millennium of Russian Christianity, have been presenting the Orthodox church as a consistent enemy of Russian national interests and the Russian culture. Contrary to the writings of such great Soviet culturologists as Dimitry Likhachev, Sergei Averintsev, and a host of lesser scholars and literary figures⁴⁴ who stress the fundamental contribution of the Orthodox church to the formation and development of all aspects of the national culture and the primitive and static character of paganism,⁴⁵ the professional atheists have been trying to present paganism as a true representative, creator, and promoter of the genuine Russian culture.⁴⁶

The pro-Christian line of the mentioned Fetisov-Antonov group and *A Nation Speaks*, on the other hand, has been inherited by Gennadii Shimanov and the samizdat almanac *Mnogaia leta* (*Many Years*), produced in 1980–81 by him with a tiny group of associates—inherited, but also developed and diversified. In contrast to Antonov's attempt to marry Leninism with Slavophilism, Shimanov and his associates are no friends of any brand of Marxism, but they are totalitarians inasmuch as they see the Soviet state structure of total control as the only appropriate one, the only one that would be capable of achieving a reconversion of the whole Russian nation back to Orthodox Christianity. All that has to be done is an ideological reconversion of the state leadership from Marxism, which they see as an anti-Russian Judeo-Masonic internationalist plot, to Russian nationalism, which is inconceivable without the Orthodox church. But the state machine, its effective police system, must be left intact in order to effect a reconversion of the rest of the nation. Although *Many Years* contains many attacks on the Jews, even on such Jewish converts to Orthodox Christianity as the famous Moscow priest, Fr. Aleksandr Men', it is not anti-Semitic in the conventional meaning of the term. Shimanov has been advocating the creation of a national home for the unassimilated Jews in Crimea. His thesis is that the Jews have played a nationally destructive role in the Bolshevik Revolution and its aftermath (including the "League of the Militant Godless") because they have lacked a national home within the confines of the Russian Empire or the USSR (no one, apparently, takes Birobidjan seriously). This is basically a *pochvennik* thesis that creativity and constructive contribution to national life

begin with the soil, a sense of belongingness, while cosmopolitanism breeds disloyalty, indifference, and destructiveness, particularly toward a national organism with strong traditions and a hierarchy of values to which such a rootless group does not belong. The attacks of *Many Years* against Fr. Men' belong to the same system of reasoning. He is accused of being too sympathetic toward Roman Catholicism (which allegedly collaborates with Zionism) and of proposing to Jews converting to Orthodox Christianity not to completely integrate within Russian Orthodoxy, but to form a Judeo-Christian church which would retain all the Judaic traditions, like the early St. Jacob's Christian community of Jerusalem. This, according to the article, makes Fr. Men' an agent of Zionism whose aim is to prevent full assimilation of Christian Jews, to preserve them for the subversive Zionist work.⁴⁷ Lately, this "semi-Christian" anti-Zionist National Bolshevism has come into the open in the so-called *Pamiat'* (Memory), one of the "nonformal associations," unofficial but tolerated by the Gorbachev regime. The movement proclaims Masonic-Zionist internationalist forces as Russia's enemy number one, allegedly aiming at the destruction of Russia, Russian culture, and Russian spirituality, including the Orthodox Christian church. It seems to be a mixed bag of defenders of the church as a church of God, as well as of extreme nationalists, defending and trying to preserve church buildings and iconography only as art, as expressions of the national genius. According to some unofficial reports, at their meetings speakers have on occasion condemned Christianity as a Jewish legacy and as too internationalist to serve Russian national interests, preferring a revival of old paganism. But according to attacks in the Soviet press, *Pamiat'* spokesmen demand return of the church buildings to the church for the purpose of worship. In the spring of 1987 it was unofficially reported from Moscow that a *Pamiat'* street demonstration marched on to the city party headquarters to demand official legislation. Representatives of the organization were received by Boris Yeltsyn, the first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. So far the organization has not received official recognition, and according to reliable although unofficial sources, four of its leaders have been expelled from the Communist party. *Pamiat'* condemns the destruction of churches. Not daring to blame the anti-Russian and antihistorical policies of the Lenin era on Lenin personally, it accuses the Masons and Zionists, citing the Jewish names of Kaganovich, who had been in

charge of Moscow's "reconstruction" from the late 1920s and responsible for the destruction of most of Old Moscow, Gubelman-Yaroslavsky, the founder and head of the League of Militant Godless, Ginzburg, the chief Moscow architect, etc. D. Vasil'ev, the leader of the movement, however, claims in his public speeches that he is not an anti-Semite, but an anti-Zionist, which is an anti-Christian and anti-Russian ideology, allegedly.⁴⁸ The movement, no doubt, has defenders and protectors in high places; it may have been at least to some extent inspired by Yeltsyn's April 1986 speech at a meeting of the Moscow party's ideological workers. There he condemned the destruction "of the historical face of Moscow, in the course of which 2,200 historical monuments had been annihilated," and complained that the remaining "monuments" were mostly in a sorry state and "are not being used for the purpose for which they were built."⁴⁹ This is a veiled form of saying that churches should be used as churches—precisely what *Pamiat'* has been calling for, according to the Soviet media. But in May 1987, *Pamiat'* was attacked in *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, a mouthpiece of Yegor Ligachev, the Communist party central committee second secretary, a hard-line Gorbachev antagonist in the Politburo and its chief of ideology.⁵⁰ Less than three months later, an unprecedented anti-Yeltsyn outburst appeared on *Pravda's* front page. In it, Yeltsyn was criticized for permitting "the use of streets and squares in Moscow . . . for public meetings of extremists who kindle international hatred."⁵¹ By November 1987 Yeltsyn was out of office. Whether this is a blow to the fortunes of *Pamiat'* as well, it is too early to say. The reactions of the "informal associations" to Yeltsyn's fall suggest that he had taken a benevolent attitude not only to *Pamiat'* but to all expressions of independent public opinion in his attempts to speed and deepen the reforms and to curb the overall monopoly of the *nomenklatura*. Whereas a 1987 internal Komsomol instruction to its cells indicates that just like the National Bolshevism of the 1960s, which had centered on the Komsomol publication *Molodaia gvardiia*, so too its new incarnation in the form of *Pamiat'* evidently enjoys the support of the Komsomol leadership. The letter instructs local Komsomol organizations to render support to and infiltrate those informal youth associations which "have a patriotic character," but "actively resist *careerists and human-rightists*."⁵²

Now, with the fall of Yeltsyn and Gorbachev's vocal attacks on his

former henchman, the regime seems to be adjusting its position vis-à-vis both reform in general and Russian nationalism. Further, the promotion of the antinationalist A. Iakovlev to full Politburo membership, where he is Ligachev's chief lieutenant for ideological matters, does not seem to strengthen either the religious or the nationalist "lobby."⁵³

The above should illustrate to the reader how the subject of Russian neonationalism in whatever aspects, and its relationship to the church, has "suddenly" moved in the last three to four years from what had seemed to be a purely academic matter to the position of a central theme in internal party politics and power struggles. We shall yet throw a look at how "Russian nationalism" affects the nationality policies in Gorbachev's Soviet Union. But in the meantime, let us turn to the more moderate and the more genuinely Orthodox Christian nationalists. Even these elements cannot entirely avoid the temptation of abusing the church for statist-nationalist purposes. *Zemlia* (*The Native Soil* being perhaps the closest translation), a *pochvennyi* samizdat periodical published by Vladimir Osipov, a wholly honorable Russian Christian *pochvennik*, just before his second arrest and condemnation to eight years in a strict regime labor camp, contained the following passage by his wife, Mashkova, cozily misquoting the first chapter of St. John's Gospel to fit Russia: "Russia is different. . . . In her beginning there was the Word, the Church, and through her all things were made, and without her was not any thing made that was made. In her 'was life; and the life was the light of men.' " She even gave the "appropriate" gospel reference.⁵⁴ This is an extreme case; probably more typically representative of the neo-Slavophiles is historian Vadim Borisov, who tried to build a theory of "eternity" and evangelical legitimacy of nations as collective persons on the basis of such gospel quotations as "Go ye therefore and teach all nations."⁵⁵

The nationalist temptation remains strong and often results in a confused and confusing identification of the nation with its government, i.e., what commonly is known among Russians as the temptation of National Bolshevism in the Soviet context.⁵⁶ Father Dimitry Dudko's repentant statement with its anti-Westernist and etatist overtones came as the culmination of a long evolution (or, rather, degradation) from Christian love and compassion for the humiliated and oppressed Russian people, his flock (both real and figurative), to the

idealization of Nicholas II and imperial Russia. Those close to him began to notice long before his arrest in January 1980 that he was reacting positively to the state-nationalist game played with him by the KGB during periodic interrogations.⁵⁷ Essentially, the rules of this game are not unlike those of many contemporary Western Sovietologists who claim a direct continuity from the czars to the Soviets.⁵⁸ The KGB National Bolshevik line is that a patriot, whether he agrees with Marxism or not, should support the Soviet state in order not to play into the hands of Russia's historical enemies.

FROM THE UNDERGROUND TO "OFFICIAL NATIONALISM"?

The collective or umbrella term for the various brands of Russian nationalists or nationalists trying to operate within or at least on the fringes of the Soviet establishment, either in the cultural-preservationist or even a political context, has been the *Russites* ("The Russian Party" having a strictly political, predominantly National Bolshevik connotation). The Russites appear to have first come into the open in 1964, when a group of Moscow University students with Komsomol support founded the *Rodina* (Homeland) Society, organizing student pilgrimages to Russia's ancient towns, monasteries, and churches, and collecting donations to restore some of them. Two years later the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical Monuments was founded.⁵⁹ The well-known artist Il'ia Glazunov, a Russite with a rather controversial reputation among the dissidents, appears to have been active in launching both societies. In this Glazunov seems to have had the backing of the armed forces and the Komsomol—both concerned with the diminishing patriotism and growing cynicism of Soviet youth.⁶⁰ One of the signs of this backing was a 1967 article by Marshal Konev, who was entrusted with the national-patriotic education of youth, complaining of its pacifism and cosmopolitanism. Soon after this, articles began to appear in *Molodaia gvardiia* praising the patriotic role of some medieval Russian saints. Slavophiles also began to receive sympathetic attention in some Soviet journals.⁶¹

The party leadership seems to have given *rusity* its support as long as it appeared that this secular nationalism might be a substitute for the

dying Marxist ideology, a replacement Soviet patriotism with claims to a national-historical continuity—even to the extent of restoring old churches as historical monuments to the genius of the first nation of socialism. But confessions like the one by Lanshchikov cited earlier, indicating that beyond restoring shells of churches there was a genuine search for God, began to disquiet Soviet leaders. Also, it soon became known widely that the Society for the Protection of Historical Monuments counted among its several million members many practicing Christians trying to preserve churches and religious art as museum pieces for the time being, in the hope of better times to come. Realizing this intimate connection between the national-patriotic and religious orientations in Russian thought, the party attacked Russian nationalist tendencies in 1970,⁶² removed the Russite editor of *Molodaia gvardiia* from his job in 1971,⁶³ and once again allowed a particularly vicious attack on Russian nationalism by the Central Committee's ideological apparatchik, A. Iakovlev, in 1972.⁶⁴

Also in 1972 harassment of Vladimir Osipov and his samizdat publication *Veche* was intensified. The appearance of *Veche* in the year in which *Molodaia gvardiia* was purged had not been coincidental. According to a source very close to Osipov, the idea was suggested to him by relatively highly placed *rusity*, most likely with KGB blessing. They hoped he would continue the National Bolshevik line of *Molodaia gvardiia* without the commitment of the state and party establishment to it, since *Veche* would be a typewritten samizdat publication without any formal official sanction.⁶⁵ But Osipov, a genuine Christian and a Russian patriot (in that order of priorities), resisted National Bolshevik pressures the best he could. In 1974 he officially closed the publication, declaring his disagreement with the National Bolshevik chauvinists, and started, with his Christian Slavophile accomplices, a new journal, *Zemlia*. A few months later he was arrested on KGB orders and sentenced by the local Vladimir court to eight years at "strict regime" hard labor, the shortest term possible as he had already served a seven-year term under the same article. According to one source, the judges, being Russian patriots, later sent their apologies to Osipov for being forced to incarcerate him for actions with which, apparently, they sympathized.⁶⁶

Some intellectuals see a direct connection between Osipov's arrest and the downfall of Aleksandr Shelepin and Dimitri Polianskii, two

former Politburo supporters of the *rusity*.⁶⁷ Characteristically, it was not only the *rusity* protectors who fell. Iakovlev, likewise, soon after his attack on Russian nationalism was shipped off as Soviet ambassador to Canada.⁶⁸ Andropov recalled Iakovlev to Moscow and made him the head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. Although Iakovlev has been acting as the Politburo's chief press spokesman for *perestroika*, Gorbachev's marked timidity and ambiguity regarding the party reform and other concrete aspects of it, as well as the nonfulfillment of the promises made by Kharchev, head of the Council of Religious Affairs, to release all religious prisoners, indicate the weakening of the reformist wing with the expulsion of Yeltsyn.⁶⁹

Among *Veche*'s supporters and financiers from the influential Russite circles was the enigmatic Il'ia Glazunov, a nationalist painter. In 1977 he became internationally known with the scandal over his monumental painting *The Mystery of the Twentieth Century*, with its idealistic depiction of Nicholas II, Stolypin, Solzhenitsyn, Einstein, and even Adenauer, along with the leaders of most other Western states. Separated from them by a sea of blood and emerging from it are the figures of Stalin, Mao, Lenin, Hitler, Mussolini, Roosevelt, and Churchill.⁷⁰ Above them there is an iconographic, weightless figure of Christ. When his first one-man public exhibition was about to open, his condition was that his *Mystery* be included. When this was rejected, he refused to hold the exhibition—an unprecedented event in the history of Soviet art.⁷¹ Rumors began to circulate that it was an act of protest against Osipov's incarceration. This raised Glazunov's credibility in the dissident, nationalist, Christian, and general intelligentsia circles, where for many years he had been suspected of close links with the KGB. Soon, however, it transpired that Glazunov's act may have been a publicity gimmick.

Owing to all these factors, when his one-man exhibition finally opened at the Moscow *Manezh* in 1978, organized by the Ministry of Culture (since the Union of Artists continued to snub Glazunov's programmatic art, often akin to quasi-iconographic posters), it caused a sensation. Probably the unprecedented mass of potential viewers waiting in queues for hours on end (some 700,000 did manage to see the four-week exhibition) had expected to see the *Mystery*. But this

time Glazunov agreed to hold the exhibition without it. The viewers were gratified by large numbers of paintings with religious and biblical themes, often with Russian national overtones (e.g., *The Return of the Prodigal Son*, in which the Son is in jeans and the Father looks like a traditional Russian peasant surrounded by saints and heroes from Russian history). The visitors' book at the exhibition was filled to the brim with nearly 1,500 comments, many signed by groups of visitors. In addition, according to reports, there were over 3,000 comments on separate sheets of paper that, in contrast to the book, have not reached the West. My own study of 190 random samples from the book produced at least 32 percent of comments of a clearly national and church orientation. In 8 percent of the cases the religious sentiment predominated; in others it was nationalism expressed in a context of sorrow for the state of the Russian nation under the Soviet regime, thanking the artist for "rehabilitating" the historical Russia and its culture, church, saints, and other historical figures. It was a clear contraposition of the nation and the contemporary Soviet state. Twenty-nine percent in this sample praised Glazunov, 3 percent expressed irritation and lack of confidence in his sincerity and his kind of patriotism. In the remainder, less than 7 percent of the comments were clearly procommunist and antireligious; of these less than 1 percent (i.e., one-seventh of this 7 percent category) approved of Glazunov.⁷²

According to samizdat, the visitors' book was taken for special scrutiny by a team set up for the purpose by the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Commission. Perhaps the greater tolerance of nationalisms, Russian as well as that of other Soviet nationalities, by the Gorbachev regime and the particular privileged status of Glazunov is a result of some secret decisions taken after the above study.⁷³ A telling aside may be in order here. As soon as he sensed that *Pamiat'* might be in hot water, Glazunov disowned it in a *Pravda* article. He rejected all rumors and western press allegations as to his leading position in the *Pamiat'* movement:

I have always been and remain a Russian, a Soviet citizen and a patriot, an internationalist. I have no relation to "Pamiat'".

There are many good people among the "Pamiat'" members, patriots of our country, of the Soviet people. It is a pity that occasion-

ally opportunists and chauvinists hang on to these healthy forces of our society.⁷⁴

Just as he had washed his hands of Osipov when he was in trouble, Glazunov has now washed his hands of a movement which, if anything, has been inspired by his chauvinism and anti-Semitism, known to anyone who had privately spoken with him, and seen by many in some of his paintings—for instance, the *Prodigal Son*, where the latter is in Western jeans while Satan, thrown into the picture, has clearly distinguishable Semitic facial features.⁷⁵

NATIONALISM AND MESSIANISM

Veche has claimed that the rise of Russian nationalism was a reaction (1) to the anti-Russian nationalist separatist movements in the national republics, and (2) to such anti-Russian writings as *The Program of the Democratic Movement*, V. Grossman's *Forever Flowing*, Amalrik's *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984*, and the "Metanoia" symposium. *A Nation Speaks* is said to have been the first immediate response to these writings.⁷⁶ This could be compared to the effect of Chaadaev on the birth of Slavophilism in the nineteenth century as a coherent school of thought. Indeed, if Amalrik, the *Program*, and Grossman can be seen as successors to the various brands of the secular and positivist Westernism of the nineteenth century, the "Metanoia" authors are closer to Chaadaev. They appear to be Orthodox Christians, religiously oriented, who see no hope for the future outside a historical Christian context. Like Chaadaev, they are pro-Western in their "historiosophy" and highly critical of the Russian church-state history; they criticize Russia's imperial expansion, subjugation of other nations, and other historical aspects. Like Solzhenitsyn, they call for repentance for these national sins and for a spiritually regenerated intelligentsia. In contrast to Chaadaev, however, they condemn messianism, seeing in it a rationale for imperialism.

The relative absence of messianism (in the sense of a national calling to save the world) in much of the neo-Slavophile and *pochvennyye* writings distinguishes them from their nineteenth-century forebears.

Although *Veche*, a free forum for any Russian-oriented thought, had published a number of articles with clearly messianic overtones, its editor, Vladimir Osipov, declared full support for Solzhenitsyn's *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*. The *Letter* condemned all aggression in foreign policy, preached withdrawal from all foreign territories and noninterference in the affairs of other states (at least until Russia's own house had been put in order, spiritually and morally), and advocated secession of all those Soviet territories that so desired. *Veche* itself editorially condemned Soviet abuse of Russian national interest in suppressing other nations and proclaimed the principle of voluntary association based on respect for the interests, culture, and autochthonous identity of each nation, however small.⁷⁷ Even writers with Slavophile overtones who do cherish some elements of messianism clearly reject its Pan-Slavist or Katkovian-Danilevskian model of military conquest. One writes that Russia is a broader concept than the area speaking the Russian language or than the borders of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). He says that it is a cultural subcontinental phenomenon, but able to attract and assimilate other nations only through its spiritual culture: the church, music, and literature. Once these are suppressed and the official state deprived of these categories, the Soviet Marxist state can only disseminate antagonism and anti-Russian secessionist feelings among the other nations held together by the regime.⁷⁸ Another author foresees a regenerated Russian Orthodox state born out of the present suffering as a moral attraction to other nations in the future, not at all as an aggressor subordinating other nations by force.⁷⁹

M. Agursky, a Jewish sympathizer of the moderate Russian Slavophiles, explains the revival of Russian nationalism and Slavophilism as the defensive action of a great nation in danger of biological and moral drowning in the Soviet sea, helped by the deliberate melting-pot policies of the Soviets.⁸⁰ Osipov and other *Veche* and *Zemlia* contributors visualize the Russian nation as being in danger of biological and moral extinction because of drunkenness and low birthrates as well as the factors named by Agursky. This is how Osipov justifies his appeal to patriotism and nationalism: it is necessary to regenerate the nation morally to stop its national suicide. For him personally, he writes, Christ and Christianity are much loftier than the ideas of nation and nationalism. But, writes Osipov, the nation en masse has been system-

atically de-Christianized for too long to respond to a direct Christian appeal; the immediate need is the interlinked problem of biological and moral survival of the physically (low birth rates) and morally (alcoholism, high crime rate) declining Russian nation.⁸¹

Another *Veche* author takes an even dimmer view: "The national emotions of the Russians . . . have been more undermined than those of other nations; therefore, it is hardly possible to unite Russians under the colors of patriotism. But . . . there is simply no other way out. . . . The Russian nation . . . must . . . purge itself of its ignorance of nationalism, return . . . to the Orthodox Church and its national culture."⁸² The identification of the Russian nation and Orthodox Christianity is incontrovertible in his eyes.

Many argue that even in a purely Soviet context the Russian nation is more underprivileged than others: it alone lacks a national capital and a national *Russian* communist party, i.e., it lacks a channel for the presentation of national grievances and for the defense of the local interests of ethnic Russia within the Soviet power echelons.⁸³

The concern for self-preservation caused some subtly racist articles in *Veche*, including some by and about Lev Gumilev, the Leningrad history professor who in his "ethnos" theories argues that "overhybridization" leads to loss of a sense of national identity and culture in a nation, eventually depriving it of its self-preservation instinct and the will to stand up for itself. *Veche* also picked up K. Leont'ev's theories according to which the survival and development of human culture depend on the dynamic flowering of individual, different local and national cultures, while mechanical assimilation, cultural fusion, and homogenization of all kinds lead to the death of culture.⁸⁴ Favorable comments on both authors and their frequent citation in *Veche* should indicate where many of the contemporary neo-Slavophiles' sympathies lie. It ought to be stressed, however, that Leont'ev was a defender of national individualism and opposed artificial Russification of the other nationalities of the empire. He died an Orthodox monk, but philosophically was a proto-Nietzschean and proto-Eurasian. His pessimistically prophetic visions regarding the twentieth century fit the moods of the contemporary Russian patriot more than the optimism of the classical Slavophiles.

THE SEMINARS

The short-lived *Zemlia*, replacement for *Veche*, in its "programmatic" article signed by the editor Osipov and his deputy V. S. Rodionov, stated that (1) in isolation from Christianity nationalism is satanic and would throw the Russian nation into a new abyss; (2) the main aim of *Zemlia* was the regeneration of ethics, morality, and the national culture; (3) these national aims could not be achieved without constitutional guarantees of human rights and without freedom of expression.⁸⁵ This triad is characteristic of the religiophilosophic seminars mentioned earlier.

Although there is no evidence of personal or organizational connections, there is continuity and evolution: *vskhson* was rounded up in 1967, and the following year the *Chronicle of Current Events* began to be published. Although the democratic movement it represented was apolitical and areligious, its emphasis on the autonomous human person (the struggle for individual human rights) stemmed from Christian ethics and eventually led many of its participants to the church.⁸⁶ The samizdat document discussed earlier on the necessity of founding Christian seminars and fraternities organizationally independent from the church came from the grass-roots democratic movement around 1970 and can be seen as a forerunner of the religiophilosophic seminars. In 1971 Osipov began to publish his neo-Slavophile *Veche*. Although the journal was critical of the democratic movement's secularism and cosmopolitanism, its editor (and probably many of its contributors) continued to cooperate with the "democrats" by signing petitions on behalf of those persecuted and oppressed. In 1974 the genuine Christian Slavophile *Veche* participants⁸⁷ parted with the National Bolsheviks. The sterility of the latter is illustrated by the fact that after producing only one issue of *Veche* (mostly made up of materials prepared by Osipov) they folded. The same year saw the publication of the much more genuinely soil-bound Christian Orthodox *Zemlia* and the appearance of the religiophilosophic seminars in Leningrad and Moscow.⁸⁸

The Leningrad seminar was inspired, in part, by the very popular lectures of the young Professor Boris Paramonov of the Leningrad University Faculty of Philosophy (1969–74). He incorporated into his courses "topics from the history of Russian religious thought," causing a sharp rise in students' interest in the subject. (There were long waiting lists for Bulgakov's and Berdiaev's books at the university library.) In the

spring of 1972 Paramonov even was allowed, as an experiment, to give a specialized seminar on Russian religious philosophy; the following year it was not allowed to be repeated. In 1974 Paramonov was dismissed from his teaching post and soon compelled to emigrate.⁸⁹

The topics raised by Paramonov in the overcrowded auditorium at the university now moved to a basement apartment occupied by Lev Rutkevich, a young philosophy and psychology lecturer. It was there that the religiophilosophic seminar started to meet as a regular central event of an unofficial Movement for Spiritual Culture. The movement began to issue literary, artistic, and religiophilosophic samizdat journals, to organize unofficial exhibitions of unofficial art, etc. At first the seminar topics included non-Marxist philosophy in general, Oriental religions, and Freudianism, but the greatest interest was evoked by studies of the church fathers.⁹⁰ From there it moved on to the study of the Orthodox church, Slavophilism, and Russian religious philosophy, merging again with the traditional Russian Christian *pochvennichestvo*. The movement also gave birth to a feminist movement and its journals: *Woman and Russia*, which included both Christian and secular orientations,⁹¹ and *Maria*, its title alluding to Mary Magdalene and the myrrh-bearing women, emphatically stated the strong Christian persuasion of its contributors.⁹²

The Movement for Spiritual Culture did not enclose itself in the ivory tower of abstract intellectualizing. Beside the facts that its activities and exhibitions embraced over two thousand people (including visitors) and led most of its participants to the church, its members also participated in general human rights activities. Two of its members, artists, were imprisoned for painting slogans in huge letters on the walls of Leningrad public buildings and public transport vehicles demanding freedom for Tverdokhlebov, the imprisoned founder and secretary of the Moscow branch of Amnesty International. Another member, the poet Iuliia Voznesenskaia, was sent into Siberian exile; later she was imprisoned for refusing to incriminate the painters and eventually emigrated in 1980.⁹³

The founder of the Moscow seminar was Aleksandr Ogorodnikov, a former student at the All-Union Institute of Cinematography, expelled in 1973 for "ideological reasons." From its very beginning the Moscow seminar had a more activist orientation than the Leningrad one. Its Statement of Principles declared, inter alia, the following aims:

III.

1. Fraternal Christian communion of love . . . re-establishment of Christian communities [on the basis of existing parishes and otherwise].
2. Construction of an Orthodox *Weltanschauung* and . . . theological education. The Russian émigrés have preserved the very depth of our national soul, the Russian religious thought. Familiarizing ourselves with their help with the depths of Orthodoxy, we must carry its burden.
3. The duty of missionary service . . . [to be realized by the] laity who are the freest members of the Church. The consolidation and restoration of the Christian community . . . inside and around the church walls is necessary for a more fruitful service to God and to fellow-man. . . .

.

V. *On Russia*. . . . The Imperishable beauty of the Church revealed Russia for us. . . . To love Russia means to take up its Cross. . . . We are united in our:

1. Love for Mother-Russia.
2. Fraternal love for the Christians of all nationalities.
3. Respect for the national dignity of different ethnic groups.⁹⁴

In one of its meetings the seminar planned a tentative program that was to include summer camps for children and youth to be run as Christian communes. The seminar published a journal, *Obshchina* (Commune), and bought a village hut for Ogorodnikov not far from Moscow with the aim of establishing it as an embryonic Christian commune. Ogorodnikov tried to register on this property as an individual farmer living off the garden plot, but the application was refused and in 1978 he was sentenced to one year at hard labor allegedly for parasitism. A year later he received an additional sentence of six years at "strict regime" hard labor to be followed by three years' internal exile, allegedly for antistate propaganda while in camp. Nevertheless, the seminar attempted to continue to function even after Ogorodnikov's incarceration. At least eight other members of the seminar were also incarcerated, while others were expelled from colleges or fired from jobs.⁹⁵

The seminar received harsher treatment than its Leningrad counterpart, which continued to publish various literary and philosophical

samizdat symposia, and where the artists' offshoot was even allowed to register officially in 1981 as a "Fellowship of Experimental Representative Art" (ТЕИ in its Russian acronym), which in 1987 joined the newly formed Leningrad Cultural-Democratic Movement, whose council represents a host of nonformal groups in the city, and which publishes the samizdat bulletin *Merkurii* (Mercury).

The reasons for the particularly harsh treatment of the Ogorodnikov seminar may have been its emphasis on social activism, on a wide social-Christian mission, and its greater geographical expansion, encompassing Moscow, Leningrad, Ufa, Kazan', Smolensk, etc.⁹⁶

The declaration of the Moscow seminar on Russia and its practical striving for the soil and community *sobornost'* (the village hut, the attempt to found Christian communes) indicates its rootedness in Russian Slavophilism in its purer form. This was articulated further by its leader, Vladimir Poresh, a bibliographer from Leningrad, after Ogorodnikov's incarceration. At his trial in 1979 he declared that by participating in the seminar he acted "in the national interest of Russia." The national interest is neither chauvinistic nor collectivistic in this context, for in his last statement Poresh spoke about a distant aim of creating "a Christian community outside national boundaries," expressing full solidarity with the struggle of the Italian Catholic youth movement *Communione e Libertà* to liberate humanity from the collectivistic tyranny of society.⁹⁷

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

To recapitulate the main features of the neo-Slavophile or soil-bound trends in Russia, in the broad sense of these terms:

1. They do not share the optimism of the early Slavophiles, only their hopes—hopes of regeneration.
2. Their nationalism is predominantly defensive; we may call it a nationalism of survival.
3. Apart from the National Bolsheviks or neo-Nazis, the soil-bound and neo-Slavophile elements are not messianically expansionist and are opposed to the retention of the empire by coercion and to any forms of imposed or accelerated assimilation. They uphold the views of K. Leont'ev that reducing nations, national cultures, and individuals

to a faceless common denominator would end human development and spell its moral death.

4. Again, except for the extremists, the neo-Slavophiles and *pochvenniki* generally have more faith in constitutional guarantees and the rule of law than did the original Slavophiles. In this they follow the Solov'evian-Vekhian revision of Slavophilism. The experience of Soviet arbitrariness may also have taught them a lesson. But like their forebears, they attach more value to personalities in social life and politics than to institutions.⁹⁸
5. They have no faith in collectivism *per se*.
6. There is no trace of Aksakov's "conservative anarchism" (Walicki's term) in any of the variants of neo-Slavophilism, nationalism, or *pochvennichestvo*. All of them recognize the necessity of a strong government with broad regulatory powers in the social and economic life of the nation.

Is the movement important? A movement that tries to root itself in national traditions, culture, and spirituality has more chance of a response from the nation than one that propagates concepts, however attractive, that have no backing in national traditions (e.g., Western liberalism). Although all these groupings are unofficial, the toleration of the so-called nonformal groups by the current regime, their proliferation, and their public support by such influential figures as Likhachev adds new importance to them. The victory of the ecological group in their hard and bitter ten-year struggle against the reversal of northern rivers and the positive response of the Soviet media, praising this initiative "from below" and encouraging such activization of the public for the future, is another pointer to the unprecedented importance of unofficial or nonformal movements in the era of *perestroika*.⁹⁹

The potential "mass platform" envisaged by the *pochvenniki* is religious believers, members of the historically national Orthodox church, rejuvenated by neophytes.¹⁰⁰

Whereas in the past explicit discourses on the interrelationship of the national and religious regeneration could be found only in samizdat, and implicit ones only in some Ruralist writings, explicit apologia for the church and her positive contribution to the nation and its moral health now appear in the official media and public statements.¹⁰¹

Except for the already discussed fringe groups, such as *Pamiat'*,

which, as we have seen, has at least so far been held in check by the Soviet leadership, both samizdat and officially published nativists (*pochvenniki*) condemn nationalistic exclusivism of all kinds. Whereas cosmopolitanism, in their view, is a materialistic category of indifference to fellow man and hence to one's nation and its spiritual culture, treatment of the nation as an aim in itself leads to Nazism.

Dimitry Likhachev, presiding over the semigovernmental Culture Fund (which, for the first time in the history of the USSR, includes a churchman in its Presidium, Metropolitan Pitirim), draws a distinction between patriotism and nationalism. A patriot, writes Likhachev, loves his country and equally respects and loves the cultures and national expressions of other nations. A nationalist has an atavistic pride in his country, while hating or despising other nations.¹⁰² In another article, a few months later, he declares the church, the monasteries, religious art, and music as the sources and the most fundamental elements of Russian culture, condemns atheists as cultural nihilists and ignoramuses, and makes clear his agreement with those *multiple* writers to Soviet newspapers who "maintain that formerly it was the Church who resisted evil, she possessed the experience of moral upbringing."¹⁰³

Another author praises the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery and its fourteenth-century founder, St. Sergius, as the greatest contributors to the national culture and to the formation and salvation of the Russian nation, both morally and in terms of participating in its physical defense or directly supporting it from the time of the Kulikovo Battle against the Tatars in 1380 to the Napoleonic Wars. The article condemns the forced closure of the monastery and its seminaries in 1919, the liquidation of its great library in 1935, and writes with great respect about its present monks and seminarians, claiming that today's "life is . . . so mysterious and multifaceted, that even now at the end of the 20th century there is room for a monk in it." The monks he chooses to describe are veterans of World War II, who had been ordinary Soviet kids, went to war, fought bravely, gained many medals, but when demobilized chose to join the monastery and/or to study at the seminary.¹⁰⁴

The above statements should not be seen as the equivalent of the opinions or policies of the present Soviet leadership. In fact, most of the pro-Christian writings have been subsequently attacked in the Soviet press, not only by the atheistic establishment but even by such

party leaders as Egor Ligachev, the CPSU Central Committee second secretary.¹⁰⁵ What is significant, however, is not only that Christian apologia continue to be tolerated in the Soviet media, although so far as an exception rather than the rule. Moreover, rebuttals to some of the atheists' writings and general criticism of the primitive level of official atheism are also printed.¹⁰⁶ This seems to indicate that somewhere at the top of the Soviet leadership there is a recognition that the national moral crisis is a very serious one and that the "code of communist morality" is unable to cure it. In despair their eyes may be turning to the church, similarly to Stalin's during World War II.¹⁰⁷

The other related topic—the existence of national tensions in the USSR—is now quite openly admitted by the establishment. What is particularly important is that not everything is blamed on the "bourgeois nationalists." Nationalistic demonstrations on the anniversary of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in the Baltic Republics and the laying of wreaths with "bourgeois" national Latvian colors at the Riga Monument of Liberty in 1987 were condemned in the Soviet press. But the demonstrations were not brutalized, the wreaths were not removed (at least not immediately after the ceremonies), and the subject was discussed in the Soviet press in an apologetic-defensive tone for the pact. Moreover, many articles have appeared criticizing those Russians living in the non-Russian republics who do not bother to learn local languages. Speakers at the May 1987 plenary meeting of the board of the Soviet Union of Writers openly condemned attempts to Russify non-Russian nationalities, while at the same time admitting that the Russians of all nationalities of the Soviet Union are the least permitted to express their national identity. Every time a Great Russian writer "confesses a natural admiration and love for his people . . . whispers accusing him of Great Power—'isms' can immediately be heard." Yet, says the Ukrainian writer Borys Oleinyk, similar statements by authors of other nationalities are taken for granted.¹⁰⁸

At that plenum and elsewhere in the Soviet press it has lately been suggested that the teaching of the local languages in the Russian schools situated in the relevant republics be made obligatory from the first grades of the primary schools, and Russians living in the non-Russian republics must become absolutely bilingual.

To conclude, it should probably be mentioned that the current Soviet government is ethnically dominated by the Slavic group of the

Soviet population, with probably a higher proportion of Great Russians than ever before in Soviet history. The Russite "lobby" in that new ruling elite is more influential than ever before, even if Gorbachev personally is not a part of it, which is not certain.

So where are the "prophets" who were predicting a doomsday for the whole world once the Russian nationalists replaced the allegedly "internationalist" Brezhnev cohort?

Catholicism and Nationalism in Lithuania

Kęstutis K. Girnius

It is widely held that nationalism and the Catholic church in Lithuania are intimately related, that their interests are virtually indistinguishable, and that Lithuanian nationalist activity is to a large degree the defense of the church and religious rights against the repressive policies of the Soviet regime. Several factors are responsible for the prevalence of such beliefs. Lithuania is, or once was, a predominantly Catholic nation. Catholic priests and laymen have been the prime catalysts of an opposition movement that accounts for a disproportionately large share of dissident activity in the Soviet Union. The first new wave of broadly based protests in the republic, the mass petitions of the late 1960s, centered on religious rights.¹ *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania* was the first, and remains the most prominent, Lithuanian samizdat publication, although more than fifteen samizdat journals saw the light of day in Lithuania before most were repressed in the early 1980s. The Communist party has frequently noted that the church portrays itself as the true guardian of the nation's cultural heritage² and has frequently accused priests of instigating nationalism among the faithful. In turn some Catholics insist that only believers can be Lithuanian patriots.

Nationalism and Catholicism are indeed related in contemporary Lithuania, yet the relationship is more complex and more contingent than popular belief would have it. Considering both to be among the most pernicious vestiges of the bourgeois past whose expeditious eradication is the ideological order of the day, the party has used its power, propaganda apparatus, and ability to control the sources and flow of information to place both Lithuanian nationalism and Catholicism on

the defensive. Lithuanian dissidents are, and know themselves to be, engaged in a holding action, a dogged attempt to forestall further encroachments of the regime on either the national consciousness or the rights of the church. They are militant, but chiefly in the defense of a narrow range of minimal rights and vital interests whose continued preservation they believe to be necessary conditions for the survival of the nation and the church. The defensive position into which they have been forced accounts for much of their interaction and the recognition of the mutuality of their interests. The long-range goals of many Catholics and nationalists are by no means identical and can be defined without reference to one another, but in the present circumstances nationalist and Catholic aims converge because of mutual self-interest, in particular because of each group's need for allies and friends. The church has the support of many nationalists, not so much because of a belief that Lithuanian nationalism and Catholicism are inherently related, but because the activity of the church directly or indirectly furthers nationalist goals. In turn, the church welcomes the efforts of nationalists to preserve Lithuanian historical consciousness and traditions, a process that in present circumstances frequently emphasizes Lithuania's ties to Western Europe and Catholicism's central role in national life.

Patriotic slogans find ready resonance in most strata of Lithuanian society, while even many atheists quietly wish the church well. Estimates of the number of Catholics have been available for some time, but it was difficult to determine the extent to which the specific concerns of nationalist dissidents were common to a broader spectrum of the population. The number of active dissidents has always been quite small, while Lithuanian intellectuals have been particularly averse to falling from the party's good graces and had diligently eschewed discussion of Soviet nationality policy. Gorbachev's campaign for *glasnost* and *perestroika* has changed matters somewhat. In particular the freedom granted to openly discuss many aspects of Lithuanian history and its cultural heritage has shown a remarkable unanimity between the arguments of anonymous contributors to samizdat and some of the most eminent men of letters in the republic. Yet Gorbachev's reforms are not without danger to the alliance between Catholics and nationalists that is a salient feature of the Lithuanian dissident movement. Greater government toleration of criticism may encourage hith-

erto silent individuals to enunciate views on national questions that challenge the importance of Catholicism as an element of national identity.

NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM DEMARCATED

Communist dogma insists that both nationalism and religion are vestiges of the bourgeois past doomed to an inevitable, albeit perhaps not immediate, demise. The destruction of the antagonistic relations of production characteristic of capitalist society should have eliminated all or most of the objective conditions necessary for the flourishing of religion and nationalism.³ According to Lithuania's communists, the continued viability of religion and nationalism is not to be explained by the fact that they are components of the superstructure and thus most independent of the economic base. Religious and nationalist sentiments are said to be incited by the actions of external reactionary forces, for whom religion, and even more nationalism, serve as basic weapons for spearheading the ideological assault on communism.⁴

The party has made little effort to give a clear definition of nationalism, preferring to use it as a broad brush with which to tar opponents of Soviet nationality policy. According to a leading Lithuanian theoretician, Genrikas Zimanas, manifestations of nationalism include the failure to appreciate the achievements of Soviet nationality policy or those of the other Soviet republics, distrust of the exchange of cadres among the republics, "localism," false pride in national achievements, cosmopolitanism, national nihilism, failure to actively struggle against bourgeois ideology, excessive ardor in the fight against bourgeois vestiges, and others.⁵ Each of these broad categories is further subdivided into more specific acts of commission and omission. This conception of nationalism is not only so encompassing that almost any disagreement with government or party policy can fall under the rubric of nationalist activity, but also extremely equivocal. The commendatory characteristic of struggling against nationalism can easily become, or be classified as, excessive ardor in fighting against bourgeois vestiges, while condemnation of false national pride can be construed as national nihilism, and so on.

If communists consider nationalism a pernicious but doomed ideology, Lithuanian dissidents identify nationalism with a patriotism

whose object of loyalty is the nation and not the Soviet state. Attitudes condemned by communists gain the approval of nationalists, but both use the term "nationalism" even more loosely than the diffuse nature of the concept warrants. In order to bridge the gap between communist and dissident conceptions, the following definition of nationalism will be used in this chapter: nationalism is a set of beliefs and attitudes according to which certain political and cultural values believed to be essential for the flowering of a nation are considered to have such intrinsic worth that actions and policies that endanger them are held to be impermissible in most circumstances, no matter how beneficial their economic and other consequences may be. The idea underlying this definition is the nationalist's belief that certain actions fostering national values should be granted protection similar to that which the constitutions of many Western nations extend to the freedom of speech and of the press, to the right of free assembly and worship, and others.⁶ For example, nationalists may proscribe large industrial developments in their homeland if they require a large influx of non-native workers who sharply reduce the share of the indigenous nationality and thus inhibit the development of the national culture. The various economic benefits of such industrial developments, including a rise in the standard of living of the native population, are considered to be inadequate compensation for the perceived harm to certain cultural values.⁷

The proposed definition has its advantages. It captures the insistence of Lithuanian nationalists that values, such as the preservation of the native language, cultural traditions, and historical consciousness, cannot be treated as ordinary inputs when calculating the burdens and benefits of possible government decisions or policies. Greater satisfaction of interests in other fields or gains accruing to other groups of individuals cannot be considered adequate compensation for the harm caused to these values. The definition accounts for an important aspect of the Soviet conception of nationalism, namely, that the nationalist is, as the Soviets claim, a localist for whom all-union interests are subordinate to local concerns that warrant special consideration. Finally, in contrast to definitions suggesting that nationalism is somehow morally suspect, the proposed conception is compatible with the widely accepted metaethical view that moral principles must be universalizable, i.e., they must be applicable to all relevant persons in similar circumstances. Nationalists do not claim that only their nation's cultural and

political values need special protection but rather that similar values of all nations deserve like consideration. Universalizability is violated only if nationalists claim for their nation rights and privileges that they are unwilling to grant other nations that are in similar circumstances.

Although the term Catholic, unlike nationalism, can be given a more straightforward definition, confusions and ambiguities arise if one assumes that there is a clearly circumscribed set of nontheological beliefs that can be classified as Catholic, and that most Catholics do indeed profess such beliefs. Both assumptions are false. Catholics do not belong to an ideologically monolithic organization whose members espouse identical or nearly identical beliefs concerning most important political, cultural, or social questions. Catholics need assent to only a limited number of theological dogmas. There can be and are Catholic socialists and fascists, chauvinists and cosmopolitans. Even in cases where tradition or popular opinion classifies as Catholic some of the nontheological teachings of the church, adherence to such beliefs is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for being a Catholic. A practicing Catholic may reject most of the political views commonly associated with the church, while an atheist can have sympathy for the church as an institution and respect for its social doctrines.

The Lithuanian nationalist movement can be considered to be Catholic in two ways. On the one hand, it can be held to be Catholic, or predominantly Catholic, because most nationalists are more or less practicing Catholics. On the other hand, the nationalist movement may be called Catholic because most nationalists, irrespective of their religious beliefs, support the church as an institution that is fostering national values. Practicing Catholics constituted an overwhelming majority of the editors and contributors of samizdat articles and journals, even those that did not openly identify with the purely institutional or religious concerns of the church.⁸ Catholics probably constitute the majority of active nationalist dissidents, usually interpreting nationalism in a secular fashion that does not make Catholicism a necessary condition for true patriotism.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Some Lithuanian Catholics would, I suspect, assent to the rather radical view expressed in samizdat that the Lithuanian nation will never

become atheist because it will die out if it does not remain Christian.⁹ A more moderate view claims that Catholicism is an important barrier to Russification and thus a major, if not the chief, defender of national interests.¹⁰ Yet several decades ago even the more moderate claim would have been controversial. The church's ability to promote such a self-image is an impressive and recent accomplishment.

The Catholic church has not always been a unifying factor in Lithuanian life, nor has its role vis-à-vis Lithuanian nationalism been unequivocal. In the second half of the nineteenth century many priests, in particular most of the church's hierarchy, viewed the Lithuanian national renaissance with a great deal of skepticism, fearing that a separate national identity, based to a large degree upon a conscious opposition to Polish influence in social and cultural life, would lead to a weakening of Catholicism. For many of the older and thoroughly Polonized priests, being a Catholic and having a pro-Polish orientation were virtually indistinguishable, and renunciation of Polish influence was tantamount to apostasy.

The left wing of the Lithuanian national renaissance movement, educated in Russian universities, generally espoused a materialist worldview. Many of the liberal intelligentsia not only objected to the church being granted a leading role in Lithuanian life but also avowed militantly anti-Catholic views. They claimed that the Lithuanian nation could flourish in cultural matters only if it were freed from the influence of "religious superstition."

While being wary of the pitfalls and inaccuracies that plague broad historical generalizations, one can nonetheless claim that from about 1890 to 1945 a deep-seated conflict between Catholics and anticlericals about the rightful role of the church in Lithuanian society permeated much of Lithuanian cultural and political life.¹¹ Catholics insisted that the church should be granted various rights and privileges, such as financial support for religious instruction; the right to register births, marriages, and deaths; as well as the right to perform other secular functions because the overwhelmingly Catholic population was said to support such measures. The first constitution of the newly independent Lithuanian state extended such rights to the Catholic church and other denominations. The anticlericals condemned the bestowal of these privileges as unjustified encroachments of the church upon civil society, incompatible with true freedom of conscience. The polemics

between Catholics and anticlericals were strident, often bitter, generally unfruitful, and to some degree responsible for the failure of democracy in Lithuania. So deep were the divisions that even during the Nazi occupation resistance organizations were divided along ideological lines. Communist agents, who infiltrated the postwar partisan movement, tried unsuccessfully to revive the old ideological discords.¹²

In the postwar period a number of factors have contributed to bringing about a reassessment of the Catholic church that has led to the almost universal recognition, outside party circles, of its role in fostering Lithuanian national interests. First, even during the darkest days of Stalinist terror the church retained some independence from the dictates of the Kremlin. The church suffered, its members were persecuted, its rights transgressed, but its functioning remained uninterrupted and was never banned by the authorities. The church was and remains the only important institution in Lithuania not subject to direct party control and having genuine historical traditions and ties to Lithuania's noncommunist past.¹³

Second, some Soviet measures directed against the church as a secular institution have inadvertently strengthened its moral authority. The church's financial power and political influence during the years of independence (1918-40) led to a number of real and imagined abuses that were criticized by Catholics and anticlericals alike. A significant percentage of priests were perceived to be more concerned with secular affairs and their personal finances than with their pastoral duties. By expropriating church lands and property, eliminating all forms of income other than voluntary donations from the faithful, and banishing priests from public life, the party made moot many of the previous criticisms. Priests could no longer be accused as easily of worldly ambitions and indifference to spiritual matters.

Third, the church has become a symbol of the nationalist opposition in part by default. Since the defeat of the Lithuanian partisan movement, no other significant center of opposition has emerged. Lithuanian liberals and intellectuals have refrained almost universally from open dissident activity, even more so than their colleagues in other Soviet republics where dissidents do not have popular support.¹⁴ The reasons why Lithuanian intellectuals have so assiduously avoided involvement in the opposition movement remain unclear, although misconceptions about the possibility of greater freedom under party rule may have

played a role. During the 1960s Lithuania enjoyed relative economic prosperity, and intellectual freedom was at its peak. Although the party had renewed its assault on religion,¹⁵ large segments of the intelligentsia apparently believed in the possibility of greatly improved life prospects and substantial changes in the method of party rule. They stated privately that further liberalization would be endangered by thoughtless and most likely counterproductive demands for more comprehensive and inclusive improvements. Thus, liberals who may have attempted to find a *via media* between communism and Catholicism managed to satisfy both conscience and self-interest by convincing themselves that the quiet performance of their duties served not only their own but also the nation's best interests. These halcyon days of relative contentment with party rule were shattered in the early 1970s; yet Lithuanian intellectuals as a whole remained aloof from the dissident movement. Lithuanians willing to express openly their dissatisfaction with government policy naturally turned toward the church among whose members they can find support and understanding. They had no place else to go.

Matters may change if as a result of the Gorbachev reforms the government continues to show greater toleration of attitudes it previously castigated as nationalistic. Those whom the reforms are encouraging to speak out openly on the nationality question and other important matters might be indifferent, if not hostile, to the fate of the church and yet succeed in mounting a credible challenge to Catholic claims of a unique role in defending national values. What is more, government concessions to the church and the slightly improved ties between the Catholic hierarchy and the authorities have led to fears among some Catholics that the bishops might eventually become as subservient to the Kremlin as their counterparts in the Russian Orthodox church. In either case there is an increased possibility of friction arising between the more nationalist and more Catholic wings of the Lithuanian opposition movement.

It cannot, however, be stressed enough that so far the church has resisted the regime's efforts to deny it the rights and liberties necessary for fulfilling its mission. Although some priests and bishops have been overly enthusiastic in submitting to the realities of Soviet rule, the majority have been steadfast in their convictions. The church's moral authority remains unimpaired, and the population at large has never considered the church to be a pliant tool of the regime.

In the early 1970s the more militant Catholics, fearful that continued silence in the face of repression would lead inevitably to the enervation, if not the demise, of Catholicism in Lithuania, launched a remarkably successful counteroffensive. Its achievements are many. *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania* has celebrated its fifteenth year of uninterrupted publication, averaging about five issues per year. The Catholic Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Faithful, founded in 1978, was Lithuania's most effective defender of human rights until its suppression in 1983. In 1978 the committee managed to convince an unprecedented 70 percent of the republic's priests to support its repudiation of the government's "Regulations on Religious Associations."¹⁶ The church's ability to mobilize support for its causes is best shown by the fact that 148,149 individuals signed a petition requesting that the illegally confiscated church in Klaipeda be returned to the faithful.¹⁷ Equally remarkable is the government promise in 1987 to hand back the church within two years.¹⁸

The struggle between the church and the government has focused on two main areas: (1) the church's demand that it be free to regulate its internal affairs, and (2) the church's desire to be allowed to carry out its evangelical mission. Catholics have been quite successful in minimizing the interference of the civil authorities in internal church matters. Since 1982 the number of bishops permitted by the government to carry out their duties has increased from three to six. What is more, protests from Lithuania seem to have played a significant role in blocking the appointment as bishops of several suspected collaborators or overly pliant individuals, while Pope John Paul II forced Bishop Krikščiūnas, the most compromised of all bishops, to resign in 1983. Catholics successfully pressured the regime to increase substantially the number of seminarians—from 48 in 1973 to 130 in 1986.¹⁹ No effort has been spared in attempts to foil the government's efforts to introduce the Soviet system of parish committees (*dvasatki*) that would take most religious and financial matters out of the hands of the priest. Although in 1984 only eighteen Catholic congregations had not signed contracts with the government for use of the church, a large number of priests were supervising the work of the committees and thus foiling the aims of the authorities.²⁰

The church has had little success in gaining greater freedom to fulfill its evangelical mission. The authorities have consistently harassed all

public manifestations of religion. Great efforts have been expended in trying to disrupt the major annual pilgrimages at Šiluva and Žemaičių Kalvarija, permission is almost never granted for local religious processions, and priests have been fined for the religious instruction of children. In a secret government report on the state of religion as of January 1, 1984, Commissioner for Religious Affairs Petras Anilionis urged local government organs to ensure strict compliance with government regulations restricting religious activity. He emphasized that "it is important not to let the least infraction go by without necessary attention" since otherwise further transgressions would follow.²¹ In a move intended as a clear warning to Catholic militants, the authorities arrested and imposed long sentences in 1983 on two members of the Catholic committee, the Rev. Sigitas Tamkevičius and the Rev. Alfonsas Svarinskas.²²

The government's restrictions on catechization remain a source of great concern for the church, reinforcing the conviction so aptly expressed in the first issue of the *Chronicle* that government policy aims at "granting it [religion] the right to live, while preventing it from being born." Nonetheless, Catholics believe that the church is in the midst of a major spiritual renewal. On the tenth anniversary of the founding of *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania*, its editors, whose statements are usually pessimistic and reflect a siege mentality, rejoiced that in the last decade the church had regenerated itself and improved qualitatively.²³ The celebration of two major anniversaries, the five hundredth of the death of Lithuania's patron saint Kazimieras in 1984 and the six hundredth of the Christianization of Lithuania in 1987, further strengthened the self-esteem of Catholics. The church's achievements and the growing feeling of confidence among Catholics have contributed to increased respect for the church.

LITHUANIAN NATIONALISM

In the 1970s there was an upsurge in the activities of Lithuanian nationalists: more nationalist-oriented samizdat was published, demands for the restoration of Lithuanian independence were voiced more frequently, and national holidays and historical anniversaries were celebrated more openly. In the early 1980s the government cracked down hard, arresting a number of influential defenders of national rights,

while most samizdat journals ceased publication. But even in the 1970s nationalist activity was but a mere shadow of the armed resistance to Soviet occupation in the postwar years.²⁴ The partisans controlled large rural areas, while the Soviets could assert their authority only in the larger towns and only during the day. Soviet sources indicate that roughly forty thousand individuals died between 1944 and 1952.²⁵ Perhaps another quarter of a million Lithuanians were deported to various regions of the Soviet Union.

The partisan insurgency left a very deep imprint on the national consciousness.²⁶ Its central aim and primary justification was the restoration of Lithuanian independence. The futility of a direct challenge to Soviet rule is apparent to all, but even dissidents with the most pronounced socialist views insist upon the need for the eventual recovery of national sovereignty.²⁷ Demands for the restoration of Lithuanian independence are considered to be timely and necessary reminders of the subjugation of Lithuania, a means of educating the younger people, an expression of hope, but hardly the material for a program of practical political activity. Moreover, calls for the restoration of independence are not at all tolerated by the authorities; the government reacted very harshly to the so-called Baltic Appeal that demanded that the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty be repealed. Contemporary Lithuanian nationalists place a greater emphasis on the defense of those cultural values that must be preserved if any dreams of future independence are to remain meaningful. Russification is considered to be a real and present danger. For example, the samizdat journal *Alma Mater* states in its declaration of purpose: "This is a difficult period for our nation, perhaps even the most difficult in its history. The existence of the whole nation is threatened."²⁸

Many Lithuanian nationalists believe that their nation and national identity are threatened in three ways: (1) linguistic Russification, (2) the destruction of national and historical consciousness, and (3) the weakening of the biological foundations of the nation. Opposition to each of these perceived dangers is an integral element of the Lithuanian nationalist program.

The fear of forced Russification is a mixture of cognitive, emotional, and evaluative elements, strongly influenced by historical consciousness. Even under normal circumstances, the nationalist would insist that special efforts be taken to foster the flourishing of national cultural

values. Yet the nationalist perceives that this overriding goal is not actively pursued but actually repressed by the authorities. The Communist party is held to be consistently inimical to the aspirations of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union; the Russians are clearly the anointed people, privy to privileges and perquisites, openly anxious to enjoy the fruits of preferential treatment. Lithuanian nationalists are conscious of several moments in the nation's past, especially the military prowess of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, the efforts made in the nineteenth century by the czarist authorities to Russify Lithuanians and by the Polish gentry to Polonize them, the brief years of independence, and the bitter postwar partisan struggle. Nationalists believe they are members of an intellectually and politically mature nation with a long history of political sovereignty and defiance of oppressors. Yet pride in the nation's past is tempered by a deep uneasiness for its future. If in the Middle Ages Lithuania was one of the largest states in Europe, then during the last two centuries, except for the years of independence, it has borne a foreign yoke while the area of ethnically Lithuanian lands has diminished substantially. In the past assimilation by more powerful neighbors and not genocide has constituted the gravest danger to the nation's further existence. The threat to national existence has receded but can gain power again, if vigilance is lacking or if the Soviet authorities try to force the pace of the so-called merging of nations. The Soviet government is perceived as a direct descendant of czarism, seeking to implement its predecessor's goal of Russifying the borderlands, while resistance to Soviet nationality policy is but a new phase in a centuries-old struggle for national identity in which Lithuanians must persevere as did their forebears in equally difficult circumstances. These factors combine to heighten the nationalist's sensitivity to perceived abuses and injustices and increase skepticism of official assurances that Lithuanian national values are no longer in danger.

Because the elements of the Lithuanian nationalist program, outlined above and to be discussed in greater detail below, were enunciated originally by Lithuanian samizdat authors, it was difficult to estimate the extent to which their views were representative of broader segments of Lithuanian society. Recent discussions made possible by Gorbachev's reforms indicate that Lithuania's literary elite shares many of the same concerns and frustrations, although remaining more sanguine about

the possibility of fundamental reforms in Soviet nationality policy. The similarity between their positions discloses the profound hold that the nationalist cultural program has on the nation's consciousness and the degree to which it has become the idiom of national protest. While intolerance, frustrated ambition, and competition for advancement are but a few of the manifold causes of national discord and friction, it seems safe to predict that for many years expressions of dissatisfaction will be clothed in terms of the nationalist cultural program.

The Lithuanian Language

"It is our greatest treasure and the foundation of our national culture."²⁹ This description of the Lithuanian language, offered by the Initiative Group for the Defense of the Lithuanian Language, expresses sentiments shared by most Lithuanians. The state of the language is considered one of the most accurate indicators of the fate of the nation itself, and changes in Soviet linguistic policy are excellent barometers of future trends in overall nationality policy. In the 1970s the fate of the language was widely discussed by Lithuanian samizdat, but concern lessened when it became clear that some of the worst-case prognostications were exaggerated.

Presently the Lithuanian language is not endangered. Lithuanians make up 80 percent of the republic's population, almost no Lithuanians consider Russian to be their first language, and about 85 percent of the republic's youth attend schools in which Lithuanian is the language of instruction. Yet to many Lithuanians this relatively satisfactory situation is not due to government policy, but an achievement attained in spite of it. Soviet efforts to promote the learning of Russian are viewed with extreme suspicion as the first step of a process intended to replace the Lithuanian language with the Russian.

In the 1970s deep fears were aroused that the authorities had launched a new wave of Russification, directed chiefly at small children and students of institutions of higher education. Ostensibly concerned with the spread of bilingualism, the party, it was claimed, planned to push the Lithuanian language out of schools as well as public and intellectual life, transforming it into the argot of the uneducated and the backward. Lithuanian nationalists reacted with great anxiety to the recommendations of a major all-Union scientific-practical conference on the teaching of Russian, held in Tashkent May 22–24, 1979.³⁰

Two different Lithuanian groups obtained the then secret draft recommendations and sent them to the West. The recommendations were denounced as aimed at assimilating the non-Slavic people of the Soviet Union and preparing their spiritual demise. Extreme anxiety was caused by recommendations to teach Russian to five-year-old children in kindergartens, urge non-Russian families and students to practice speaking Russian among themselves, and to instruct institutions of higher education to devote more of their curricula to the teaching of Russian.³¹

Even before the Tashkent conference Lithuanian samizdat had expressed concern about efforts to increase the use of Russian. In 1978 the journal *Aušra* announced that the Ministry of Education was preparing to introduce the teaching of Russian in preschool classes.³² Samizdat published excerpts from a set of instructions issued by the rector of the University of Vilnius demanding that the Russian language be given more attention at the university.³³ There have been complaints about other manifestations of the increased use of Russian: street signs and directions now must be bilingual, train and bus station signs are becoming predominantly Russian, and senior party and government officials are said to have been unofficially instructed to read part of their talks in Russian.³⁴

To counter government efforts to foster the increased use of Russian, nationalists urge Lithuanians not to send their children to kindergartens, to use Lithuanian in official correspondence, and to demand that the Lithuanian language be given a greater role in public life.

History and National Consciousness

Lithuanian nationalists and communists agree that history is not simply a discipline concerned with determining the chronological and causal relations among events. According to the current ideological secretary of the Lithuanian Communist party, Lionginas Šepetys, history is a profoundly ideological subject and its teacher more than just an ordinary worker on the ideological front. As an integral part of the ideological education of every communist, the teaching of history must assist in inculcating Soviet patriotism, the friendship of nations, and socialist internationalism. Lithuania's past must be evaluated from a class and party position, purged of all elements of bourgeois national-

ism, chauvinism, and all that elicits feelings of national superiority or contempt for other nations.³⁵

Lithuanian nationalists are just as convinced of the preeminent importance of history for national life. History is the nation's memory and thus an essential component of national self-identity. For Lithuanian nationalists, knowledge of one's past is a major patriotic duty because it enables one to discern the machinations of the regime and draw upon the experience of the generations that successfully resisted tsarist efforts to throttle Lithuanian national self-identity. According to *Aušra*, Lithuanians will cease to be a nation if the regime succeeds in cutting the ties that bind Lithuanians to their cultural and spiritual heritage.³⁶

The imposition of the communist interpretation of history is considered a key element in Soviet plans to denationalize the Lithuanian people.³⁷ Nationalists roundly condemn the official interpretation for its portrayal of the history of Lithuania as being to a great extent the history of the Communist party and its ideological ancestors; for its excessive glorification of the timely and unselfish help that the Russian people, or at least its democratic and progressive elements, have supposedly extended to Lithuanians; and for the distortion or denial of facts that cannot be readily integrated into the party's model of the past.

Lithuanians have grudgingly accepted the inevitability of their nation's history being rewritten according to Soviet specifications, for they recognize that even Russian history is subject to some distortions. Lithuanian samizdat have frequently argued that the unequal treatment of the military achievements of the Grand Duchies of Lithuania and Muscovy as well as the attempts to downplay Lithuania's feudal past are the fruits of Russian chauvinism and discrimination against Lithuanians. It has been asked why Aleksandr Nevsky's victory in the Battle of the Ice, during which twenty German knights were slain, is celebrated as an important event, while the battle of Durbė in 1260, in which Lithuanians killed 150 German knights, is deemed unworthy of mention.³⁸ The anniversary of the battle of Kulikovo is celebrated on an all-Union scale, while Lithuanian victories of similar magnitude are passed over in virtual silence. Samizdat have complained that the writings of major Lithuanian authors remain unpublished if they castigate the tsarist regime for oppressing the Lithuanian nation, while Russians

who denounced czarism are hailed as democrats and "the best sons of their nation."³⁹ Bitterness is also caused by the government's failure to honor properly many Lithuanian writers of the precommunist era and failure to celebrate publicly major political and cultural anniversaries.

Such complaints may seem petty, but they are motivated by resentment and fear: resentment that even the victories that Lithuanians had won more than six centuries ago and the few eruptions of genuine literary talent in the nineteenth century must be sacrificed on the altar of the new Soviet man who will be a Russian in new dress; fear that these cases of differential treatment form a consistent pattern of discrimination that is part of the party's concerted effort to denigrate Lithuania's past, to destroy the memory or reinterpret the meaning of significant national achievements as a prelude to denationalization.

In November 1986 Lithuanian writers, critics, and historians embarked on a wide-ranging and open discussion of Lithuanian history and historical prose that dominated cultural life for six months. The participants were almost unanimous in lamenting the abnormal constraints on the writing of Lithuanian history. Aleksandras Krasnovas rued the shortage of serious historical studies, "the scandalously impoverished program" for teaching history, and excessive deference to Russian sensibilities, warning that previous policy turned the natural pride in one's history into strange and distorted forms. The noted poet Sigitas Geda demanded an end to the falsification of Lithuanian history and the overemphasis on Lithuania's peasantry and the nation's political disasters.⁴⁰ Participants in a discussion of Lithuania's literary heritage, held in April 1987, condemned the failure to publish important literary works of the nineteenth century, called for an end to the constant interference of the censor in the literary process, and demanded a change in the criteria used to evaluate the nation's literary heritage.⁴¹ In many cases the specific examples the literary establishment used to lambaste the folly of previous ideological constraints were those that samizdat had been mentioning for more than a decade.

Weakening Biological Foundations

Lithuanian nationalists express in varying degrees fears concerning the weakening of the biological foundation of the nation. The major causes of this concern are the spread of alcoholism, the decrease in the rate of

growth of Lithuanians, and the movement of non-Lithuanians into the republic.

Alcoholism is a very serious problem in Lithuania. In a recent article Jonas Gečas, the secretary of the Commission for the Fight against Drunkenness at the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers, noted that Lithuanians had been increasing their consumption of alcohol at a prodigious rate. In 1960 per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages, converted to 100 percent alcohol, was 2.9 liters, 25 percent less than the USSR as a whole, but by 1984 consumption had increased to 10.9 liters, a third more than the per capita rate for the USSR.⁴²

The government ignored the problem until Gorbachev came to power, but even then it published few hard data about the scope and effects of alcoholism. Yet a philosopher claimed that alcoholism has claimed more lives than World War II and the partisan struggle combined and has created for centuries "a society within society of thousands of poor freaks incapable of caring for themselves."⁴³

Lithuanian samizdat, especially the journal *Aušra*, have written extensively on alcoholism, which it considers responsible for the increase in various social ills, including violent crimes, child abuse, and divorce. Dissident authors have urged their countrymen to form temperance societies similar to those the Catholic church founded in the mid-nineteenth century. Lithuanian priests, including the majority from the archdiocese of Vilnius and the Catholic Committee to Defend the Rights of the Faithful, asked the church's hierarchy to proclaim 1980 a year of temperance in Lithuania.⁴⁴

The government's response to such private initiatives has been singularly inept. Failure to take any effective measures to curb the use of alcohol despite the obvious economic and social disutility of excessive drinking reinforced distrust of the authorities, while state interference in attempts to found private temperance societies⁴⁵ fueled suspicions that the party was actively promoting the use of alcohol as a means of keeping Lithuania enslaved and its people enervated.

The demographic situation is more favorable but changing for the worse. Lithuanians still account for 80 percent of the republic's population, although the annual rate of natural increase in the republic has decreased sharply in the last twenty years, from roughly 15 percent per thousand population to 5 percent in 1986. By 1985 Lithuania actu-

ally was experiencing negative population growth.⁴⁶ At the same time net immigration has grown, accounting for a 12 percent increase of the population during 1959–70, 24 percent during 1970–79, and 42 percent during 1979–86.⁴⁷ However, demographers do not expect the number of non-Lithuanians migrating into Lithuania to increase in the foreseeable future because the neighboring Soviet republics have an even lower birthrate and face similar shortages in the labor force.⁴⁸

Authors of samizdat articles have raised alarms about the decline in the birthrate, the increase in the number of ethnically mixed marriages, and the suspected sharp increase in the immigration of non-Lithuanians. An article in *Tautos kelias* presents a graphic argument to show why Lithuanians should not seek solace in the fact that they constitute 80 percent of the republic's population. *Tautos kelias* points to a study published by the Soviet demographer Boris Urlanis in 1963 in which he showed that from an initial population of a thousand individuals who formed families having but two children, only eight descendants would remain after three hundred years. Because the current birthrate is even lower than the one Urlanis uses in his example, the contributor to *Tautos kelias* fears that *ceteris paribus* there might be only about twenty thousand Lithuanians left in less than three hundred years.⁴⁹ Some nationalists have suggested that Lithuanians have a patriotic duty to have three or four children.⁵⁰

The nationalists' fear of being inundated by Slavs is stimulated by the fate of Lithuanian villages in Belorussia and the decrease in the last two centuries of ethnographically Lithuanian territory. Compact Lithuanian settlements and villages are dying out in Belorussia. The process is not unexpected, but many Lithuanians think that communist officials have hastened the process by discrimination and oppression. The denationalization of Lithuanians in Belorussia is considered by some to be a harbinger of Lithuania's future, a glimpse of its demise.⁵¹

PARTY RESPONSE

The Communist party's efforts to challenge nationalist sentiments have been ineffective. Nationalist feeling is sufficiently deep that even a superlatively organized propaganda campaign would have only a limited chance of success. For decades internationalist and antinationalist propaganda was decidedly conservative, based on a threadbare ideo-

logical arsenal, and often undermined by the heavy-handed actions of security organs and party activists. Some changes are now in the offing.

Soviet propaganda is double-edged, combining litanies of praise for real and supposed Soviet achievements with strident criticisms of nationalism. The party spares no effort to convince the population that life under the Soviets is better than it was during the years of independence and that this is the fruit of Soviet nationality policy. Economic achievements usually are highlighted with constant reminders that current annual industrial production is more than sixty times as great as in 1939. This economic argument has always been met with great skepticism because increased industrial production is not usually translated into more and better consumer goods.⁵² The frustration of the rising expectations that were common in the 1960s and the worsening economic situation of the late 1970s did not make the claims more convincing. More important, these paeans to Soviet economic achievement miss the target; nationalist dissatisfaction is not focused primarily on economic policy or the standard of living.

Official propagandists have been unable to alleviate the anxieties and resentment generated by the perceived indifference of the party to national cultural values and the preferential treatment granted to Russians. The party was unable to formulate a coherent justification for the decisions of the Tashkent conference concerning the teaching of Russian to the very young. No public explanations were forthcoming to justify the requirement that all doctoral dissertations, even those concerning Lithuanian language and literature, be submitted in Russian, although travelers from Lithuania hint that this requirement was intended to counter the failure of Central Asian and Caucasian universities to uphold high academic standards.

Criticism of Lithuanian nationalism, mostly focusing on the interpretation of the nation's past, remains ineffective and even counter-productive. Even many youths remain impervious to party propaganda. At a plenum of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist party, held on August 16, 1982, First Secretary Griškevičius complained that Lithuania's youth supposedly had too rosy a picture of the interwar years and did not appreciate the "anti-people character of the whole bourgeois system."⁵³ Two weeks later Genrikas Zimanas complained that some Lithuanian nationalists were trying to transform hatred of czarism into distrust of the Russian people.⁵⁴ He pointedly

argued that special measures must be taken to improve the ties of friendship among Lithuanians and Russians and to convince Lithuanian youths to appreciate the central role that Russia has played in founding and preserving the Soviet state. The party hierarchy does not seem pleased with recent discussions about Lithuania's history. In February 1987 Griškevičius warned writers not to idealize Lithuania's past and declared that "there can be no talk of a noncritical view of the past, much less about a revival of its reactionary tendencies."⁵⁵ What is more, the unprecedented propaganda campaign aimed at denouncing the organizers of a demonstration in Vilnius on August 23, 1987, to commemorate victims of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact showed unequivocally that much of Lithuania's recent history remains subject to the old taboos and prohibitions.

Much of the blame for the ineffectiveness of the party's efforts to combat nationalism can be placed squarely at the feet of individuals responsible for the clumsy repression of activities that could neutralize much of the popular resentment against Soviet cultural and nationality policy but that would not endanger either the hegemony or the authority of the party.

The harassment of private temperance societies is a clear example of the government's intolerance of even the most beneficial activity, if it remains free of the party's control. Another example is the fate of the *Lituanistinė biblioteka*, a series of books reprinting literary and historical classics. In the early 1970s party officials had pointed proudly to this series as a sign of change in Soviet policy toward Lithuania's cultural heritage. In 1979 the series was halted for almost five years because, according to samizdat, party functionaries were incensed by some anti-Russian sentiments expressed by the seventeenth-century historian Albert Kojalowicz-Wijuk, whose works were being printed in the series.⁵⁶ In April 1987 Lithuanian writers condemned the action. Preparations are now under way to publish this and many other formerly forbidden books, but great damage has already been done.⁵⁷

Ethnographic groups also fell under the party's interdict. Apparently some of their members began collecting information about the Lithuanian partisans, developed ties with colleagues in other republics, and concerned themselves with the fate of Lithuanians in Belorussia. In 1973 several groups were disbanded, a few amateur ethnographers imprisoned, and others thrown out of work or school.⁵⁸ The party pro-

ceeded to throw an ideological straitjacket on almost all ethnographic activity. The Ethnographic Society elected a new presidium packed with party functionaries and published new guidelines, demanding that ethnographic groups focus their attention on gathering data about the struggle for Soviet power, the victories of the Red Army, and the development of socialism.⁵⁹ In the words of samizdat, "ethnography has become Partography."⁶⁰

CATHOLICISM AND NATIONALISM

Because a large percentage of active Lithuanian nationalists are either Catholics or are sympathetic to the church as an institution whose preservation is a task of the first importance, one may be tempted to identify Catholicism and Lithuanian nationalism. Such a move cannot be justified; some nationalists are neither Catholics nor favorably disposed toward the church, while not all Catholics are nationalists.

Individuals can consider Catholicism and national values to be internally or externally related. The tie is internal if one believes that being a Catholic is a necessary condition for being a Lithuanian nationalist or patriot—in other words, if one believes that being a Catholic is somehow an essential or inherent feature of being a "good" Lithuanian. The tie between Catholicism and nationalism is external if one believes that in the present circumstances the church promotes and defends values central to the nationalist program, but need not necessarily do so in fulfilling its pastoral mission. The church, as it is now, opposes Russification and attempts to falsify history, condemns abortion and alcoholism, and seeks to perpetuate Lithuanian traditions. It is because of these aspects of its activity that the church wins the approbation and support of the nationalist. Of course, to say that the alliance of the church and the nationalist is contingent is not to assert that the tie is either temporary or fortuitous.

Proponents of the internal-tie theory sometimes assert their position rather bluntly. The editors of *Aušrelė* insist that every Lithuanian should be a Catholic, living according to the precepts of the Bible. They also state that "the nation will remain alive only as long as the Catholic Church remains alive."⁶¹ A contributor to *Aušra* has made a similar claim, writing that the Lithuanian nation will remain Christian or not exist at all, i.e., if Lithuanians renounce their religion, they will re-

nounce their national identity.⁶² The *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania* suggests that if Lithuanians become atheists and forget their Christian traditions, they will bring about conditions conducive to the loss of their nationhood.⁶³ Another samizdat author claims that a Lithuanian Catholic will not become a Russian but that Lithuanian atheists ignorant of their nation's past may promote Soviet schemes of Russification, if such action is personally advantageous.⁶⁴ The existence of proponents of the internal-tie view also can be inferred from statements to the effect that there are atheists genuinely concerned with the welfare of the nation, an assertion so obvious that it would not need to be made if there were not those who denied it.

Adherents of the internal-tie theory seem ready to equate conversion to atheism with opportunism. Individuals are thought to become atheists for personal gain and increased career opportunities. If a person is ready to renounce God for personal advantage, then he is liable, so the argument goes, to disavow his national identity for similar reasons, the party being anxious that its members be "good internationalists" as well as active atheists.⁶⁵ It should be noted that Lithuanian samizdat often use the term atheist to refer to militant atheists, i.e., to party officials, propagandists, and others who aggressively seek to undermine religion and intimidate believers, and not to those who simply disbelieve God's existence. Thus, the general condemnation of atheists should be understood as denunciation of militant proselytizers of atheism, although some Catholics probably disapprove of all atheists.

Proponents of the external-tie hold that the church serves the interests of nationalism but does so contingently and indirectly. Although the church could perform most of its pastoral mission while remaining aloof from nationalist affairs, it has become a major defender of nationalist values, and its concerns have converged with many facets of the nationalist program. Catholics and nationalists are mutually interested in strengthening one another's value systems. In seeking converts or support from the people the church can appeal to national sentiments by arguing that Catholicism is the traditional faith of Lithuanians and that by becoming or remaining Catholics they distance themselves from the party and its internationalist aims. Catholics also claim that Lithuanians opposed to the church are digging their nation's grave because the church is the only legal institution struggling for the preser-

vation of national traditions.⁶⁶ Many nationalists would second a declaration signed by a group calling itself the Lithuanian Youth of Vilnius that states that the church is the nationalist's greatest ally in the struggle against Russification.⁶⁷

An excellent example of the external-tie view can be found in *Tautos kelias*. The author of one article claims:

Even now religion and the Catholic Church are the most important sources for rejuvenating the national spirit and strengthening the nation's morality. In defending the stability of the family, fighting against alcoholism, promiscuity, the killing of unborn life, and other negative phenomena, the Church strengthens the nation's vital and moral forces and makes the struggle for national existence easier. . . . Religion means so much to the Lithuanian nation that one can boldly assert that as long as the people remain religious, they will be neither totally denationalized nor demoralized.⁶⁸

The nationalist can remind Catholics that the weakening of Lithuanian national self-identity would undermine much of the popular base of the church and increase the danger that the authorities could coerce the church to become as submissive as the Orthodox church. While only a few believe that good Catholics invariably become conscious nationalists, most would assent to the claim that a practicing Catholic is more likely to be impervious to party propaganda about the benefits of Soviet nationality policy.

Catholics and Lithuanian nationalists hold similar views about the central importance of resisting party efforts to reinterpret Lithuanian history and suppress the nation's historical consciousness. Both are adamant in insisting that Lithuanian history cannot be reduced to the history of its communist party, and in emphasizing the continuity of Lithuanian history, its deep ties to Western Europe. Their general conceptions are similar, although the nationalist is more liable to praise the grandeur of the feudal Grand Duchy, which was pagan during most of its expansionist phase, while Catholics emphasize the church's role in Lithuanian cultural and spiritual life. In contrast to the party's conception of Catholicism as a foreign and malignant growth upon the Lithuanian nation, Catholics point to the founding of the University of Vilnius by the Jesuits, the building of churches, and the spread of art as

proof that the church has had a beneficial influence and that Catholicism is an organic part of Lithuania's past. Catholics are evidently quite successful in propagating such a view because the party propagandists have begun to pay more attention to it and are attempting to marshal more sophisticated arguments against it.⁶⁹ Nationalists are not averse to such Catholic arguments, for they also make much of Lithuania's uniqueness in comparison to the rest of the Soviet Union, its independent cultural development, and other factors that distinguish its past from Russia's.

The nationalist's interest in strengthening the biological foundations of the nation is furthered by Catholic teaching and the activity of lay Catholics. The church has always been in the forefront of the fight against alcoholism. An increase in the birthrate of Lithuanians would be ensured if Catholics acted upon church teaching on contraception and abortion. Marriages between Lithuanian Catholics and non-Lithuanian Slavs are disapproved of by both the church and nationalists—the former on religious grounds, the latter for fear of denationalization.

For the external-tie theorist, it is the church's activity and its stand on questions of fundamental national importance that make it a bastion of nationalism, and not any intrinsic tie between Catholic beliefs and patriotism. And it is because, and insofar as, the church furthers nationalist aims that adherents of the external-tie view urge their fellow nationalists to defend it from the onslaughts of the party. For in undermining the church, the regime is weakening the major ally of nationalism. Unlike supporters of the internal-tie view, the external-tie theorists can conceive of circumstances, however unlikely at the moment, in which church and national interests would be at variance. A church subservient to Moscow would not retain the support of the external-tie proponents.

A final note on the relationship between the two views: many of the internal-tie adherents would agree with most of what the supporters of the external-tie view assert about the church's positive influence on the implementation of nationalist aims. Yet they would insist that two propositions, not part of the external-tie view, are true: (1) the church's activity always will have beneficial consequences for Lithuanian nationalism; and (2) Lithuanian patriots, with a possible but quite limited number of exceptions, must be Catholics.

*The Relationship between Catholics
and Lithuanian Nationalists*

Although data are limited, it would seem that a greater number of Lithuanians accept the external- rather than the internal-tie conception. Not only is the external-tie view inherently more reasonable, but the actual relationship between the more nationalist and more Catholic wings of the opposition movement is compatible with the state of affairs suggested by the external-tie model. According to it, nationalists should feel free to devote themselves to more immediate nationalist concerns, confident that such activity also will indirectly aid the Catholic cause, while Catholic activists should immerse themselves in religious matters, assured that their devotion will be beneficial to the nation. In fact, nationalists and Catholics have pursued independent, although parallel, courses of action. The rather common belief that the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania* from its inception reported on concerns of both Catholics and nationalists is without foundation. The *Chronicle* has restricted itself almost entirely to religious matters, not even granting much attention to the Kaunas riots of 1972. Although the church has projected itself as the true guardian of the cultural heritage, national traditions, and customs, the bishops and even the more militant priests in general have eschewed direct involvement in strictly nationalist activity. A more public embrace of nationalist aspirations would give the authorities an added excuse to crack down on Catholic activists, justifying the action as the repression of political clericalism fully compatible with the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the constitution.⁷⁰

In 1979–81 some Catholic priests began to support nationalist causes more openly. During an unofficial commemoration in 1980 of the 550th anniversary of the death of Lithuania's most respected feudal ruler, Vytautas the Great, several members of the Catholic Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Faithful celebrated mass and by their sermons gave a decidedly religious tone to the whole celebration.⁷¹ But this remained an isolated incident, for the authorities soon suppressed open nationalist dissent and increased pressure on the Catholic committee.

In the 1980s the party became quite concerned about the growing

acceptance of the church's claims about its role in national life. The party press began to claim more insistently that the church has been hostile to national aspirations and that any ties between nationalism and the Catholic church are at best accidental. In their effort to drive a wedge between the church and nationalism, Soviet authors have even mentioned criticisms of the church's stance toward Lithuanian nationalism by the two most important figures of the national renaissance as well as by supporters of the nationalist regime that ruled Lithuania for most of the years of independence.⁷² Government propagandists have resorted to the traditional divide-and-conquer method, trying to convince nationalists that Catholics are indifferent to their cause, while suggesting to Catholics that the defense of national aspirations is a purely political and dangerous activity.

In general, relations between nationalists and Catholics are very harmonious. The Lithuanian opposition movement is rather unanimous in holding the church to be an institution beneficial to the national cause. Criticism of the church generally has been criticism of the hierarchy and priests accused of collaborating with the regime. The critics have been primarily other priests, including the editors of the *Chronicle*. Samizdat have reported only two cases of dissidents criticizing the church. The first criticism, of which only a secondhand account is available in the West, was printed in the samizdat journal *Laisvės šauklys*;⁷³ the second was voiced in a press conference dissidents had organized with foreign journalists.⁷⁴ Priests were accused of being too arrogant and fostering illusions of infallibility and of placing too much emphasis on religious matters in contrast to national concerns. But the criticism of the church was not a quarrel between Catholics and non-Catholics, for a practicing Catholic, Antanas Terleckas, uttered both criticisms.

This is not to deny that conflicts can arise. Some dissidents felt that priests should have allocated more of their greater financial resources to aid nationalist samizdat publications. There were other sources of tension. However, the amount of disagreement between nationalists and the church is substantially less than that among priests, most notably between the editors of the *Chronicle* and the hierarchy. Since 1978 the *Chronicle* has become quite vocal in its criticism of particular priests, even mentioning their names.⁷⁵ The appearance of criticism directed against the *Chronicle* and other leading elements of the Catholic

wing of the opposition movement does not necessarily imply that non-Catholics have become more active in nationalist circles; it could be but a sign of greater disagreement among Catholics.

While it is most unlikely that a non-Catholic nationalist would espouse the internal-tie view, a proponent of the external-tie concept could easily be a non-Catholic. A favorable evaluation of the church's activity is quite compatible with disbelief of the central dogmas of Catholicism. However, the available evidence suggests that most dissidents are Catholics. Many of the more than fifteen samizdat journals published in Lithuania were associated with the church: either their main topic was religion and religious rights, or many of their editors or contributors were Catholics. Even such journals as *Laisvės šauklis*, *Vytis*, and *Perspektyvos*, which some observers in the West classified as non-Catholic,⁷⁶ now are known to have had strong Catholic representation among their editors or contributors. One knows far less about the membership of clandestine organizations that issued in the 1970s proclamations, mostly political in nature. Yet these groups, even the more prominent ones such as the National People's Front and the Lithuanian Freedom League, have had little or no popular support and presumably were the work of a few individuals, writing proclamations for publication in samizdat.⁷⁷ Even their limited activity has long ceased.

Because of the predominance of Catholics in the Lithuanian opposition movement as a whole and probably in the nationalist wing as well, it is misleading to talk of Catholics and nationalists, as if they constituted two different groups of individuals. Often the same dissident is both a Catholic and a nationalist. The distinction, however, is useful as a means of categorizing the concerns and actions that are motivating an individual at a particular time and for classifying, however roughly and tentatively, articles by unknown samizdat authors.

Two factors contribute to the preponderance of Catholics among active members of the opposition movement, even its nationalist wing. First, Catholics are subjected from childhood to various kinds of discrimination, mockery and injustice. Thus, they are likely to be skeptical of party claims about the equality of all Soviet citizens and, by generalization, of assertions about the party's equal solicitude for all Soviet peoples. Second, Catholics who openly express their beliefs have less to lose materially. They face active discrimination in the job market and are barred from many professions, such as teaching and administrative

work. Skeptical of party propaganda, impervious to blandishments of better jobs, perhaps even embittered by discrimination or ostracized by neighbors, Catholics are Lithuania's proletariat with little to lose.

CONCLUSION

The ties that bind Catholicism and nationalism in Lithuania are deep and multifaceted. Many dissidents are both Catholics and nationalists. Even the nonbelievers are supportive of the church as a public institution fostering national aspirations. While nationalist and Catholic goals converge significantly, they are neither identical nor perceived as such. Catholics and nationalists share many concerns. Yet with very few exceptions most dissidents seem to invest most of their energy defending either religious or national rights, but usually not both. This division of labor is understandable in view of the idea, prevalent in dissident circles, that defending the church is helping preserve the chief guardian of the national heritage and that the fostering of nationalist aspirations contributes to the strengthening of the church.

The intimate tie between Catholic goals and nationalist aspirations is temporary and conditional on a number of factors. A church subservient to Moscow would lose favor with Lithuanian nationalists, while the influx of many militant agnostics or atheists into the ranks of the nationalists would jeopardize relations with Catholics. Although the conditions necessary for cooperation among Catholics and nationalists are likely to persist for some time, the unique position of Catholics as spokesmen for national aspirations may be challenged indirectly. *Glasnost*, the reduced fear of imprisonment for criticizing the system, and the newly emergent possibility of affecting some aspects of the government's ecological and social policy might convince individuals without any ties to the church to criticize publicly and offer alternatives to party nationality policy. Given the depth of nationalist feeling, such individuals could attract a popular following, but it is unclear if they would persist in their course if the security organs threatened a new crackdown.

In recent years the decline in the percentage of Catholics has ceased.⁷⁸ The Catholic counteroffensive has achieved some of its more important goals. Many Catholics no longer are cowed by the authorities and

express their beliefs more openly. All indications suggest that nationalism is very deep-seated; it may even be gaining strength. Thus, the existence of a more self-assured and militant church and strong nationalist sentiments ensure that Catholicism and nationalism will remain the central inspiration for dissidents in Lithuania.

Religion and Nationalism in Ukraine

Vasyl Markus

The Soviet sociopolitical landscape of the present day Ukraine has been shaped by forces and an ideology that deny both the religious value system and the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people. In the view of the architects of this social engineering, religion as a state of mind and its institutionalized expression, the church, should have yielded to a new enlightened *weltanschauung*: scientific communism, embracing also atheism. In spite of massive efforts on the part of the political establishment, the process of substitution of a secular religion for a revealed one has had limited success. Similarly, nationalism, allegedly a product of class antagonisms in presocialist society, has maintained its vitality and constitutes a formidable challenge to the supranational Soviet Russian societal model.

Moreover, religion and nationalism, labeled reactionary vis-à-vis the "progressive" new social and international order that the communist party of the Soviet Union intends to shape, have succeeded in forging an alliance against their common enemy. This might be viewed as a simple expediency, a tactical maneuver in the face of a common threat. Yet a closer historical investigation and cultural-psychological analysis of the two phenomena will attest to an interdependence and, at times, to a symbiosis of religious and national ideas. Judaism is certainly a prototype of such a coalescence of the religious and the secular. Christianity, although a universalist religion with a new message according to which "there is no room for distinction between Greek and Jew, between the circumcised and the uncircumcised, or between barbarian and Scythian, slave and free man" (Col. 3:11), was not immune to the nationalist contamination. Certainly, Western Christianity succeeded

for a while in creating a multinational empire in the form of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. But the empire succumbed to new ideas and to forces generated within the same Christianity in its pristine reformist incarnation. Likewise, Eastern Byzantine Christianity attempted to construct its own supranational model, although with even less success. Particular national-cultural entities soon emerged and threatened the ideals of the universal Byzantine Empire, as later they would challenge Islam.

Church and religion often have been articulators and supporters of imperial universal designs. But within the same church, and among adherents of the same religion, movements have emerged to hinder such designs in the name of national self-assertion and cultural self-actualization. Eastern Europe and the orbit of the Third Rome served as another example of the perplexing interplay between religion and nationalism, church and public power. In certain periods some church organizations and religious leaders have supported larger political structures with one nation in a privileged position while other Christians, Orthodox or Catholic, fought against such structures and articulated rival national ideologies. In most cases among the ruling and the ruled national entities we find a coalescence between religion and nationalism. A tendency toward a closer relationship between them within the same society is prevalent when both, or just one of them, are threatened from the outside.

The Ukrainian case concerning the nationality-religion relationship demonstrates some similarities with, and differences from, analogous cases in Eastern Europe, e.g., the Polish, Russian, Lithuanian, and Romanian cases. In periods of Ukrainian political autonomy the institutionalized religion tended to support secular power and vice versa (Kievan Rus', the Ukrainian Cossack state). At times when Ukraine was deprived of its independence, as has been the case throughout most of its history, the church either remained a catalyst of the national consciousness (and its last refuge), or was forced, even manipulated, into being an instrument of assimilation with foreign ruling nations and serving their interests in Ukraine.

Potentially an assimilative role could have been assigned to the Uniate church by the Polish sponsors of the Union of Brest (1596), which brought Ukrainians and Belorussians under the authority of Roman pontiffs. Yet there were strong forces operating within that

church, as well as outside it—mainly among the non-Uniate branch of the Church of Rus'—which molded it into an expression of Ukrainian (Ruthenian) nationhood.¹ There were periods and situations when some segments of that church served as mediators of a supranational Polish ideology. This has been expressed in acceptance of the imperial-feudal national identification (*natione Polonus, gente Ruthenus*) and in close rapprochement with, if not in the absorption into, Roman Catholicism. The latter, theoretically, was universal and non-national. In reality it was imbued with Polish culture and national pride. This Polish option of the Brest Union materialized only partly, scoring individual successes in absorbing some members of the Ukrainian political elite or, exceptionally, in bringing over to Polish Catholicism a few hundred thousand people, as in the Cholm region. The Uniate church, as a whole, did not prove just an ephemeral creature and instrument of conversion (or transmission); it had developed into a Ukrainian national institution and has remained so to the present day.

It was the strongly anti-Catholic Orthodox church in Ukraine, which restored its hierarchy in 1620 under the authority of Constantinople, that remained for over a century a more dynamic articulator of national aspirations. However, common religious bonds with Russian Orthodoxy and incorporation of the Ukrainian church into the patriarchate of Moscow in 1686, basically a political act, brought about the neutralization of Ukrainian Orthodoxy's national character and function. It was this neutralization that became a real menace to the Ukraine's national existence. Throughout the eighteenth century, Russian ecclesiastical and political authorities succeeded in enlisting the services of the Ukrainian hierarchy and clergy in pacifying autonomist currents. This was achieved by co-opting the human resources and absorbing the cultural values of the Kievan Orthodox heritage in the name of a higher "Pan-Russian" unity. Subsequently it brought about an accelerated Russification and integration of the Ukrainian church of the former Kiev Metropolia into the Russian church.

The nineteenth century witnessed almost a complete alienation of the Russianized Ukrainian clergy from the emerging modern national movement in Eastern Ukraine. Unlike other European societies, none of the ecclesiastical figures is known to have been active in the process of national revival in Eastern Ukraine. (In Bukovina, which was under Austrian domination, a few Orthodox priests did participate in

it, however.) In contrast, the Galician (West Ukrainian) revival largely was promoted and led by the Uniate clergy. But some clerics there—particularly in Hungarian Transcarpathia—partly due to foreign influence and partly in reaction to menacing Polish and Hungarian nationalism, looked to Russia as the “protector of the Slavs” and promoted the Russification of local Ukrainians (“Little Russians” or “Carpathorussians”). Even in that capacity, representatives of the church served as agents of nationalism—in this case, Russian nationalism. The so-called Russophile (*Moskvofily*) movement among Western Ukrainians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries collided with the dynamic, popular Ukrainian nationalism and plainly lost this historic cultural and political confrontation. The religious dimension of this struggle made itself evident through the support given to the Russophiles by the Russian church and the synod, as well as by the fact that the Uniate church and, later, the Ukrainian autocephaly constituted the spiritual backbone of the secular national movement.²

Early in the twentieth century and during the Revolution of 1917–20, in the Russian-ruled Ukraine only a minority of the lower-rank clergy embraced the Ukrainian national cause. Slowly, they came to realize that Ukraine, if it was to survive as an independent nation, needed a separate church organization and its own religious ideology. This brought about the movement to create an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox church. Autocephalists invoked the period of relative autonomy and the traditions of the Kievan church under Metropolitan Petro Mohyla and his successors prior to 1686 as their frame of reference. Ukrainian autocephaly also was inspired by the democratic and popular nature of the Ukrainian liberation movement during the revolution that culminated in the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic.³

The autocephalous church has been, in its substance, politically nationalist and ideologically anti-Russian and antiauthoritarian, while the Russian church remained Russian nationalist and imperial. The Russian Patriarchal church acted on the Ukrainian territory through the native Ukrainian and Russian clerics or laymen who abhorred the nationalist inspirations of the autocephalists, without admitting Russian nationalist motivations in their own stand. Certainly, those nationalisms were diverse in form and in certain expressions but the same in substance. Thus, two trends in the Orthodox religion in Ukraine

existed side by side, often indulging in conflict and mutual recriminations inspired by hostile nationalisms, viz., a separatist (Ukrainian) and integrationist (Russian) organization. The latter was, under certain circumstances, willing to admit an autonomous (as opposed to autocephalous) status for the Orthodox church in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church, formally established in 1921, was initially tolerated by the Soviet regime, even viewed for a while as a more "progressive" force in opposition to the "reactionary" Russian Orthodox church. It soon established itself in the Soviet Ukraine not only as a protector of the Ukrainian Orthodox people against the authoritarian and monarchist church of Moscow, but also as a stronghold of national aspirations when Ukrainian separatist nationalism failed to prevail over Soviet power. Many former political activists joined the ranks and even the leadership of the Autocephalous church, which was becoming increasingly popular. As a result, the church was attacked by the party and by the Soviet government, which saw in it a real danger to the multinational Soviet state. In 1930 the Autocephalous church was suppressed and its leadership decimated. It was not accidental that a major show trial in 1929-30 against the Union of the Liberation of Ukraine implicated also the leadership of the Autocephalous church.⁴

The Uniates or the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite, which before 1944 acted outside Soviet control, played an even larger role in the modern national movement. The towering figure of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, who for forty years headed the see of Lviv, personified the close relationship between the religious life and the national aspirations of Western Ukrainians. The government of the short-lived autonomous state of Carpatho-Ukraine (1938-39) was led by a Uniate priest, Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn. The Soviet regime, which took these territories under its rule in 1944-45 in a new historical effort to "collect all Russian lands," moved naturally against the Uniate church. Between 1946 and 1949 it was outlawed and cruelly suppressed in what was not so much a drive against religion as such, but one against a church that fostered a nationalism hostile to the regime.

Lacking only the formal act of dissolution, the same fate befell the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church, which had been restored on German-occupied territory during World War II. During the two or

three years of relative religious freedom under the Germans, the idea of an autocephalous Ukrainian church had rallied a significant following among Soviet Ukrainians, thus becoming an important channel for revived Ukrainian nationalism. It was logical for Stalin to move against both national Ukrainian churches and to favor their absorption into the Russian Orthodox church. The latter succored the new Russian nationalism revived during World War II by the Kremlin in its search for legitimization. With the changed nationality and religious policies of the CPSU, Soviet leaders have preferred a conservative and nationalist Russian church in Ukraine to the local, autonomous national churches because the latter proved themselves to be potent instruments of Ukrainian consciousness.

PRESENT STATUS OF RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN UKRAINE

Today's Ukraine is divided vaguely into two camps in terms of religion: those who believe and those who do not. It is difficult to assess numerically the two constituencies; yet, on the basis of sundry claims, one may infer that probably about half of the Ukrainian population still considers itself religious in the broadest sense. Most of the rest are flatly indifferent, ignorant, religiously passive, or intellectually areligious, but not necessarily militantly atheistic or antireligious. Only a slight minority of nonreligious individuals profess antireligious zeal and commitment to combat religion as a hostile ideology, though this is the main concern of those institutions and individuals of the system that specialize in antireligious propaganda. In Ukraine, as in other Soviet-ruled territories, only the high priests of secular atheism and their salaried lower-rank preachers are truly antireligious.

Despite massive effort and tremendous financial input into antireligious work, religious communities in Ukraine have survived and are thriving. Soviet antireligious workers also have to face in some way the issue of nationalism that affects, though sometimes marginally, the sociopolitical fabric of present-day Ukrainian society.

I have broken down the religious communities into four categories: (1) religious entities controlled by the regime but enjoying some preferential treatment due to political expediency, (2) controlled and rela-

tively restricted organizations, (3) organizations controlled with excessive restrictions, and (4) organizations that are banned and openly persecuted.⁵

The Soviet totalitarian system does not recognize the autonomous existence of any religious body. Thus, the classic principle of the liberal church-state separation is not valid in the USSR; there the state is not neutral. Religion is not autonomous, but subject to control and manipulation for political purpose by those in power.

Preferentially Treated Religious Groups

The Russian Orthodox church is the only member of category 1 in Ukraine. Although the CPSU and the Soviet state are committed to the objectives of scientific communism, including the promotion of atheism, the Russian Orthodox church has, nevertheless, occupied a somewhat special place among religious bodies of the USSR since World War II. Having discovered that the Russian people were not giving up their ancestral religion, but had preserved it despite years of severe persecutions, and having realized that religion could strengthen the patriotic feeling of the masses, Stalin decided to stage a reconciliation with the church and its hierarchy. Instead of combating the church, he used it, particularly in those areas that were in the Russian Orthodox church's historic sphere of influence, and where non-Russian nationalism operated, actively or latently. In this regard, Ukraine was a primary target.

The first task of the Russian Orthodox church in Ukraine was to absorb the Ukrainian Autocephalous parishes and clergy which had been restored for a short time from 1941-44. Soviet authorities were adamantly opposed to the continuation of the *petlurite* church⁶ that had emerged again under German auspices. The latter fact certainly was a serious liability, even though the church's promoters were no more pro-German than were their counterparts in the "autonomous" Orthodox church who supported unity with the Moscow patriarchate. The *de facto* suppression of Ukrainian autocephaly, without any formal act or pronouncement, was facilitated further by the mass exodus of that church's hierarchy and of the most outspoken clergy. The patriarchate and the government had to deal with only the lower echelons of clergy who reluctantly accepted the new state of affairs, tacitly joining the ranks of the Russian Orthodox church.

A more serious issue was the Russian Orthodox church's successful "reunification" of Ukrainian Catholicism with the see of the Moscow patriarchate. Despite a long and difficult struggle, the Russian Orthodox church and the Soviet regime eventually were able to sever local ties with Rome. The Russian church easily extracted concessions from the regime, in payment for its role in the pacification of Western Ukraine. The perseverance of nationalism in Ukraine and its continued identification with the Uniate church are the guarantee of the continued usefulness of the Russian Orthodox church in Ukraine to the regime.

As a result, the benefits are encouraging for the Moscow patriarchate. The territory of the Ukraine, and particularly Western Ukraine, is one of the most religiously active areas of the USSR. There are about three thousand parishes operating in the Ukrainian SSR, representing some 42–45 percent of all the parishes of the Moscow patriarchate in the USSR. The number of eparchies is eighteen, with fifteen bishops in 1986 (one metropolitan-exarch, two other metropolitans, five archbishops, and seven bishops). Among the hierarchs, there are ten or eleven ethnic Ukrainians, three Russians, and one Russian born in Ukraine.⁷ About 60 percent of the Ukrainian congregations are located in West Ukrainian eparchies, underscoring their importance in the total structure of the Russian Orthodox church. With the exception of Lithuania and possibly Moldavia, the percentage of individuals practicing religion here is the highest in the USSR. For some statistical data and comparisons of Russian Orthodox churches in Ukraine see table 6.1.

This does not mean that atheist work is not carried on in Western Ukraine or that church activities are not hindered. Some churches have been closed, registered priests are restrained and closely monitored, and bishops and other ranking church officials, being a part of quasi-*nomenklatura* appointments, are regulated thoroughly in their administrative activities and church personnel policies. But as long as there are other, more immediate targets—the tolerated, but socially dangerous, sectarian religious groups or politically "obnoxious" facts or people to be neutralized—a conservative and conventional religious community tends to become politically acceptable to the regime.

The marriage of convenience of Russian Orthodoxy in Ukraine with the system has, however, imposed a certain price. The very fact that the

Table 6.1 Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine (ukrSSR) in the Mid-1980s

51 million population, 18 percent of the USSR	
1986	18 eparchies (15 bishops) 5 vacant eparchies 27% of the USSR eparchies, 28% of resident bishops
late 1970s	ca. 155 deaneries out of 326 in the USSR 47% in Ukraine (42% in Western and Right Bank Ukraine)
late 1970s	ca. 3,000 parishes (registered churches) out of 7,062 (total USSR) 42.5% in Ukraine ca. 2,500 priests out of 5,995 (total USSR) 42% in Ukraine 9 convents and monasteries in Ukraine 50% of total
1974-75	118 theology students (Odessa seminary) out of 566 (total USSR); 21%. A considerable number of Ukrainian students are enrolled in two academies and two seminaries in Russia. One Soviet Orthodox source gives the figure of the enrolled students at Odessa seminary for mid-1980s as 240-50; half of them are most probably studying by correspondence. ^a
1974	134 ordained priests out of 297 (total USSR) 42% in Ukraine;

Eparchies in order of number of parishes and servicing priests (population rank in parentheses)

1. Lviv-Ternopil (4)	10. Khmelnytsky (13)
2. Volyn-Rivne (9)	11. Zhytomyr (11)
3. Ivano-Frankivske (6)	12. Kirovohrad-Mykolaiv (7)
4. Mukachiv (17)	13. Kharkiv (6)
5. Kiev (3)	14. Poltava (12)
6. Chernivtsi (18)	15. Sumy (15)
7. Odessa-Kherson (5)	16. Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizha (2)
8. Chernyhiiv (14)	17. Symferopil (8)
9. Vynnytsia (10)	18. Voroshylovhrad Donetsk (1)

Sources: See n. 7.

^aI. Nikitenko, M. Novosad, and Yo. Oksiiuk, *Orthodox Eastern Faith in Ukraine* (Kiev: Ukraina Society, 1986), p. 104.

church initially embraced over twenty-five hundred Uniate parishes and close to fifteen hundred Uniate priests manifested itself in a new ethnic composition of the Orthodox church in Ukraine. The Ukrainian identity of the former Uniates, now forced into conversion to Orthodoxy, did not disappear; it remains visibly present and has to be tolerated. The language used in the liturgical functions is a Ukrainianized variant of Old Church Slavonic; the language of the sermons and of local administration is standard Ukrainian. Most of the local bishops are natives of Western Ukraine, and 95 percent of the clergy consist of local people. A number of West Ukrainian rituals and ceremonies, different from those practiced elsewhere by the Russian Orthodox church, are tolerated.

In the 1950s the Moscow patriarchate attempted to "orthodoxize" the newly incorporated congregations by eliminating the so-called Latinizing influences and practices. In this respect several measures were introduced vis-à-vis West Ukrainian clergy with few results.⁸ The question of language, as the primary indicator of national perseverance, still remains crucial. When Metropolitan Filaret Denysenko, the patriarchal exarch of Ukraine, visits Western Ukraine, he addresses local congregations in Ukrainian. *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk* (one of the two Orthodox monthlies in the USSR) appears in Ukrainian. It also services substantially Russianized eparchies and parishes of Central and Eastern Ukraine. The only prayer book published in the Ukrainian SSR since World War II features Old Church Slavonic texts in the Ukrainian variant, together with some prayers in the Ukrainian vernacular.

An excessive zeal about Ukrainian language is viewed with suspicion. According to a *samvydav* source, a certain priest, Father Sava, started to preach in Kiev's St. Vladimir Cathedral in Ukrainian. He was removed shortly thereafter and sent to a village church.⁹ The use of the Ukrainian language in the cathedral in the capital of Ukraine appears to have been more than regime officials and representatives of the Moscow patriarchate could stomach.

Nevertheless, the status of the church in Ukraine clearly was upgraded. Although not an autonomous branch of the patriarchate, the Ukrainian eparchies constitute an exarchate, the only one within the Russian Orthodox church in the Soviet Union. This might be due to the traditional prestige of the metropolitan see of ancient Kiev. The present exarch, Metropolitan Filaret, enjoys a particular position

within the Russian Orthodox hierarchy. He is second in rank to Patriarch Pimen and often represents the Russian Orthodox church and the Moscow patriarchate on ecumenical and foreign missions. The role of Filaret and of the exarchate was underscored when, in 1969, a department for the external relations of the Russian Orthodox church was established in Kiev.¹⁰ This measure pursues a long-range objective, especially in dealing with the issues of the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox churches active in the diaspora.

Relatively Restricted Religious Groups

Among the churches in Ukraine that are tolerated and controlled, but not excessively restricted, are the Evangelical Christian-Baptists, the Reformed Church of Transcarpathia, and the Old Believers. The last group consists of the remnants of once flourishing isolated communities, mostly in ethnic Russian rural settlements in Bukovina (the so-called *Lypovany*), in Chernihiv, and in the Kherson regions. Numerically and organizationally, it is an insignificant group, without any political relevance. Since the Old Believers, scattered in a few rural communities, are self-centered and do not display missionary zeal, the regime does not treat them any more harshly than it treats religion in general. The Old Believers do not play any supportive or adversary role vis-à-vis the Ukrainian national cause, and only a few individual ethnic Ukrainians share their beliefs.

Reformed Church of Transcarpathia. An organization of ethnic Hungarians, this church is a traditional national denomination of Magyars that historically was an advocate of Hungarian nationalism, mainly in the borderlands. It embraces about half of the Magyars in the area (about sixty thousand) and maintains about forty operating churches with about thirty pastors, who are trained in Hungary. Since the Hungarian minority in the Ukrainian SSR belongs to a relatively privileged ethnic group, this church is tolerated, although closely watched; it has not been upbraided for Hungarian nationalism. Given a change in the international context, it could resume its former role as spokesman for Hungarian territorial revisionism.

Evangelical Christians and Baptists. These groups constitute organizationally one body but historically have belonged to various Protestant denominations and sects. When in 1944 the Soviet government decided to legalize Protestant activities, it preferred to deal with one

rather than several groups. As a result, Soviet Baptists, along with Pentecostals and Adventists, formed the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists. In 1966 the council was joined by the Mennonites, ethnic Germans who had had a sizable following among Germans in Ukraine prior to the war. Individual congregations of the two Protestant communities in Western Ukraine, the Reformed (Calvinist) church and another Church of the Augsburg Confession, also joined the council. But the bulk of the faithful of this new church body consisted of Baptists who had acquired a growing following in Eastern Ukraine and who had attempted before, in the 1920s, to create an all-Ukrainian organization of their own.

Presently, the community has its central authority in Moscow, supervising between 1 and 1.5 million believers, half of them in Ukraine. There is a chief presbyter in Kiev for the Ukrainian republic and a district presbyter in each *oblast* (province). Over 80 percent of the communicants in Ukraine are ethnic Ukrainians. For a long time, the Evangelical Baptist community was, in terms of national identification, indifferent. The congregations, mostly in the Eastern Ukraine, followed the pattern of the Russian Orthodox church—that means that they were Russianized and used mostly Russian as the language of religious functions. In the Western Ukraine, primarily in Volhynia where there are numerous congregations of Evangelical Christians, the language used in church is prevailingly Ukrainian.

However, no Ukrainian language publications are being used, and only recently has the Ukrainian character of these communities become more pronounced. The New Testament and a hymnal were published in a limited number of copies by an underground printing shop, *Khristianin*. More frequently than before, prayers and services are conducted in the Ukrainian language. It appears that the tendency to revive cultural ethnicity is connected with the internal ferment within the Christian-Baptist community. The emergence of a more radical group, known as *Iniitsiativnyky* (action group), was connected to the awakening of national consciousness among some activists and rank-and-file believers. Yet the *Iniitsiativnyky* as a whole do not identify themselves with the Ukrainian cause and avoid involvement in political and cultural nationalism. At the same time, they are not instruments of Russian nationalism, as the Russian Orthodox church in many ways tends to be.¹¹

Excessively Restricted Religious Groups

A denomination that can be classified as tolerated but excessively restricted is the Roman Catholic church, which has not yet been suppressed in Ukraine. It exists on the parish level without any central authority in the republic. All former dioceses on the Ukrainian territory are vacant, the archdiocese of Lviv being only the latest vacancy. There are now only three historical-ethnic and jurisdictional Roman Catholic groups in the Ukrainian SSR.

Catholics in Western Ukraine. The remnants of the Polish Roman Catholics living in the dioceses of Lviv, Luts'k, and parts of Peremyshl-Przemysl make up a dozen or so congregations with a score of priests. Here Roman Catholicism is strongly identified with Polish national consciousness. Their number does not exceed a hundred thousand potential followers.

Catholics in Kiev, Odessa, and right-bank Ukraine. A second group includes those right-bank Ukraine and east Ukrainian cities with some Polish and German minorities, i.e., the territory where Soviet rule was established in 1920. Here, the once-flourishing Roman Catholic minority dwindled ethnically (caused by the decline in the numbers of Poles and Germans) and organizationally to a token presence. There may still be as many as 150,000–200,000 nominal Roman Catholics, i.e., those who are baptized or whose parents were baptized. However, organizationally this community finds itself in a sorry state. Only a few itinerant priests service large areas between Kiev, Odessa, and Kamianets Podil'skyi. The existing congregations have minimal contacts with the better-organized Roman Catholic communities in Lithuania and Latvia, and even less with Poland. Yet it is known that a majority of the priests servicing this community in Ukraine came from Latvia. For the declining Polish nationality in Ukraine the Roman Catholic church could become a source of ethnic maintenance and revival. Soviet authorities are aware of this and are inclined to speed the process of assimilation of the Poles and, eventually, achieve obliteration of their national church.¹²

Catholics in Subcarpathia. A small group of Roman Catholics in Subcarpathia consists of ethnic Hungarians, Slovaks, and Germans. Again, the group lacks hierarchical ties with larger communities; some practical working relations exist with the Roman Catholic church in neigh-

boring Hungary and Slovakia. This community is able to operate on a more or less normal basis. The number of registered Roman Catholic parishes in Carpatho-Ukraine is higher than that in any other region (more than forty).

The fate of Roman Catholics in Ukraine in a peculiar way is tied to that of the Ukrainian Eastern-rite Catholics and to the policy of the Holy See vis-à-vis all the Catholics in the Ukraine and, ultimately, in the USSR, since they are parts of the same church.

Jews and Muslims. Two non-Ukrainian and non-Christian religious communities in the Ukrainian SSR fall into the excessively restricted group: the Jews and the Muslims. The first group numbers over half a million potential adherents, but only a fraction of these, mostly in the western *oblasts*, are practicing Jews. There are no more than twenty to thirty registered Jewish congregations. Allegedly there is only one active rabbi in Kiev; in other cities, the congregations are presided over by cantors or other elders. However, Judaism is part of the ethnic heritage of even nonpracticing Jews and is therefore a vital component of Jewish national identity. With the exodus of most active members of the Jewish population to the West in the 1970s and 1980s, not only religion but also the cause of ethnic Jewish survival in Ukraine has been weakened.

The Muslim community in Ukraine used to consist of Crimean Tatars who were uprooted after World War II. Today there are individuals who were transferred here from the Muslim areas of the USSR and live mostly in Donbas (some seventy thousand). They do not constitute any organizational base or community. Their individual religious expression, if any, is tied with their ethnic-religious homelands: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Tatar area, etc. The Crimean Tatars, forcibly resettled in Central Asia in 1944, have not been permitted to return to Crimea.

Banned Religious Groups

The fourth category of religions consists of those organizations that have been outlawed by Soviet authorities and are therefore actively persecuted. This category includes the two historic churches—the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church and the Ukrainian Greek-rite (Uniate) Catholic church—and smaller sects—the Pentecostals, the Adventists, and the Jehovah's Witnesses. Besides these, there are two other

religious organizations in the Ukraine that operate outside the law. The Truly Orthodox church (*Istinno-Pravoslavnaia Tserkov*) was set up in opposition to the legalized and submissive Russian Orthodox church. Its followers (among whom few ethnic Ukrainians are to be found) are fanatical zealots mostly withdrawn from public life and sometimes openly defying the system. The other was the *Initsiativnyky*, a branch of Evangelical Christians and Baptists who broke with the docile leadership of the All-Union Council in the early 1960s. The *Initsiativnyky* called for a more independent stand vis-à-vis Soviet authorities, criticized the regime's religious policy, and defied all restrictions imposed on church activities. Georghi Vins, pastor of Kiev, became secretary-general of its underground central authority, the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christian Baptists. As mentioned before, the group was strongly supported by Ukrainian congregations. Thanks to this group, the Ukrainian national factor has been recognized among an otherwise cosmopolitan Baptist community. The *Initsiativnyky* also maintain contacts with the exile-based All-Ukrainian Fellowship of Evangelical Christians, a group known for its clear national position. In recent times the Soviet government appears to have adopted a more lenient attitude toward Baptist opposition, showing a willingness to register the churches and even tolerate independent activities not subordinated to the obedient Moscow All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists.

The other outlawed sects—the Pentecostals, the Adventists, and the Jehovah's Witnesses—are quite militant, based mostly in the rural areas, and consist of 95 percent ethnic Ukrainians. They maintain a closely knit organizational network of small congregations with elected preachers, use private homes or secret outdoor gatherings for religious functions, and, therefore, cannot be easily controlled. Their "home churches" refuse to register. The members often defy strict legislation about religious activities and challenge certain civic obligations (e.g., the draft, atheist schooling of children, blood transfusions). Nationally they are indifferent, although part of their literature, reproduced secretly in the USSR, is in Ukrainian; e.g., the Pentecostal monthly *Vartova Bashta* (Watchtower) appears in the Ukrainian language. These groups tend to develop their following in certain areas: the Ukrainian Pentecostals are in Volhynia, Podilia, Polisia, and Ternopil *oblasts*; the Adventists in the Chernivitsi *oblast*; and the Jehovah's Witnesses in

the Transcarpathian and Crimean *oblasts*. These sects are also spread among Ukrainians dispersed in Siberia, the Kuban region, and Central Asia.¹³

THE UKRAINIAN HISTORIC NATIONAL CHURCHES

The Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Greek-Catholic churches are referred to as historic and national churches in the common perception of Ukrainians in the free world as well as in the writings of *samvydav*. These are the traditional churches, in contrast to the new Protestant-inspired denominations and sects that appeared in the second half of the nineteenth and the twentieth century. They are perceived to be specifically Ukrainian in their cultural context; in fact, the membership of these two churches has been exclusively Ukrainian. Ethnic Russians naturally prefer the Orthodox church integrated with Moscow or, in extremis, the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox church under the patriarchal jurisdiction. The two national churches are now outlawed and are considered reactionary, hostile, anti-Soviet, and anticommunist. Although unrecognized by the regime, prohibited, and persecuted, they continue to exist under adverse conditions: the Ukrainian Catholic Uniate church retaining a formal underground structure, and the autocephalists retaining an alternative church ideology and a potential following within the folds of the official Orthodox church.¹⁴

Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church

The journalistic labels attached to the Uniate church in the USSR such as the "Church of Silence" or the "Catacomb Church" do not convey its true situation. It is neither a silent religious community nor are its "catacombs" entombed in the underground caves as some would have it. The Eastern-rite Catholics in Ukraine have adopted various modes of existence for the sake of survival. Some consider themselves a "church within a church," while others view themselves as constituting a marginal religious community.

The "church within the church" is the prevalent form of existence. The bulk of the Uniates, forcibly converted to Orthodoxy, still consider themselves Eastern-rite Catholics, even though formally under the jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarchate. They have remained *in*

pectore, and often publicly, Catholics. To average believers, their presence in the Russian Orthodox church is made less embarrassing by the fact that their former priests are serving there, as well as their local successors (who frequently refer to themselves as Catholics), and, given the opportunity, they would return to their ancestral church, which was equally Catholic and Eastern (in rite and spirituality). The liturgy, the services, the customs, the language, and the entire spiritual atmosphere have not changed considerably from what it was before. Moreover, the church is trying hard to preserve its ethnic Ukrainian characteristics.

The now-outlawed Uniates also embrace the status of "a church within *another* church." Some of them, especially in urban communities where the Latin-rite Catholic churches still operate, attend these churches to satisfy their spiritual needs (confessions, baptisms, even sometimes nuptial rites). The number of such Ukrainian Catholics is not very high for several reasons: Roman Catholic parishes are sparse; the spiritual needs of those who refuse to attend Orthodox churches are, to a great extent, being taken care of by the Ukrainian Catholic nonregistered or "secret" priests; and identification with Roman Catholicism (which in Ukraine is equivalent to Polish nationality) might be viewed as unpatriotic.

One should consider this option not only an accidental component of a complex religio-national situation, but also a possible concept to preserve Catholicism against apostasy. It is noteworthy that Soviet authorities do prefer such a possibility to the separate operation of illegal Ukrainian Catholic communities. Several sources, including the Vatican, have suggested that under certain conditions, the Soviet government might consent to the registration of Ukrainian Roman Catholic communities in Western Ukraine or, eventually, to the Ukrainianization of existing Roman Catholic parishes. The implications of such an option are serious. Still, the concession undoubtedly would be limited to only a few parishes and thus would not cause a general reversal of the post-1946 trend. Such a solution would be divisive for the Ukrainian Catholics since the majority would decline to embrace this solution. Finally, such a minuscule "splinter" church would not and could not be in a position to claim spiritual and jurisdictional unity with the Ukrainian Catholic church structure abroad.

Much more interesting and also more troublesome for the regime is the phenomenon of the so-called Uniate "marginal community," or the nonofficial church. These groups are not easy to assess numerically but are present in each major locality and even in some smaller ones. Usually, the followers are organized informally around unregistered priests, itinerant monks or nuns, and activist lay people. The groups maintain contacts and communication among themselves and communicate with distant congregations as well as with their leadership. The spiritual leadership tends to preserve the canonical hierarchy that, of course, is not recognized by civil authorities. Secret bishops have their jurisdictional territories, although they may live as workers or pensioners in a small town or village. Moreover, the communicants outside the Ukraine, but still in the USSR, keep in touch with their brethren in the homeland.

The number of priests in Ukraine was estimated in the 1970s at between three and five hundred. However, as a result of the recent upsurge of Ukrainian Catholic activity, the number of priests, both monastic and secular, has doubled. There is a continuous addition of new priests ordained by secret bishops. Soviet sources report on "secret seminaries," which are in reality no more than private training courses conducted by qualified priests for willing candidates. The underground church allegedly has many religious vocations. A great deal of pastoral work is done by the nuns. They usually live in small communities and earn their living as factory workers, medical personnel, or workers on collective farms. Their identities are, in most cases, known to the authorities. Because they do exemplary work at their places of employment, they are harassed but usually tolerated. Still, from time to time arrests do occur. The priests are watched, called to police stations, fined, and even arrested for transgressing legislation concerning religious cults.¹⁵

It seems that there is a tacit understanding on the local level that if religious activities of the recalcitrant Uniates are not provocative, are not widely known, and are conducted semiprivate (e.g., celebration of holy mass at a private home), they can be overlooked. Periodic imprisonments, searches, trials, and public "unmaskings" of illegal activities serve to compel, or at least encourage, the Uniates to restrict themselves to low-key and subdued religious work.

Pokutnyky

Along with the moderate underground Uniate church, there are more radical followers to Uniatism. There is a Uniate dissenters' group, called neo-Uniates by Soviet sources, whose fanatical spokesmen disagree with the established and hierarchical Uniate church. They question the apparent readiness of the Uniate clergy and laity to accommodate the system if it will grant them recognition. They totally reject the Soviet regime, refuse to cooperate with it, and call for disobedience.¹⁶

This radical religious movement started in the obscure village of Serednia (in the Ivano-Frankivske *oblast*) where in 1954, allegedly, the Mother of God appeared to a local woman. The "miracle of Serednia" soon attracted many pilgrims to the site, on some occasions as many as several thousand worshippers. It is known that at least three illegal Ukrainian Catholic priests actively promoted this religious movement. Soviet media and antireligious propaganda initially referred to this group as the *Ihnativtsi* sect, derived from the name of its first leader, Fr. Ihnatii Soltys, who was later imprisoned and sentenced. He was succeeded by another itinerant Uniate priest, Fr. Antin Potochniak. The group's adherents prefer to call themselves *Pokutnyky* (the Penitents), because they preach that the Ukrainian people must repent their sins of the past in order to be delivered from their present yoke.¹⁷

The established underground Ukrainian Catholic church questioned the veracity of the miracle and reacted even more critically to certain postulates and practices of the group, such as preaching the end of the world (announced for 1962), prescribing a nine-day penitence and a pilgrimage to the "Holy Place of the Virgin's apparition" in order to be saved, anathematizing Rome for its cooperation with "antichrist," and proclaiming the "Holy Mountain" in Serednia as a "New Rome" along with the announcement that a "true pope" had appeared in Ukraine in the person of Arkhierei Emanuil as a "visible Peter II on earth."¹⁸ This led to an actual break between the regular Ukrainian Catholics and the *Pokutnyky* sect. The latter maintained some of its following among the fanatical and desperate opponents of both the regime and Russian Orthodoxy, mostly among the peasants, and most particularly among peasant women. The influence of the *Pokutnyky* weakened in the late 1970s, however.¹⁹

Soviet sources admit the challenging nature of the *Pokutnyky* move-

ment, particularly its nationalistic-messianic undercurrent. This aspect was especially singled out by a Soviet author who asserted that the *Pokutnyky*

are playing on national feelings by asserting that Ukraine, which has been oppressed in captivity and serfdom for long centuries, is being now resurrected by God. Thus, they try to foment hatred of other peoples, primarily of the Russian nation which, allegedly, introduced atheism in Ukraine. Although the *Pokutnyky* are not widely spread, this nonetheless means that under particular conditions, there is a possibility of close interaction between religion and nationalism.²⁰

The unofficial or marginal church has been surrounded by an aura of martyrdom that might, for certain individuals, become an additional stimulus to be a part of a repressed group or at least to sympathize with the underdog.

New Wave of Catholic Activism

The situation has noticeably changed in the 1980s. Ukrainian Catholics have become more vocal and organized. Like Lithuanian Catholics, they intensified their pastoral work, extended their influence to larger segments of the population, publicly demanded the legalization of their church activities, and started to publicize Soviet reprisals against believers. In 1982 an Initiative Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine was founded under the leadership of Yosyf Terela. A few priests and nuns joined the group, among them a veteran church activist, Rev. Hryhorii Budzinsky, and a former *Pokutnyk*, Rev. A. Potochniak. The group started to publish the *Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church*, patterned on the Lithuanian Chronicle. The Initiative Group is also known as the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics.

The group initiated writing letters to the Soviet authorities with the request to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR. In August and October 1987 two petitions were addressed in this regard to the Supreme Soviet with the signatures of bishops, clergy, and laity. A press conference was held in Moscow, so that the activity of the group was sufficiently publicized outside the USSR. Simultaneously the Ini-

tiative Group solicited the support of Pope John Paul II, urging him to help the restoration of the suppressed Ukrainian Catholic church.²¹

Moreover, three other events marked the recent and dramatic struggle of Catholics in the Ukraine. In the spring of 1987 the news spread in the Ukraine and throughout the USSR that there had been a miraculous apparition of the Holy Virgin in a small village of Western Ukraine, Hrushevo. The site soon became the place of many pilgrimages, something on the scale of Medjugorje in Yugoslavia, and was acknowledged by the Soviet press.²²

Another event worth mentioning was the appearance of the *samvydav* work by Reverend Mykhailo Havryliv entitled *Every Person Is First of All a History*, an account of the conversion of an Orthodox priest to Catholicism and of his pastoral activities. The book was smuggled out of the Soviet Union and published in Ukrainian and English in Rome. Soon the Reverend Mr. Havryliv was subjected to harsh sanctions. He was drafted into the Soviet army at the age of thirty-eight, although he had completed his military service when he was a young man.²³

The third important event was the sudden grant of a visa to Terela and his family so they could leave the USSR. Allegedly, this religious activist faced the option of leaving the Soviet Union or of being imprisoned again. With the departure of Terela to the West (he now resides in Canada), the Catholic resistance in the Ukraine did not cease. The group is now chaired by Ivan Hel.²⁴

The problem of Ukrainian Catholics acquired special significance in view of a possible papal visit to the Soviet Union. The Vatican continuously maintains that such a visit is possible only if the pontiff would have an opportunity to visit Catholic communities, including those of the Ukraine. Moscow places considerable value on a papal trip for political reasons, and for a while it seemed possible that the pope might come for the millennial celebration of Christianity in the Soviet Union. But the Vatican would not compromise on its preconditions, and hence the pope did not accompany the high-level Vatican delegation that attended the millennial celebrations in June 1988.

Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev, the spokesman for the patriarchate, recently made a public statement that the papal visit to the Soviet Union cannot take place because the pope supports the Uniates and is apparently involved in the "alternative" celebrations of Christianity in Russia, i.e., the Millennium of Christianity of Ukraine. The same prelate

admitted the fact that in the USSR there are several thousand Uniates and three bishops. Even more revealing was the statement by another Russian Orthodox prelate, Archbishop Irinei Susemil of Vienna, who confirmed the existence of Ukrainian Catholics in the USSR, stating that "in the new wave of democratization also the Uniates should find their place." Still Archbishop Irinei underscored the political nature of the Uniate problem in the USSR. It is not excluded that the archbishop may have expressed the official view when he mentioned that the government might take a more liberal stand on the issue. He added, however, that this might be the case if the Soviets were convinced that the emancipated church would not become "another political underground organization."²⁵

As a result, the Catholic church in the Ukraine finds itself at a very critical juncture. It can expect some gradual improvement in its status in view of the domestic and the external situations. Yet there might be new dangers in store to its precarious existence. Some Soviet political quarters indicate that some uncertainty on the part of the regime was motivated by consideration of the millennium celebrations. Now that that occasion has passed, some radical elements in the government and in the Russian church may return to the previous policy of repression against the Uniates.

Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTS)

When it comes to the Ukrainian Orthodox church, it is not so much its present situation that gains attention as the role of the Autocephalists in the past. A Soviet author, writing in the atheist journal *Liudyna i svit*, described Ukrainian Autocephalist ideology as a "synthesis of clericalism and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." The same author specifically singled out the use of the Ukrainian language in liturgical services as an element of nationalism.²⁶

Bishops of the second autocephaly (1942–44) are attacked, especially the outspoken Metropolitan Mstyslav Skrypnyk, who now heads the most representative branch of the Ukrainian Orthodox church in exile. The continuity of the autocephaly as an alternative concept to the present Russianized Orthodox church is obviously troublesome to the Soviets. Although presently not threatening, it is potentially an alternative to the Russian Orthodox church and might become as attractive as it was in the 1920s or early 1940s. Therefore, those who shape na-

tional and religious policies in the Ukraine would prefer to see the Ukrainian Orthodox congregations in exile absorbed by other national Orthodox church structures, including the newly established Orthodox Church of America (OCA). Incidentally, the nominally nonethnic Orthodox Church of America is in reality still very much Russian, and as such it is strongly opposed by Ukrainians in the United States and Canada.

Most recently, on the eve of the millennial celebrations of Christianity in Kievan Rus', Patriarch Pimen addressed Orthodox faithful outside the USSR, and among them those "who call themselves members of the Ukrainian Autocephalous church" to join in the celebration with the mother church and break with separatism. As expected, this call was rejected by the Ukrainian Orthodox churches abroad.²⁷

Any work of religious self-promotion on the part of autocephalists in the Ukraine is rebuffed by the Soviets, as are the contacts of Ukrainian Orthodox quarters in exile with the ecumenical patriarchate and other churches. The elaborate structure of the official Russian Orthodox church outside of the USSR, with many exarchates and missions in the Western world, is designed equally to counteract exiled Russian Orthodox churches, as well as Ukrainian ones. It is noteworthy that the patriarchal jurisdictions abroad with the majority of the faithful of Ukrainian descent are staffed by ethnically Ukrainian bishops and priests (in Canada and Argentina).

THE ROC'S AND THE SOVIET RESPONSE

The existence of the "second church" in the Soviet Union is evidenced not only by political or antireligious sources, but also by Orthodox religious figures and publications. In an article, "The Truth about the Union," Bishop Ioan of Zhytomyr and Ovruch wrote:

Even now a certain number of people in Halychyna stay under the Uniate influence, considering that the Union forcefully imposed on their ancestors, and not the Orthodoxy shared by our forefathers, is the true religion. These people look at Orthodoxy as on a foreign faith, lacking grace. It is a grave mistake. This causes us great sorrow. It is difficult to explain why certain priests and laity in Halychyna, while keeping in mind the servility of the

Uniate leadership toward the enemies of the Ukrainian people, are still unable to free themselves from the Uniate yoke. . . . Those believers in Halychyna who are still in the Uniate captivity . . . should reunite with their Mother Orthodox Church, and she will embrace them with love as her faithful sons.²⁸

Many secular sources bring home the reality that the Uniate church is alive, its followers even taking initiatives to change their illegal status. A Soviet student of religion, M. Mchedlov, admitted already in 1970 that in the USSR there was

a certain revival and activization of former Uniates. They spread rumors among the populace, particularly among those who were converted to the Orthodox Church. They often slander Soviet reality, inspire all kinds of letters to be sent to Soviet authorities demanding the registration of Uniate congregations. They urge the restoration to Ukraine of the Greek Catholic Church, etc.²⁹

Mchedlov was commenting on the efforts of the church in the 1960s, but these efforts have continued through the 1970s. The movement of petitions and calls for legalization of the outlawed Uniate religious community has become even more insistent, as has been amply documented in religious and national *samvydav* literature of the period.

Equally revealing is the concern of Soviet policymakers in the Ukraine, as illustrated by the same author. Mchedlov charges "Uniate churchmen" with promoting nationalist ideals. He condemns this activity as being "diversionist," anti-Soviet, and antisocialist in nature. "It is not accidental that artificial attempts to revive the Greek Catholic Church in the Ukraine, to establish it as an organization, and to unite all existing Ukrainian church entities, have found support equally among the counter-revolutionary émigré clergy and among the secular bourgeois nationalists."³⁰

The campaign of defamation of the Uniates conducted by atheists and party agents, also echoed in the writings of the official representatives of the Russian Orthodox church, focuses on the national-political role of the Ukrainian Catholic church, now and in the past. It is not the purpose of this chapter to present a full account of the anti-Uniate campaign in the Western Ukraine or to analyze its themes and arguments. Suffice it to say that there are a large number of publications devoted to

the problem; it is also a major topic of lectures, seminars, broadcasts, films, and exhibits in the museums of religion and atheism. An author specializing in the anti-Uniate struggle summarized the tasks of vigorous Soviet propaganda against the "remnants" of the Uniates in this manner:

In this connection it is indispensable to expose continually and pointedly the shameful history and pernicious role of the Greek Catholic Church in the social life of our people. It is necessary to disclose the anti-communist substance of the alliance between its leaders and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, to prove the futility of attempts by Western reactionary-bourgeois-clerical quarters to revive artificially Uniatism and to exploit religio-nationalist survivals in the struggle against the USSR, the forces of peace and of social progress.³¹

The leaders of the Ukrainian Catholic church have been charged with collaboration with the Germans during World War II. Even the figure of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, who is well known for his clear stand against the Nazi Holocaust and who personally contributed to saving the lives of many Jews, has not been spared.³² The attack has been particularly strong on the former spiritual leader of the Ukrainian Catholics, Josyf Cardinal Slipyj in Rome, who himself spent eighteen years in Soviet prisons and camps. Slipyj's successor, Cardinal Myroslav Lubachivsky, who also claims to be leader of all Ukrainian Catholics including those in the Soviet Union, has become a special target of Soviet invective.³³

Soviet propaganda attacks the efforts of Ukrainian Catholics to organize their church as a particular structure with autonomy and restored traditional institutions, including a patriarchate. That, of course, is anathema to the Kremlin. Agitprop condemned the cause of beatification of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, and it accused Cardinal Slipyj of not keeping his promise to stay away from anti-Soviet activity (allegedly made when Khrushchev agreed to release him in 1963). The present pope also is attacked indirectly for his "generous" treatment of Ukrainians in exile: granting them synodal rule, appointing an archbishop-coadjutor to Slipyj with the right of succession to the see of Lviv-Halych (where the union with Rome was declared dissolved over four decades ago), or sending special messages to the Ukrainian Catholic

hierarchy on the eve of the millennium of Christianity in the Ukraine. Radio Vatican Ukrainian-language programs beamed to the Ukraine are labeled "nationalist" and accused of sowing national hatred.³⁴

In this regard the church hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox church also takes issue with the Vatican. On two recent occasions there was a strong intervention of Russian hierarchs with the Holy See. One protest was in response to the pastoral letter of Pope John Paul II on the millennium of Ukraine's Christianity; the second protest came in response to the decision of the Ukrainian bishops' synod to solemnly reject the so-called *Sobor* of Lviv, which had declared the Uniate church dissolved.³⁵

Both Ukrainian national churches are thorns in the side of the regime: the existing Russian Orthodox church is tolerated as the lesser "evil" while the Orthodox church in the Ukraine is granted some insignificant concessions (e.g., displaying its Ukrainian features) in order to neutralize "nationalist" propaganda emanating from the Uniates and Autocephalists.

Soviet writers have outlined some of the motivations of those still religiously active in Ukraine. First—according to these writers—there are forces (primarily from outside Soviet society) that use religion in an attempt to disseminate among the Soviet people bourgeois ideas and ways of life. Second, the same agents, along with some internal foes of the Soviet regime, intend to use religion to revive the remnants of bourgeois nationalism. To this end, according to Soviet spokesmen, some churchmen pretend that religion preserves the national tradition. It is, according to V. Tancher, presented as the champion for the conservation of national traditions. The religiosity of a people, the author argues, is further portrayed as the virtue of national selfhood, while the performance of religious rituals and the observance of holidays are valued as expressions of a national character.³⁶

The same author specifically singled out Ukrainian Catholics to criticize their nationalist attitude, in particular their attempts to foster opposition between Ukrainians and Russians. As long ago as 1968 Tancher wrote that

all churches serve the interests of the exploiting classes. But the Uniate Church played a particular reactionary role. Uniate believers desired opposition between the Ukrainian and Russian nations. They wanted to see these countries quarrel; they attempted to iso-

late these two friends from each other. Religious differences shook the foundations of Ukraine's national unity.³⁷

Religion and nationalism are serious obstacles and ideological foes to two programmatic values of Soviet communism, internationalism and atheism. They are presented as reactionary prejudice, still alive in Soviet society, trying to counter Marxist-Leninist ideas. Because of their "reactionary" nature and the survival of past traditions, they interact and support each other. "Religiosity motivates national isolationism, and nationalist vestiges frequently stimulate religious prejudices," according to another Soviet author.³⁸

This is relevant in particular in the Ukrainian case, where two "traditional" churches oppose the Russian character of the communist regime and its Russificatory nationalities policy. The idea has been spelled out by an author specializing in antireligious and antinationalist pamphlets. "The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist ideologists," he writes,

assert that religion (in its Uniate and autocephalous variants) constitutes, so to say, the "spiritual support" of the Ukrainian nation and impedes its assimilation into the Soviet multinational state. From this erroneous assumption, they arrive at the conclusion about the anti-national character of atheism which supposedly aims at the denationalization and Russification of the people within the USSR.³⁹

That observation is apropos. Not only representatives of church organizations but also secular critics of Soviet religious policy point to the fact that the Soviet ideological struggle in the Ukraine is aimed simultaneously at both religion and nationalism.

DISSIDENTS' VOICES

In its first issue (January 1970) *Ukrainsky Visnyk* (the *Ukrainian Herald*) published a detailed, documented survey of the reprisals against Ukrainian Catholics in the late 1960s. It mentioned two dozen Uniate priests who were arrested, tried, or harassed in other ways for their priestly activity.⁴⁰ The same issue featured a lengthy statement by a persecuted Ukrainian Catholic priest, Hryhorii Budzynsky, in which the author questioned charges raised against him that led to his sentencing

in 1945 and resentencing in 1957. In the same article, Fr. Budzynsky criticized the Soviet government and the Russian Orthodox church for their roles in the forcible dissolution of the Ukrainian Catholic church in 1946. It was the atheist government and its police agents (of the NKVD) that convened the Lviv Synod with a view to the formal suppression of the union with Rome, argued Budzynsky. He also indicted the Russian Orthodox church for its regrettable service to the secular regime, simultaneously spelling out his nationalist sentiments:

In the past, the Russian Church truthfully and faithfully served the robber imperialism of the Russian czars and in the long course of its history, has specialized in criminal acts. Its leadership severely persecuted the best sons and daughters of the Ukrainian nation; it hated the Ukrainian language and fanatically fought against it.⁴¹

A short note in the journal's second issue illustrated how religion and national culture are intertwined in everyday relations. In *Visnyk's* account,

fines of 30 rubles were imposed on some 30 villagers of Kosmach by the decision of the Kosiv *raion* executive committee of Ivano-Frankivsk *oblast* for having gone carolling on Christmas. About a hundred persons were interrogated in this connection. As a result, the priest of the Kosmach church, Vasyl Romaniuk, was prevented from performing his priestly functions for a month. Such was the decision of the plenipotentiary for religious affairs in Ivano-Frankivsk *oblast*. The reason for the charge was that Father Romaniuk had been telling people, in his sermons, to dress in their Hutsul folk garb, not to sell antique objects to tourists, and, in general, to preserve Hutsul traditions. When asked what is wrong with that, the plenipotentiary replied: "*Eto pakhnet natsionalizmom!*" [This smells like nationalism.]⁴²

It was Valentyn Moroz who, among national dissenters, most strikingly demonstrated the close ties between the traditional Ukrainian church and the nationalist idea in his essay "Chronicle of Resistance."⁴³ Religion and religiosity, in Moroz's view, are chiefly expressed through the national spirit and national culture. Although disseminated only as *samvydav* writing and published only in the West, the essay made a strong impression on the dissident movement in the Ukraine.

Moroz, a historian and writer, views the role of the church in Ukrainian society as an essential component of national life. "The Church entered so deeply into the civilization and spirituality of the Ukrainian people that it is inconceivable to get at it without destroying the entire spiritual structure of the nation," he declared, and urged his contemporaries to resist any encroachment against religion and the beliefs of the people.⁴⁴

In addition to Budzynsky and Moroz—the former a Uniate priest, the latter an Orthodox layman—other prominent religious dissenters of the 1970s include Orthodox priest Vasyl Romaniuk, Orthodox layman Lev Lukianenko, and two Catholic laymen, Josyf Terela and Vasyl Barladian.

Romaniuk, a baptized Uniate from Western Ukraine who embraced Orthodoxy, experienced difficulties early on with the regime and the church hierarchy. Before his imprisonment, and even more after, he voiced his opposition to the regime's repressive policies. He sent many petitions to the pope, the World Council of Churches, the Ukrainian hierarchy abroad, and others, calling for intercession on behalf of religious freedom in the Soviet Ukraine.⁴⁵

Lukianenko, a lawyer from Eastern Ukraine who had spent fifteen years in prison for nationalist activities, joined the Kiev Helsinki monitoring group in 1977. In 1978 he was arrested again and sentenced for a second time. Among his known writings are two pieces on religious subjects. The first, "A Christmas Message to the Stubborn Atheists," presented Lukianenko's severe criticism of atheism and Marxism. The second, a letter to Metropolitan Filaret, urged the defense of religion against regime discrimination. The author challenged the submissive prelate to intervene in the debate over the constitutional draft to ensure that the legal rights of all religions would be incorporated in it, and that the right of atheistic propaganda would be counterbalanced by a right of religious propaganda. Incidentally, both dissenters made their *profession de foi* as adherents of Ukrainian autocephaly.⁴⁶

Terela's and Barladian's many letters and petitions reflect the fate of persecuted Catholics of the Eastern rite in the USSR. In a lengthy letter to Yuri Andropov that reads like an indictment of the system itself, Terela wrote: "I am a Christian—more specifically, a Ukrainian Catholic, to whom it is prohibited, under the threat of imprisonment, to take part in religious functions, that is, to confess, to christen chil-

dren, to repent, and to celebrate religious holidays without being labeled a 'militant Catholic.' The Ukrainian Catholic Church is in the catacombs."⁴⁷ Religious themes have entered into *samvydav* literary works of the 1970s. Mykola Rudenko and Oles Berdnyk, two writers and poets active in the Kiev monitoring group, have enriched the religious samizdat by their philosophical-mystical writings, promoting theistic and libertarian thought. Other poets, like Ihor Kalynets, Vasyl Stus, and Mykola Horbal, are motivated by religious symbolism.⁴⁸ In the unofficial visual arts being created in Ukraine today, Christian motifs serve as an inspiration to many artists, including Borys Soroka and Opanas Zalyvakha.

Along the same lines, religious values have been assessed by a literary critic, Yevhen Sverstiuk, in his inspiring essay *The Cathedral in Scaffolding*. In the author's view, religion, spirituality, and culture constitute primordial values that constantly enrich humanity and give real and genuine dimensions to existence. "How many sacrifices our people made in order to pass to posterity the true human ideals, beliefs, selfless love of truth and devotion to God of our forefathers!" exclaimed Sverstiuk.⁴⁹

Throughout the many works of literature and art of the new Ukrainian generation, a close relationship between religion and nationality is reflected as a *signum temporis*, a writing on the wall amid the gloomy reality of our times.

CONCLUSION

The religious-national panorama of Ukraine, analyzed in its past and present dimensions, provides us with several models of underlying spiritual-ideological values, the type of organization based on them, and finally, certain political concepts resulting therefrom.

In the first model, the Ukrainian national churches, viz., the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic (or Uniate) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox, represent a single pattern: religiosity is treated as the "national character" of Ukrainians; and a separate, indigenous Ukrainian cultural development, as opposed to the Russian one, is stressed. Here, it is implied, national culture has been inspired by religion for over one thousand years, and therefore a symbiosis of religion and nationality is taken for granted. Religion has also affected the revival of national

consciousness in modern times and the awakened nationalism contributes to the articulation of national church ideology. This then becomes a challenge to broader universal ecclesiastical communities (Roman Catholic or Orthodox). Religion, in principle, tends to identify with ethnic nationalism in this model. Politically the first model expresses itself in the quest for national statehood.

The proponents of Russian Orthodoxy, in the next model, also assume the religious nature of Eastern Slavs as a starting point and see an essential cultural factor in the millennium-long common Russian past of Eastern Christianity. Kiev Rus', as the cradle of all-Russian religious-cultural heritage (and, even more so, Muscovite Russia), molded its own unique expression of Orthodox spirituality that was simultaneously Russian-national and supranational (in a regional Slavic context). From this there developed a Russian national church with Slavophile and sometimes universalist overtones. The Russian Orthodox church was, in many ways, the Eastern counterpart of the Roman Catholic church. The difference is that the Roman Catholic church became international over time, claiming the fidelity of numerous European sovereigns. Russian Orthodoxy, on the other hand, closely identified itself with one sovereign, the tsar of Russia. The Russian church became nationalist—not in a narrow ethnic sense, but in a pan-Russian and pan-Slavic sense, integrating many ethnic elements in the process of their gradual Russification.

Other Christian religions in today's Ukraine hardly parallel either of these patterns. Their motivating values are purely religious ones and are not rooted in the ethnosocial past of the nation. When the Ukrainian national movement and consciousness appeared as a reaction to the dominating nationalisms of neighboring countries, all Protestant groups and denominations maintained neutrality. Some of them may have been responsive, for practical reasons, to the use of the Ukrainian language, but their motivation in this regard was not to strengthen Ukrainian ethnic consciousness and national aspirations, but simply to establish as broad a presence as possible in the Ukrainian community. Moreover, these sectarian groups were in their very nature international and addressed themselves equally to all ethnic groups. The result is non-national religious organizations. Their civic attitude is loyalty to any system willing to tolerate religious pluralism. Cosmopolitanism is their preferred concept insofar as international relations

Table 6.2 The City of Man on Earth (Soviet religious-political scene)

Underlying values	Institutional-sociological concept	International concept	Political concept
<i>Model 1: Nationalist</i>			
Religious psychology	National or particular church	Ethnic Ukrainian membership exclusively	Nationalism/ Separatism
Culture rooted in Christian traditions	Church autonomy/ autocephaly	Cooperation with non-Russians	Independent national state
National consciousness			Democracy
<i>Model 2: Imperial</i>			
Russian religious heritage	Orthodox pan-Russian church with ecumenic aspirations	Religion of all East Slavic (Russian) peoples	Soviet-Russian nationalism
Common Russian ethno-cultural unity		Open to non-Slavs	Unity of historical Russia
Traditionalism/ messianism			Autocracy
<i>Model 3: Internationalist</i>			
Pure religious consciousness	International church organization	Open to all	Loyalty to any regime respecting rights
Anti-establishment subculture		International cooperation, brotherhood	Cosmopolitan
National neutralism and pluralism			Democracy
<i>Model 4: Communist-Hegemonic</i>			
Scientific atheism	"Soviet people"	Rapprochement and mutual cultural enrichment	Soviet commonwealth
Internationalism	"New Soviet man and society"		Continuity of Russian Empire
Primacy of Russian culture		Merger of nations	Totalitarianism
		Friendship	

are concerned. It is understandable, then, why rigid Ukrainian, Russian, or Polish nationalists would view Protestantism with much suspicion as an alien body.

Finally, the fourth model, Soviet secular antireligion, possessing some quasireligious features and functions, fits our analysis in this way. Its underlying values are scientific atheism and the claim of internationalism (so-called proletarian internationalism). Yet within the definite historical context the Soviet model replaced initial Marxist rootless internationalism with Russian culture, the historical and geopolitical heritage of imperial Russia, as a more tangible mobilizational value to shape a new man and society. These values materialize in the notion of the Soviet people as a new sociocultural and psychological entity, consisting of many ethnonational elements. The formation of a "Soviet people" (*Sovietskii narod*) is now an expressed goal of Soviet social engineering. Since it is, at least under present conditions, inconceivable that such an entity would be a nationless hybrid, the Soviet people is being shaped around the Russian national culture and language. From a religious standpoint the pretension is to be the ideal form of the City of Man on earth (see table 6.2).

As much as the two Ukrainian national churches coalesce in one model, the two others, the Orthodox-Russian and the secular communist, also tend to converge, at least on a political level, partly for practical and partly for more serious ideological reasons. The case of present Soviet nationalities and religious policies largely proves it. As a result, a protracted tension between the two ensues, with the intermediary model being temporarily neutral.

Religion and Nationalism in Soviet Georgia and Armenia

S. F. Jones

Contrary to the predictions of Marx and most modernization theorists, ethnic and religious differences have proved resilient to the powerful forces of "modernity" such as industrialization, urbanization, mass education, and social mobility. Since the 1960s both communist and noncommunist states have experienced an ethnic revival among their minorities, and students of national identity have reevaluated the impact of premodern collective ties and ethnoreligious solidarities on modern consciousness.

Religion was crucial to the formation of ethnic identity in the premodern world and remains pivotal to many "modern" national identities today. Ironically, communist regimes, despite considerable success against religious practices, have often reinvigorated ethnoreligious identity by a combination of religious repression and, in the search for national legitimacy, encouragement of church patriotism. The national churches in the USSR,¹ along with other religious organizations, are uniquely isolated from communist state structures and relatively independent both ideologically and morally; in a situation where there is no other significant ethnic organization opposed to the "internationalist" communist worldview, they often become a focus for national identity and tradition among the minorities.² They are important for nationalist movements because they provide one of the only mass bases for an alienated national intelligentsia seeking political change.³ However, support for the church is not simply a substitute for nationalism; many adhere to the church for spiritual reasons, or because the religion has been handed down with the family. Nationalists, on the other hand, are often hostile to religion.

Nationalism is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down; for our purposes, it may be defined as a set of beliefs which attribute intrinsic or supreme worth to the nation defined by certain common cultural and ethnic attributes and attitudes. This is a very wide definition and may include "nationalists" who differ profoundly in their attitudes and behavior. Nevertheless, for the sake of analysis in this chapter, we can accept Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's description of two basic nationalist trends in the Soviet Union: "orthodox nationalism," which seeks "maximum accommodation" to national demands within the system; and "unorthodox nationalism" (dissidence, public demonstrations, terrorism), which rejects systemic limitations on national rights.⁴

For those nations such as Georgia and Armenia, where historically religious distinctiveness was interwoven with national survival, communist atheist policies imposed by a Russian-dominated government take on a national character. Throughout the Soviet period both state and national church leaders in the USSR have recognized this religio-national symbiosis, and Soviet nationality policy in its long-term attempts to "homogenize" the Soviet population differentiating less and less between the religious and secular aspects of minority national identities. Inevitably this has drawn secular nationalist and traditional religious elements, who both feel threatened by Soviet policies, closer together, although the degree of religio-national symbiosis is dependent on the role of the church in national formation and its past contribution to group identity. For this reason, an analysis of the relationship between nationalism and religion under communism must begin with a discussion of premodern solidarities.

RELIGION AND ETHNICITY IN GEORGIA AND ARMENIA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

There are similarities in the history of these two countries which produced strong ethnoreligious identities. Both peoples, who were evolving into distinct cultural units by the fourth century, were among the first converted to Christianity.⁵ Their geopolitical position placed them in the frontier zone of Christian resistance to Islam. Constant wars with adversarial Islamic powers reemphasized the links between communal and religious identity and cemented the interdependence of church and state. As frontiersmen they became especially conscious

of their religious and cultural differences. Both had strong priesthoods which in a hostile environment were the carriers of distinctive languages with unique alphabets, the transmitters of culture (including myths of common origin traced to biblical antecedents), and the guardians of laws and sacred texts. Both belonged to the Eastern Christian tradition of decentralized national patriarchs, rapidly attained autocephaly, and adopted ethnographical names (the Armenian church, Georgian Orthodox church).

However, there are also crucial differences which may explain in part the relatively stronger ethnoreligious identity in modern Armenia. After the fall of the Armenian Cilician kingdom (1375), the Armenians possessed no state of their own. In the absence of native kings the church became the only tangible focus of ethnic identity, with a sacred geographical center at Echmiadzin (at present in Soviet Armenia). It maintained social, fiscal (rights of taxation), educational (through an extensive system of parish schools), and a degree of political control over its flock scattered throughout Turkish Armenia. These powers were institutionalized by the creation of an Armenian church *millet* within the Ottoman Empire in 1860. Similar religious (but not civil) autonomy was granted to the Armenian religious community in Russian Armenia by the "Supreme Regulatory Statutes" (*Polozhenie*) of 1836.⁶ Religion, as with the more familiar Jewish diaspora, became central to the preservation of Armenian identity.

In contrast, Georgians, who maintained independence until the beginning of the nineteenth century, were increasingly mobilized around territorial and dynastic issues as the church went into decline after the seventeenth century. The Georgian church was not recognized as a nationally representative organ by tsarism and was considered sufficiently weak to be absorbed by the Russian church in 1811 without risk of social disorder.⁷

The Armenian church was also a more democratic organization than its Georgian counterpart. The laity was involved at all levels from election of the parish priest to the appointment of the catholicos. This intermingling of congregation and clergy at every level reinforced identity with the national church even among illiterate Armenian peasants who had little understanding of the Christian faith.⁸ Although the Georgian church was also interwoven with every part of the peasant's life, evidence from travelers of the seventeenth century onward points

to a growing rift between a demoralized clergy and parishioners who infrequently attended church.⁹

Finally, Armenian ethnoreligious identity is underlined by the church's doctrinal specificity. This goes back to the early Christian theological disputes which led the Armenians to abandon Eastern Orthodoxy after they had rejected the rulings of the Council of Chalcedon in 451.¹⁰ The sectarian doctrinal practices of the national church led to repression by the Byzantine emperors as well as the Sassanid Persians and encouraged the use of specific rites and symbols centered on the Armenian language (rather than Greek). Georgians, however, remained within the Orthodox fold, which may partly explain the ease with which their church was absorbed by Russian Orthodoxy in the nineteenth century.

Notwithstanding these differences, on the eve of 1917 crucial elements of ethnic identity such as shared memories, common myths, symbols, and other cultural distinctions were inextricably bound up with both the Georgian and Armenian national churches. Although faith may have been weakened by the new secular ideologies of socialism and nationalism, consciousness of the church as a cultural bond was still embedded in the minds of the vast majority of the native population.

Tsarism and Renationalization

By the end of the nineteenth century, although rural life still centered on family, village, and, among Armenians in particular, on the church, there had been a shift from a religious to secular ethnic identity among urban dwellers, including the intelligentsia. The "new motor of ethnic revival" in the nineteenth century, as Anthony Smith puts it, was "generated by the historical, philological and anthropological researches of the scholars, and the literary and artistic achievements of the poets, musicians, dramatists and painters."¹¹ The penetration of the market, the development of internal communications and mobility, the breakdown of traditional communities, the expansion of public education and study in Russia or abroad, the rise of a bureaucratic state, and in the Armenian case the "internationalization" of relations with the declining Ottoman empire produced an increasingly politicized and socially mobile population prepared to support the new secular priest-

hood of nationalists and socialists. By 1905 socialist parties with strong nationalist overtones had acquired mass ethnic bases and dominated political life in both nations.¹² However, despite a mood of anticlericalism among the intelligentsia (not necessarily shared by other classes such as Armenian merchants in Constantinople or Georgian nobles), repression of the national churches continued to arouse popular anger and, in the Armenian case, open revolt.¹³ Intelligentsia representatives, largely educated in native religious schools and seminaries, almost always sprang to the defense of national church rights, and churchmen, particularly in the Armenian case, took an active role in nationalist politics.¹⁴ During World War I Transcaucasian national church leaders encouraged the formation of native volunteer units to fight their traditional Muslim foe.

Nevertheless, the overall trend was toward a more secular ethnic identity. The war mobilized the mass of Armenian and Georgian conscripts (as well as the public at home) around issues of territory and national defense (Transcaucasian irredentist claims against the Turks were encouraged by the tsarist authorities). The Armenian *millet* in Turkey, increasingly persecuted by Ottoman leaders with a new militant Turkic ideology, was compelled to respond in kind and, following the example of other Ottoman Christian minorities, began to organize nationalist resistance movements. In the chaos following the revolution and the Ottoman genocide against the Turkish Armenian population (which left a million dead in 1915–16 and subsequently became a vital element in Armenian self-perception), Georgia and Armenia gained independence under the leadership of monoethnic socialist governments. The churches continued to decline in importance (although the Georgian church regained its autocephaly) as the new leaders launched secular programs of education and excluded the church from national decision making. The experience of independence in the midst of civil war and continued Ottoman invasions of Transcaucasia (1918 and 1920) produced fierce nationalist governments which rallied their citizens around the flag of self-determination. The legacy left by these independent governments to the new Soviet conquerors of Armenia (January 1920) and Georgia (February 1921) was exhausted but politicized native populations led by intelligentsias strongly committed to national ideals.

*Soviet Renationalization and
the Armenian and Georgian Churches, 1920–53*

One result of Soviet rule over non-Russians, despite the regime's stated aim of "homogenization," has been an increase in national differentiation. The processes of modernization, which in the last century began to produce a secularized national culture among the Georgian and Armenian population, were accelerated by the communist policies of mass education and economic development. The promotion of national equality and the policy of *korennizatsiia* (the preferential employment of native cadres and expansion of native language use in government and educational institutions), and the freedom given to national forms of expression which lasted until the early 1930s and legitimated a form of cultural nationalism, were accompanied by the repression of traditional patriarchal attitudes connected with the family and church.

Leninists, unlike Marx, attributed primary importance to combating religion,¹⁵ and church life in Armenia and Georgia (if judged by the number of working churches, clergy, and attendance) continued to decline as a result of intense atheistic campaigns, including the confiscation of church property and expulsion of priests, backed by economic and legal restrictions on religious activity. According to Georgian Communist party secretary V. Lominadze, by 1923, 2,355 churches had been closed in the republic; in Armenia similar measures by 1932 had reduced the once-thriving monastery at Echmiadzin to twenty monks and the number of priests in Erevan, the Armenian capital, to two.¹⁶ Churches and their representatives, particularly in the rural areas, suffered intensified repression during the collectivization campaign and the purges of 1936–38, when all "bourgeois" or "national" elements were singled out for elimination. Deprived of financial means (due to nationalization or confiscation of property) and the right to propagate religion (by a 1929 decree on religious associations), to teach in schools, or to take part in charitable work, the churches of Armenia and Georgia, as elsewhere in the USSR, lost influence with their flock. Despite some evidence that both churches, in particular the Armenian, continued to maintain support in the countryside in the 1920s, the "nationalist" intelligentsia in both republics did not come to the defense of their churches' national rights (partly out of fear of course) and were more concerned with republican autonomy and the status of the native language. In the 1930s,

as Stalin drove for uniformity and Russification, both church and intelligentsia were terrorized into submission. In short, between 1921 and 1941 the forces of state propaganda and coercion against religion, combined with accelerated urbanization and mass education, probably weakened the nexus between ethnicity and religion among the population and increased the trend toward a secular national identity. The Soviet leaders, by classifying their citizens on ethnic lines (in passports) and by creating national administrative units and governments, formalized the growth of this "secularized" national identity.

However, the thaw in church-state relations during and after World War II revealed that the national-religious nexus was not broken in Armenia, although in Georgia the church failed to reestablish a popular base until the 1960s. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to harness Soviet minority nationalisms to their cause during the war and in doing so exploited the patriotic influence of the national churches.¹⁷ Along with praise for Armenian and Georgian antiquity, publication of previously banned patriotic works (Raffi in Armenia, Constantine Gamsakhurdia in Georgia), the granting of republican ministries of defense and foreign affairs, the official glorification of national figures such as the Armenian epic hero David of Sassoun and the Georgian King David the Builder (after whom armored divisions were named), both the Armenian and Georgian catholicoses were encouraged by the Soviet authorities to express support for the patriotic cause.¹⁸ In return they were granted numerous concessions. The Armenian church seems to have been either more favored or more capable (aided by money from the diaspora abroad?) as it produced a new journal (*Echmiadzin*) and reopened a seminary immediately after the war, both of which the Georgian church failed to achieve.

From the end of the war until Khrushchev's deposition, the Georgian church barely functioned. In 1956 there were only seven students training for the priesthood; in 1980 the Georgian church calendar declared that during this period "there were so few Georgian clerics that the service in the native language was rarely taken."¹⁹ The intensification of the antireligious campaign under Khrushchev hardly affected a church already in desperate straits. When the Georgian Orthodox Church joined the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1962 (Soviet authorities seemed to be seeking influence in this international body at the time), Catholicos Eprem II announced that ten of the fifteen

dioceses were unfilled and that 105 working priests served a Georgian republican population of 4 million.²⁰ This is not to assert that religion held no place in the population's consciousness; the local antireligious campaign and the church's subsequent revival suggests it was not absent, but that its role in the new ethnic nationalism expressed in the more enlightened atmosphere of the de-Stalinized 1960s was comparatively weak. Georgian church leaders were feeble; they had been co-opted as Soviet foreign policy spokesmen since the war and were little respected. At this stage, state control of a subservient and demoralized church alienated potential support for a new ethnoreligious nationalism. On the other hand, state co-optation of the church (Epem II was a member of the Georgian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Society for the Preservation of Cultural Monuments, and appeared frequently at state occasions or at celebrations of national figures) did give the church some legitimacy and a higher profile in Georgian national affairs. Membership of the WCC also added to the church's status and politicized the church leadership, which was forced to take stands on international issues ranging from racism to repression of national liberation movements. This official toleration of the church may have indirectly led to its growing influence among Georgians in the 1970s and the rejuvenation of the ethnoreligious link.

The situation of the Armenian church was more favorable after the war for a number of reasons. First, the church continued to play a role in Soviet expansionist aims in Turkey. The Soviet government, after abrogating the Soviet-Turkish treaty in March 1945, called for the return of the former Armenian territories of Kars and Ardahan lost to Turkey in 1920. This received the full public backing of Catholicos Kevork VI, of the mass of the Armenian population, and of the Armenian communist leadership until the USSR dropped the idea in 1953.²¹ Second, the church also supported the Soviet government's policy of encouraging the Armenian diaspora to return to the Soviet Armenian "homeland." Approximately a hundred thousand did so, mainly from the Middle East, between 1946-48. Kevork VI became one of the main spokesmen for this national irredentism. The Soviet motive was to replace much-needed personnel after the war (although the new influx must have been a serious drain on scarce resources), to build up Soviet Armenia as the natural "homeland" and thus increase Soviet claims to

represent Armenian interests abroad, and to use the policy as a propaganda weapon within the influential diaspora and the West. Finally, the relative success of the Armenian church compared to its Georgian counterpart must have been partly due to financial aid provided by the diaspora (40 percent of 1955 church income) and to the latter's role as a publicizer of antireligious repression in Armenia which could be damaging to the Soviet image abroad.²²

Concessions to church patriotism and the courting of church officials had drawbacks for the state as it encouraged Armenian ethno-religious identity both at home and abroad. Support for church influence in the diaspora increased church status at home as pilgrimages, delegations, and gifts flowed in from coethnics abroad. Soviet championing of the Echmiadzin catholicos against rival claimants abroad also emphasized his special importance to all Armenians. Throughout the Khrushchev period the Armenian church under its popular Catholicos Vazken 1 Baljian presented itself publicly as a defender of national interests. This was despite the intensified antireligious campaign and a disastrous start to his office when he attempted to secure Echmiadzin's (i.e., Soviet) control over the Armenian diaspora catholicosate of Cilicia in 1956.²³ The church was given a prominent place in official anniversaries of national or historical importance. Thus, in 1962, during the sixteen-hundredth anniversary celebrations of the Armenian alphabet, its clerical inventor, the monk Mesrop Mashtots, was raised by both church and government to exalted status; Armenian writers later recalled the "incredible atmosphere of national intoxication" during the festivities, and one Western scholar remarked that "religion and more specifically the Armenian brand . . . were singled out as the incubators of national genius."²⁴

Nationalism and Religion in Georgia and Armenia since 1965

After Khrushchev the antireligious campaign slackened. The national elites in Georgia and Armenia consolidated their position, extended republican autonomy and native control in their republics, supervised a period of rapid expansion in higher education monopolized by indigenous youth, permitted extensive native networks in the economy and state (including unofficial black market activities), consented to a greater expression of national sentiment in the cultural field, expanded

contacts abroad, and achieved genuine social and economic advances, notably in living standards, among the republican populations. These factors together with the increasing disillusionment among the intelligentsia with the stale ideology of Marxism-Leninism encouraged the growth of a new ethnic nationalism among the native intelligentsias. Both played increasingly prominent roles in the post-Stalin politics of Georgia and Armenia, shared similar concerns (language, history, demography, and, in Armenia's case, territory), and sometimes supported church interests. The church in both republics benefited from the revival of interest in ethnicity. Republican Societies for the Preservation of Cultural Monuments were formed in the mid-1960s whose activist student membership enthusiastically restored churches, historians and writers took advantage of the ideological relaxation to explore (and praise) the role of religion in national history, well-publicized archaeological expeditions confirmed the churches' importance to cultural development, and the churches themselves were given more opportunities to reassert their role in popular customs and traditions. In a sense, as Alan Scarfe has noted elsewhere, nationalism (in terms at least of the defense of national culture) became "a natural dimension of church activity."²⁵

This dual process of increasing indigenous autonomy and religious revival began to seriously alarm the authorities in Moscow, and they took action in the 1970s on three fronts in an attempt to reassert central control: first, a crackdown on the increasingly complacent native elites and their networks; second, a reemphasis on Russification measures, particularly in the area of language; and third, an atheistic campaign centering mainly on religious festivals. Religion was seen as an obstacle to the reintegration of Armenians and Georgians into international Marxism-Leninism, and the government, as we shall see, was clearly aware of the mutually reinforcing relationship of religion and ethnicity.

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1965: THE STATE'S VIEW

Communist governments attack religion on the one hand as an erroneous ideology and superstition, and on the other as a social and political force with a popular base outside communist control. Soviet religious

policy in Armenia and Georgia is more concerned with combating the church as an autonomous ethnic organization than as a propagator of an alien spiritual ideology. Religion is seen as a central support of ethnic resistance to assimilation, but as Pedro Ramet points out, the style and method adopted to fight church influence vary and are determined by such factors as the ethnic configuration of the congregation and the history, size, and cooperativeness of the church.²⁶ As the Armenian and Georgian cases present different problems and led to different approaches by the state, it is best to deal with them separately.

Armenia

In many ways the Armenian church has been treated relatively mildly since the war. Possible reasons have been noted above: its use as a propaganda weapon, the role of the diaspora as an economic and political resource (to the Armenian government as well as to the church), its traditionally wide base of ethnic support, and the absence of a spiritual focus abroad (unlike the Catholic church). One might add to these the cooperativeness of the church leadership with the authorities and its lack of anti-Russianism. Muslim Turks have always presented a greater danger to Armenian nationhood than Russia, and the Armenian church shares the overwhelmingly anti-Turkish and traditionally Russophile sentiments of the native population. Toleration of the church was part of a general pattern, which developed from the 1960s onward in Armenia, of a growing political autonomy and pride in national achievements.

Under these conditions the church has reasserted its traditional role as a representative of the nation. A veritable cult has been built around Vazken 1, who has overseen significant growth in church influence among the population. On his seventy-fifth birthday, for example, amid wide public acclaim, he was awarded a "Scroll of Honor" by the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet for his "patriotic activity in defense of peace." Fadei Sarkisian, the prime minister, described Vazken as "one of the most highly recognized and authoritative figures in the Christian world."²⁷ On another occasion the chairman of the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet praised his service "to the Armenian people and our Fatherland, Soviet Armenia," and one Western resident in Armenia in the 1970s reported that "his portrait is seen on the walls of many shops and homes."²⁸ The church is also invited

to take a prominent part in official celebrations of critical events in national history such as the Battle of Sardarabad (in which a Turkish army was repelled by a smaller Armenian force in 1918), and joint annual pilgrimages by government and church leaders are made to the Martyrs' Monument which commemorates the genocide of 1915-16. Liturgical music is often played on official occasions.

In return for these concessions the state expects church support for government policies, particularly in the field of foreign policy. Vazken has obliged with pro-Soviet statements on Cuba, China, Israel, and Lebanon.²⁹ However, there is no evidence that these pro-Soviet declarations diminish Vazken's popularity or public support for the church. One suspects that they might actually enhance the church's status, especially when they concern problems of the diaspora, as in Lebanon.³⁰ In short, the Armenian government policy of co-optation probably strengthens rather than diminishes the ethnoreligious link in Soviet Armenian identity.

Official toleration of the church is accompanied by atheistic campaigning and continuing restrictions on church life.³¹ Armenian government leaders control an extensive atheistic organizational network, but as in neighboring Georgia, the success of the government's antireligious campaign has been limited. At a press conference in Geneva in 1978 Vazken 1 noted that atheist propaganda over the last two decades on radio and television had dwindled to "one or two programs a year."³² Armenian party leaders themselves constantly criticize the "serious deficiencies" in atheistic work and its lack of progress.³³ Since October 1984, when a CPSU Central Committee resolution condemned the Armenian party's poor ideological record, the antireligious campaign has intensified, and in 1985 a House of Scientific Atheism was created.³⁴

Party leaders in both Moscow and Armenia classify religion under the general rubric of "relics of the past," alongside "petty-bourgeois psychology" and "national narrow-mindedness." Religion and nationalism are clearly linked in the campaigns for an "international atheist education."³⁵ The Armenian leaders are particularly keen to repudiate the view which equates "ethnic values with religion and the traditions of the Armenian church."³⁶ There is little indication that they have made any headway in achieving this, even among members of the party, and religion and nationalism continue to be targeted for attack as mutually

sustaining ideologies, in the process driving them closer together in the public mind.

Georgia

As in Armenia, Georgians after the war went through the same process of native consolidation, increasing their demographic and political domination of the republic. Under First Secretary V. P. Mzhavanadze (1954–72), a long period of political stability, ethnic favoritism, and growing prosperity coincided with a new freedom to explore the nation's past and publicly express pride in national achievements. The growing confidence of Georgian nationalism was expressed in major patriotic demonstrations in 1956 (against the denunciation of the Georgian Stalin) and 1978 (against an attempt to remove Georgian as the state language from the new 1978 republican constitution). Although the Georgian church benefited from the Georgian government's encouragement of secular ethnicity (which led to a growing interest in Georgia's Christian past), it was also subject to increasing state interference in its affairs. Crippled by the Stalinist repression, suffering from a chronic lack of cadres, finance, and support from at home or abroad, the church was isolated from a Soviet Georgian flock that had already been extensively secularized in the nineteenth century. Unable to resist KGB penetration, it suffered from the spread of corruption among the republic's political and economic institutions. Lacking a leader of Vazken's stature, its moral decline culminated in a series of trials and scandals involving former church leaders in 1978–79.³⁷

The enfeebled Georgian church required little supervision from the state, and the antireligious campaigns were not pursued with great vigor by Mzhavanadze. At the twenty-third congress of the Communist party of Georgia in 1966, Mzhavanadze made no mention of religion in his attack on "relics of the past." However, there were indications by the end of the 1960s that a small religious revival was taking place³⁸ and after the fall of Mzhavanadze, the new first secretary, Eduard Shevardnadze, incorporated the antireligious campaign into a vigorous attack on corruption and ideological deviationism in the republic. Antireligious propaganda concentrated on religious festivals, church marriages, and baptisms, but by the end of the 1970s, as believers began to establish links with nationalist and civil rights movements and as the new

dynamic catholicos, Ilia II, began to rejuvenate the church and take a far more visible role than his predecessors in national life, the Georgian government concentrated much of its fire on the national-religious link, especially among youth.³⁹ The church's attempts to identify itself with the nation were condemned as "ambitious self-interest" and a "masked ideological diversion" by the Georgian press.⁴⁰

One suspects that the coupling of religion and nationalism as "joint enemies" of the state, as in Armenia, made Georgian nationalists incline toward the church and vice versa. At the same time the Georgian government, by continuing to devote considerable sums and space in its press to the restoration of churches, and by inviting Ilia II to important national functions such as World War II victory celebrations or opening sessions of parliament, increases the church's status and strengthens the link between religious and national interests.⁴¹

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM: THE CHURCHES' VIEW

Religion and nationalism are not natural allies; the secular and egalitarian ideology of nationalism is often resisted by patriarchal and conservative church leaders, as in the Armenian case in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, as the Balkan experience showed, the church may take a leading role in nationalist movements from an early stage. Whatever the degree of ecclesiastical involvement in nationalist movements—which is contingent on a host of historical and political factors—the church frequently claims to be the defender of national interests and demands the loyalty of its flock to a national religion. This does not necessarily make it "nationalist," although as the Georgian and Armenian cases demonstrate, under communism the churches often become highly politicized bodies which share the concerns of nationalists. Church and nationalist interests coincide in particular in the spheres of language, territory, and in the interpretation of national history. Human rights concerns are shared by believers and "unorthodox" nationalists in which the official church rarely gets involved.

Armenia

In Armenia the religious and language community have always coincided. The church played a major role in the formation of the alpha-

bet, its guardianship of this distinctive sacral script and promotion of the Armenian language made religion and language inseparable parts of Armenian ethnicity. The church continues to exalt the Armenian language (one of the oldest living languages in the world), and although it plays a much more cautious role in the public defense against Russification measures than the secular intelligentsia, unlike Armenian civil life, it remains a bastion of the Armenian language, largely immune to linguistic Russification.⁴² The symbolic religious-linguistic link is maintained not only during religious services and in church literature, but in the broader public sphere. In 1962 the church played a prominent role in the sixteen-hundredth anniversary festivities of the Armenian alphabet, and when Vazken 1 celebrated his twenty-third anniversary as catholicos in 1979, he presented the nation with a tablet of the Armenian alphabet with each letter made of gold.⁴³

As noted earlier, the church was active in territorial claims against Turkey after World War II. Today the most volatile issue for Armenians is the situation of their coethnics in the Nagorno-Karabagh Autonomous Region (81 percent Armenian) and Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, both under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan (ASSR). Given the sensitivity of this question and Moscow's categorical refusal to return the areas to Armenia despite a series of petitions and protests, the church has refrained from publicly intervening on the issue.⁴⁴ This has led to considerable dissatisfaction among Armenian nationalists, but the church's frequently expressed concern for the almost 2 million diaspora abroad (in Cyprus, Lebanon, and other trouble spots) and its role as the spiritual guardian of all Armenians make it clear that its passivity on Karabagh is an involuntary one. In the meantime the church supports the continuing native consolidation of Armenia by encouraging immigration from abroad and discouraging emigration from the "Mother Homeland"—policies which coincide broadly with Soviet wishes.⁴⁵ It also shares the symbolic attachment of all Armenians to Ararat, the mountain on which Noah's Ark was alleged to have rested and which is now in Turkey, visible from the Armenian capital of Erevan and a constant reminder of Armenia's territorial losses during World War I.

The restrictions on religion and nationalism make human rights of obvious common interest for believers and "unorthodox" nationalists, but the church leaders have avoided any involvement in this

question (except in the wcc when it applies to other countries) for fear of losing the church's privileged position in Armenia. Thus, "un-orthodox" nationalists do not necessarily gravitate toward the church (although many are regular churchgoers) where they will find little support, and Armenian samizdat is overwhelmingly concerned with secular nationalist themes of language, irredentism, and the genocide of 1915-16.

History has always been important to national consciousness, and the party in its attempt to undermine non-Russian national identities has played down their past national achievements or inflated the role of class and the Russian people. Until the 1960s events such as the 1915-16 genocide or the battle of Sardarabad had no place in the Armenian official calendar, and native historians were firmly controlled. Since then, although historians and writers are routinely condemned for glorifying the Armenian past and overemphasizing the role of the church, there has been a much more distinctive Armenian interpretation of their national history. The church, naturally, stresses its own role. In 1979 Vazken I declared: "It is on our church that the essential task of the preservation of Armenians rests. . . . When we did not even have a cultural center . . . it was the church that conserved the unity of the Armenian people."⁴⁶ The view that the church preserved Armenian ethnicity in the six centuries since the loss of statehood is widely accepted by Armenians despite the party's emphasis on the anticlerical nature of the Armenian national revival in the nineteenth century. A student of the Armenian church has noted that Vazken in his other statements repeatedly alludes to the Armenian question from a "territorial and anti-Turkish point of view" which is much in line with the convictions of "orthodox" and "unorthodox" nationalists.⁴⁷

Georgia

The Georgian church has taken similar positions to its Armenian counterpart. It identifies itself with the defense of the Georgian language. In his 1980 Christmas message Ilia II warned his flock that "where language declines, so the nation falls,"⁴⁸ and in his 1981-82 Christmas sermon declared, "The one main source where Georgians receive their spiritual strength is from the ancient and merciful Georgian language."⁴⁹ The official church calendar and journal (*Jvari Vazisa*) are full of articles and sermons glorifying or defending the native language. For

example, the 1976 church calendar carried a speech by the nineteenth-century Archbishop Gabriel which declared that "the union of a small people with a larger one . . . is possible in spirit, heart and mind, but the destruction of its language is impossible."⁵⁰ The church officially celebrated Georgian language day (April 26) in 1986 by publishing a booklet entitled *Glory to the Georgian Language*, the name of a poem by a tenth-century Georgian churchman.⁵¹

Language, homeland, and faith are seen by the church as the three pillars of Georgian nationhood. However, the conjunction of Christianity with Georgian territory is not one that can easily be made by the church. A significant minority of Georgians in the Adjarian Autonomous Republic (in the southeast of Georgia) or in the southern region of Meskheta are Muslim. Other Muslim coethnics reside in Azerbaijan (the Ingilos). The Ingilos and Meskhians have been defended against discrimination (particularly the latter who were deported at the end of the war to Central Asia) by Georgian "unorthodox" nationalists, and the church, although insistent that Christianity and Georgian culture are inextricably linked, also accepts the Georgian ethnicity of these Muslims.⁵²

The church regards Georgian and church history as one and the same. In a view clearly unacceptable to official Soviet Georgian historians Ilia II declared in his 1980–81 Christmas sermon that "we preserved Christianity in Georgia, and so preserved our being and national existence."⁵³ In another Easter Epistle he declared, "What would Georgia be without Christianity?! We defended Christianity and Christianity saved us. . . . Our soul is by nature a Christian one."⁵⁴ Although this view may differ from the more secular nationalist version, it does stress, like the latter, an ancient lineage of national unity which is rejected by official Soviet histories.⁵⁵

On the question of human rights the Georgian church finds itself in the same vulnerable position as the Armenian church. It expresses no sympathy and gives no support to dissident activities. Many nationalist dissidents are believers and demand better religious rights, but their campaign evokes no (public) solidarity from the church. The church is not prepared to traverse the limits of "orthodox" nationalism.

In conclusion, both the Georgian and Armenian churches share many of the positions defended by native nationalists. They take a moral stand on issues such as abortion, alcoholism, and drug taking, which,

although not specifically nationalist issues, underline concern for the nation's biological well-being. However, the coincidence of church and nationalist concerns does not mean church followers are necessarily nationalist or vice versa. Most of the samizdat in both republics are concerned with secular issues, unrelated to religious questions. Nevertheless, church activities and statements on the one hand and "orthodox" or "unorthodox" nationalism on the other are mutually reinforcing elements in the continuing vigor of national consciousness in both republics.

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM: THE NATIONALIST VIEW

We can get a limited idea of the strength of belief in a Soviet republic from observation and the Soviet press (although there must be many secret believers), but the reasons for religious belief and its interaction with nationalist sentiments—which is what we are really interested in—are almost impossible to ascertain. Neither can we assume, of course, that nationalists or believers are homogeneous groups. Some believers will be driven by a personal faith, others by a sense of cultural community within the church. Some nationalists want autonomy, others independence. Remembering these difficulties, for reasons of analysis we shall stick to the two categories of Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone—"orthodox" and "unorthodox" nationalists—and try to determine, however unsatisfactorily, their perception of religion and the church.

Armenia

We have already noted the growth of Armenian national assertiveness since the 1960s in connection with the combined forces of modernization and Khrushchevian "liberalization." Recent statistics show that in the republic (as distinct from the Soviet diaspora) there is continuing ethnic homogenization, an extremely high attachment to native language, high fertility rates, low exogamy, and the second highest rate among union republics in the USSR (Georgia is the first) for per capita number of "specialists with higher education."⁵⁶ Since the signal given by Anastas Mikoyan in Erevan in 1954 when he rehabilitated a number of former "nationalist" writers and attacked the "harmful nihilism" shown toward Armenian culture, there has been an explosion in the

publication of works exalting Armenian culture and history.⁵⁷ Armenian party leaders have regularly warned the creative intelligentsia against "national narrow-mindedness," resorting to intense ideological campaigns in their attempts to control it, as in 1964-66, the mid-1970s, and, more recently, since 1984.⁵⁸ However, as the latest Moscow-initiated campaign demonstrates, little progress has been made against "orthodox nationalism" in either literary or government circles. At a July plenum of the Armenian central committee in 1987, First Secretary Karen Demirchyan reiterated the problem: "Isolated individuals demonstrate pseudo-patriotism in their speeches and publications, speculate on national feelings, and do not receive the necessary rebuff."⁵⁹ The most articulate "pseudo-patriots" are the writers who, whatever the latest statistics might suggest, are anxious about the loss of Armenian national identity. They focus in particular on the use of Russian in Armenian educational institutions, which has been slowly advancing since the 1930s. An unidentified female speaker at the eighth congress of the Writers' Union of Armenia in 1981 saw Russian language advances as a long-term threat to the Armenian nation. "Deprived of language and the past, a person's national character is barren and useless to humanity," she declared.⁶⁰ Silva Kaputikian, a famous Armenian poet, took up the theme in the pages of *Pravda* in May 1987. "With every passing year," she wrote, "the sphere of application of our native language is narrowing in Armenia." She went on: "True patriotism, inspired by a people's history and culture, is a reliable shield protecting young people from alien outside influences."⁶¹

The other major issue for Armenian nationalists, both "orthodox" and "unorthodox," is Karabagh, where there has been a history of resistance by the local Armenian majority to Azerbaijani rule. There were petitions from the local Armenians in 1963, 1967, and 1972 demanding incorporation into the Armenian republic, and serious conflicts with the native Azerbaijanis in 1967 and 1975. One source claims that Armenian party leaders went to Moscow in 1969 to support the claim for incorporation.⁶² One of the latest manifestations of Armenian irredentist concern was an open letter in 1978 to Brezhnev from one of Soviet Armenia's most popular novelists and a prominent party member, Sero Khanzadian. He called for the return of Karabagh to Armenia and described its present status as "an instance of injustice which calls for liquidation."⁶³

Armenian writers and officials are regularly harangued by party representatives for their obsession with lost Armenian territory. At the ninth congress of the Writers' Union of Armenia in June 1986, Vardges Petrosian, chairman of the Writers' Board, upbraided his listeners: "We all . . . feel nostalgia for the lost part of our homeland," he said, "but this is nostalgia, not fever." He criticized the parochialism of Armenian literary criticism and noted that less than one-quarter of the output of the Armenian publishing house *Sovetakan Grogh* dealt with contemporary (i.e., Soviet) themes.⁶⁴

"Unorthodox nationalists" have similar concerns to the "orthodox"—language, Karabagh, and the past, although one may add human rights and the church. Since April 1965 when thousands of Armenians demonstrated against the genocide of 1915–16 and demanded the "return of their lands" from Turkey, the "unorthodox" nationalist movement in Armenia has grown. In 1966 an Armenian National United party (NUP) was formed with a program of self-determination for Armenia. In 1967–75, as a result of eighteen trials, fifty of its members and fellow travelers were convicted for six months to ten years of prison and exile. Three of its members were executed in 1979 for allegedly planting a bomb in the Moscow subway.⁶⁵ In 1977 a human rights group was set up to monitor Soviet observance of the Helsinki Agreement of 1975; concerned with broad civil rights, it included demands for freedom of worship, the right of national self-determination, and the incorporation of Karabagh and Nakhichevan into the Armenian republic.⁶⁶ In 1978 there were demonstrations against an attempt to remove the clause in the Armenian constitution guaranteeing Armenian as the republic's state language. In 1981 there were arrests in connection with a new underground nationalist organization called the Union of Armenian Youth.⁶⁷

The articulated concerns of "orthodox" and "unorthodox" nationalists in Armenia are largely secular. The NUP, which declares the interest of the nation "higher than class, religion, [or] party," will accept any member "regardless of political or religious convictions."⁶⁸ "Orthodox nationalists" are animated by linguistic and educational Russification rather than by the rights of Armenian believers. However, there is a complex interplay between national and religious issues in Armenia. The church remains a national symbol which attracts popular loyalty. It is the most important institution in Armenian history, and its lead-

ers share the nationalists' concern for their coethnics. Most Armenian national or historical events are inseparable from religion. In July 1983, for example, there was a nationalist demonstration to mark the eightieth anniversary of the confiscation of Armenian church property by the tsarist authorities, an event which in 1903 had united all Armenian classes in defense of the church. Some Armenian dissidents such as Robert Nazarian, member of the NUP and founder of the Armenian Helsinki Monitoring Group, obviously see church and nation as inseparable. In a letter to Vazken 1, he wrote: "Beginning with the fourth century, the Armenian has allied his fate with that of the church and found it not only a spiritual center but also the means of saving his own national individuality, a means of saving all that which is tied to and which tied him to the past."⁶⁹

This view is probably shared by a broad section of the Armenian population. Most Armenians, if Vazken 1 and the observations of Western visitors are to be believed, are in some sense followers of the church. In 1975 Vazken claimed there had been a fourfold increase in baptisms in his time as catholicos and estimated the baptized population at 65–70 percent. Eighty percent counted themselves as believers, he declared, and 60 percent attended church.⁷⁰

As to why Armenians continue to follow the church is difficult to answer. People "believe" for different reasons; it could be for emotional support, for moral and ethnic guidance, a sense of community, or for none of these motives. Despite the difficulties in determining why people adhere to the church, perhaps we can divide believers into two rather crude but overlapping categories: those for whom religion is primarily a personal faith, a belief in the metaphysical, and those for whom religion represents a sense of community and belonging. The latter emphasize religious ritual and custom rather than a personal communion with God.⁷¹ One suspects, as does Robert Kaiser, that most Armenians belong to this latter category and that, for them, the church "is more important as a symbol of their nation than as a tie to God."⁷²

Georgia

Georgia went through much the same processes of ethnic consolidation and advance in the 1960s as Armenia. The 1979 census showed that 98.3 percent of Georgians in their republic considered Georgian their first language and that 96.1 percent lived within the republic's borders.

The Georgian proportion of the republican population continued to increase (from 61.4 percent in 1939 to 68.8 percent in 1979) as Armenians and Russians began to move out (from 1959 at least).⁷³ Georgians have overwhelming dominance in republican economic, administrative, and educational institutions, so much so that Yegor Ligachev, the party's leading ideologist, during a visit to Tbilisi early in 1987 demanded a reduction in the proportion of Georgian students in the university.⁷⁴

Orthodox nationalism pervades republican public life. Books, the media, and theater are full of paeans to Georgian nationhood, and Georgian literature is unashamedly patriotic. Since 1972, when Eduard Shevardnadze was appointed first secretary of the Georgian party to put an end to ethnic protectionism and nepotism, a campaign against "half-baked nationalism" and "harmful traditions" (religious marriages, baptisms, and festivals) has continued. At the twenty-sixth congress of the Georgian Communist party in 1981, Shevardnadze warned against the "lack of ideological content, triteness, provincialism and elements of nationalism and chauvinism" in republican literature.⁷⁵

Orthodox nationalism extends to the neglect of Georgia's own minorities such as the Abkhaz and Ossetians⁷⁶ and to concern over environmental issues such as the latest project to build a railway across the Caucasus, which has aroused officially expressed fears of pollution and destruction of national monuments.⁷⁷ However, in common with the Armenians, the greatest anxiety is linguistic Russification. At the congresses of the Writers' Union of Georgia in 1973 and 1976, writers N. Tsuleiskuri and R. Djaparidze openly condemned Russifying educational policies, and in 1980 an open letter to L. I. Brezhnev signed by 364 members of the Georgian intelligentsia denounced language policies which were "leading essentially to a gradual loss of the national rights of the Georgian people."⁷⁸ In 1986 the Georgian Young Communist League paper *Akhalgazdra komunisti* launched a campaign to preserve the purity of the Georgian language.

"Unorthodox nationalism," evident during the 1956 and 1978 demonstrations in Tbilisi, developed in the 1970s among professionals and students frustrated with the failure of political reform and the anticorruption drive. The samizdat that emerged in the 1970s concentrated on language, the treatment of coethnics in Azerbaijan, the Meskhians, the preservation of monuments, and corruption in the church. A small group of these nationalists see the church as playing a vital part

in the struggle for national self-expression. Tengiz Janelidze declared in a samizdat article, "the war against religion is also a war against the culture which embodies it," and in February 1978 leaflets distributed at Tbilisi university identified "language and the Georgian church" with the "nation's spiritual buttress."⁷⁹ Zviad Gamsakhurdia, one of the most active Georgian dissidents and founder of the Helsinki Monitoring Group in Georgia (1977), puts forward a similar argument to Nazarian's on the relationship between church and nation: "The struggle against the Georgian church is a struggle against the Georgian language and culture, because Georgian culture has found its highest expression in the Christian religion."⁸⁰ Other demonstrations have taken place in the 1980s which show a more secular concern with problems of Russification,⁸¹ but there is clearly an active section of nationalists for whom religion and nationalism are inextricably linked.⁸²

Despite the small number of nationalist dissidents in Georgia, the Georgian party is alarmed at a possible fusion of religious and nationalist sentiments. A recently published collection of public opinion survey results on religion and youth in Georgia suggests they have good reason.⁸³ Although there are serious problems associated with opinion surveys in the USSR (and in the West), particularly in areas such as religion where there is a reluctance to admit one's "deviance," the surveys in the book probably give an approximate picture. They confirm, as both party and church leaders admit, that the church has significant influence among Georgian youth.⁸⁴ One survey of Tbilisi students by T. Panjekidze revealed 28 percent firm believers and 20 percent "indifferent," with the rest categorized as atheists of one kind or another (one suspects in rural areas the figure may be more favorable to "believers"). A survey of urban fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds found only 5 percent firm atheists with 21 percent firm believers and a further 63 percent who denied religion was a negative phenomenon.⁸⁵ More revealing was the close association made by both groups between the church and ethnicity. According to Panjekidze, a "majority" of the students believed that the church played a decisive role in the preservation of Georgian culture and saved the nation from destruction. He cites a typical response: "Georgian culture was more or less forged from the heart of the church. The church today is the keeper of the ancient rich treasure, of which Georgians . . . are still proud, from the gospels to the many unique icons adorned with the master-work of our ancestors."⁸⁶ In an-

other typical reply a high school pupil declared, "If there had not been Christianity, the Georgian people would not have survived."⁸⁷ When asked why they were attracted to the church, the students tended to cite ritual and tradition. The growing interest in the church was not caused by faith, one student answered, but "by interest in culture. A great role is played by national feeling."⁸⁸ When the fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds were asked the same question, 47 percent declared they went to church because "the church pays attention to the historical monuments of our national culture, to our architecture and painting."⁸⁹ One of the contributors to the book admits that it is young people's "interest in the nation's ancient roots" which attracts them to the church and argues that the church's success is a result of its influence on young people's "national feelings."⁹⁰ From other examples in the book it is clear that many young Georgians regard the church, not so much as a place to pray, but as a place for communion with one's past and national culture. This ethnoreligious basis of identity for large numbers of Georgian youngsters may prove troublesome to the Soviet government in the future.

CONCLUSION

The modern national identities of both Georgians and Armenians are intimately linked with the national church. The geopolitical position of both countries on the frontier of Christianity and Islam produced a particularly powerful ethnoreligious identity. This began to give way in the nineteenth century (earlier in Georgia) to an ethnolinguistic identity. But under communism two separate tendencies have combined to reassert to some degree the national-religious symbiosis among the two populations. On the one hand, the failures of the Brave New World and the transformation of Marxism-Leninism into a rationalization of the status quo has stimulated the educated but alienated Soviet Armenians and Georgians, in their search for self-definition, to seek spiritual satisfaction in nonmaterial spheres of life. On the other hand, Soviet nationality policy, with its contradictory principles of cultural differentiation (the "blossoming" or *rastsvet* of national cultures) and its long-term aim of "homogenization," has produced non-Russian citizens increasingly sensitized to their ethnicity. In the relatively "liberal" years since the death of Stalin with a population no longer terrorized

into conformity, these two streams have come close together, united by a nationality policy that attempts to repress *both* as alien to Soviet integration.

In the context of Russian ethnic dominance of an antireligious state, nationalist and religious elements have many common concerns. In Georgia and Armenia, although both "orthodox" and "unorthodox" nationalists adhere to nationalism's secular tenets, there is a growing symbiosis with religion, particularly among "dissident nationalists." Thus, after a continuing decline in the religio-nationalist nexus in both Armenia and Georgia from the nineteenth century onward, we have seen a certain revival in its strength over the last two decades. This is particularly significant in Georgia, where ethnoreligious identity, for historical reasons, has always been weaker than in neighboring Armenia.

However, despite the national-religious link in the ethnic identity of large sections of the population (particularly among youth for which we have some evidence), there has been no support (as in Lithuania) either from the clergy or the population at large for a broad national movement united around the church. Thus, although nationalists may see the church as the natural font of national culture and tradition, and believers support nationalist concerns for moral and political rejuvenation, the relationship is not as yet sufficiently politicized. This may be in part due to the special conditions of tolerance shown the national churches in Armenia and Georgia (especially the former), but it must also be a result of the continuing domination of a secular ethnic identity among the majority of the population.

Islam and Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia

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Islam in Soviet Central Asia, with its millennial roots, has for more than sixty years been tenaciously resisting attempts by the communist regime to extirpate it. Despite some reverses in the face of persecution, coercion, and hostile propaganda, it is maintaining its grip in different ways at different levels of society. Its greatest strength is its identification as an ethnic symbol for the Turkic and Iranian nationalities that compose the indigenous population of the area.

Thus, Islam continues to play its historic role as an international symbol of resistance on the part of Muslims to domination by non-Muslims, especially Europeans. Simultaneously, Islam as a broad social concept has developed into a bulwark of the new local nationalisms in the Muslim Soviet republics. In the process, it gives evidence of assuring its future by adapting to the outlook and goals of the Soviet-trained but nationalistic elites who are emerging as leaders of the region.

In the face of this challenge to ideological purity and social integration the most conspicuous response of the Gorbachev regime has been to target religious backsliders among the native Communist elites who are supposed to serve the regime as "conveyor belts" of ideology. A Politburo member who is close to Gorbachev, Aleksandr N. Iakovlev, has decried the "strange" fact that "the influence of Islam on the creative intelligentsia has been strengthened." Gorbachev himself, in a stopover in Tashkent when returning from a trip to India, complained to the local leadership of the Uzbek Communist party about party members who pay lip service to communist ideals but themselves take part in religious rituals. Party sanctions have been used against members involved in religious services: in one six-month period of 1987

fifty-three members were expelled from the Uzbek Communist party for "organizing religious rituals and taking part in them."¹

The Gorbachev leadership has also deplored growth of the Islamic clergy. At a 1987 party plenum in Tashkent it was revealed that in the preceding ten years the number of *official* clergy had doubled, and that some two hundred unofficial "self-styled mullahs" were also active. The latter, Islamic activists who operate outside the "official" religious framework, are subject to criminal penalties. As of June 1987 more than a dozen imprisonments of Soviet Muslims for such transgressions as creating Koranic study groups or "trading in Muslim literature" had been documented by a human rights group; in all cases the victims were under criminal confinement.²

At the same time the Gorbachev leadership, like its predecessors, has apparently shrunk from all-out attack on religion among the mainstream Muslim masses, evidently in unwillingness to destabilize the system at a time of economic and social crisis. Indeed, the policy of *glasnost* has helped to create an atmosphere of uncertainty, if not tolerance, that may actually favor low-key religious observance.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL SETTING

Geography

Central Asia, with a population of more than 40 million whose Asian component (already a large majority) is increasing steadily due to a high rate of natural growth, is demonstrating its potential to shake off the torpor of past centuries. This gives to the five Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan the potential to exercise leadership of their Islamic neighbors, many of whom were once economically and culturally more developed.

Peripheral to these five republics, and a part of the same religious and cultural world, are:

- Tatar settlements along the Volga and in Siberia. The Volga Tatars, whose intelligentsia were once leaders of reform and revolutionary movements among the Muslims of the Russian Empire, are handicapped today by their position as an enclave within the giant Russian SFSR and their inferior political status as a second-ranking "autonomous republic" in the federal structure. However, with a socially ad-

vanced population of more than five million, they are still a force to be reckoned with among Soviet Muslims.

- Azerbaijan, lying westward across the Caspian. As the only major Shi'ite people of the Soviet Union (about 4.5 million) and with an equal or even greater coethnic group across the border in Iranian Azerbaijan, the Soviet Azeris have come into special prominence with the Iranian revolution.
- Muslim peoples of the northern slopes of the Caucasus. Perhaps too small in number to be a major political force today, the fiercely nationalistic North Caucasian Muslims and their militant mullahs have historically played a disproportionately large role in keeping the faith alive.
- Just beyond the Soviet borders, the Muslim communities of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and northwest China.

The position of the Central Asian Muslims at the heart of this vast Islamic territory enhances their challenge to the Slavic minority in their midst.

History

Following the Middle Ages, the once vital civilization of Central Asia became mired in stagnation. It is only in the last one hundred years that the region has begun to shake itself—or be shaken by outside forces—into catching up with the modern age. The territory occupied today by the five Central Asian Soviet republics once sat astride a great land caravan route, the “silk road,” from East to West. This vast expanse, half the size of the continental United States, has been for thousands of years of recorded history a theater of successive invasions, varied hegemonomies, and shifting cultural influences. The implantation of Islam by the Arabs more than a thousand years ago must be seen in the perspective of a much older history: the city of Samarkand recently celebrated its twenty-five hundredth anniversary and Tashkent currently is marking its two thousandth. Alexander the Great, who marched through Central Asia with his armies in the fourth century B.C., is still remembered popularly by his Eastern name “Iskander” or “Iskander Rumi” (“Iskander the Greek”), particularly in place names and in legends where he figures as the ideal ruler, often with religious overtones.³

Before Islam first took root in the seventh century A.D., the area

already had been exposed to other religions: shamanism, Hellenism, Manichaeism, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism. Traces of the pre-Islamic religions still impinge on the popular consciousness through vestiges found in contemporary Islam, in folklore, or in the nostalgic evocations of modern Central Asian writers.⁴

Still, Islam had dominated the religious and cultural life of the cities of this territory for more than a thousand years when they were occupied in the last century by invading Russian armies. The faith had come later to the nomads of the steppes, deserts, and mountains, but they too had embraced it firmly.

Enlivened by their strategic position astride the East-West trade route, the communities of Central Asia played their part in producing some of the great figures of Islam's dynamic early civilization. Among them were al-Khorezmi, credited with elaborating the principles of algebra; al-Biruni, whose travel book on India was recently reissued by an English publisher; or ibn-Sina (Avicenna), the philosopher and naturalist whose medical treatise remained for centuries a standard reference work in both Christian and Islamic worlds. All of these men were born before A.D. 1000. Later, Central Asia rose again from the devastation wrought by the Mongol invasions to give Islam a new crop of historical figures. They were men like the conquerors Tamerlane and Babur (the latter the founder of the Moghul Empire in India) who, although both reputedly descended from the cruel Genghis Khan, cultivated scholarship and the arts. There was also a leading astronomer of his time, Ulugh Bek, whose observatory in Samarkand is preserved today with loving care.

It was the decline of the great land route caused by competition from a new age of sea transportation that forced Central Asia into centuries of stagnation, interrupted only by the Russian advent in the last half of the nineteenth century. During that retrograde period Islam was stigmatized by the ignorance, fanaticism, and venality of many of its religious figures.

Although the Russian Empire had since the eighteenth century come to exercise a loose hegemony over the Turkic nomads of the steppes extending southward from Siberia, its conquest of the sedentary heartland was not completed until the second half of the nineteenth century. A Russian Governate-General of Turkestan was formed, with the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva becoming autonomous

protectorates under their native rulers. There were some attempts by the Russians to convert Muslims to Orthodox Christianity, but by and large they remained free to practice their own religion and customs, except when provisions of the *shari'a* (Koranic law) were "repugnant" to Russian justice.

At the time of the revolution there were in this predominantly Sunni region one mosque for every 700 to 1,000 inhabitants of the territory, 595 religious seminaries (*medresas*), and 6,300 religious schools.⁵ Cultural influences from more advanced Muslim areas of the empire, notably the Volga region with its affluent and sophisticated Tatar population, and Shi'ite Azerbaijan where the new petroleum industry was boosting development, helped to offset the impact of Russification. In particular, the grip of religious obscurantism was challenged by the spread to Turkestan of the Muslim *usul jadid* (new method) reform movement whose central purpose was creation of schools where secular subjects could be taught in modern fashion.

An Uzbek Muslim who left his homeland during World War II has described the indigenous religious tradition in Central Asia prior to the revolution in these terms: "Turkestan was a land of Islamic dervishism which strived to strengthen the spirit of Islam." He listed four Sufi orders (*tariqa*) that had existed there, the Naqshbandiya, the Qadiriya, the Kubravia (founded by Kubra, who fell in an attack by Genghis Khan); and the Qalandariya; the differences among these four orders were described as slight. The orders were said to concentrate on disseminating the teachings of early Islamic mystics, prominent among them the twelfth-century Sufi philosopher Yassawi. This source also described as common among people a belief in the *chiltan*, forty spirits regarded as protectors of Islam from evil who were thought to be present at the graves of "saints."⁶

SOVIET POLICY

Through seven decades of Soviet power, official policy toward Islam, while fundamentally hostile, has been marked by unevenness. In the early period the party's initial assault on Muslim institutions and religious figures was softened at times so as not to antagonize the faithful, whose support or neutrality vis-à-vis the Basmachi rebels was needed. By 1935, however, the call of the muezzins had been silenced, mosques

confiscated for use as "atheist museums," clubs, or prisons; *waqf* (religious property foundations) confiscated, mullahs arrested in large numbers, and resistance driven underground or inward. The slogan "*Komsomol bu dunya uchun, murud ahirat uchun*" ("The Komsomol for this world, muridism [a Sufi acolythate] for the next one") was the order of the day.⁷ World War II brought for Islam, as for other Soviet religions, a temporary remission of the regime's implacable hostility. During the war a Muslim spiritual directorate was organized in Tashkent as headquarters for the officially "registered" religious establishment in Central Asia.

Writing in 1980, Bohdan Bociurkiw, the Canadian authority on religion in the Soviet Union, distinguished six stages of policy toward Islam. In the most recent of these, the Brezhnev era, he found: "the anti-religious campaign in the USSR lost much of its violence and vulgarity; yet it continued at a much slower rate, by more sophisticated means, aided by various sociological surveys designed to identify the main target audiences and the most appropriate methods to reach them, as well as to monitor the effectiveness of various anti-religious measures."⁸

The Brezhnev period saw an overall softening in the tactical handling of Islam. In 1975 the religion was still being viewed, despite some concessions, in a decidedly negative light, both ideologically (its "superstitious" nature) and because of its perceived harm to the goal of "*rapprochement* of the Soviet peoples."⁹ By 1978, however, on the eve of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, an official writer went so far as to declare, with unprecedented permissiveness and in seeming disregard of the party's jealously guarded role as preceptor and guardian of ideological purity, that "Islam is a matter of the individual conscience" (*Islam—delo lichnoi sovesti*).¹⁰ In retrospect, one can discern practical reasons for this softening: (1) excessive zeal in antireligious campaigns has been found to trigger social unrest while failing to achieve ideological goals; and (2) a posture of tolerance toward domestic Islam has been useful to Soviet purposes in dealing with Muslims abroad. (This posture did not prevent most Muslim countries from boycotting an international Islamic conference hosted by the Soviets in Tashkent after the invasion of Afghanistan.)

In Brezhnev's final years there were signs of further softening. The official stance on Islam was cautious, ambivalent, and at times almost friendly. The net effect was a degree of acquiescence in, if not actual

encouragement of, discreet Islamic activity. This suggested that a still newer phase of policy toward Islam might have been entered, linked quite possibly to the leadership's nervousness over the explosive potential of the troubled situations in Iran and Afghanistan on its southern border, immediately adjacent to the Central Asian republics. Both countries are tied to the Soviet Muslims not only by common religious bonds but by the presence of sizable coethnic groups straddling the frontier.

To be sure, Islam still was perceived as a competing ideology and therefore one that must be ultimately erased. Propaganda and agitation against it were still conducted in the name of "scientific atheism," if in lower key, and the media continued to denounce attempts by the "imperialists" to manipulate Islam for their own ends. But with respect even to domestic Islam, a new note of permissiveness seemed to be sounding. Typical was a 1980 expression of the official attitude toward Islam in *Pravda* which, while stipulating that, "Of course, we Communists are atheists and do not welcome religious aberrations," adopted a relatively conciliatory tone with regard to Islam: "Making wide use of the rights and freedoms accorded them under the USSR Constitution, the Muslims of our country are also conscientiously fulfilling their civil obligations."¹¹

A rationale for this spirit of conciliation, so out of keeping with traditional Soviet hostility to Islam, can be found in a 1982 Soviet book on the subject.¹² The author was relatively forthcoming toward domestic Islam and, in particular, contemporary Islamic religious figures in the USSR. If in tsarist days the mullahs' forebears had been staunch supporters of the "exploiter regime," and after the revolution had organized "counterrevolutionary mutinies" and collaborated with Allied interventionists, the author asserted, their attitude was not one of immutable antagonism toward the regime. Within a few years, he declared, some of the Muslim leaders had begun to urge acceptance of the new regime. He quoted a 1923 *fetwa* (pronouncement) of the Ufa spiritual directorate as declaring: "By the great grace of Allah, the Revolution which has taken place in Russia has destroyed a brutal, despotic autocracy which persecuted the religion of Islam."¹³ (This Soviet author's historical perspective naturally differed from that of Western writers like Bociurkiw.) In adopting a new, more pro-Soviet stance, religious figures were seen as influenced by believers among the toiling masses.

The book identified the late 1930s (the period of harshest repression) and early 1940s as a time when "a new political course of loyalty to the Soviet state and socialist system came to prevail among Muslim religious organizations and clergy." Another phase in the evolution of domestic Islam was said to have begun in the 1960s (corresponding to Bociurkiw's sixth or "Brezhnev" period), characterized by "normal" relations between Muslim organizations and the state, by support from believers and their spiritual leaders for Soviet policies, and by an "intensive process of modernization." In sum:

While socialism was "only" a theory, the Muslim ideologists in our country came out against it, and considered it a great evil that destroyed the order of things established by Allah. They intimidated believers with various fantasies ascribed to socialism. When, however, the social teaching of Marxism-Leninism was transformed into a mighty real force revolutionizing the entire structure of life not only in the USSR but in tens of other countries, when thanks to that teaching a new social order was created which was the highest achievement of social progress, then the religious leaders began to "discern" in Islam ideas consistent with the principles of scientific socialism.¹⁴

By 1982 a striking manifestation of the new milder tone was to be found in no less a vehicle than the theoretical journal of the Soviet Communist party, *Kommunist*, one of the most authoritative purveyors of the party line whose readership is mainly domestic. In publishing its version of a speech by the Soviet Union's Marxist Afghan ally Babrak Karmal, *Kommunist* chose to include references by him to "holy" Islam and "its historical appeal to justice, equality and the eradication of man's exploitation of man."¹⁵ Despite the foreign context, the authority of the journal was such as to give such dicta universal application. This was a far cry from Soviet treatment of Islam in earlier days, and its appearance in *Kommunist* meant that it was not to be taken lightly.

Even in retreat, Soviet policy toward Islam continued to be manipulative. The regime seemed to be placing its hopes for eventual disappearance of Islam less on direct confrontation and more on the long-term consequences of industrialization and urbanization, with their disruptive effects on the large, extended-family structure and other indige-

nous institutions, especially in the conservative rural areas that are the stronghold of traditional Islam. These desired trends have been slowed, however, by economic and social problems, and it is questionable in any case whether their impact on the survival of Islam is decisively negative. For example, the influence of urbanization on traditionally large Muslim families seems to be less than expected.¹⁶

Another tactic was the creation of new "civil rituals" meant to replace traditional religious observance of holidays and life-cycle events with secular activities more compatible with a regime that preaches atheism. To increase the acceptability of these so-called new traditions, some of the trappings of religious ceremonies were preserved, such as traditional wedding costumes. Still, the official media complained of resistance to the innovations and the continuing sway of what are termed "harmful survivals" of the past.¹⁷

The initial aggressiveness of Brezhnev's successors toward the Muslims suggested that the relative mildness of his era might be at an end. Whether a tougher policy can be sustained in the long term, given the cost in terms of Muslim morale and ability to make dissatisfactions felt, remains to be seen.

THE REALITY

Despite decades of antireligious campaigns under Soviet rule, Islam remains today a powerful social force in Central Asia. Soviet writers on domestic Islam now generally concede that, particularly in the case of such life-cycle rituals as circumcisions, weddings, and funerals, Islamic practice among members of the Muslim nationalities remains very widespread, if not universal. Many who observe such rituals may not take active part in communal worship, or even be believers, but they are nonetheless tied in this way to the Muslim *umma* (totality of believers). Religious fasting, prescribed for the faithful during the Muslim month of Ramadan, remains common, despite official objections that it saps labor productivity. Feasting on religious holidays (*iftar*) and ceremonial occasions (*toy*) also prevails, despite complaints that it is a cause of worker absenteeism. Certain taboos of the *shari'a* also are widely observed, such as the ban on intermarriage between Muslim females and non-Muslims.

Official opposition creates political and social pressures that compli-

cate open adherence to Islam, especially for those actively employed in the work force and thus vulnerable to criticism from superiors, either directly or through manipulation of their "collectives." One of the most informative Soviet writers to date on questions of Soviet Islam is T. S. Saidbayev, whose work is based in large part on empirical surveys of the population. Saidbayev points to pensioners, illegal private businessmen, and others not belonging to the regular work force as most active in the practice of Islam.¹⁸ By the same token, he indicates that among private entrepreneurs who do not depend on a collective, religion may be more freely practiced: "There are families with great material affluence gained by private initiative, speculation, etc. who preserve a high degree of religiosity."¹⁹ Official strictures are offset to some extent by countervailing grass-roots pressures, exercised through the extended family and the ethnic community in general, which cuts across social divisions created by differences in status and educational level, rural vs. urban residence, etc. These pressures constrain people to demonstrate their continuing fidelity to Islam: "Of course, in this [phenomenon] there is a sharp reflection of conformism of such people" (i.e., even those with superior education and culture) "a desire 'not to stand out,' not to put oneself in opposition to the nation."²⁰ There is also the role of Islam in people's quest for social acceptance: "On the whole, the micro-environment is well disposed toward those who regularly fulfill religious rituals and obligations, who frequent the mosque."²¹

Pressures to conform socially are by no means the only motivation for adhering to Islam. Many continue to do so for reasons of belief, for example that Allah can ward off natural disasters. The 1966 Tashkent earthquake was a case in point: it was reported that in the first months after the earthquake, especially in April and May 1966, there was a sharp upsurge of religious activity, manifested in the conduct of long-forgotten religious rituals. The earthquake was followed by "massive ritual collections (*zhertvoprinosheniia*) in public places—streets and cemeteries" accompanied by doling out of ritual foods to passersby and those specially invited.²²

The role of the Muslim religious leadership is ambiguous. The officially sanctioned spiritual directorate in Tashkent (the leading one of four in the country, and with the largest flock) unquestionably serves the regime in various ways. First and foremost is its role as apologist for Soviet foreign policy, even in Afghanistan. The presiding mufti also

aligns with the regime from time to time in denouncing the more exuberant or "superstitious" religious practices, many of them linked to Sufism in its more fundamentalist manifestations: performance of the *zikr* accompanied by frenzied singing and dancing or pilgrimages to the graves of "saints." At the same time official Islam, however submissive to the regime in some areas, does provide an institutional framework for aggregation and articulation of Muslim interests. This writer has been told by Muslims otherwise outspokenly antipathetic to the regime that in their view the function of the officially sanctioned religious leadership is on balance a positive one. As with other religions in the USSR, there is also an unofficial "grass-roots" religious leadership that eschews ties with officialdom and whose members are said to enjoy greater trust on the part of the faithful, while being denounced regularly in the press as harmful influences, often as confidence tricksters who raise money from believers for spurious purposes. It may be noted, however, that official as well as unofficial religious leaders have been criticized on occasion in regime media.

The *Pravda* article cited earlier²³ rather defensively denies allegations attributed to "bourgeois ideologists" that Muslims are forbidden to pray and fast, that they are kept in "artificial isolation" from their foreign coreligionists, or that they oppose the socialist system as a kind of "counter-society." It says they have several hundred large cathedral mosques and thousands of apartment (*kvartal'nyye*) and rural mosques. (It is difficult to obtain independent corroboration of such claims, which frequently appear to be inflated in order to impress foreign Muslims.)

Islam in the Soviet Union is linked closely with ethnic values and conflicts which set the Central Asians, often scorned by Russians for their non-European characteristics, at odds with the Russocentric Soviet political culture. It is especially in this context of ethnic conflict that the role of Islam is significant. The list of distinct ethnic values that differentiate the Islamic Central Asian culture from that of the Russian and other European cultures is a long one, including language, literature, architecture, dress, food, pottery, and music. A key ethnic value, often expressed as such in the media, is the Central Asian propensity for prolific childbearing. As Saidbayev puts it, "We share the opinion of demographers who see the influence of Islam on the stereotypes of national behavior also in connection with the phenomenon of multiple childbearing."²⁴

In the vernacular literature the term *miras* (heritage) subsumes all of these traditional aspects of ethnicity.²⁵ *Miras* as a bulwark against the encroachment of alien cultures has a special meaning for the Central Asian Muslims. It relates to the belief that in those things that contribute to the beauty of human existence—not only the arts and philosophy, but also the regulation of human relations on a basis of equality and justice—the Islamic world was at its high point centuries ago, that, paradoxically, the essential goal of progress is to recapture what was positive in the past. How to reconcile this goal with the need for material advance is a problem faced in common with other Islamic lands.

That there is a close relationship between Islam and ethnicity or “nationality,” despite the supposedly secular nature of the latter, is admitted freely now by Soviet authorities. There are criticisms that the mullahs, once blamed for refusing to recognize any nationality but that of an all embracing, supranational “Islamic nation,” have espoused not only the concept of individual nationality for Soviet Muslims but are now playing on Uzbek, Kazakh, or other ethnic awareness to rally support for Islam.²⁶

There have been recurring complaints by official spokesmen that many people lose sight of the religious roots of some traditions, mistaking them for secular ethnic customs. For example, “not only from the mouth of an illiterate old-man believer but also from that of a young educated man one can hear: ‘He who is not circumcised is not an Uzbek’ (or Turkmen or Tajik or Azerbaijani or Tatar, as the case may be).”²⁷ This blending of ethnic and religious values, which the mullahs have been charged with aiding and abetting, naturally complicates the task of propagating “scientific atheism.” On the other hand, even more pernicious in the view of official critics of Islam is the fact that many purely secular ethnic attributes (history, language) are held in the popular mind to be “Islamic.”

Of special concern to officialdom is the persistence of Islamic practices among the youth. The newspaper of the Uzbek Komsomol has complained that in addition to atheists in the population and those who are indifferent to religion, as well as those who waver between religion and atheism, “there are even some [young] persons who consider purely religious rituals and prayers (including circumcision [*sunnat*], funeral services [*janaza*], weddings [*nigah*], fasting [*rozah*]) to be useful and nec-

essary, an important element of the spiritual side of the national life."²⁸ Among youth, it was admitted that about 10 percent participate in the *iftar*, the data taken from an official survey conducted "under the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan Communist Party." Some wedding couples, dissatisfied with the official civil ceremony performed in "Houses of Joy" ("*Baht uylari*") were said to "continue to say their religious vows, openly or in secret." Observance of fasting and feasting, it was said, is believed by some youths to be a "means of cultural satisfaction." Such practices are viewed as harmful because, given that half the Soviet population is under thirty (in areas of high fertility like Uzbekistan the proportion in that age cohort is still higher), "the basic productive resources are youths." Yet "the overwhelming majority of religious youths do not take an active part in public work," and "the more people's religiosity increases, the more their social activism slacks off." In the writer's opinion, the remedy for such problems was ideology—indoctrination in "scientific atheism."²⁹

ISLAM, SOCIAL STRATIFICATION, AND THE NEW INTELLIGENTSIA

Saidbayev has shown that, compared with other Soviet religions, Islam is not only more widely practiced by its adherents but is also more uniform, i.e., less stratified in terms of social variables. According to his data:

1. "Religiosity" (*religioznost'*) is markedly more persistent among Muslims than residents of Christian areas of the country. On the predominantly European state farms of one of Kazakhstan's "virgin lands" zones the ratio of atheists to believers is 9 to 1, whereas in the Karakalpak "autonomous republic" in Uzbekistan the number of believers exceeds that of atheists by a ratio of 5.5 to 4.5.
2. If in non-Islamic areas of the Soviet Union the "overwhelming majority" of believers are women, in Islamic areas the sex difference evens out "due to the heightened religiosity of men."
3. In the Islamic regions the age profile of religious persons is "much" younger, i.e., there is less cleavage between young and old.
4. In European areas the level of religiosity among those with higher and secondary education is only 1-1.5 percent. In Islamic areas the

corresponding figures are tenfold: 10–15 percent (showing that educated Muslims are religiously less differentiated from their society than are the educated groups of other nationalities).³⁰

Saidbayev ascribes these differences to "peculiarities of structure, demography and cultural development" of the Islamic peoples, and to the specific nature of the "functions" fulfilled by Islam compared to other religions. Some "peculiarities" are the prevalence of the large extended family, as well as vestigial clan and tribal affiliations that tend to unite Muslims across economic and social lines. There is also the widely reported fact that nominal differences in individuals' economic levels (in terms of the official economy) may be to a large extent offset by the leveling effect of participation in the unofficial private or "second" economy. Above all, there is the common link of a distinctly Central Asian identity in the face of the Russian (or European) challenge, with adherence to Islam a prime symbol of resistance or rejection.

Sovietization has raised educational levels greatly. It is claimed that illiteracy, at the beginning of this century pandemic, is now virtually nonexistent. The 1979 Soviet census gave the number of persons in the labor force in the Central Asian republics (all nationalities) who had at least some secondary education as from 770 per thousand employed in the lowest-ranking republic (Tajikistan) to 848 per thousand employed in the highest (Uzbekistan).³¹ In a recent year the total university population of the five Central Asian republics was about 700,000.³² Breakdowns of such figures by nationality no longer are published, but even making allowances for a disproportionately large representation of Russians and other nonindigenous groups, it is clear from the pattern of previous years that the overwhelming majority are native Central Asians.

At the pinnacle of the new intelligentsia is a modern professional elite that is coming increasingly to dominate important areas of the society, especially culture and the media. In 1980 the number of holders of advanced degrees, corresponding roughly to the American Ph.D. or higher, in the five Central Asia republics was more than three thousand.³³ Even though the exact number of degrees belonging to members of the indigenous nationalities is not published, it is plainly considerable. It is from this new indigenous intelligentsia, whose intellectual heritage combines the Islam of their forefathers with Western ratio-

nalism as filtered through the works of Marx and Lenin, that future leadership at the republican level will have to come, even if ultimate control rests with Moscow.

The members of this new intelligentsia are the survivors of the shocks, disillusionments, and exterminations of the twentieth century. They are spiritually descended from the *jadids* and other forward-looking Muslim intellectuals who greeted the Russians at the turn of the century as bearers of a new and more enlightened culture that would help to free their own from the intransigent grip of narrow and reactionary mullahs. They are also the heirs of the Muslim leaders who cast their lot with the Bolsheviks in the struggle against the Basmachi and other enemies of the new regime, only to experience arrest and sometimes execution as "Turkish spies" and "bourgeois nationalists." They themselves have witnessed the penchant of the central authority to subject their peoples to Russification and other forms of discrimination. The linkage between the present generation and the traumas of the earlier Soviet period is typified by the fact that an emerging literary figure in Uzbekistan is Kamil Ikramov, whose father, Akmal Ikramov, first secretary of the Uzbek communist party, was executed after a Stalinist purge trial of March 1938; or that Faizullah Khojayev, chairman of the Uzbek Council of Peoples Commissars, who was liquidated in the same trial, is now lionized in the Uzbek media as a "true son of the people" (while Nikolai Bukharin and other Russian communists who perished with him had to wait until 1987 to be rehabilitated).

It is abundantly clear from a variety of sources that many members of this educated group are rediscovering Islam as a vital part of their heritage. As previously noted, Saidbayev's data indicate that from 10 to 15 percent of Soviet Muslims with higher education are possessed of "religiosity," a term for which he does not give precise definition. From a sufficiency of qualitative indicators, it would seem that an even higher proportion participate in some form of Islamic practice, at least in a secular way. How then does this elite relate to Islam, or Islam to it?

The evidence shows that Central Asian intellectuals are reexamining Islam from at least two different and, seemingly, contradictory perspectives, one rational (modernist) and the other mystical, as exemplified by Sufism in its early metaphysical phase.

ISLAMIC MODERNISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

In the early part of this century the typical (or stereotypical) portrayal of the Central Asian religious scene was one of reactionary mullahs feeding on the ignorance, prejudice, and superstition of the illiterate Muslim masses. Those masses are today experiencing a much greater degree of social mobilization, with the accompanying education, mobility, and exposure to media.

It would seem predictable that the new native elites, highly educated and increasingly assuming leadership roles in various walks of life, would regard Islam from a perspective of special sophistication. And indeed, although there are still references in the literature on Soviet Islam to such dervishist survivals as "patron saints" of doctors or chemists,³⁴ horizons have broadened. Nor has Islam itself remained stagnant. It has shown the flexibility to adapt to new conditions.

A revealing glimpse of modernizing trends in Central Asian Islam, and of the evolution of official policy toward them, is to be gained from the official literature. Back in 1963 an "atheist" commentary on the Koran published in the vernacular by the Uzbekistan SSR "Bilim" ("Knowledge") Society, counterpart of the all-Union "Znanie" Society, asserted plaintively: *"In our country and abroad many priests and bourgeois Islamologists are striving to modernize the Islamic religion, including the tenets of the Koran, i.e., to adapt them to the various requirements of contemporary social progress."*³⁵

"Islamic modernists" were said to be relying heavily on a verse of the Koran's Sura 2 (The Cow) as justification for their work of adaptation: "Whatever verse we cancel, or cause to forget, we bring a better or its like. Knowest thou not that God hath power over all things?"³⁶

A more recent source in Uzbek has listed the ingredients of "Islamic modernism":

- Idealization of pristine Islam;
- Portrayal of Muhammad as a "democrat, reformer, revolutionary, even as a socialist";
- Affirmation of Islam as a bulwark of progress, disseminator of knowledge and education, preceptor of equality, bearer of freedom;
- Identification of Islam with socialism and communism;
- Equation of religious and communist morality;
- Defense of Islamic rituals as of scientific value;

- Modernization of Islamic doctrine and *shari'a* rules with regard to women, the family, and daily life;
- Placing the *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca) on the level of "international congresses."³⁷

Further, the modernists and their ideas have been described by the same Central Asian source as occupying a decisive and dominant place in contemporary Islam and are considered to be defenders and propagators of true, pure Islam. ("Islamic" or "Muslim" socialism is viewed by the Uzbek encyclopedia as an offshoot of the modernizing movement that seeks to respond to the popularity of socialism and socialist ideas in the world. Two different directions are identified: (1) equation of socialism and Islam; (2) differentiation between contemporary socialist ideas and Islam, but with the belief that the socialism of original Islam represents a "third way" between capitalism and modern socialism. Islamic socialism, dismissed as "antiscientific," is portrayed as a phenomenon of the Muslim world in general, and the Uzbek encyclopedia is vague as to the possible extent of its following among Soviet Muslims.³⁸)

The modernists are depicted in Soviet commentaries as playing down Koranic teachings that do not meet contemporary political, scientific, or ethical criteria, and softening the more stringent religious requirements placed by the faith on believers. Their *fatwas* and other religious writings, as well as their sermons in the mosques, reportedly give a new interpretation to Koranic theology on such subjects as "a one and only, almighty Allah, predestination and fate, heaven and hell, the universe, religious obligations, and resurrection."³⁹

Islamic modernization in the USSR is seen as part of an international phenomenon, a movement among Muslims in many countries to bring the precepts, taboos, and restrictions of the Koran, the hadiths, and the *shari'a* up to the level of contemporary scientific and social practice, and to meet the "needs of religious people," even at the expense of renouncing to some extent the principles formulated in the early period of Islam and the Middle Ages. According to an Uzbek source, this movement is spearheaded by "the imams and readers of the official mosques, members of the trusteeship boards (*mutawalliat*), functionaries of the spiritual directorates, and students at religious seminaries."⁴⁰

Initially, Soviet critics were skeptical of or outspokenly hostile to-

ward the idea of a modernization of domestic Islam. In all probability this was because the trend made Islam more palatable to the new professional elites on whom the system is dependent, thus rendering it ideologically more competitive in the eyes of a group that already was showing a perverse tendency to cling to the old Islamic traditions. Modernization undercut the regime's best argument for wooing the professionals away from Islam: its retrograde character and superstitious basis. It also made it possible for the once backward clergy to reach that group more persuasively.

Thus, the writer of the 1963 commentary had asserted that the "Islamic modernists" had tried after the October Revolution to co-opt Marxist-Leninist nationality policy and put it "on the path of Pan-Islamism." Foreign "bourgeois" publications on Islam were quoted to the effect that the "Muslim ulema" in the USSR were seeking to "connect" or "reconcile" Koranic dogmas with scientific teaching on nature and society, although the two things were as antithetical as "fire and water." In this, he charged, they were using the experience of Catholicism in adapting science to religion. He disclosed that the Islamic modernists were depicting God as a depersonified, faceless symbol (*ramz*), invoking in particular verse 34 of Sura 24 (The Light): "God is the LIGHT of the Heavens and of the Earth."⁴¹

In 1963 the official line was that Islamic modernizers were hypocritical, aiming deviously at gulling those sophisticates who were critical of the religion on rational grounds. The point was made that the number of people in the USSR who can read the Koran in the Arabic original and analyze it "from a position of Marxism" is small, and that a majority of believers either cannot read the original at all, or read it without understanding it. However, subsequent years have seen a softening of this indictment, just as they have witnessed a general softening of the overall treatment of Islam.⁴²

By 1975 a commentator hinted that modernization was at least in part positive since it was a response to social reforms and enhanced public awareness due to Sovietization. He listed with seeming approbation some Islamic reforms: a tendency to criticize excessive and overly expensive observance of religious holidays, ceremonies, and rituals; revision of past condemnation by Muslim theologians of famous historical figures like the philosopher Avicenna, who had once been branded a heretic; renunciation by the clergy of preaching antipathy to non-

Muslims, even to the point of performing religious marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims; holding of joint Sunni-Shi'a religious services; and support for science, technology, and art, for "mutual enrichment" of Muslim and non-Muslim cultures, for "friendship of the peoples." At the same time it was charged that such reforms were made under pressure and not only did not flow from the nature of Islam but were actually in contradiction to it.⁴³

By 1982 another writer was much more forthcoming, taking the positive view that the hallmark of domestic Islam was its "intensive process of modernization of the socioethical outlook, of a number of theological (*verouchitel'nyye*) aspects, and religious (*kul'tovaya*) practice."⁴⁴

CENTRAL ASIA AND SUFISM

While the modernist trend offers Islam a means of adapting to the needs of a literate, media-rich, and increasingly professionalized society, the native religious tradition is not rationalistic but mystical. This hardly can be expected to change overnight. In that connection, there is ample evidence that Central Asian interest in the mystical aspects of Islam, and in Sufism in particular, remains very much alive.

Many of the religious practices of the Central Asian Muslims, especially the less orthodox ones, have Sufist associations; these exist on a sufficient scale to be regular targets of official criticism, not only by secular officials but also by the establishment clergy. They include pilgrimages (said to be advocated by the mullahs as substitutes for the *hajj*⁴⁵) to the tombs of Muslim saints like the Sufi philosopher Yas-sawi, who is buried in Turkistan, a town in Kazakhstan. It is paradoxical that the state, while criticizing such pilgrimages, often contributes to them through upkeep of their sites as "historical monuments," as at such well-known tourist attractions as the fourteenth-century Shah-i-Zinda necropolis in Samarkand or the tenth-century Ismail Samani mausoleum in Bukhara.

Alexandre Bennigsen, the pioneer of Western study of Islam under Soviet conditions, has found intriguing indications in Soviet sources that the mystical Sufi orders are still active in Muslim areas, especially the North Caucasus (where in the past century Sufism was important as a political force, animating the struggle against Russian rule

by Sheikh Shamil and his murid followers].⁴⁶ With respect to Soviet Central Asia, there is sporadic confirmation in official sources of the activities of Sufist brotherhoods, especially in the western part of the territory. One book gives details of certain practices associated with Sufism at a rather primitive fundamentalist level (dervishism, zikrism) that have persisted to the present day in Turkmenistan on the Caspian, but their extent there is uncertain.⁴⁷ Bennigsen and his collaborator Chantal Lemerancier-Quelquejey have found evidence of such activities as far east as Kyrghyzstan.⁴⁸ However, the diligence with which the Soviet security organs pursue any organized activity not sanctioned by the regime casts doubt on the possibility of a widespread Sufist movement at the level of concerted practical action to achieve political or social goals, whether overt or clandestine.

What is certain, on the other hand, is the interest of Central Asian intellectuals in the Sufism of its earliest period (seventh through thirteenth centuries A.D.) as a philosophical teaching, possibly even as an ideological alternative to the materialism of Marxist-Leninist society. This is implicit in the illumination given it in their specialized media, if usually with the requisite few words of criticism. Since practically no Russian ever learns the vernaculars, these media have what is essentially an exclusively native readership. The fourteen-volume *Uzbek Soviet Encyclopedia*, the first of its kind ever to appear in the native language, and not available in Russian, devotes generous entries to Sufist philosophy, to its various philosophers (e.g., Yassawi), and to the Sufist orders. Despite the routine criticism of religion required by the official ideology, these articles manage to convey much positive information about Sufism as, in dealing with Yassawi: "in quite a few of his poems restraint, compassion for the needs of the people, and decency are propagandized."⁴⁹ Sufism in its theoretical aspect, at least, seems to be impinging in a way that may have far-reaching consequences for the future of Soviet Central Asia.

Sufist philosophy has been traced by some scholars to the influence of Christian neo-Platonism. In its early form it preached self-denial and asceticism in reaction to the growing materialism of Arabic society engendered by the bounty of conquest. The object of the early Sufis was to go beyond reason and emotion, striving to become one with God through mystical contemplation; in this respect, Sufism had been compared with Zen Buddhism and other Eastern religions. Later it de-

scended from a spiritual plane to a more earthly one: the "ecstasy" to be found in communion with the divinity came to adopt more corporeal form. The hedonism of classical Persian verse, to this day a strong influence among both Turkic and Iranian people in Central Asia, is said to derive from Sufi influence. Various Sufi "orders" devoted to this or that teacher came into being, some of them concerned with aggregating interests of questionable religious content.

Northeast Persia, of which Turkestan oases like Bukhara and Samarkand were culturally an integral part, was one of the two early centers of Sufism (the other being Mecca).⁵⁰ Thus, Sufism, in addition to presenting a nonmaterialistic alternative to Marxism-Leninism today, has particular Central Asian roots. It is perceived by some in the region as very close to their own present concerns through the role attributed to it as an anti-Arabizing, autochthonous force drawing on Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Islam. A critical work on Sufism published in 1978 in Ashkhabad is explicit on this point.⁵¹

In a recent Uzbek short story a contemporary mullah who is a follower of the Sufist Yassawi is portrayed with respect, and a Soviet youth who mocks him is held up to derision.⁵² A nationalistic preoccupation with the native pre-Islamic religious heritage also is to be found in modern literary works published in the Central Asian vernaculars.⁵³

Something of the difficulty faced by promoters of "scientific atheism," even in official circles, is reflected in a recent novel by the Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov entitled *And a Day Is Longer Than an Age*. Much of the significance of this sympathetic treatment of Islam lies in the fact that its author, a well-known establishment figure whose books are read all over the Soviet Union, has been a member of the Communist party since 1959 and is holder of one of the USSR's highest decorations, Hero of Socialist Labor. In Russian alone, magazine and book editions of this latest novel of Aitmatov's have totaled more than three million copies. The work is a sentimentally supportive portrayal of efforts by an elderly Kazakh, Buranny Edigey, who had long been a devoted Soviet worker, to perform a ritual Muslim burial for a deceased friend, in the face of difficulty caused by the fact that his clan's ancestral burying ground was fenced off as part of a Soviet space launching site. When someone objects to his intention to hold a religious service complete with prayer, pointing to the anomaly that the Soviets have

been in power for some sixty years, Buranny Edigey rejoins: "Come on, what's Soviet power got to do with it? People have been praying over the dead from time immemorial. It's a human being that died, not an animal!" At another point in the novel, the hero, setting off on his camel to conduct the religious burial service himself, reflects on the value of prayer:

Thinking it over, Buranny Edigey repeated to himself the half-forgotten prayers to get them in the proper order, to fix more clearly in his memory the sequence of thoughts addressed to God, for only He alone, unknown and invisible, could reconcile in the human consciousness the irreconcilability of the beginning and the end, of life and death. Probably, that was why prayers were composed. After all, you couldn't reach God by yelling, you couldn't just ask Him why He fixed it so people were born and died. Man had lived with that as long as the earth had been there, not accepting, but reconciled. And the prayers had been unchanged since those days, and what was said in them was always the same—to keep man from grumbling in vain, so that he might be comforted. But these words, polished by the thousands of years like gold bars, were the last of the final words that the living were required to pronounce over the dead. Such was the ritual.⁵⁴

How is it conceivable that modern Central Asian intellectuals, products of secular education and indoctrinated almost from birth in an atheistic, materialistic ideology, can make the spiritual and intellectual jump to acceptance of a mystical religious philosophy? Pertinent in that connection is an article written in another Islamic context, that of the Iranian revolution, by an Israeli Arabist. Commenting on the persistence of religious feeling even among the educated classes in Islamic countries, a phenomenon that in his opinion is too often overlooked by Western observers, the author says that, "having reached a stage of social development where religion is conceived more in terms of moral values than in terms of theological precepts, most Western visitors to Islamic countries are led to believe that the educated classes have accepted their own attitude toward religion." This mistake, he writes, "is easily made because many of those educated Muslims speak European languages, dress like Westerners, frequently visit Western countries

and in many cases have had Western educations." And "what seems to baffle many experienced observers is that individuals known to have been quite Westernized revert to fundamentalist belief."⁵⁵

CONCLUSION

Certain apparent similarities have invited comparison between the Russian Orthodox church and Islam in the USSR: the fact that they are the two most populous religions, the relative tolerance that is enjoyed by at least their official exponents, and the disposition of the latter to give public support to the Soviet regime, especially on questions of foreign policy. Yet the comparison breaks down in one key respect: Russian Orthodoxy is identified historically with the interests of the superordinate Great Russians who, if not exactly beneficiaries of the system, may at least be said to be its major building block. Islam, on the other hand, is the symbol of a group whose ethnic interests lie somewhere in the opposite direction. In its role vis-à-vis Moscow, Soviet Islam might more aptly be compared with the Catholic church in Poland than with Russian Orthodoxy.

Pedro Ramet points out elsewhere in this volume that if "national" churches "can buttress tangibly the position of a government, they also can undermine its stability where they advocate the rights of ethnic minorities in multiethnic states." Islam, while not organized like a church, is with its concept of *jihad* (more accurately translated here as "patient struggle" than as "holy war") ideally suited at all social levels to rally the native peoples in resistance to encroachment by a power-wielding non-Muslim presence. Indeed, the relative lack of a formal hierarchical organization in Islam makes it less susceptible to manipulation or eventual extermination, thus adding to the dilemma of the Soviet leadership.

Modernization of the five Central Asian republics, and other changes associated with Soviet rule, have vastly transformed the economic and social landscape. Yet despite new patterns of social stratification, Islam remains for the Muslim nationalities a unifying force that cuts across social barriers, deriving its strength from deep roots in indigenous ethnic values.

In fulfilling different needs and performing different functions, Central Asian Islam assumes today a variety of forms: modern and tradi-

tional, secular and spiritual, rational and mystical. In particular, Islam seems to be evolving so as to adapt to the emergence of a new and more sophisticated Muslim *umma*, one whose members have been trained in Soviet schools and universities but cling stubbornly to ethnic tradition and ancient loyalties.

With little sign that ethnic differences are on the wane, but more that demographic trends indeed may be deepening them, Islam appears to be assured of a continuing vital role in the society, at the levels of both overt and covert adherence. In addition, the region's deepening economic crisis, made all the more serious by the growing needs of a mushrooming Muslim population, and compounded by a water shortage that has begun to have a directly deleterious effect on infant mortality and other aspects of public health, means that *perestroika* can offer little promise for a better life. This adds to the potential of Islam as both a rallying force and a source of solace for its followers.

Part III Eastern Europe

The Luther Revival: Aspects of National *Abgrenzung* and Confessional *Gemeinschaft* in the German Democratic Republic

Dan Beck

In the years surrounding the celebration of the Luther Quincentenary in 1983 a peculiar mixture of both *Abgrenzung* and *Gemeinschaft* has taken root in the relationship between church and state in the German Democratic Republic. While pronouncements by the Socialist Unity party (SED) during the Luther Jubilee pointed to an *Abgrenzung* of national heritage between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the leadership of the Evangelical church in the GDR pursued a policy of *Gemeinschaft*, an attitude of integration and advocacy that has extended beyond its own borders into the FRG. The coexistence of two such contrasting policies of national identification for Christians in the GDR—one stressing historical uniqueness and division, the other a sense of community—reflects the delicate balance that the Honecker regime has created in its relationship to the church. A vital element in this balance has been the SED's use of prominent figures from German history to reinforce its policy of national *Abgrenzung*. Although reaching into the past is not without precedent in Germany,¹ the SED has faced the additional challenge of reconciling resurrected individuals with Marxism, an ideology that had previously damned many of them. Such, indeed, was the case with Martin Luther.

Just as if a pontifical wand were waved over the abused memory of Luther in Marxist historiography, Luther's heritage experienced a gradual redemption from Engels's bourgeois purgatory in the decade or so before the quincentenary. Once derided as "the gravedigger of German freedom," Luther was praised by SED leader Erich Honecker as "one of the greatest sons of the GDR" during the quincentenary.² This ideo-

logical revision has, understandably, posed serious questions for the Christian community within the socialist borders of the GDR. Specifically, the Luther Jubilee served to focus attention on the role religion plays in defining what officially constitutes "national identity" for citizens of the GDR. Although Christians were called upon "for friendly coexistence and mutual understanding" during the nation's formative years under Ulbricht,³ the experience of this time was not as amiable as the invitation. Since the hostile era of Ulbricht, however, the Honecker regime has sought to improve church-state relations, to the point where it wishes to dispel any suggestion that it is antireligion, much less the "Antichrist."⁴

Yet to return the focus to the issue of national identity, just where has the church in socialism found itself amid the SED's professed conversion from antagonism to altruism? What message did Christians in the GDR confront during the Luther Jubilee in regards to their relationship with the state? Should one view this development under Honecker as syncretism or sham?

By using these questions as a framework for inquiry, it will be shown that the SED has engaged in a selective and careful reconstruction of history which envisions the present German socialist nation as the sole recipient of all that is humanistic and progressive from the German past. To the degree that this related to Christians, the Luther Jubilee in 1983 represented a diligent effort by the SED to confirm the church's recognition of the party as the legitimate authority in the GDR, exercising its divine right to govern society, especially in the area of military policy. Since it is to the past that the SED initially returned in its recovery of Martin Luther, so shall the past be the first topic for examination.

RETHINKING HISTORY?

An unavoidable issue in approaching the alchemy of Luther, religion, and national identity in the GDR is the relationship of the two German nations to each other. Since the GDR did not exist—in name, at least—until 1949, the SED's understanding of its place in German history becomes crucial for the historical background against which this interplay of people, ideas, and allegiances must operate. To what degree,

one then asks, is there an East German nation (*Volk*) distinct from the German nation of the FRG?

The answer to this question reveals the evolution of SED policy itself. Since 1952 the SED has been developing an interpretation of German history which attempts to evoke "a patriotic state consciousness" (*Staatsbewusstsein*) from its own citizens. This interpretation is also aimed at convincing inhabitants of the FRG that the GDR, under the direction of the SED, is the only advocate for the German people.⁵

In the initial years of this policy it may have proven sufficient to employ a standard Marxist formula for describing the East German state: "The most progressive class line in German history, which finds expression above all in the history of the German workers' movement, reached its apogee in the history of the GDR."⁶ A clearer vision of a distinct East German identity, however, appeared after the ninth party congress of the SED in 1978. At this point it was announced that with the establishment of the GDR "a new type of nation arose in German history: the socialist German nation. Out of the previous uniformity of a capitalist nation arose two nations of an opposing socio-historical type."⁷ More recently, the chairman of the Council for Historiography in the GDR, E. Diehl, declared that "not until the working class and its Marxist-Leninist Party took over, not until the socialist revolution—the first successful people's revolution in our history—could our people's destiny be resolutely turned for the good forever."⁸

As these quotes demonstrate, the existence of another German state has been a continuing concern for the SED in its effort to establish the GDR as a legitimate state. The task of affirming a distinct national identity for citizens of the GDR would, therefore, require historical evidence to authenticate the evolution of socialism before the actual creation of a socialist, German nation. To accomplish this, the SED has sought to identify those revolutionaries, democrats, humanists, poets, and thinkers in German history who, in their own manner, allegedly yearned for the type of humane society now taking shape in the GDR. The troublesome aspect of the other Germany plays a prominent role in this process. Such was underscored by Diehl in his statements which stressed that the progressive and humanitarian currents in German history bore no relationship to the imperialist German state of the FRG. Lest one be tempted to envision any common bonds between the two

German nations, Diehl subsequently described such a view as nothing more than historical blindness, for these "speculations can make no difference to the permanent existence of the GDR and its role as a reliable bulwark of socialism and peace in Central Europe."⁹

As part of the GDR's thirty-fifth anniversary celebrations in 1984, the official newspaper of the Freie Deutsche Jugend, *Junge Welt*, published a "family tree," listing the names and portraits of 102 distinguished Germans—the "best sons and daughters of the German people."¹⁰ While among this honored family such names as Luther, Johannes Gutenberg, Johann Sebastian Bach, Wolfgang von Goethe, and Immanuel Kant can be found, those names absent provide an insightful glance into the dynamics of shaping a socialist consciousness of history (*Geschichtsbewusstsein*). Though officially rehabilitated, neither Otto von Bismarck nor Friedrich the Great was mentioned in *Junge Welt*. One might at first suggest it is only a matter of political whim that decides the matter of complete acceptance into socialism's heritage. A more cautious response, however, should consider the delicate position in which the SED finds itself. Although the party has, as previously mentioned, taken steps to refute claims of its opposition to religion, many in the church nevertheless assert that the state continues to view religion as "unscientific, false, unprogressive, and condemned to a gradual death."¹¹ Thus, while there are still those in the SED who give some credence to this Marxist tenet, the continued existence of the church in socialism should be considered as a factor in the process of determining who receives complete acceptance into socialism's heritage. Even though this is not necessarily a consideration in every case, the awkward coexistence of church and state played an influential role in the SED's decision to include Luther's legacy in the construction of a national identity. However, the road to incorporating certain elements of Christianity as part and parcel of the GDR's progressive and democratic heritage lies strewn with polemical potholes.

LUTHER AND THE PAST

In assessing the ideological preparations for the Luther Quincentenary in 1983, it is interesting to note that the actual amount of material written by Marx and Engels concerning Luther is relatively small. He

receives the greatest attention in Engels's *The Peasant War in Germany* (1850), which paints an essentially negative view of Luther's role in the rebellion. Within Engels's concept of the "early bourgeois revolution," Luther's primary significance lies in his promotion of the bourgeois state from feudalism, the necessary precursor to socialism. There is, however, no intrinsic worth in Luther's actions. Even when Engels does detect a positive contribution, the reader is not allowed to forget the reformer's true legacy:

Luther had given the plebeian movement a powerful weapon—a translation of the Bible. . . . The peasants had made extensive use of this weapon. . . . Now Luther turned the same weapon against the peasants, . . . extracting from the Bible a veritable hymn to the authorities ordained by God—a feat hardly exceeded by any lackey of absolute monarchy.¹²

In the introduction to Engels's *Dialectics of Nature* (1882), Luther escapes with a short accolade, but only in reference to his stand against the Roman church and his linguistic accomplishment: "Luther not only cleansed the Augean stable of the Church but also that of the German language; he created modern German prose and composed the text and melody of that triumphal hymn which became the Marseillaise of the sixteenth century."¹³ One may confidently say that from Engels's perspective, Luther himself is not considered a progressive figure; his actions contributed but indirectly to the ineluctable march of socialism which was taken up by the peasants and Thomas Müntzer.

This view is reflected by early Marxist historiography of the GDR. In the period just after World War II Luther's writings were linked with the anti-Semitic fascism of Nazi Germany.¹⁴ He received perhaps his harshest judgment at the hands of Alexander Abusch, later minister of culture in the GDR, when he was labeled "the gravedigger of German freedom" and "the biggest intellectual figure of the German counterrevolution."¹⁵ True to Engels's interpretation, Luther is seen as a traitor toward Germany's progressive peasant movement and Müntzer's socialist vision.

It was in the 1960s that one noticed a new stance toward an understanding of Luther. For both the 450th anniversary of the Reformation, celebrated in Eisenach and Wittenberg in October 1967, where "he was

portrayed as a German national hero, a progressive force, a forerunner of socialism, a kind of spiritual godfather of the GDR,"¹⁶ and the 900th anniversary festival of the Wartburg fortress in Eisenach, his refuge for translating the New Testament into German, a less critical interpretation was bestowed upon him. At the latter event Hans Seigewasser, then GDR state secretary for religious affairs, stated that "the historical events connected with this Luther festival belong to the progressive humanist tradition and the revolutionary tradition of the German people."¹⁷ Gerald Götting, secretary general of the Christian Democratic Union in the GDR, took an additional step forward by calling the battles of the Reformation "the greatest mass revolutionary movement of the German people until the Spartacus [Communist] uprising. In the first German workers' and peasants' state we have achieved what the leaders of the Reformation really aimed for."¹⁸

Two events in 1978 played a vital role in laying the basis for a working partnership involving church and state in a joint celebration of Martin Luther. First, the rapprochement in March of that year revealed Honecker's readiness for a relationship with the church that espoused increased interaction and visibility. Second, the appearance of Ingrid Mittenzwei's biography of Bismarck reflected the increasing willingness on the part of the SED to confront controversial figures and their ideas from Germany's past. While these events were undoubtedly meant to serve purposes well beyond the festivities of any one person, the timing could not have been better; on June 13, 1980, the "Luther Committee of the GDR" was formally activated as the official body to oversee the Luther Jubilee. Marxist historian Horst Bartel, a member of this committee, delivered a speech that called for a "deeper investigation of the early burgher revolution."¹⁹ One notes that Bartel was not calling for a shift away from Marxist principles. Rather, he sought to fit Luther "into the complex revolutionary matrix of the sixteenth century" and secure a respectable position for him within a Marxist framework. Erich Honecker, who assumed the post of president of the Martin Luther Committee, further declared that

the enveloping transformations of our times in and of themselves demand party engagement for that which is historically progressive, rational and humanistic. In the battles of his times Martin Luther exerted great influence upon the development of history.

He was one of the most prominent humanists, whose efforts were of value to a more just world.²⁰

This revised, positive appraisal of Luther highlights the broader context of reclaiming the past within the GDR, which also includes "the so-called 'Prussian wave.'" ²¹ However, given the fact that the Luther Jubilee far outshone the celebrations for Karl Marx in the same year, one should not be content to consider Luther as but an example of historical renovation. The following section thus seeks to identify the political purpose behind a revitalized Luther. Just how did the Marxist-Leninist SED hope to tip the delicate balance between church and state in its favor during celebrations honoring a famous Christian theologian and reformer? What, if anything, can one conclude concerning an attempt by the SED to foster a national identity among Christian citizens favorable to objectives of the state?

Addressing the question of Luther's legacy and the two German nations at his quincentenary, Jürgen Moltman, a Protestant theologian residing in the FRG, opined that the GDR "is denazified but not denationalized, and West Germany is denationalized but not denazified."²² Moltman went on to state his belief that the FRG has been stripped of any sense of nationhood while trying to come to terms with its Nazi past. The GDR, on the other hand, having been cleansed from the guilt of war atrocities by disassociating itself from "the mendacious and misanthropic ideology of imperialism" as well as "the fascist Wehrmacht,"²³ hungers for the national identity that remains after its historical purification. While this drive for a national identity in the GDR has taken the heritage of Luther seriously—a man whose theistic writings pose a challenge to the foundational beliefs of a Marxist state—Moltman submitted if he told his students at Tübingen University that Luther was the greatest of all Germans, "they would all laugh." Moltman's comment causes one to speculate that the persistent specter of Nazism in the FRG has enabled the GDR to seize the initiative in asserting a cultural lock on a selective, sanitized German past. In applying this idea to Christians and national identity in the GDR, one objective of the SED would include disentangling Martin Luther from the sins of Nazism in order to utilize that which could be interpreted as contributing to the progressive, humanistic evolution towards socialism.

LUTHER AND MARX: A SHARED NATIONAL IDENTITY?

In his address to the Conference of the "Christian Circles" in Halle, Gerald Götting revealed that the project for creating a secular Luther as a bridge between Marxist ideology and church doctrine—a bridge that might foster an East German national identity—required the task of "critically separating and overcoming" the vagaries of Luther to affirm his "vital place in the progressive traditions of German history."²⁴ In order to become a positive addition to the desired national identity, the SED's image of Luther had to be sufficiently historical to achieve a sense of legitimacy among the Christian population. This authentication would in turn serve as a basis from which the SED could promote specific policy concerns, such as the role of the military. The sustained effort exerted by party officials and scholars attests to the importance assigned by the government to this issue. The task now at hand is to expose the manner and words used in the attempt to integrate Martin Luther into a socialist identity for Christians in the GDR.

THE LUTHER JUBILEE

The creation of a "secular Luther"²⁵ required first and foremost historical legitimacy. The Honecker regime learned a lesson from the 1967 fiasco, when church representatives withdrew their support from celebrations for the 450th anniversary of the Reformation due to the SED's hostile attitude toward church-sponsored activities.²⁶ The absence of church leadership figured as a significant blow to this attempt by the SED to selectively incorporate church history into the socialist legacy of the GDR. In other words, the official presentation had failed in the act of "critically separating" Luther the theologian from Luther the contributor to socialism's evolution without losing the participation of the church. The Luther Jubilee in 1983, however, witnessed a concerted effort to address both parts of the man, thereby seeking a total, legitimate Luther indelibly etched in the GDR's history. Part of this process involved a Marxist renovation of Christian terminology. In a speech by Kurt Novak, theologian and church historian at Karl Marx University, one discovers that

Luther's experience of salvation gains new importance for us. The fate of the human race is promised a good ending because of God's acts of salvation. It is not possible to transfer in a naive fashion this experience of faith to the process of history. But impulses of encouragement that come from this experience, the hope that it gives and the challenge that it evokes point the way to the future.²⁷

Without implicitly rejecting the authenticity of Luther's fideism, Novak gently nudges the importance of salvation and the hope it engenders into the materialist's domain, as "impulses of encouragement" direct energies and attitudes toward a blessed Marxian hope on earth.

Adolf Laube, a member of the GDR Academy of Science's Central Institute for History, performed a similar manipulation by adapting Luther's understanding of priestly intercession to the vocabulary of revolution: "Luther . . . in order to legitimize the social forces calling for change, challenged the necessity of the church institution per se as a mediator between God and man. This was the decisive impulse which . . . made it possible to change this movement into a broad popular uprising."²⁸ Laube conveniently placed the cart before the horse in identifying another socialist "impulse" from Luther's theological contribution to the Reformation. While one may well argue that Luther's call for spiritual freedom from the Roman church had an impact on the peasants' growing desire for social freedom,²⁹ it is quite another matter to transform Luther's belief in the priesthood of the believer—as Laube has done—into a scheme designed to justify the liberation of the masses.

Beyond the adaptation of specific terms, one also notices the appearance of a subjective and objective Luther as a further method for gaining historical legitimacy—a perspective on Luther that separates his personal being from his alleged significance for socialism.³⁰ With this technique Luther the man remains as one person, while the legacy inherited from him is divided by a factor of socialist acceptability. However, before such a division could be instituted with any real expectation of its acceptance by the citizenry of the GDR, the government realized the necessity of dealing frankly with Luther in a Christian context. Among the scholarly works published in the GDR for the Luther Jubilee, Gerhard Brendler's contribution served as an

example of acknowledging and integrating, rather than dismissing, the reality of Luther's spiritual crises as a necessary factor in understanding his life.³¹ Further evidence of the SED's effort to present an impartial encounter with Luther was seen during a five-part, seven-and-one-half-hour television series covering Luther's early years (1517-27) in which "Luther's theology as the driving force in his life is presented more clearly than has previously been the practice in the GDR."³² No ideological mishap, the film intended to narrow the gap between revolutionary and reformer by emphasizing the latter. Indeed, with the new interpretation of Luther one discovers that "the writings of Martin Luther show that socioeconomic reform ideas as well as political concepts belong to the essential character of the Reformation and cannot be separated artificially from religious-theological concepts."³³ By acknowledging the "religious-theological" nature of both the Reformation and Luther, party historians confronted the political implications of this movement. However, the SED has attempted an application of this differentiation of forces within the Reformation itself to the intent and effect of Luther's writings alone. Thus, even if one maintained an orthodox interpretation of Luther's works as a Christian reformer (the subjective intent) it would not be accurate to "artificially" separate this from the "socioeconomic reform ideas" (the objective result) that subsequently transpired. Although this argument may not in and of itself appear biased, in actuality only the objective results vis-à-vis socialism's progression found praise. The Peasant Wars are a prime example. No attempt is made to forgive Luther's support of the princes against the progressive peasant movement, for Luther could not have been conscious of the real significance of the resistance. Nevertheless, "his attacks on the Roman church challenged the question of power, the central question of any revolution."³⁴ Luther's antisocialist stance can be overlooked as but a subjective reaction of his medieval understanding of the world. The objective result of his actions during the time of the Peasant Wars was to shake the centralized authority of the Roman church—a revolutionary advancement that pointed toward socialism's inevitability from the perspective of current Marxist historiography in the GDR.

In viewing this division of Luther one is uncomfortably compelled to admire the ingenuity of SED theoreticians. Whereas Luther's life will undoubtedly continue to generate controversy as attempts are made

to reconcile his diversity amid his genius, the SED's interpretation of Luther has sought, in oversimplified terms, to separate the good from the bad without dismissing the individual as a whole. By this means the state was able to share a podium with the church and partake in discussions on Luther with a greater degree of legitimacy than previously possible. While not all the celebrations included state participation (a matter considered in subsequent discussion), the church-state balance that did emerge created an opportunity for Christians in East Germany to consider Luther as a legitimate contributor to the progression of a social system in which they now exist. Thus, the process of establishing one's identity as a Christian in the GDR, a Christian in socialism, need not exclude identifying with a great church reformer such as Luther. From this basis of historical legitimacy (both for Luther as a contributor to the evolution of the socialism and, ultimately, the SED's role as the appointed authority for all citizens under its domain), a Christian should confidently identify with the GDR as his or her own nation. Indeed, as a nation founded upon the objective achievements of Germans throughout history whose subjective individualities manifested a markedly different nature, the GDR acknowledges the value of a Christian worldview as a vital component of modern Germany's maturing socialist society.³⁵

One of the most significant issues coinciding with the Luther Jubilee was the question of peace in the GDR. The disagreement among church and party officials over how "peace" is to be understood reveals the different results *Abgrenzung* and *Gemeinschaft* can have on the formation of a national identity. The first question, then, is how did the state interpret Luther during the Jubilee Year on the question of peace?

As a Soviet ally, the GDR leadership opposes any escalation in NATO forces and supports those initiatives that share a similar commitment to a deescalation of nuclear weapons. The official rehabilitation of Luther reflected this reasoning with timely pronouncements that appealed to a modern application of the reformer's thought. Recalling Luther's fresh appraisal of the importance each individual has in contributing to the cumulative good of the church, Kurt Novak declared: "In our time the question about the concept of man has received a new impetus of elementary importance. . . . The threat of a European or global holocaust does not simply imply the fears and hopes of the individual. Individual destiny cannot escape into imaginary niches of

history."³⁶ Luther's belief in the responsibility of the individual Christian to the corporate good of a church body is used to convince citizens that a sense of individualism in one's personal, spiritual life does not relieve her or him from involvement in the concerns of real existing socialism. No eschatological hope should be used to justify an escape from the present threat of nuclear escalation; Luther's concept of an individual's commitment to the betterment of the whole opposes such.

An additional opportunity for the SED to utilize Christians in the peaceful promotion of socialism was found in Luther's work ethic (*Berufsethik*) and his emphasis on caring for the poor. While the Evangelical church has demonstrated a continuing commitment to providing medical care for GDR citizens,³⁷ the government has further attempted to use attributes often associated with Luther's work ethic for broadening the historical consciousness identified with the GDR.³⁸

For the Honecker regime, however, the pursuit of selective peace programs became increasingly difficult. The official peace initiative vis-à-vis nuclear weapons became unavoidably entangled with an indigenous peace movement that opposed the military policies of the SED, particularly the growing commitment by the party to the militarization of society.³⁹ While the Evangelical church leadership has avoided public solidarity with this movement, Ronald Asmus has noted that "the critical role the [Evangelical] Church as an institution has played in fostering the emergence of the unofficial peace movement cannot be underestimated."⁴⁰ This role carries an additional implication for the question of national identity and *Gemeinschaft* for Christians in Germany. In recognition of the war guilt that all German Christians share from their silence during the Nazi terror, Manfred Stolpe, head of the Berlin Consistory of the Evangelical church, has urged a joint, inter-German peace effort aimed at confronting questions that in the past have been divisive for German Protestants. By using "a special sense of community" of the German Protestant churches, Stolpe hoped that Christians would educate their fellow citizens on the need to avoid an arms race, risk trust instead of armed security and limit their political support to those leaders who share the church's commitment to peace.⁴¹ This desire on the part of the church in the GDR to speak on matters involving a shared German identity has resulted in a spirit of *Gemeinschaft* which has gained the acceptance of the SED,⁴² even

though this action may prove counterproductive for the party's efforts to attain a separate national identity for Christian citizens in the GDR.

In spite of the inter-German initiative that has come from church leaders in the GDR for peace, the Luther Jubilee provided the SED with opportunities to seek the support of Christians for its own peace policy. The state sought to present itself as an authority given the divine right to defend itself with military force. In the words of Gerald Götting, "Referring to Romans 13 [Luther] states: 'Worldly authorities have been established by God not to destroy peace and start war but to manage peace and avoid war.' . . . Luther thus has a very realistic view of the contrasting realities of this world—the contrast between the forces protecting peace and the forces that for questionable reasons are willing to start a war."⁴³ By drawing directly from Luther's pen, Götting is able to succinctly define one's duty to the state's political objectives: "Socialist foreign and military policy is therefore essentially peace policy. Christian citizens of the GDR are in agreement with it and support it."⁴⁴

The above references serve to make at least two critical points for the Christian in a socialist society: the GDR is a state with a distinct political system that is distinguished by its appeal for peace; and, as a "worldly authority," the SED has the divine right to loyalty from its citizens. By combining the concerns of legitimacy and authority, the regime has apparently sought to quell matters of conscience. Critical dissent by the unofficial peace movement strikes at the heart of Luther's own belief in the subjection of a Christian to those who have political authority in society.

In the wake of the SED's preparation and direction of the Luther Quincentenary as one vital part of the GDR's reclamation of the past, a movement identified in this interpretation as the attempt by the state to direct the attitudes of Christians toward identification with and loyalty to their government as the legitimate heir of a progressive, humanitarian Luther, it is necessary to examine the church's response during the jubilee. Did a genuine church-state reconciliation take place in the manner desired by the SED?

While the SED did gain the church's participation in its own official ceremonies, the ability of the party to co-opt Luther in achieving a socialist, national identity for its Christian citizens is in doubt. The

preceding pages have shown that the Luther year displayed greater designs than a mere attempt to placate Christians in the GDR and as such must be judged by a more piercing light.

Following Erich Honecker's speech at the official dedication of the Luther Committee, Evangelical Bishop Werner Leich, one of the church members of the official committee, recalled that Martin Luther "wanted to confess nobody but the Lord Jesus Christ alone."⁴⁵ He went on to state that the church in the GDR "will not laud Martin Luther as a great human being, but pay tribute to his instruction . . . the joyful message of Jesus Christ."⁴⁶ The motto chosen by the Evangelical church for its celebrations of Luther at the *Kirchentage* (the church congresses—seven separate meetings in different cities representing the various regions of the GDR) was Luther's own: "Above all, fear, love, and trust God." When literature from the *Kirchentage* is examined, one does not find the same ideological intrusion upon Christian doctrine which was evident in party pronouncements. Rather, there was a commitment to Luther the theologian, exploring issues such as "Faith as a basis of our life; Confession and pastoral affairs; the renewal of the Church, and the consequences of such renewal."⁴⁷ A similar sense of commitment seeking a better understanding of the situation facing the church in socialism could also be detected in questions used to generate group discussion.⁴⁸

This general concern for awareness among Christians was exhibited as an "increased self-confidence of the GDR churches" at the Potsdam Union Synod of September 1983.⁴⁹ At this gathering Bishop Johannes Hempel reflected a spirit of frustration by denouncing "the growing disappointment and embitterment" in the country. Bishop Hempel not only cited persistent discrimination against Christians, but included in his concerns "the middle and lower cadre" who have expressed dismay over "the wasting away of creative potential in our society."⁵⁰ This vision of the church as a voice for those experiencing disenfranchisement—members of the social classes for which Marxism theoretically brings a bright message of hope—poses a challenge to the SED in its role as caretaker of the people. While this extension of the church's prophetic mission is not without its potential costs,⁵¹ it does indicate an attitude wary of an overly comfortable ideological partnership with the state. Indeed, as Arvan Gordon surmised after the Luther Jubilee: "The term 'the Church in Socialism' involves constant pitfalls. The

experience of 1983 underlines the fact that the Protestant leaders can never relax."⁵²

Such pitfalls apparently continue to remain in the minds of church leaders. In February 1986 the retired Lutheran Bishop Albrecht Schönherr reflected upon the Church's initial meetings with the Honecker regime and the moral imperatives of the Barmen Declaration which preceded them by forty-five years and concluded that

phrases such as "Church in socialism" and satisfactory talks and meetings like the one of 6 March 1978 cannot conceal the fact that state and Church will always be subject to tensions. . . . [The Church] must "preach the free mercy of God to all the people" . . . it must be prepared to accept that it is going to be prevented from using the word and the work of its Lord in the service of any high-handedly chosen desires, goals and plans [Barmen 6].⁵³

That the Barmen Theological Declaration, a document embedded in a period of German history which supposedly has no moral connection with socialism, would be summoned to the consciousness of Christians in the GDR today sounds a cautionary note to those in the church who might consider their national identity to be distinct from the FRG.

In an interview in the spring of 1987 Bishop Gottfried Forck of the Evangelical church in Berlin-Brandenburg (East) responded to a question concerning the relationship between "the anti-clerical socialist government" and the church in this manner: "I believe the Church stands by the witness of the New Testament, that it should follow in the steps of Christ. Christ said: If they persecute me, they will also persecute you. It is therefore normal for the Church to be under pressure."⁵⁴ Forck's reflection on life in the church at its inception points to Luther's own understanding of this matter. For the Christian in the GDR, Forck's answer is that the church recognizes socialism as God's appointed place "where we as Christians must persevere," but without allowing this acceptance to be understood as "a meaningless affirmation of socialism."

History, however, can be as one wishes to perceive it. A second glance at the genesis of the church reveals a different emphasis: "Recalling the 'communities of fighting spirit' of early Christianity can justify 'active propaganda, incessant battle against the enemy without and within, proud confession of the evolutionary viewpoint before pagan judges,

a martyr's death of certain victory.'"⁵⁵ When juxtaposed with Forck's comments, these words of Engels—quoted in an East German article promoting the cooperation of communists and Christians—compel one to reaffirm the necessity of distinguishing and defining the components in any system of belief that contribute to its significance or distinctiveness. Just such a recognition merits even greater attention when two worldviews traditionally at odds with one another are seen in a new, conciliatory light.

The examination of the Luther Quincentenary contained in these pages has sought to shade this light and probe its source. In the case of the Luther Jubilee this chapter has focused on the reasons for the SED's selective emphasis and, to a degree, outright distortion of Luther's words and intent. The Honecker regime hoped to manufacture and adapt the figure of Luther in such a way as to contribute to its policy of national *Abgrenzung*, thereby addressing the SED's concern for both its own legitimacy and its military policy in the eyes of the church. The church's response to this was one of limited cooperation with the state, a partnership which nevertheless rejected the concept of a historical or ideological identification with socialism on the basis of revised interpretations of Luther and Christianity. The church neither demonstrated a willingness to acquiesce to the state's integration of Luther into a distinct socialist heritage nor abandoned its support for a peace movement that targeted its own nation as well as the FRG—indications of its rejection of a unique East German identity. Furthermore, statements made by leaders of the East German church at the Frankfurter Kirchentag in 1987 denounced the SED's use of *Abgrenzung* to hamper inter-German peace efforts. As East Berlin theologian Joachim Garstecki noted, "Abgrenzung is a political anachronism. . . . The conciliatory process envisions the responsibility of Christians to build a dialogue of trust regardless of borders; the renunciation of the principle and practice of *Abgrenzung*; the strengthening of an ecumenical consciousness which promotes the community [*Gemeinschaft*] of people above class, race, ideology and differences in historical development."⁵⁶

In the wake of the church-state partnership that did occur for the Luther Jubilee, one discovers what may be the crucial concern in the relationship between the church and the regime in the GDR: the degree to which Christians will be willing to actively participate in socialism's development while recognizing and asserting the quiddity of

Christian *Gemeinschaft* vis-à-vis Marxist *Abgrenzung*. With the SED's desire for "a political integration of Church and state" clearly evident, the 1986 pastoral letter of the Catholic bishops in the GDR clarified this point, stating: "It is, therefore, understandable that the key question at this time concerning the place of Catholic and Evangelical Christians in society does not seem to be one of *Weltanschauung*. Rather, it concerns the readiness of Christians to build up and defend the state and socialist society under the direction of the SED."⁵⁷ Thus, one of the many tasks of the church in the GDR will be deciding its degree of involvement in the construction of socialism without relinquishing an active role in this period of *Heilsgeschichte*—the church as a witness for Christ, treading the narrow road of coexistence with, but not in conformity to, a socialist state.

From the state's perspective the SED faces its own set of challenges. Not only must it contend with the church as, in Bishop Forck's words, an independent "authority of faith" (*Vertraueninstanz*); it must also face this "authority" on issues that have shown no sign of abating: education and parental authority in matters of religious training; military service; and a commitment to human rights for all of society.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the Honecker regime may well confront unsettling ideological questions of its own making; within the "complex GDR conception of history," notes a party historian, there exists a "conceptual weakness in the historical picture of the origin and growth of the GDR."⁵⁹

Whether or not historiography ever becomes a troublesome topic for the SED remains to be seen. Perhaps the state will find a greater ideological kinship and comfort in extolling the virtues of Thomas Müntzer during the upcoming festivities planned for his quincentenary than it has found in contending with the legacy of Martin Luther. But there is, perhaps, a warning from the past for the SED's toiling in history. In his work on the Luther Jubilee of 1883, West German church historian Hans Düfel concluded that the festivities of that year reflected the influence of the Enlightenment which tended to emphasize the secondary themes of Luther's impact during the Reformation. The final paragraph is most instructive:

Reinhold Schneider wrote in an essay on Pope Alexander VI: "The Reformation unfolded, at least in Germany, not due to moral indignation, but due to a religious emergency—the fear of God." Every

endeavor with the Reformation and with the person of Luther has to commence from this point; should it not do so, it fails in its task. This genuinely religious criterion is and remains the standard by which all past and future Reformation and Luther festivals are to be judged.⁶⁰

Like the church, the Honecker regime has its own balance to maintain. Should the SED fail to apply genuine religious criteria in its relationship with the church, especially as the party strives to gain legitimacy for itself and the acceptance of the GDR as "a spiritual, political, and ecclesiastical homeland" for Christians,⁶¹ the SED may unwittingly contribute to an unintended *Abgrenzung* within its own borders.

Church and Nationality in Postwar Poland

Vincent C. Chrypinski

For the majority of Poles, Catholicism has become the core of their national identity. The convergence of religious and national consciousness nursed both Catholicism and nationalism, and created for both advantageous conditions for a viable existence. Over centuries past, Catholicism became a national necessity in Poland and fidelity to the church became synonymous with faithfulness to the nation.

The communists, who acquired rule over Poland after World War II, perceived neither the nature of Polish Catholicism nor its peculiar relationship to Polish nationalism. Motivated by atheism and monistic ambitions, they opened an offensive against religion and the Catholic church in the belief that administrative measures would provide a final push toward an ultimate destruction of the "remnants of capitalism." To their great disappointment, these "relics of the past" not only survived but actually became stronger and have come to enjoy greater moral authority than ever before.

This development was associated with the continuation by the church of close bonds with the people and by its great concern for Polish national aspirations. Among the latter, three were, in my opinion, of special significance: (1) the integration of the western territories; (2) the preservation of Polish national culture; and (3) the struggle for the freedom of people.

THE CHURCH AND THE "RECOVERED TERRITORIES"

Among the multitude of formidable tasks facing the Poles after World War II, none was more inspired by a sense of historical mission than

the integration of formerly German provinces assigned to Poland by the victorious Allied powers. When, in 1945, Poland took over these lands, dubbed "Recovered Territories," they presented a picture of utter destruction and chaos. Immense human and material losses, caused by the ferocity of the war, were aggravated by the arbitrary behavior of military commanders and their troops, as well as by the inability of Polish officials to get control of a fluid and stressful situation. The expulsion of German inhabitants, ordered at Potsdam, created additional problems and tensions. To make matters worse, the devastated but still opulent lands became an object of often senseless "revindication" by Soviet authorities and of ordinary plundering by looters from central Poland.

But this was not all. Before the seething cauldron began to simmer down, a massive migration of Poles, expelled from the eastern borderlands taken over by the Soviet Union, streamed into the western territories. They were brought by trains, with the meager remnants of their personal belongings, unloaded at railroad stations determined by the Polish Repatriation Office, and sent to villages and towns that often were destroyed or still occupied by Germans. In addition to this forced migration, there also came voluntary Polish returnees from other European countries, especially from France, Belgium, West Germany, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Finally, there was also a significant influx of settlers from the overpopulated villages of central Poland, augmented by thousands of returning prisoners of war, inmates of concentration and labor camps, and soldiers released from the Polish army in exile.¹

In these circumstances it was only natural that a great many of the newcomers, as well as the old inhabitants, suffered extreme poverty and faced the specter of famine. Food, medicine, and clothing were all in short supply, along with many other items of vital importance. Alcoholism, disease, and licentiousness spread among the people, causing irreparable harm. All these matters combined confronted the people with the problem of sheer physical survival.

In this grim situation the church took the initiative and started manifold charitable activities, covering basically two broad areas. The first involved not only the provision of food, clothing, and shelter, but also the aiding of people in the reactivation of farms, crafts, and small industrial enterprises. The second area involved the provision of health services and the organization of custodial and educational institutions.

In order to handle the demanding job properly, the episcopate created in 1945 a special national organization called Caritas. Its work, supervised by an episcopal commission, was carried out through diocesan and parish branches that extended to all corners of the country. In the recovered territories Caritas developed very rapidly and, in spite of many difficulties, was able to meet the basic needs of the indigent population.

The statistics, though not giving a complete picture, are impressive.² For instance, by providing food, clothes, and pocket money, Caritas took care of 35,000 people in the Opole Apostolic Administration, 75,000 in Wrocław, and 87,000 in Gorzów. Without this assistance, thousands certainly would have perished. Field kitchens, orphanages, shelters for the aged, outpatient clinics, nurseries, sewing workrooms, homes for unwed mothers, boarding schools, summer camps, clubrooms, travelers' aid stations, etc., were operated by Caritas in the recovered territories with the help of thousands of volunteers, most of them priests and nuns.

All these activities were, in the early period, financed exclusively from perpetual collections conducted throughout Poland and from assistance by the UN Relief Administration and other charitable organizations throughout the world. Much help came from the United States where Americans of Polish descent played a leading role in organizing the Catholic League and the Polish Relief Council.

The church's contributions to the welfare of the recovered territories were not limited to the material necessities of life but extended also to an area whose dimensions escape full statistical measurement: social relationships.³ Each group coming to the recovered territories, as well as the autochthons, represented a specific set of characteristics, a sub-culture acquired during years of habitation in a particular cultural milieu. As might be expected, their mingling in the newly obtained lands resulted, at first, in a number of tensions and confrontations detrimental to the cohesion of the community and to joint efforts for economic recovery. That the explosive situation did not end in catastrophe and that gradually an organic unity was created out of this kaleidoscopic admixture was due, to a great extent, to the efforts of the church. A speedy re-creation of the network of parishes led to the formation of parochial communities. The building and strengthening of human interrelations followed. They were facilitated greatly by the fact that

a great majority of the newcomers professed the Catholic faith or at least observed Catholic customs and traditions. The churches provided recurrent opportunities for peaceful meetings and for the discovery of common virtues. This, in turn, led to other contacts and to closer co-operation in other fields. The common religion induced people to work for the common good.

By preaching spiritual and humanist values, the church greatly accelerated the dynamics of this development. At the same time, by using the Polish language, by offering behavioral models taken from Polish history, by presenting the most attractive features of Polish culture, and above all by stressing the strong links of Poland and Catholicism with these lands, the church laid solid foundations not only for the social unification of the people residing in the recovered territories but also created a deep sense of identification with the entire Polish nation.

This influence was of special significance in regard to the autochthonous population, especially in the Opole region where it numbered around 800,000. This people, though exposed to intensive Germanization, preserved a consciousness of their Polish origin and of the Polish cultural heritage. And, of course, they remained faithful to the Catholic religion. Yet their way of life was influenced greatly by German prototypes that, though mostly beneficial, were different from the Polish. Consequently, the autochthonous group was set aside from the rest of the population, especially from those who came from the eastern provinces long exposed to Russian models of behavior. Luckily, the church had at its disposal in the Opole region a team of about four hundred priests who had shared the years of German occupation with their congregations and who had remained with them during the war. Thanks to their posture of equanimity toward all groups, the antagonism gradually subsided. Speaking in March 1963, the late Cardinal Kominek, himself a native of an Opole village, could point out that the situation at that time was much calmer and could claim that his people excelled not only in religious practice but also in meeting the obligations of good citizenship.⁴

Such a description does not, however, tell the complete story. Another element, equally important, also must be mentioned here. The Potsdam decision, which had assigned the formerly German provinces to Polish administration, created a vague political situation to be finalized by a pending peace settlement. Quite naturally, this circumstance

produced a feeling of impermanence and insecurity, especially among the newcomers to the recovered territories. Propaganda conducted in the British, French, and American zones of occupation of Germany, by refugees and expellees from the East, against the Potsdam decision, added fuel to the uncertainty.

The dismal situation was aggravated even more by the stand of the Vatican, which consistently refused to adjust ecclesiastical administrative borders in the recovered territories to correspond with the new Polish borders, to change the anomalous church structure,⁵ or to appoint regular residential bishops. As late as 1970, *Annuario Pontificio* listed "Breslavia, Breslau, Wrocław" metropolis together with German dioceses and enumerated Polish church administrators as acting "*ad nutum S. Sedis*" (by the grace of the Holy See). While the position of the Holy See could be explained by the well-established practice of waiting until the conclusion of a peace treaty before redrawing diocesan boundaries in territories transferred as a result of war, the ensuing delay threatened to have a very adverse impact on the process of integrating the recovered territories into the rest of the country.

However, the Polish bishops, and especially the primate, August Cardinal Hlond, were convinced that the Potsdam award was final and that the integration of the recovered territories had to proceed without delay. The cardinal hoped that the Holy See would establish a normal church organization in these lands within two or three years.⁶ Acting in this spirit and vested by the pope with the power to set up a provisional administration in the five newly acquired western districts, Cardinal Hlond appointed apostolic administrators for these areas in August 1945, aligning jurisdictional borders generally with the new administrative divisions of Poland. Thus, Rev. Karol Milik received jurisdiction in that part of the Wrocław archdiocese that at the time belonged to the Lower Silesian province; Rev. Bolesław Kominek, Upper Silesia with the seat in Opole; Rev. Edmund Nowicki, the northern part that belonged to the Poznań province, prelacy "nullius," and those portions of the Berlin diocese that were now within Polish borders; Rev. Andrzej Wronka, Gdańsk diocese; and Rev. Teodor Bensch, Warmia diocese (within Polish borders), with the seat in Olsztyn.⁷ The nominating decrees were issued by Cardinal Hlond on the basis of a special authorization of the Holy See dated July 8, 1945, and received by him personally while in Rome on the way back to Poland after the

long wartime exile. Each nominee assumed the rights and obligations of a residential bishop.

The new apostolic administrators followed the cardinal's admonitions, and during September 1945 all of them managed to find suitable locations for themselves and their staffs and to arrange solemn ingress ceremonies attended by public officials, hundreds of priests and nuns, and many thousands of faithful. Hlond gave the new administrators complete personal and institutional support, and they became full-fledged members of the Polish episcopate. Faced with a great shortage of priests, the apostolic administrators also received Hlond's assistance in recruiting augmentees from the monastic orders.

The Polish church viewed the taking up of the responsibility for the Oder-Neisse regions as a patriotic calling. While the Vatican allowed the bishopric of Gdansk to be occupied by a German until 1964, and refused to recognize the permanence of existing clerical administration in Poland's western and northern provinces until June 28, 1972, the Polish church hierarchy adopted, early on, a defiant posture vis-à-vis the Holy See and avidly defended Poland's claim to the territories.⁸

THE DEFENSE OF NATIONAL CULTURE

Polish culture was formed under the great influence of the Roman Catholic church. Consequently, it acquired a Christian character and became an element of Western civilization. While the impact of the church was especially strong during the Middle Ages and most particularly among the peasants, it extended to all periods of Polish history and to all social groups. The church's unique leadership role was visibly manifested in 1451, when the primate of Poland acquired the right to crown the Polish kings.⁹ Later, when the partitions carried out by Austria, Prussia, and Russia (1772, 1793, and 1795) removed Poland from the map, the Catholic church

was one of the links which maintained the sense of nationhood across dividing frontiers. In the part of Poland under Russian rule, religious differences between Orthodox Russians and Roman Catholic Poles helped to shield the national identity against Russification. After the Polish insurrection of 1863 in particular, the Russian government attempted to strike back at the Poles through

their church, by resorting to curtailment of religious instruction in schools, the reduction of enrollments in Catholic seminaries, and the enlistment of priests to the government's side.¹⁰

The church penetrated national life in both cultural and social spheres. Polish religiosity blended with traditional Polish culture and customs. Polish Catholicism was instrumental in inspiring Polish literature and art, especially during the period of the partitions, and the entire national ethos.

To the ruling communists this situation was intolerable, and therefore they decided to deal with the problem by eliminating from school curricula and from publications all inconvenient items, especially in the fields of history and literature. By blotting out the past, the communists hoped to destroy the historical continuity of Polish culture and thus clear the ground for an easier acceptance of socialist reality. They expected that by imposing the highly rigid framework of state monopoly on education and publishing, and by exercising restrictive censorship, they would be able to undermine the influence of religion and nationalism, the twin forces whose unity gave the Polish nation a very unique ability to resist foreign intrusion.

The communists' attempts to falsify Polish history and pillage Polish literature met with strong resistance. The most pronounced subject of controversy was the question of the interpretation of national history. While Marxists saw in the Polish past only a dimension of the international class struggle, their opponents insisted on the recognition of the pivotal role played by individuals in history and on the affirmation of Poland's glorious past. In the forefront of the struggle against Marxist attempts to subvert history was the church, which openly and courageously fought for the nation's right to know its true and complete past and to draw from its entire cultural heritage, "unpurified" by communist censors. The position of the church was expressed in several letters of the episcopate, in numerous pastoral messages and sermons of Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński (Hlond's successor), and in official remonstrations presented to the government. Their contents clearly indicated that the defense of national culture and of its Christian character was considered a matter of utmost importance by Poland's bishops.¹¹

As might be expected, special attention was paid by the episcopate to the upbringing of Polish youth. A pastoral letter issued on April

15, 1948, warned young people of the official educational approach, that insisted that Polish history be viewed through materialistic lenses. It reminded them of the inadequacy of evaluating the deeds of their Christian forefathers exclusively in terms of class interests. Finally, the epistle expressed the conviction that the young Polish generation "will live and act for the good of its Nation, state and Church in the Catholic spirit of our past."¹²

The same concern moved the episcopate to intervene when, in 1973, the authorities were preparing a new educational reform. The bishops, unhappy with several questionable features of the project, designed to paralyze catechistic action and to circumscribe greatly parental influence over their children, debated the issue at every plenary session of the Bishops' Conference, presented their comments to the government, and sent memoranda to the Council of Ministers and to the *Sejm* (Parliament). Not finding a positive response to their objections, they finally brought the problem to the attention of the general public in three pastoral letters on May 5, June 17, and September 14, 1973.¹³ While these documents concentrated on the issue of comprehensive community schools and all-day classes, they also included vigorous protests against atheist indoctrination and school curricula that completely omit the role of the church in Polish history and culture.

The party's distortion of Polish history and culture was strongly attacked by Cardinal Wyszyński in a letter of June 10, 1978, to Kazimierz Kakol, chief of the Office for Religious Affairs. The primate not only condemned the perniciousness of dialectical materialism as a method of interpreting the Polish past but also resolutely defended the activities of individuals and groups, such as the "flying university," that tried to correct the deplorable situation by private initiatives.¹⁴

A special chapter in the church's struggle on behalf of national culture was written by the episcopate acting in defense of the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL). This institution, the only one of its kind in the Soviet sphere of influence, was founded by private initiative in 1918. Closed by the Germans on November 17, 1939, KUL was reopened in 1944. Its activities were, however, threatened constantly by the communist authorities, who attempted to undermine the university's academic freedom and curtail its work. Governmental intrusions came in a variety of forms. The authorities interfered with the elections of rectors (in 1951 and 1965), imposed limits on the admission of students

(1952 and 1960), ordered the liquidation of the School of Law and Socio-economic Sciences (1952), prohibited the admission of students to the first year of English, German, and Romance Philology (1963), dictated the transfer of senior classes to other universities (1963), and suspended the right to lecture of several well-known professors, including Rev. J. Pastuszka, C. Strzeszewski, and I. Czuma. In addition to these difficulties, the government tried to suffocate the university by refusing to allow the construction of additional facilities, ignoring the school's financial problems, and imposing heavy taxes.¹⁵

The episcopate never abandoned the assailed university and through unyielding resistance¹⁶ was able to ensure its survival. An important aspect of the struggle was the bishops' ability to organize massive public support, moral as well as material, for the school. Five times a year, during all masses in all Polish churches, collections were taken up for the upkeep of KUL. The results were overwhelming, and each year millions of zlotys were transferred from parishes to the university, covering about two-thirds of the expense of running the institution.¹⁷

While defensive activities occupied the constant attention of the bishops and other clergymen, they were able to muster enough initiative and ingenuity to fill, at least in part, the gap created by the ruling communists toward national history and culture. Not surprisingly, the special concern of the episcopate was to remind the people of the role the church played in the Polish past. Thus, the church solemnly celebrated the millennium of Poland's Christianity in 1966, openly referred to Poland as the "Bulwark of Christianity and Western Culture," emphatically recalled the vows of King Jan Kazimierz, who, in Polish Lwów, had pledged the nation to the care of the Mother of God, pointedly commemorated St. Stanisław, the patron saint of Poland, and Paweł Włodkowic, who had opposed the use of the sword in ideological conversion. The church proudly recapitulated its contributions to the growth of Polish science and education (e.g., on the five hundredth anniversary of Mikolaj Kopernik and Jan Kanty, both in 1973), and stressed the sacrifices of many priests in the struggles for national independence.

With equal devotion, the church commemorated nonreligious events of Polish history and saluted lay personalities who had made important contributions to the national life. Of special significance were commemorations of the rebirth of the Polish state in 1918, anniversaries

of the Polish victory in the war against the Bolsheviks in 1920, observances of the deaths of interwar leaders such as Pilsudski, Dmowski, and Witos, commemorative plaques for them in the Warsaw cathedral, and the expressed readiness to place the funeral urn of General Sikorski in the vaults of the Wawel cathedral next to the royal tombs.¹⁸ Such acts not only promoted knowledge of the nation's history but also contributed to the national ethos. The Poles, made aware of their heroic past, regained their sense of self-esteem.¹⁹

In attempting to describe the church's efforts on behalf of national culture, one should not forget the essential contribution in the form of solid humanistic education provided for seminarians in the diocesan seminaries.²⁰ During their early years of study, the candidates for the priesthood acquire substantial familiarity with Polish history and literature.

There were also other, more visible, manifestations of the church's input into the contemporary cultural life of Poland. It seems that two deserve special mention. One found expression in the organization of the "Days of Christian Culture," the other in the initiation of so-called Sacro-songs. The idea for the "Days of Christian Culture" came, in 1974, from Rev. Tadeusz Uszynski, chaplain of the Warsaw Campus Ministry. With the blessings of his superiors, he organized the first "Week of Christian Culture" in Warsaw in 1975. The initiative proved to be a huge success and spread very rapidly to other dioceses, including Kraków, where Karol Cardinal Wojtyła, the present Pope John Paul II, became its ardent promoter.²¹ Once started, the Days established themselves as an annual feature of Catholic cultural life.

The Weeks usually were held in local churches but often they extended to other places such as the Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia, the offices of cultural periodicals, and the abodes of campus ministries. Their programs were, as a rule, framed by opening and closing holy masses offered by high religious dignitaries, including Cardinals Wyszyński, Wojtyła, and Macharski. The backbone of activities consisted of lectures delivered by noted specialists and covering a wide range of topics that touched on religion and historical/cultural problems. In addition, there were concerts; poetry readings; films; art exhibits; meetings with scholars, writers, and artists; as well as informal discussion groups. The benefits of the Weeks were many. Perhaps the most important was that they provided a forum for creative authors

ostracized by Polish officialdom for refusing to conform to directives issued by party ideologues. Banished from theaters and lecture halls, from magazines and books, they found in the churches an outlet for their creativity and eager customers for their works. Undoubtedly, such meetings were beneficial for both sides, especially as a platform of convergence and cooperation between clergymen and lay people.

Another significant input into contemporary Polish cultural life took the form of the "Sacro-songs." This was a bold postconciliar attempt to adapt the church's pastoral work to new styles of life and to establish a closer relationship with Polish youth. The first Sacro-song, initiated by Rev. Jan Palusinski,²² took place in 1968, in Łódź; it was moved each subsequent year to a different diocese. The venture became an instant success and each time attracted thousands of performers, both Catholic and non-Catholic, from Poland and abroad, and tens of thousands of listeners, mainly youth.²³ From its inception, the Sacro-songs became also an inspiration for many eminent poets and composers who responded with enthusiasm to the desires of the masses of believers who craved poetry and music with religious content. The works produced for and executed at the Sacro-song festivals included not only light compositions but also serious symphonies and cantatas, among them more than twenty masses. Together they filled a vacuum created by the planned atheization of mass culture.

THE CHURCH AND HUMAN RIGHTS

There can be little doubt that the struggle for human rights and freedom, manifested especially strongly in the 1970s and 1980s, has expressed the aspirations not merely of a single social class but of the entire Polish nation. The spontaneous growth of the independent trade union Solidarity in 1980 and the broad support given to it by all segments of the population proved it beyond any doubt. The church could not remain aloof in the face of popular yearning for moral and social renewal; the bishops backed the movement from its inception. Their posture resulted not from the pressure of Catholic radicals but from a recognition that it was a genuine creation of the working people. The fact that the inspiration for the Solidarity movement came not from priests but from laymen and that it was a surprise to the clergy²⁴ did not restrain the prelates from giving it their wholehearted support.

As might be expected, the novel situation raised a number of theoretical and practical problems. In the doctrinal sphere, the principal consideration was the controversy between theocentric and anthropocentric concepts of Christianity. In the area of daily practice, the most important was the issue of the relationship with the government and with the opposition. It seems that in both realms, a sort of "third position" was worked out. The notion of "radical anthropocentrism within the framework of theocentrism" provided assurance to those who were afraid that a contemplative stance might be relegated to a secondary priority by the more mundane efforts exerted on behalf of the Polish people. Acting on principle, the church unhesitatingly fought for human rights for all members of Polish society, nonbelievers included.

The Polish church has been active in the defense of human rights throughout the period of communist rule. A communiqué issued on May 24, 1946, by the plenary conference of the episcopate²⁵ raised the issues of personal freedom, the protection of human life, the torturing of prisoners, and the deprivation of religious assistance for them. The bishops pointed out that these offenses, committed by the holders of power without any legal basis and directed against individuals and entire families, constituted an unprecedented violation of the innate rights of humanity and the humiliation of human dignity. They also warned that the effects of such action would adversely influence the future of the nation.

In a 1947 appeal²⁶ the episcopate called attention to the fact that the authorities continued to transgress human rights by depriving people of their rightful holiday rest; it protested job discrimination against believers and condemned excessive and groundless limitations of liberty. Prejudicial censorship, drastically and injuriously curtailing freedom of the press, was underlined as one of the most harmful and humiliating forms of governmental abuses of power.

The cause of human rights found a valiant proponent in the person of the late Stefan Wyszyński, bishop of Lublin from May 1946, and primate of Poland, 1949–81. His credo was enunciated clearly in his pastoral letter issued on the first Sunday of Advent 1946, entitled "On the Christian Liberation of Man." This epistle began with a vivid description of the human suffering caused by the Nazis, and Wyszyński appealed for "reverence for each man, for each brother, regardless of religion, language, uniform, or party."²⁷ He underlined that human dig-

nity comes from God himself and that no state can take it away since no earthly power has an absolute dominion over humanity.

The same motifs were repeated in his pastoral teaching, in the programs of the Great Novena, in the celebrations of the millennium of Poland's Christianity, as well as in his sermons and speeches in the 1980-81 period. Wyszyński openly criticized the violations of human rights in Poland during the anti-Semitic campaign of 1968,²⁸ and in many instances raised specific issues with governmental officials. After the tragic events of December 1970, when Polish workers demonstrated against the regime to protest proposed meat price hikes, the episcopate solemnly stated that the fatherland belonged to all and that all have a sacred right to enjoy peace and security. In April 1976 the episcopate took up the cause of the rural population and demanded the extension of the nation's social security system to private farmers. In the wake of the June 1976 riots the bishops openly sided with the workers and called on the authorities to stop the repression, to return to the strikers the rights and privileges taken from them, and to start a dialogue with society.

The establishment of Solidarity in August 1980 seems to have been received by the primate as a momentous step toward the realization of his hopes. Other bishops, even if less optimistic, could not refuse to accept the labor movement. Two considerations weighed heavily in favor of this attitude. First, cooperation with Solidarity could not be branded as an alliance between the altar and the throne, and thus was not inconsistent with the tradition of the Polish church. Second, it reaffirmed the traditional stand of the church in favor of human rights. The new relationship between church and Solidarity was described as a "partnership" founded on mutual understanding and brotherhood.²⁹ In entering into this relationship, the church was willing not only to provide the movement with religious services and advice regarding the church's stand on social problems, but also to defend the trade union and its members if and when their rights should be endangered. However, the bishops insisted that priests should not get directly involved in its organizational activities and should act primarily in a pastoral role.

Consequently, Bishop Lech Kaczmarek of Gdansk responded positively to the strikers' requests for priests in the locked-out shipyards and, undoubtedly in concert with the primate, initiated talks with the

authorities aimed at encouraging negotiations and averting bloodshed. Later, the interventions concentrated on Warsaw. Although they were conducted by the episcopate's secretary, Bishop Bronisław Dabrowski and members of the reactivated Joint Church-Government Commission, Cardinal Wyszyński showed deep interest in the problems discussed and on several occasions personally interceded with government officials. Thus, in August 1980, he met with Stanisław Kania and Edward Gierek; on October 21, 1980, and February 7, 1981, he met again with Kania who had, by then, replaced Gierek as party first secretary; and on March 26, already ill, he met with the new prime minister, General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Meanwhile, the bishops and the primate himself gave many public demonstrations of their moral support for independent movements that adopted for themselves the name of Solidarity. In particular, it is worth recalling the audience of Solidarity chairman, Lech Wałęsa, with the pope, and the fact that the last group received by the primate before his demise was a representation of the national organizational committee of private farmers. It is beyond any doubt that the episcopate's pressures and demonstrative acts on behalf of Solidarity contributed to the restrained behavior of the authorities and to the legalization of independent social organizations.

The church gave full moral support to Solidarity. Yet while Cardinal Wyszyński appointed Professor Romuald Kukulowicz, of the Catholic University of Lublin, as a liaison with the trade union, and the bishops (as well as some theologians, such as Rev. Jozef Tischner) were always ready and willing to share their views on social issues with the workers' leaders, the church was abstaining purposely from direct involvement in the internal affairs of the organization or from claiming a right to influence its program. This attitude was expressed unequivocally by the prelates on several occasions (for instance, Cardinal Wyszyński stated, in his April 1981 speech to representatives of the independent farmers, that he did not want to form "confraternities or sodalities"). The current primate, Józef Cardinal Glemp, indicated several times that he viewed Solidarity as a labor organization aggregating people of various outlooks and serving the whole nation.³⁰

In one respect the bishops and Cardinal Wyszyński in particular were not reluctant to invoke their prestige and authority: the episcopate was aware of the revolutionary potential of the opposition movement and feared that the escalation of demands might lead to a violent encounter

with the government, to bloodshed, and to Soviet military intervention. The examples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were still fresh in the prelates' memories. For this reason, the church appealed to the Polish people for calm and moderation, for public spirit and national unity.³¹ In the same spirit, the pope exhorted his countrymen to wisdom and prudence. Cardinal Wyszyński advised Solidarity leaders to concentrate on concrete social and economic goals and to beware of people seeking to "entangle Poland in certain political situations."³²

As might have been expected, these requests did not evoke uniform reactions. The communists were, naturally, pleased because the bishops' voices acted soothingly on the perturbed public opinion and gave them time to mobilize preventive measures. On the other hand, the episcopate's posture met with sharp criticism from the radical wing of the opposition movement. In the view of the radicals, Solidarity faced the danger of "Khomeinization" growing out of a peculiarly Polish syndrome identifying patriotism and Catholicism. The peril needed to be combated by eliminating the influence of the church and by providing more room in the organization's leadership for activists with a leftist and anticlerical pedigree, such as Adam Michnik.³³ The purpose of such tactics was to extricate Solidarity from the moderating influence of the church and to use the organization's revolutionary potential as a main political weapon in the struggle against the existing system of government.

The disapprobation of the church's behavior marked a significant departure from the earlier posture of the secular Left, which in the 1970s had praised the church as the chief defender of human freedoms and which had advocated, at the time, a dialogue with believers.³⁴ It seems that the radicals decided that in the new situation, the umbrella of Solidarity provided them with a better and more convenient protection. It is interesting to note that some Polish circles in the West, especially around the Paris periodical, *Kultura*, also adopted an openly critical posture and predicted the inevitable decline of the church's role in Polish society.³⁵

The church remained unswayed in its moderate conduct. The death of Cardinal Wyszyński on May 28, 1981, did not alter that course, and the church continued in its role as mediator. The impasse in negotiations between Solidarity and the government that developed after the Bydgoszcz confrontation (March 19, 1981), as well as the growing polar-

ization of society, made the conciliation increasingly difficult, however. The church was especially sensitive to the problem of societal cleavage and tried to prevent it by bringing about honest discussion between the government and Solidarity. The bishops saw that as a step toward overcoming the existing political crisis and as a preparation for future reforms based on solid institutional foundations.

In the course of his endeavors the primate met several times with Lech Wałęsa, for example on November 21, 1981, and conferred with General Wojciech Jaruzelski, to whom he apparently presented a compromise proposal meeting halfway the postulates of the government and of the opposition. It was rumored that the scheme attempted to reconcile the principle of the so-called leading role of the party with guarantees for popular participation in the process of governing. It is possible that the project was discussed at the three-way meeting arranged by Archbishop Glemp with Jaruzelski and Wałęsa on November 4, 1981. Shortly before the December 10–11, 1981 session of the Solidarity coordinating commission in Gdansk, Archbishop Glemp sent Wałęsa a letter, warning him against rashness and urging the union to seek a dialogue with the authorities. On December 11, 1981, the primate issued a dramatic appeal for national unity and peace in the face of domestic unrest.

Taking on itself the necessary but highly responsible and difficult role of mediator, the episcopate categorically declined to take part in the political infighting and made it clear that the church's aim was neither a "historical compromise" with the Marxists nor participation in a ruling coalition. Instead, the bishops repeatedly recalled that the church's goals were strictly religious and transcendental. In one of his sermons in Bydgoszcz, Primate Glemp reiterated that the church did not want to become a "third power" in the configuration of social forces but wanted to serve all Poles through prayer and sacraments.

The military coup of December 13, 1981, presented the church with a new situation and new problems. The most urgent was the prevention of bloodshed. To this end, the bishops urged the people to retain their composure and abstain from violent resistance. At the same time the episcopate explicitly identified and condemned those responsible for the state of war and the interruption of the renewal process.³⁶ The bishops were of the opinion that the Jaruzelski putsch did not solve the crisis and that the military rule must, sooner or later, come to an end.

Consequently, while critically evaluating the imposition of the martial regime, the episcopate insisted that a positive program for the solution of existing problems must be found and that a search for it must involve all significant social forces, including the suspended union, Solidarity. At the same time the prelates warned the junta of the dire consequences of acts dictated by revenge and the desire to settle accounts with the opposition. They also insisted that the agreements of August 1980 should be respected and workers' gains preserved. The pope, who on a number of occasions had reminded the ruling communists that the Poles would never accept slavery, also advised resumption of negotiations.

Since the military coup, Polish society has been polarized sharply into two camps: the forces of order and proletarian internationalism, and the forces for reform and democratization. In this situation, the church has tried to reconcile the two sides and to help to bring about a new social covenant. In an episcopal communiqué released February 26, 1982, the bishops requested that the authorities abandon martial law and the policy of repression and open serious negotiations with advocates of reform. The idea of a social covenant also was aired in the theses issued on April 5, 1982, by the primate's Social Council, a thirty-member body headed by Stanisław Stomma, a well-known member of the old "Znak," the Catholic parliamentary faction. The council called for the relegalization of Solidarity and other suspended organizations, the removal of restrictions in the area of human rights, and the drawing up of a general program of social and economic reform. The council emphasized that if the government were to regain the people's trust, it would have to embrace the program of 1980 and to convince the people that it would sincerely revive the reform process started then.

Despite this pressure from the church and despite certain flurries of arrests or harassments of priests, the regime by and large refrained from attacking the church. It is a moot question whether the authorities showed such restraint because they were not certain of victory or because they needed the church to tranquilize the waters if things became stormy. Whatever the answer, a period of relative peace prevailed, though more and more often one could hear anticlerical voices and a few direct attacks on individual bishops (like Bishop Tokarczuk of Przemyśl). Clearly, the example of Moscow's criticism of the Polish church and of the Polish pope³⁷ was being followed by anticlerical zealots in Warsaw. But the episcopate was not frightened into silence

or deterred in its efforts toward national reconciliation. In fact, the bishops increased their pressure on the government. In the middle of September 1982 the episcopate issued a communiqué condemning the use of violence against peaceful street demonstrators and openly accusing the junta of not having made any attempts at accommodation with the society.

In subsequent years the church continued its efforts for national reconciliation as well as for civil rights and democratic reform of the political system. Again and again, the episcopate emphasized that "without full respect for the rights of a human being, of social and vocational groups" and without "a real and honest dialogue,"³⁸ it is impossible to solve the economic problems facing the country. While not offering specific solutions to current political and economic issues and strenuously avoiding any direct forays into politics, the bishops preached what constitutes a good society and reminded Catholics of their right and duty to apply Catholic social principles to existing circumstances.

The church's endeavors took place amid growing social crisis, aggravated by economic hardships and a deep moral depression, leading to a renouncement of civic responsibilities and craving for revenge. The brutal murder by members of the state security apparatus of Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko on October 19, 1984, stirred a powerful ingredient of hatred into the popular mood.

Polish bishops were fully aware of these destructive attitudes and decided to concentrate the pastoral work of the church on a moral renewal of the Polish society and reawaking of the national will. The arrangement of John Paul II's visit to his homeland in June 1983 was a conscious step in this direction. The intentions of the episcopate were associated not only with the effervescence of the papal presence but, first and foremost, with his teaching that stressed the dignity of the human being as the foundation of Christian faith.

Facing his frustrated countrymen, whose valid claims for justice and well-being he undoubtedly shared, the pope emphatically called on them not to give up hope and to abstain from the use of violence. His appeals for social peace were, without question, motivated not only by compassion for those who could become the victims of revenge but even more by a deep concern for possible avengers who would lose

their human dignity and destroy themselves morally.³⁹ The message, consonant with the earlier encyclicals *Redemptor hominis* (1979) and *Laborem exercens* (1981), proclaimed a universal truth that the only way in which the problems of this world could be solved is the one that would not impinge on the integrity of human beings, which rests on the foundation of personal subjectivity and self-determination.

In the context of the pope's teaching, the church in Poland oriented its pastoral activities toward "the sanctification of individuals and the moral renewal of the nation."⁴⁰ This did not imply, however, that the church resigned from the defense of human rights or gave up attempts to restructure the existing sociopolitical system in accordance with Christian values. During the disturbances of April/May 1988, the bishops once again pointed out the pressing need for including nonparty people in the political life of the country.⁴¹

THE THEOLOGY OF NATION

The support of the national aspirations of Poles by the Roman Catholic church, undoubtedly a spontaneous expression of a long historical tradition, found a theoretical basis in the Polish "theology of the nation." Its main exponent was the late Cardinal Wyszyński, who realized that such a direction of religious activities required a normative way of thinking. Unfortunately, his pastoral and administrative duties did not allow him to develop his ideas into an articulate system, and what we know about his thought comes mainly from his numerous sermons, pastoral letters, and other public pronouncements, which reflected particular situations. They have become the object of scholarly research, resulting in the publication of a few pertinent studies that form the basis for this section.⁴²

Even before World War II, Father Stefan Wyszyński was interested primarily in social questions. Wyszyński viewed the early postwar phase as perhaps the most critical and dangerous period of Poland's entire history, because of communist attempts to destroy the church, to interrupt religious and cultural continuity, and even to undercut biological existence by an ill-considered population policy. Since there were no political means to defend the nation, the primate believed it was necessary to engage all the spiritual and institutional resources of the church in struggle. In order to live up to the task the church had to redeem

the war losses, improve the operational efficiency of the clergy, and synchronize the whole rhythm of religious activities with the changed national life. The church had to prove its strength and social usefulness not only for Catholics, but for members of other denominations and even for nonbelievers who could find in it a spiritual asylum and protection against incursions on human dignity and individual rights.

The change of attitude created a need for formulating a new notion of the nation. It is important to keep in mind that Wyszyński's conception was influenced greatly by a long Polish tradition of differentiating between the nation and the state, and by nineteenth-century Polish messianism. With time, the cardinal's perception moved away from a juridical and sociological perspective to a more historical and religious one.

According to Wyszyński, a nation is a product of natural development with God as its primary source. It is one of the basic structures of divine creation, and has temporal and transcendental dimensions. No nation is innately good, for, like a person, it is not a fulfilled being, a creature in an ultimate form, but a living thing striving to develop to its own perfection and completeness. Teleologically, the movement evolves into national integrity that overrides socioeconomic and political divisions, and, therefore, none of these structures can decide singularly for the entire nation.

It is not surprising that Wyszyński conceived the idea of the nation as a new ecclesiological category: the Church of the Nation. Being novel, the concept soon encountered criticism. Some imputed to it the promotion of "religious nationalism." In fact, however, the accusation was unjustified insofar as, for Wyszyński, church and nation could never be identified. Between the church and the nation, according to Wyszyński, there existed a unique relationship, similar to the one between body and soul.

Since, in the temporal order, the nation was the most perfect human community, it became a particularly appropriate subject for the embodiment of the universal church. Thus, with God's will, there came into existence a truly authentic "Church on the Vistula"—the "Polish church," and not just the Church in Poland. This church formed a locus for the creative convergence of religious and secular life and, in the course of common history, developed great social awareness, close communication with the community, and a unique ability of adapta-

tion to the changing environment. It also acquired considerable influence among the people.

But the church was bound to respect the autonomy of the nation and intervene in the nation's life directly under specific circumstances only, as regards the deterioration of social behavior (the "spread of sin"), and in response to catastrophes and other pathological conditions. Normally, the church should exercise its influence indirectly on the nation by preaching the gospel, educating the people in the values of Christianity, providing examples of moral behavior, and helping people spiritually. Of course, Cardinal Wyszyński did not consider autonomy an open gate to secularization. On the contrary, he strongly maintained that the nation was subordinate to God in all respects and that secularization was extremely dangerous to national life, not only in its transcendental, but also in its temporal dimension.

The primate constantly preached the need for the sanctification of the nation, but he did not mean that the church should try to impose its authority on any sphere of national life. Even in the name of noble religious aims the church should not turn the nation into an instrument of its own will. Quite the contrary, Wyszyński saw the role of the church as serving the nation. He treated this service as the highest honor.

At the same time the cardinal readily admitted that the church was also a beneficiary of the close relationship with the nation, for it was able to draw from the riches of national values and accomplishments. While stressing the importance of the nation and insisting on the implantation of the church in national life, Wyszyński treated the state as a political convention, inferior and subservient to the nation. In his opinion, the functions of the state were of secondary importance, and even its very existence formed not the foundation of national life, but merely an external manifestation of the sociopolitical segment of that life. The state could never use the nation as a volitionless tool, because the purpose of creating the state was not domination but service.

Such views made it self-evident that the church should affiliate its life not with the state but with the nation. Such affinity, being more natural, was conducive to unity and to the common search for salvation. Moreover, Polish historic experience demonstrated that there were periods when the state disintegrated, existed in a vestigial form, or was incapacitated. The lessons of the past dictated the unquestion-

ably momentous imperative for the church, viz., the maintenance of close relations not with the state but with the nation. Clearly, in times of crisis, the retention of inseparable bonds created the best possible conditions for the survival of both the church and the nation. It should not be forgotten, however, that the superiority of the nation on which Wyszyński insisted was not tantamount to the denial of the state's importance for national life (that, in his opinion, could never be perfect without the state). Needless to say, in such a situation, the church had a moral obligation to assist the nation not only with its religious services, but also with national and social service. Most important, the church had a duty to preserve national existence and the historical continuity of national life.

According to Wyszyński, the nation has the inherent right to form its state in a free and peaceful way. In a Christian nation, like Poland, Christian values have to be expressed in the totality of social and political life. Where the nation is homogeneous in religious belief, the state should not be indifferent to the devotional needs of the people, keep them apart from the church, or propagate atheism.

Should the state be confessional in that case? Wyszyński's answer, especially since the Vatican II council, was definitely negative. While he considered religion an indispensable element of national life, the state legitimately could be secular. The religiosity of the nation did not have to be expressed in a "Catholic state" or lead to the ostracism of members of other denominations or unbelievers since they belong to the nation as well. On the very sensitive issue of church-state relations Wyszyński's views obviously were influenced by the monopolistic aspirations of the communist state. The essence of his thought consisted in the acceptance, however reluctant that acceptance might be, of the principle of separation of church and state. At the same time, however, he strongly promoted the idea of the freedom of the church and resolutely fought against interference by government officials in the internal life of the church. He considered this struggle not only a necessary, but also a beneficial phenomenon, that stimulated the social awareness of the people and contributed to reciprocal adaptations. Consequently, he believed that the creative condition of strained relations should not be terminated either by the outbreak of an open conflict or by the conclusion of a false peace.

CONCLUSION

It may be assumed quite safely that nationalistic sentiments are very strong among Polish Catholics, bishops and clergy not excluded. Although this circumstance is not much different from the situation that prevailed over most of the years between the two world wars, one must keep in mind that not everything remained as before.

Of the numerous changes that occurred during and after World War II, unquestionably the most momentous were those in Polish national culture. The tragic experience of the double occupation and of the communist rule caused a definite evolution of many of its component elements, including that of nationalism. Polish chauvinism waned in strength, and the defensive character of Polish nationalism was underpinned. The leaders of the Polish church have enhanced the transformation by words and deeds. The famous letter to the German bishops of December 1965 proved convincingly that the Polish episcopate intends to keep Polish nationalism away from the spell of chauvinistic temptations. Equally significant is the fact that the church, clearly the institution that could easily employ Polish nationalism for utilitarian purposes, shows no tendency to intertwine religion and philosophy with current politics. Instead, the bishops are influencing public consciousness by the promotion of Christian ethics and morality in private and public life. Hence, while nationalist traditions still form a substantive segment of Polish consciousness, they are infused primarily with humanistic values that the past centuries created and bequeathed to posterity.

Christianity and National Heritage among the Czechs and Slovaks

Pedro Ramet

A national community's self-image is a factor, in part at least, of its orientation toward its *national heritage*, which may be defined as the collective memory of a community focusing on those people, events, cultural products, and symbols which are seen as formative of the nation and its place in the international order. The more elements (people, events, cultural products, symbols) that are incorporated into an active, conscious sense of national heritage, the more secure the sense of national identity and the stronger the nationalism of the group. Hence, when the English begin to boast of the post-Cromwellian restoration, of the First Reform Act of 1832, and of the sundry English scientists, playwrights, and authors, they reveal a very secure consciousness of what it means to be English. By extension, the nineteenth-century national revivals among the peoples of Eastern Europe necessarily focused on recalling past glories as a means of securing the sense of national identity.

Insofar as religion is, or aspires to be, the dominant channel for the spiritual life of a community, i.e., the channel and purveyor of its values and symbols, it is an organic part of the national heritage. Hence, when there is harmony between the religious tradition and the national heritage as a whole, the national identity is at peace and secure. But when there is a tension between the two—as in the case of the Catholic Czechs, whose national heritage is closely bound, at a crucial stage, with Protestantism—there may be an attenuation of nationalist defiance or of religious devotion or of both. Conventional wisdom holds that both have been weakened among Czechs.¹ Among the Slovaks, for reasons which will be explored, the situation is completely different.

For the purposes of this chapter *nationalism* will be understood as the collective attitude toward the national heritage. Since the past may be recalled in very different ways, nationalism assumes a quite different character among different peoples. I would like to distinguish among five kinds of nationalism, emphasizing that the list is not meant to be exhaustive and that they are understood here as ideal types (in the Weberian sense), so that there are perhaps no pure examples of any ideal type, although numerous illustrative examples, whose content is, one may hope, illuminated by the ideal type, may be identified. The first type is *heroic nationalism*, in which history is recalled, whether accurately or not, as a more or less steady unfolding of glories, with a stress on the victorious struggle against external challenges. The nationalisms of the English and French come to mind. A second type may be called *defiant nationalism*; here history is recalled as uncertain and full of menace, with stress on uncertainty in struggles and on the existence (to the present) of external threats. The nationalisms of Poles and Lithuanians come to mind.

Nationalism may also take a *traumatic* form, when history is read with an emphasis on defeat in struggle. The Serbs, by riveting on the fourteenth-century Battle of Kosovo polje (which they lost) and on the past and present "martyrdom" of the Serbs, exemplify traumatic nationalism. The Hungarians and Armenians, with their awareness of being small and vulnerable, the former recalling even now the defeats of 1526 and 1849 and the territorial losses after World War I, and the latter unable to forget the genocides suffered at the hands of the Turks in the early part of this century, likewise show a traumatic attitude. The Czechs, I shall argue, similarly display a traumatic nationalism, and their behavior is unmistakably colored by this fact.

The fourth form that the collective attitude toward the national heritage may take I call *taboo nationalism*. Here nationalism is overladen with guilt, with historical memory entangled with incessant charges from foreigners that the given nation bears responsibility for war crimes and other inhumanities. To the extent that the reprehensible side of a nation's history comes to *seem* to be a dominant or major theme, its nationalism inevitably becomes tainted, taboo. German nationalism since World War II—especially in West Germany—illustrates this category very well. One might note parenthetically that in communist Yugoslavia the regime has been trying since World War II to stir up col-

lective guilt among the Croats for the war crimes of the fascist *Ustaše* party and thereby to give Croatian nationalism a taboo character. In this endeavor, however, the Yugoslav regime has failed.

And finally, there is a category of *muted* nationalism, which is not nonexistent, only less strident, with less historical longevity, so that members of the national group feel a weaker inclination to view themselves as distinct from their neighbors. In cases of muted nationalism there is typically much less stress on the role of struggle in national history. The emphasis shifts to pride in cultural achievements or in economic productivity, or even to pride in a way of life. I believe that Austrian, Canadian, Slovenian, and Slovak nationalisms all illustrate this ideal type.

The contrast between traumatic and heroic nationalism was highlighted in the results of surveys conducted simultaneously among Hungarian and French high school students in 1981. The French were overwhelmingly proud of being French, proud of their history, found ample people to admire, and felt completely confident that the French nation would still be around in the year 2500. The Hungarians, by contrast, had trouble finding sources of pride, expressed shame of the precommunist political system, tended to look up to sports stars if anyone, and became confused and uncertain when asked if the Hungarian nation would survive to 2500.²

Psychoanalytical studies have amply demonstrated the role that trauma plays in shattering the individual's worldview and mode of relating to the world, and in coloring subsequent behavior. An individual who has experienced trauma approaches phenomena associated with the trauma experience with trepidation, and responds to the new phenomena in terms of the earlier trauma, even if the present circumstances are different. To the extent that a specific person or institution is held responsible, whether justly or not, for causing or contributing to the experience of trauma, the traumatized individual is alienated from that person or institution. If the person or institution is one with whom the traumatized individual cannot make a complete break—such as a parent or one's church—the result is internal tension and the risk of alienation from self. In the case of trauma associated with a church, religious apathy and conversion emerge as the obvious solutions—the former in cases of self-repression and the latter in cases of heightened self-awareness.

I shall argue in the following pages that the strength of Catholicism and appeal of Protestantism among the Czechs and Slovaks today, and hence also the context in which the Communist party fashions its religious policy, are very much conditioned by the presence (in the Czech case) and absence (for the Slovaks) of national trauma associated with religion. For the Slovaks, who lost their national state around A.D. 900 and whose experience of bogus independence during World War II was brief and uncertain, nationalism is not associated with any sense of tragic loss, though, as numerous observers have pointed out, the Slovaks' most immediate rivals are the Czechs. For the Czechs, by contrast, despite the fact that the present state is of their making, there are painful recollections associated with a double defeat in the seventeenth century: a political defeat at the Battle of White Mountain on November 8, 1620, which turned the tide against Bohemian (Czech) independence, and a religious defeat immediately thereafter as the Catholic church unleashed its (second) Counter-Reformation in a program to weed out "heresy." Trauma cannot nurture itself without some symbolic focus, and White Mountain provides just that focus. Accordingly, Victor Mamaty did not exaggerate when he wrote, in 1981, that

in modern Czech national consciousness, the Battle of the White Mountain of 1620 holds an analogous place to that held by the Battle of Kosovo Field in 1389 in the minds of modern Serbs or that held by the Battle of Mohács of 1526 in the sentiments of modern Hungarians. Like these two historic battles, the Battle of the White Mountain spells stark, irreparable national tragedy. The Czechs regard it as marking the end of [the] independence of their medieval state, the kingdom of Bohemia, and the beginning of the most humiliating period in their national history which they call their age of "Darkness" (*Témno*).³

THE HUSSITE OVERTURE

The Czech religious awakening must be dated to winds of reform which blew across the Bohemian church in the late fourteenth century. One source for reform ideas was the English reformer John Wyclif of Oxford University, whose philosophical works were reaching Prague by 1390.

Jan Hus (1369–1415), who would be preaching at Prague's Bethlehem Chapel by 1402, earned money in the 1390s by copying Wyclif's works, and in the process, imbibed his logic.⁴ Hus, who became dean of the philosophy faculty of Charles University, began to preach Wyclif's ideas, calling into question the doctrine of transubstantiation, rejecting the concept of the church as a papal monarchy, and describing the church instead as a spiritual fellowship of the redeemed (thus embracing the idea of predestination). The ideas became controversial and the dispute polarized along national lines, with the German theologians condemning Wycliffian-Hussite heresy, and the Czechs rallying to what they viewed as reform. Hus wrote tracts in both Latin and Czech, thus giving himself a wider readership among the Czech population, and in September 1410, when Rome demanded that Hus appear before a papal court on suspicions of heresy, Hus refused and sought the protection of King Wenceslaus IV of Bohemia. Two years later, Hus was excommunicated, but he continued to preach, by now writing exclusively in Czech, and told Czechs that an evil pope was not worthy of obedience and that the true church should disdain material wealth. He subsequently refused to attend the Council of Constance, but in 1415, deceived by a promise of safe conduct, he fell into the hands of Emperor Sigismund of the Holy Roman Empire, who had Hus burned at the stake on July 6.

By 1414, followers of Hus had revived the long-abandoned practice of giving both bread *and* wine to the congregation during the liturgy—a practice known as Ultraquism. This development, combined with the execution of Hus, contributed to a feverish kind of religious excitement, and reformist and chiliastic preachers found receptive audiences in Bohemia in these years. In July 1419, followers of Hus stormed Prague's Town Hall and threw several of their adversaries out the window—an event that has come down in history as the First Defenestration of Prague. Hussites went on rampages now, sacking monasteries and destroying priceless Gothic paintings and sculptures, in the righteous conviction that the church should not be wealthy.

In these volatile times the story spread among Hussites that the world would end on February 14, 1420. When nothing happened, the radical wing of the Hussite movement, which included landless peasants and country squires who felt powerless before the wealthy barons, gathered in south Bohemia and decided to build a town. This town,

which they called Tábor, was characterized by communal ownership of wealth, and a military code of conduct. The Táborites were borne along by religious enthusiasm, and in the areas where they asserted their control, the existing hierarchy was removed from the scene, bishops were elected by the people, the faithful read and explained the Scriptures for themselves, and liturgy, conducted without the traditional vestments, became simple. The Táborites combined religious millenarianism (expressed in their belief that most of the world would shortly be destroyed, except for five cities which would be spared) with heightened sexuality and permissiveness. The movement came under the *de facto* leadership of Jan Žižka of Tročnov (d. 1424).⁵ Under Žižka's capable leadership, the Hussites went to war in 1420 "to liberate the truth of the Law of God and the Saints and to protect the faithful believers of the Church, and the Czech and Slavonic language."⁶

Emperor Sigismund joined with the pope in sending mercenary armies to suppress the Táborites. But "God's Warriors," as the Táborites called themselves, went into battle singing hymns, and that alone was often enough to strike terror into even militarily preponderant Catholic forces.⁷ After a string of victories, the Táborites suffered a reversal at the Battle of Lipany in 1434. A negotiated settlement followed. Under the terms of an agreement reached at Kutná Hora in 1485, Hussite parishes were allowed to function in the absence of papal recognition and their pastors were not subordinate to Rome. From 1517 until 1620, Protestants enjoyed toleration in Bohemia. As late as 1609, Emperor Rudolf issued a patent on religious toleration, which seemed to bode well for Czech Protestants. The patent went farther than previous decrees in that it permitted Protestants to build their churches on the estates of Catholic barons, as well as vice versa.

A few years later, Czech Protestant nobles saw the chance to improve their lot and, on the pretext that the patent on toleration had been violated,⁸ launched a rebellion against Holy Roman Emperor Matthias (1612–19), electing Friedrich, the Calvinist elector of the palatinate, as their king. They miscalculated. The Catholic Habsburgs were not as weak as the Protestants had thought, the Protestant world was not able to provide assistance, and the Protestant peasantry no longer felt (as they had in the early fifteenth century) that they shared a common Protestant cause with their Protestant nobles. The result was

the routing of Protestant forces at White Mountain. Ironically, Pope Paul V (1605–21) suffered a stroke during the procession to celebrate Friedrich's defeat and died of a second stroke the following year.⁹

Although the rebellion had been launched by the Protestant nobles for largely political reasons, with the religious remonstrance serving but as a fig leaf, the defeat had dramatic effects on religious life in the Czech lands. The patent on religious toleration was revoked, and the several Protestant sects were banned, beginning with the Union of Czech Brethren. Catholicism was declared the only legal religion in Bohemia in 1627, and in Moravia in 1628. Where more than 90 per cent of Czechs may have been Protestant prior to White Mountain,¹⁰ rapid attrition now occurred. Protestant nobles were driven into exile, and "reliable" Catholics, including many foreigners, came in to take their place. The Jesuits, placed in control of higher education in Bohemia, burned large numbers of books and manuscripts. Reconversion to Catholicism was enforced by arms, and the population of Bohemia and Moravia plummeted from about 3 million to some 900,000.¹¹ Germans now dominated the towns, and German became the language of government and business. Re-Catholicization was associated, thus, with Germanization, and the Catholic church was implicated in the national trauma. Indeed, the Catholic Counter-Reformation was in itself a large part of the Czech trauma of the seventeenth century. Tomáš Masaryk, who would become the first president of Czechoslovakia, told an audience at Kozí Hrádek in 1910, "The Counter-Reformation . . . was a terrible period in the history of the Czech people and in the annals of the human race. Three-quarters of our land was confiscated and squandered away to foreigners."¹² Forced to accept the religion of their foreign overlords, the Czechs became emotionally detached from their religion.

REVIVAL AND PROTESTANT RESTORATION

The course of development among the Slovaks was, to a point, rather similar. Certainly, as of 1600, most of Slovakia was Protestant.¹³ And the process of Catholic restoration inevitably met with resistance. But when Czechs and Slovaks began to rediscover their national heritage and national culture in the nineteenth century, they took differ-

ent directions. Among the Slovaks, Catholic priests such as linguist Anton Bernolák (1762–1813), poet John Hollý (1785–1849), and Bishop Stephan Moyses (1797–1869) played a significant role. In fact, where Bernolák developed a western Slovak dialect as the Slovak literary language, Slovak Protestants (such as Frs. Jan Kollár [1793–1852] and Pavel Jozef Šafárik [1795–1861]) looked instead to Czech, their liturgical language since the sixteenth century. The result was a “linguistic schism” between Slovak Catholic and Protestant intellectuals. Indeed, the idea of Czechoslovak unity had its origin among Slovak Protestants, for whom a common language seemed a natural accompaniment of nation building. Only when Slovak Protestant intellectual L’udovít Štúr (1815–56) accepted a central Slovak dialect as a basis for the Slovak literary language—a concession to Catholic sentiment—did Protestants come to accept the idea of a separate Slovak literary language.¹⁴

After the 1867 *Ausgleich*, which created the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the Slovaks found themselves ruled by Hungarians, at whose hands they had not suffered anything remotely resembling White Mountain. Moreover, Slovak sentiments would find resonance in the clerical Slovak Catholic People’s party, founded by Fr. Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938) in 1913, though Hlinka was actively defending Slovak culture much earlier than that.

The *Ausgleich* created an anomalous situation. In the Austrian half of the empire, where the Catholic faith remained the favored creed, Czech national revival took on an anti-Catholic hue, and there was an attempt—never fully successful—to wed Czech nationalism to Protestantism, in particular to the Hussite tradition. By contrast, in the Hungarian half of the empire, the Catholic church lost its preferential position as religious liberalization extended certain benefits to other churches as well. Magyarization was vigorously pursued in Slovakia, as elsewhere in the “Kingdom of Hungary,” and by 1914 there was not a single high school in Slovakia, for example, where Slovak was being used. Furthermore, in all Slovakia there was not a single Slovak bishop at that time: the Catholic hierarchy was uniformly Hungarian. But the majority of Slovaks—by and large Catholic and uneducated—looked not to the hierarchy for inspiration, but to their local parish priest. The parish priest was Slovak, espoused anti-Hungarian Slovak nationalism, and tended to be antihierarchy as well. The post-1867 wedding

of Catholicism and Slovak nationalism is a direct result of the relationship of priest and flock at the parish level.

A *Los von Rom* (Away from Rome) movement had taken hold among German-speaking liberals in Austria and Sudetenland in response to Austrian religious legislation of 1868 and 1874, but when the *Los von Rom* current spread to the Czechs, it assumed a nationalist character. For Masaryk and other Czech intellectuals, conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism served as an act of nationalist defiance, an assertion of the Czech national spirit. Indeed, Masaryk specifically looked to the Hussite era for inspiration. In his view,

As a great historical process our reformation can only be understood in terms of Czech national spirit. For this reason, it is important for us to be clearly aware of the issue involved in the Czech Reformation movement, its principal ideas and directions. . . . The entire Czech nation, as one single body, defied Rome; this is the special significance of the movement. Ultimately, of course, the Reformation spread all over Europe, but it took a century before other peoples followed in our footsteps. . . . How can we belong to the Catholic church, yet acknowledge Hus as a national martyr, honor and revere him? My answer is this: Hus, the Táborites, [Petr] Chelčický and [Jan Amos] Komenský gave us a better, a higher form of religion than was given to us by this Roman theocracy.

We see in the Czech Reformation a deeper manifestation of the Czech soul and of our national character.¹⁵

Masaryk was accordingly hostile to the Catholic Cyril and Methodius Association which had been founded in 1860 to promote Slavic unity under a Catholic banner.

The Catholic clergy tried to take part in the Czech revival. Pope Leo XIII (1878–1903), for one, was sympathetic to the nascent Czech national movement and considered its demands legitimate, and supported Czech demands for linguistic equality in a speech in 1889. Even earlier, Catholic “awakeners” such as Václav Matěj Kramerius, František Jan Tomsa, and Jan Rulík tried to foster the ideas of the Catholic Enlightenment and promote Czech language and culture.¹⁶ But the Catholic awakening among the Czechs must be seen as largely “defensive.”¹⁷ Ultimately, it was not able to prevent the divorce of Czech nationalism from Catholicism.

RELIGION IN NONCOMMUNIST
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In November 1918, as the Habsburg Empire collapsed and advocates of the "Czechoslovak" idea prepared to set up a new state, exultant Czechs tore down and demolished the statue of the Virgin Mary, "Our Lady of Victory," in the Old City Square of Prague. The statue was seen as a reminder of White Mountain, and at this historic moment—the birth of a new state—Czech nationalism expressed itself in a symbolic act of vengeance against the Catholic church.¹⁸ Nor did it stop there. In the first year after the war, hundreds of statues of the Madonna, of St. John Nepomucene, and of St. Wenceslaus were destroyed, and about three hundred churches were expropriated by the authorities. Significantly, as Ludvík Němec notes, these acts of vengeance were confined to the Czech parts of the country; the Slovaks did not succumb to the anti-Catholic temper of their Czech compatriots.¹⁹

The new Czechoslovak government showed unmistakable antipathy toward the Catholic church and encouraged the re-creation of a Hussite church which, in accordance with its nationalist self-image, called itself the "Czechoslovak Church." At the time of its establishment in 1920, the Czechoslovak church claimed 150,000 adherents. The new church grew rapidly and as of 1930 numbered some 793,000 adherents. In the same time span the proportion of Catholics in Czechoslovakia declined from 95 percent to 75 percent.²⁰

In the Czech lands society became polarized and priests were held up for contempt by Czech "progressives." Church attendance became unpopular or controversial and fell off. Catholic priests were publicly ridiculed, came to feel estranged, and hence cut back on the frequency with which they ventured beyond church property. The Catholic church responded by organizing a youth movement, an academic league, and a new publication, *Dorost*. In 1935 the Catholic church convened a congress in Prague; 1 million Catholics from all parts of the republic converged on the capital. This demonstration of Catholic strength impressed Masaryk, and he subsequently moderated his policy of promoting Protestantism as the Czech national heritage.

In Slovakia the relationship of nationalism to Catholicism was entirely different—itsself a danger signal to politicians who thought that Slovaks were merely eastern Czechs, common members of a "Czecho-

slovak" nation. Here, Hlinka's Slovak People's party was the only Slovak party with a nationalist cast, and was above all fearful of the infiltration of Slovakia by Protestant or, worse yet, atheist Czechs. In 1921 Hlinka's party placed third in Slovak elections, after the Czechoslovak Social Democrats and the Agrarian party. But its nationalism—which had a clerical coating—gave it strong appeal. In the elections of 1925 the People's party established itself as the largest vote-getter in Slovakia—a position it retained until the dissolution of the First Republic.²¹

Subsequently, when Adolf Hitler declared the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia to the Third Reich, Slovakia was proclaimed an independent republic on March 14, 1939. The new state was 14,693 square miles in size, claimed 2.69 million inhabitants (according to the 1940 census), and had, as its head of state, Hlinka's successor as head of the People's party, Msgr. Jozef Tiso (1887–1947). The Slovak Republic evoked a mixed reception among the population, divided in large part along confessional lines, most Catholic clergy and believers supporting Slovak statehood albeit under Nazi sponsorship, while Protestants often reacted negatively to the regime's close identification with Catholicism. Most Slovak Lutheran ministers, accordingly, joined the anti-Tiso resistance.²² Despite the controversial character of the Slovak state, the "overwhelming majority" of Slovaks did not want to see the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia and were loathe, at the end of the war, to lose their Slovak statehood.²³

Because of their domination of the Slovak resistance, Protestants dominated Slovakia's political scene in 1945. Anticlerical measures followed. On May 16, 1945, the Slovak National Council issued a decree nationalizing all private and ecclesiastical schools. This cost the Catholic church in Slovakia some eighteen hundred elementary schools, twenty-three high schools, and twenty vocational schools.²⁴ Important publishing houses of the Catholic church were confiscated, several church newspapers were suspended, and when the Catholics protested, Slovak police arrested two bishops and many priests and laypersons.

Czech-Slovak tensions were stirred up in 1947 when the Czechoslovak government, in which communist ministers already played a leading role, put Msgr. Tiso on trial for "war crimes." The trial was carried out in Bratislava on orders from Prague, but was unpopular from the beginning among Slovaks. The court predictably found Tiso guilty, and he was hanged on April 18. But Slovaks continued to venerate him and

view the trial as an anti-Slovak and anti-Catholic act.²⁵ In consequence, when Archbishop Josef Beran (appointed to the Prague archbishopric in 1946) organized festive celebrations of St. Adalbert that year, the Slovak bishops refused to allow the Slovak provinces to take part.

A few months later, in February 1948, the Communist party carried out a coup and removed noncommunists from the government. The Communist party could now proceed with its program of social transformation without regard to the sensitivities of uncertain coalition partners.

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN COMMUNIST CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In a census taken in 1950, 94.6 percent of the total population of Czechoslovakia was religiously affiliated; in Slovakia the figure was 99.6 percent.²⁶ A study of religiosity in northern Moravia conducted by Erika Kadlecová in 1963 and published in Prague in 1965 found that while there was more stability in the ranks of Protestants—a finding consistent with the argument I have developed thus far—the Catholic church continued to claim more adherents. Of the total adult population in the region, about 30 percent described themselves as “atheists,” 30 percent admitted they were “practising believers,” and 40 percent said they were “undecided.”²⁷ A subsequent survey (in 1968) among fourteen hundred residents of Slovakia found that 70.7 percent of the sample remained religious.²⁸ In Kadlecová’s sample, religion was strongest among the oldest, atheism was strongest among those in their thirties and forties, and young people were most inclined to a general indifference to both religion and atheism.

In 1984, according to official statistics, only 36 percent of the Czechoslovak population over age fifteen were religious believers—breaking down into 30 percent of those in Bohemia and Moravia and 51 percent of the inhabitants of Slovakia. On a regional level the two most religious areas are East Slovakia (57 percent religious) and Central Slovakia (53 percent); the two least religious regions are North Bohemia (15 percent) and West Bohemia (21 percent).²⁹

Statistics for 1982–84 show that out of a total population of 15.4 million, 10,024,361 are adherents of the Roman Catholic church, with another 353,991 affiliated with the Greek Catholic church. Among

Protestant churches, the largest church is the Czechoslovak Hussite church once favored by Masaryk, which claims 500,000 adherents. The next largest Protestant church is the Slovak Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession (369,363), followed by the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren (230,000), which grew out of missionary efforts by American revivalists in the nineteenth century. The Czechoslovak Orthodox church claims the next position, with 150,000 believers. The only other religious bodies with more than 20,000 adherents are the Christian Reformed Church of Slovakia (100,000) and the Silesian Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession (46,725), most of whose members speak a "Silesian" language similar to Czech, but a minority of whom speak Polish.³⁰

Within the context of this multiconfessional environment, the Czechoslovak communists took a page from the Soviet Bolsheviks (who had initially encouraged smaller sects in the 1920s, while attacking the largest denomination, the Russian Orthodox church) and determined to concentrate their energies on confrontation with the Catholic church. Accordingly, secret instructions from the Central Action Committee of the Communist party in Prague in 1948 advised party officials that the Czechoslovak (Hussite) church and the Evangelical church were to receive privileged treatment, while Catholic properties were to be confiscated, and some of them reassigned to these "favored" churches. The Orthodox church was also to be treated well.³¹ Further instructions added that "closest cooperation with the Czechoslovak Church is necessary. Encourage participation of their bishops on the occasion of any celebrations; welcome them with full honor."³²

The Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, despite its modest strength, also came to be favored by the communists and became, in fact, the most influential church in at least some arenas in Czechoslovakia.³³ This was due in great part to the efforts of one of its leading theologians, Fr. Josef Hromadká, dean of the Komenský Theological Faculty of the Evangelical church. Hromadká decided right from the beginning that he had nothing against communism and was prepared to cooperate in building a communist society in Czechoslovakia.³⁴

Where the Catholic church was concerned, the Communist party hoped to draw favorably disposed priests into outright collaboration with the regime (giving them parliamentary seats or, as in the case

of Fr. Josef Plojhar, a ministerial portfolio), to create a series of state-controlled parallel church organizations ranging from a shadow "Catholic Action" to a Peace Committee of Catholic Clergy to a surrogate "church" press which would replace the original, authentic church institutions, to assert the right of approval of all significant ecclesiastical appointments, and to exploit nationalism in the endeavor to persuade part of the Catholic clergy to break with Rome and create a schismatic "national" Catholic church. In line with the last strategy the authorities began encouraging clergy to demand that religious services be conducted in Czech and Slovak, rather than in Latin, and playing up the tradition of Cyril and Methodius.³⁵ To achieve this goal of creating a schismatic "national" church it was necessary, the communists were convinced, to foment a rift between the hierarchy and the lower clergy, isolating the former from the flock.³⁶

The communists failed to achieve their most ambitious goals, but in a series of measures, 1949–50, they compelled the churches to submit their budgets for approval to the Bureau for Church Affairs (which had been established on October 14, 1949), established government regulation of the teaching of religion including the requirement that all teacher appointments, syllabi, textbooks, and equipment be approved by the bureau, put the clergy on state salaries, and seized Catholic monasteries and convents on the grounds that they were "centers for espionage and subversive activities."³⁷ Finally, to back up its policy, the regime incorporated the following provision in the penal code passed in July 1950:

Section 174

1. Whoever intentionally frustrates or obstructs the governmental supervision over a church or religious association shall be punished by confinement for from one year to five years.

2. Whoever intentionally violates in any other manner the provisions of laws protecting the churches and religious associations by the government shall be punished in like manner.³⁸

By 1950 three thousand of the seven thousand Catholic priests were either in prison or in labor camps. Of the twelve thousand female and male members of religious orders, eight thousand were locked up for an average of five years. Tens of thousands of Catholic lay activists, including teachers, scout leaders, journalists, and novelists, received

jail sentences. Thirteen of the Catholic Church's fifteen seminaries were closed. And from 1950 until the late 1960s there was almost no publication of religious literature.³⁹

The situation changed overnight in March 1968 as the "Prague Spring" gathered steam. To begin with, the proregime Peace Committee of Catholic Clergy, headed by Plojhar from the time of its formation in 1950, collapsed, and a new organization with new officers and headed by Bishop František Tomášek took its place. The party began to take a new attitude toward religion and appointed sociologist Erika Kadlecová to take charge of the Bureau for Religious Affairs. The Greek Catholic church, suppressed in the early 1950s, was once again given legal status. The Theological Faculty in Olomouc was reopened. And from March on, Catholic newspapers were once more able to expound Catholic views on matters of concern to the church.⁴⁰

PACEM IN TERRIS AND RELIGIOUS "NORMALIZATION"

After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, it was only a matter of time before the churches would feel the effects of "normalization." In July 1969 Kadlecová was dismissed from office and replaced by her hardline predecessor, Hruža. In June 1970 M. Válek, the Slovak minister of culture, appointed a committee to form a new priests' association, and the resulting body, *Pacem in Terris*, came into being in August 1971. This association has been, like the earlier Peace Committee, completely open to communist manipulation. Illustrative of *Pacem in Terris*'s orientation is the declaration passed at its first congress (in Brno, June 3-4, 1975), which was attended by more than four hundred members. According to this declaration, the members of *Pacem in Terris* "are convinced that the socialist social system satisfies the ethical requirements of our faith much better and respects the values of every person, including her or his natural rights, far better than the capitalist system has done, either in the past or in the present."⁴¹

Pacem in Terris has three chief tasks: to be "socially engaged" in the construction of socialism, to work for peace and for good relations between peoples, and to advance the professional interests of its members.⁴² But *Pacem in Terris* has done very little, if anything, for the church. It has kept silent about state insistence that priests not cele-

brate liturgy without a state license. It has kept silent when security police have contacted young seminarians to recruit them as informers. It has never helped to ease the conditions for religious instruction. When Slovak priest Fr. Alojz Tkáč dared to tell an assembly of the priests' association in the mid-1970s about the difficulties in registering Catholic children for religious instruction, he was punished by being stripped of his right to practice his trade.⁴³

Pacem in Terris traces its tradition to earlier priests' associations: a nineteenth-century Jednota (disestablished in 1907) and a twentieth-century association of the same name, whose radical wing broke away in 1920 to revive the Hussite church. These earlier incarnations were in part animated by Czech national consciousness, and the concept of "patriotic priests" represents, in the view of Pacem members, a development of this earlier national awareness.⁴⁴

But the association's de facto betrayal of the church earned it ecclesiastical censure in 1982. In that year, on March 8, the Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano*, published a condemnation of priests' associations which support a specific political ideology or which assume the functions of trade unions, thus reducing the local bishop to a mere "employer."⁴⁵ The condemnation, which had been ratified by Pope John Paul II on March 6, was specifically aimed at Pacem in Terris. In the months that followed, the membership of Pacem in Terris declined rapidly.⁴⁶

In the meantime, post-Spring "normalization" saw the establishment of an Institute for Scientific Atheism in Bratislava in 1971, the establishment of an Atheism Faculty at every university in Slovakia, and other measures concentrated in Slovakia—in recognition of the fact that Catholicism, thanks to its positive correlation with Slovak nationalism, is much stronger among Slovaks than among Czechs. Pressure was also applied on schoolchildren who attended religious instruction. But regime efforts suffered a serious setback—at least among Slovaks—when fellow Slav Karol Cardinal Wojtyła of Kraków was elected pope in October 1978. Slovaks took heart at this development, and numerous reports emerged confirming that unlicensed priests, debarred nuns, and even illegally established seminaries were continuing church work in Slovakia.⁴⁷ In the autumn of 1980 the Slovak secretariat for internal affairs established a special secret police unit and brought in an additional three hundred agents from Bohemia and Moravia. Their task: to

Table 11.1 Catholic Dioceses in Czechoslovakia (as of December 1987)

Diocese/status	Name (age)	Administrator (age)	PIT ^a
Bohemia			
1 Prague Archbishopric	Cardinal František Tomášek (88)	—	no
2 Litomerice Bishopric	vacant	Josef Hendrich (65) Vicar-Capitular	yes
3 Hradec Kralove Bishopric	vacant ^b	Karel Jonas (79) Vicar-Capitular	yes
4 Ceske Budejovice Bishopric	vacant	Josef Kavale (?) Vicar-Capitular	no
Moravia			
5 Olomouc Archbishopric	vacant	[Bishop Josef Vrana, the apostolic administrator, died December 1, 1987, at the age of 82. His successor was not immediately announced.]	
6 Brno Bishopric	vacant	Ludvik Horky (74) Vicar-Capitular	no
Slovakia			
7 Trnava Archbishopric	vacant	Jan Sokol (54) Administrator	no?
8 Banska Bystrica Bishopric	Jozef Feranec (77) Resident Bishop	—	yes
9 Nitra Bishopric	Jan Pasztor (74) Resident Bishop	—	no
10 Kosice Bishopric	vacant	Stefan Onderko (71) Vicar-Capitular	yes
11 Rožnava Bishopric	vacant	Zoltan Belak (74) Vicar-Capitular	yes
12 Spis Bishopric	vacant	Stefan Garaj (72) Vicar-Capitular	yes?
Eastern Rite			
13 Presov Bishopric	vacant	Jan Hirka (65?) Provisional Ordinary	no

Sources: Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, November 27, 1987, pp. 23–24; and *Keston News Service*, no. 289 (December 3, 1987), p. 18.

^aMembership in the proregime priests' association *Pacem in Terris* (PIT).

^bThe consecration of Karel Ocenasek as resident bishop of the bishopric of Hrade Kralove in April 1950 was not acknowledged by the state.

ransack religious buildings, search for "incriminatory" material, and arrest priests and believers.⁴⁸ But even two years later, the party organization at the University of Bratislava was said to remain concerned about the strength of the "underground church" in Slovakia, particularly about the growing number of believers among medical students.⁴⁹

Furthermore, with the state regulating the number of students permitted to enroll in the seminary, the number of Catholic priests actively engaged in pastoral work in the Slovak dioceses is steadily declining. An average of fifty priests die each year in Slovakia, while only thirty new priests are ordained there on the average. In addition, the average age of priests in Slovakia has risen from 59.9 in 1980 to almost 62 in January 1987.⁵⁰

Slovak Catholics who want to evade state regulation must be careful. Small groups are organized, surreptitiously, to study the Bible or to receive religious instruction from priests—this despite the fact that priests are no longer allowed to give religious instruction. Accordingly, these groups are not centrally organized and members of one group are usually unaware of the members or activities of other groups. In recent years more than ten thousand people, mostly young people, have taken part in such secret religious study groups in Slovakia, and only a small percentage of the groups have been uncovered by secret police.⁵¹

In such conditions it is clear that the demand for religious material will remain high. Hence, when an interdenominational edition of the New Testament was put on sale in late 1987, all fifty thousand copies were sold out within a few days.⁵²

Of Czechoslovakia's 4,336 Catholic parishes, only 1,131 had their own priests as of mid-1986. Of the thirteen Czechoslovak dioceses, ten were vacant as of December 1987 (see Table 11.1), because the regime refused to approve the Vatican's candidates, and the Vatican refused to approve the regime's candidates.⁵³ Believers have suffered job discrimination; for example, they are excluded from the teaching profession. Likewise, there have been insuperable obstacles to the construction of new churches.

In late 1987 the West learned of a letter sent by František Cardinal Tomášek, primate of Czechoslovakia and archbishop of Prague, to Milan Klusak, the Czechoslovak minister of culture. In this letter Tomášek presented some sixteen demands, including

- that the state refrain from interfering in admissions to the two existing Catholic seminaries, and that a third seminary be allowed to open in Moravia;
- that students who enroll in religious instruction should not suffer discrimination in secondary and university education;
- that the suppressed religious orders be allowed to reestablish themselves;
- that the Catholic church be allowed to establish youth associations and that these associations be able to hold activities both on and off church premises;
- that the church be allowed to operate an independent religious press, and arrange Catholic radio and television broadcasts;
- that priests and believers arrested for their religious activities be freed from prison and exonerated;
- that the construction of new churches be permitted;
- that the church be allowed to fill the vacant episcopal sees;
- and that church be separated from state.⁵⁴

On December 10, 1987, about a thousand young people gathered at the statue of Jan Hus in downtown Prague. The assembly took place implicitly in defiance of the authorities who had forbidden a planned demonstration there by the human rights group Charter 77. On the square the young people shouted "Husák out!" and called for Gorbachev. In fact, matters were drifting in just that direction, and only a week later, Gustáv Husák was forced out as party secretary and replaced by economic specialist Miloš Jakeš. That same week the Vatican and Czechoslovakia resumed high-level discussions after an interval of almost four years.⁵⁵

The continued strength of Catholicism among Slovaks was very clearly demonstrated in 1985 during celebrations of the eleven hundredth anniversary of the death of St. Methodius, bishop of Moravia. A petition signed by between seventeen thousand and twenty thousand Czechoslovak believers asked the pope to visit Czechoslovakia during the celebrations,⁵⁶ and the pope himself sought to obtain regime concurrence in such a visit. When the regime refused, the pope sent a letter to Czechoslovak believers, praising Methodius's role (with his brother, Cyril) in introducing the Slavic liturgy and "strengthen[ing] the foundations of Czechoslovak cultural history."⁵⁷ A confidential Czechoslovak

Communist party directive criticized the pope for attempting to proselytize in Eastern Europe, instructed party cadres to debunk the celebrations in whatever means available, and revealed that the Academy of Sciences and the archaeological institutes of Brno and Nitra had been instructed to "demonstrate the colonial character of the mission of the two brothers among the Slavs and the nonexistence of Methodius's grave at Velehrad."⁵⁸

When the commemorative day of July 7 arrived, the difference between Czech and Slovak religiosity was once again demonstrated. Although Methodius had lived and worked in the traditional Czech lands and was buried in the Moravian town of Velehrad, some 100,000 to 250,000 Slovaks swarmed to Velehrad for the occasion, while only a few Czechs turned out.⁵⁹ The commemoration of the death of a missionary to the *Czechs* had become a *Slovak* national religious event.

The regime had tried hard to impose its own meaning on the Methodius celebrations. But when the crowds gathered at Velehrad in July 1985, they sang the well-known protest song "We Shall Overcome," clearly expressing their determination to defeat the regime's subversive actions. When a local politician got up before a microphone and tried to welcome the people to "this peace assembly," he was booed off the stage. Police circulated among the crowd and took photographs, and there were provocations all during the event. But the crowd refused to be provoked into any overt antiregime statements which could provide a pretext for the police to close it down. The believers spontaneously chanted, "We want the pope! We want freedom!"—and this again suggested a link between the desire for religious freedom and the desire for political self-determination.⁶⁰ For the Slovaks it was perfectly natural that a religious event should assume a nationalist character.

It is no doubt above all its continued frustration at its inability to curb religiosity among the Slovaks that lies behind the regime's preparations, in the course of 1987, for a complete restructuring of the apparatus for supervising religious affairs. According to reports first surfacing in the Czech Catholic samizdat journal *Informace o Cirkvi*, the projected changes will include the creation of ten regional secretariats for church affairs, to replace the existing one hundred district secretariats. Each office will be administered by three officials: one responsible for supervising the Catholic church, one responsible for all other denominations, and one responsible for financial management. A further

provision, which underscores the importance with which the regime regards its church-monitoring apparatus, calls for the elevation of the secretaries for church affairs in Prague and Bratislava to the rank of deputy minister. *Informace o Cirkví* interpreted these plans as indicative of the state's intention to increase and improve its supervision of religious bodies.⁶¹

CONCLUSION

For the first twenty years of communist rule the Slovaks were animated by resentment at their loss of autonomy and at the relatively less advanced state of their economy compared with Bohemia and Moravia. The federalization of 1968–69 by and large satisfied the first of these desiderata, while a steady program of development of the Slovak economy has gone a long way toward eliminating the sense of economic relative deprivation. Hence, for the past two decades Slovak nationalism has certainly been *muted*.

But Slovak nationalism has also been muted in a broader historical sense. Unlike Czech nationalism, it is neither heroic nor tragic, it lacks a traumatic focus, and only the stillborn Slovak state of World War II provides a rather pale object for nationalist reverie. To the extent that Slovaks have a natural vehicle for their nationalism it lies in their Catholic faith; for the Slovaks, Catholicism is inseparable from the national heritage, and religious celebrations figure simultaneously as a protest against Czechoslovak and Soviet communists, and against Czech Protestants and atheists. Nor have the Slovaks forgotten the efforts of Hlinka and Tiso on behalf of the Slovak national heritage, as Slovak historians Samuel Cambel and Marian Skaldany recently admitted.⁶²

The Catholic Czechs may of course look back to Masaryk, or before him, to the nineteenth-century historian František Palacký (1798–1876). But there is certainly some irony in the fact that for a forceful embodiment and symbol of the struggle against foreign domination, whether spiritual or political, Catholic Czechs tend to look back to a fifteenth-century Protestant.

I have described Czech nationalism as *traumatic* and have provided statistical indicators of the decline of religiosity among Czechs, tracing this decline to the antagonistic nexus between Czech nationalism and

the dominant religion among the Czechs. The relationship between Catholicism and nationalism is almost the "opposite" among Czechs from what it is among Slovaks. For this reason, communist preoccupation with religion has focused very much on Slovakia, and the intensified antireligious drives of the early 1970s and the 1980s have been concentrated there.

Finally, I have suggested that the contrasting relationship between Catholicism and nationalism must be traced not merely to the Hussite legacy and the Battle of White Mountain, but further to the different conditions in which Czechs and Slovaks had to practice their faiths in the nineteenth century (the Czechs under Catholic Austrian rule, the Slovaks under liberal but Magyarizing Hungarian rule), to the differences in historical focus between the Czech and Slovak national revivals in the nineteenth century, and finally to the particular role played by the Slovak People's party of Frs. Hlinka and Tiso.

For the communists, who speak of wanting to develop "ways of overcoming religious prejudice and ensuring religious freedom,"⁶³ and who identify Christianity, and especially Catholicism, with political pluralism,⁶⁴ the legacy of the interaction between national ethos and religious organization provides an opportunity where the Czechs are concerned, and a considerable challenge for the Slovaks.

Religion and Nationality in Hungary

Leslie László

Before 1918 Hungary was a multinational state where religion and the churches played an important role in all the nationalist movements.¹ There were national groups in Hungary, such as the Serbs, Romanians, and Transylvanian Saxons, which had their autonomous churches, but there were also nationalities with divided religious allegiance, such as the Slovaks. Moreover, there were churches, most prominently the Roman Catholic church, which had followers among several nationalities. The dominant Hungarian (Magyar) nation, numbering about half of the population of some 20 million in Old Hungary, was itself divided along religious lines: roughly two-thirds were Catholics, the rest Protestants. Jews, almost all of whom considered themselves Hungarians, accounted for about 5 percent of the total population.

Historic rivalry embittered relations between the two most important Hungarian churches. The members of the Presbyterian, or Calvinist church—less than a quarter of the nation—claimed for themselves the distinction of being the only true bearers of Magyar nationalism. They called their denomination the “magyar vallás,” the Hungarian religion; the implication being that their Catholic conationals, i.e., the two-thirds majority of Hungarians, were following an alien religion and were ready to subordinate the nation’s interest to foreign powers, be that the Habsburgs in Vienna, or the pope in Rome.

The self-consciousness and grossly inflated self-importance of Hungarian Calvinism dates back to the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Habsburgs were bent on forcibly re-Catholicizing their domains (including Hungary) and the defense of the Protestant Reformation became inextricably linked with the struggle

to safeguard both Transylvania's precarious independence and the traditional autonomy within the Empire of the Kingdom of Hungary, in order to preserve the Hungarian character of "both fatherlands" against the encroachments of a centralizing and Germanizing Vienna. The Calvinist princes of Transylvania—István Bocskay, Gábor Bethlen, George Rákóczi—were the paragons of this double mission: defenders of the faith and champions of Hungarian liberties. Of course, Catholics too could marshal equally glorious names among the defenders of Magyadom, such as István Báthory, prince of Transylvania and king of Poland, or Péter Cardinal Pázmány, statesman, writer, founder of Budapest University, or Ferenc Rákóczi II, last prince of Transylvania and the head of the greatest revolt against the Habsburgs. Moreover, if the Protestants pointed to Lajos Kossuth, the fiery leader of the 1848–49 Revolution and War of Independence, the Catholics could glory in Count István Széchenyi whose lofty ideals, coupled with superhuman achievements in the practical fields of law reform, industry, and commerce, earned him the epithet "the greatest Hungarian" from Kossuth himself. Nevertheless, the myth of the preeminence of Calvinism in Hungarian nationalism prevailed and, indeed, survives until today.

There is, of course, more to it: it is not only a myth. There is no denial that in spite of Habsburg oppression and their dwindling numbers, the Protestants in Hungary continued to play a disproportionately important role in politics, business, and culture. Indeed, the religious differentiation within the social stratification of prewar Hungary was rather curious. The high aristocracy who together with the prelates of the Roman Catholic church owned the great latifundia were Catholic. The noble landowners of the middle-sized estates, as well as the many impoverished "gentry" who found employment in the army, the civil service, and the free professions, were mostly Protestants who, after the 1867 constitutional compromise with Austria, dominated Hungarian politics and culture. Finally, banking, industry, and commerce, and a progressively larger share of the free professions, academic life, and the arts, became the preserve of the Jews whose numbers steadily increased after the middle of the nineteenth century by free immigration from Austrian Galicia.

The so-called Compromise Era, 1867–1918, was not only a period of feverish railroad building and industrialization, but also a time for Hungarian self-assertion that, after the 1880s, manifested itself in an

unbridled chauvinism and a determination to "Magyarize" the non-Magyar half of the population, by force if necessary. Catholics and Protestants, but also the Jews, vied with each other to prove who was a better Hungarian, who could "convert" more "heathen" Slovaks, Swabians, Romanians, etc., to true Magyardom. The churches played a vital role in the assimilation process by virtue of their control of the majority of the schools, the primary instruments of "Magyarization." Their effectiveness was not inconsiderable among the Slovaks, Ruthenes, and Swabians. However, among the Serbs, Romanians, and Saxons, who possessed their own strongly nationalistic churches, the impact of the Magyarization drive remained negligible.²

Following World War I, two revolutions, and a counterrevolution, Hungary was deprived of two-thirds of its territory and more than half of its population. The losses included nearly all of the non-Magyar nationalities, together with some 3 million Magyars who became the new minority in the successor states. Nationalism in the much reduced but now nearly homogeneous Magyar country took the form of an embittered irredentism, a passionate desire to reverse the terms of the Treaty of Trianon and regain the lost territories and population. To aid Hungarians suffering under foreign yokes across the borders became a sacred duty.

Bickering continued among the churches during the rule of the Calvinist Regent Miklós Horthy. The Protestants complained about the quasi-established church role and privileges of the Catholic church and its great landed wealth, while Catholics resented Protestant preponderance in public life and the proportionately greater state subsidies to their churches. However, all churches, as indeed all Hungarians, were at one in supporting the revisionist irredentism of the government, while in the lost territories religion became—especially through the parochial schools—the bulwark in the defense of the national language and culture.³

NATIONALISM OR INTERNATIONALISM?

A partial realization of the irrendenta, the recovery by Hungary of some of her lost territories between 1938 and 1941, was made possible only through alliance with the Axis powers. That, in turn, placed Hungary on the side of the losers once more. As the price of defeat, Hungary's

territory and population again was reduced to the confines of the Trianon borders. More significantly, the entire socioeconomic system of the semifeudal prewar period was swept away by the conquering Red Army. A whole new set of values was imposed abruptly on the beaten nation. Revisionist nationalism, the irredentism of the Horthy era, was now outlawed. With the communists rising to power, nationalism became a dirty word, linked in tandem with another malodorous category as "bourgeois nationalism." Internationalism of the Soviet communist type, i.e., solidarity with the world proletariat, but above all, love for the first socialist country, the great Soviet Union, was to replace Hungarian nationalism in the hearts of the people. History was rewritten according to Marxist philosophy, with emphasis on economic factors and class struggle. The Hungarian past was reduced to the recounting of incidents of social protests, glorifying obscure leaders of revolting peasants, while the heroes of the thousand-year-old Christian kingdom were neglected, even vilified as the oppressors of the common people. Desperate attempts were made to present the Soviets, not only as true friends and liberators, but also as the role models whose example should be emulated to the last detail as the only true way for the future evolution of the Hungarian nation. All this represented a wrenching away of a whole nation from its past values, based on European Christian culture, and forcing it into a new mold of Soviet life-style.⁴

This proved to be far from easy. Contrary to Soviet wishful thinking, the Hungarians continued to perceive them as conquerors and oppressors. Moreover, because the Magyar language belongs to the small Finno-Ugric family, Hungarians always felt alone and threatened in their national survival, on the one hand by the Germans, but even more by the Slavic sea surrounding them and dominated by the Russians.⁵ Suspicion and distrust of the latter is exacerbated by the profound sociocultural differences in which religion plays an important role. In contrast to the Russians who follow Christianity of the Eastern, Byzantine rite, Hungarians, whether Catholic or Protestant, belong to the Western religious cultural tradition. Orthodox Russian culture, symbolized by the Cyrillic alphabet and onion-domed churches, was and remains totally alien to Hungarians. Thus religion represents a powerful obstacle to the grandiose plan of cultural transformation, the magic "Operation Switch" from West to East.

National resistance to Sovietization and Russification found its great-

est champion in the person of József Cardinal Mindszenty, archbishop of Esztergom, prince-primate of Hungary. Coming from a family of small farmers, this immensely energetic and courageous prelate regarded himself as the first dignitary of the realm, the spiritual leader and teacher of his nation. Deliberately ignoring the changing times, he refused to renounce his claim to political influence and responsibility in public affairs, as these had been granted to his predecessors under the old monarchical constitution.

During the early postwar years the "Muscovite" leader Mátyás Rákosi, using his famous "salami tactics,"⁶ silenced one by one all voices of opposition until, by 1948, the cardinal remained virtually alone, a fearless advocate of legality and respect for human rights, ceaselessly castigating the government for the excesses of the ever-increasing police terror.⁷ For the new communist rulers Mindszenty became the personification of The Enemy, but for the great majority of Hungarians, regardless of their religious conviction, he was the symbol of resistance against alien domination, indeed, the nation's conscience, her only true voice.

In his frequently issued pastoral letters and speeches delivered to immense crowds while tirelessly touring the country,⁸ he used examples from the nation's history to recall its sacred mission as the defender of Christianity and Western cultural values. In order to reinforce his listeners' national spirit and pride, he rallied them around national religious symbols. He reminded them that Hungary was once called the *Regnum Marianum* whose quasi-miraculous survival amid its enemies for over a millennium was due to the special protection of Mary, the *Magna Domina Hungarorum*, to the wisdom and statesmanship of King St. Stephen, to the prayers of St. Margaret of the House of Árpád, as well as to the noble deeds of countless other national heroes imbued with Christian virtues. The activities of the prince-primate, however, were not confined to religious and moral exhortations. In the face of government inaction he took it upon himself to protest in the name of all Hungarians against the punitive Paris Peace Treaty of 1947,⁹ and also against the forcible resettlement and expulsion of Hungarians by Czechoslovakia.¹⁰

Outraged by the cardinal's presumption to speak in the nation's name, but even more embarrassed and mortified by his immense popu-

larity, the communists did their best to discredit him and thereby to undermine the impressive unity of the resistance. In their propaganda they called the prince-primate a Swabian, a Nazi sympathizer, an anti-Semite, a reactionary who wanted to restore the great latifundia to the former landlords, and a religious fanatic who would want to reintroduce the inquisition and forcibly reconvert Protestants and agnostics to Catholicism. Mass rallies of workers were held against "clerical reaction," clamoring for the blood of that "enemy of the people," the traitor Mindszenty. By various means of physical and mental coercion even some prominent Catholics were persuaded to disassociate themselves from the primate's policies and denounce him as the greatest obstacle to peace and social harmony.¹¹ Still, the cardinal's great moral authority remained intact. When Rákosi finally decided to silence him, he was arrested and tried as a common criminal on charges of foreign currency speculation, antipeople conspiracy, and treason against the motherland. At his famous show trial the communist propaganda machine contrived to project an image of him as a feeble, confused, repentant petty criminal, and not as a heroic martyr revered the world over.¹²

The following years, 1949–56, were times of great economic hardship and brutal oppression. Religion was persecuted, and the churches—like all former opposition—were thoroughly purged and domesticated. It should be noted that the communists from the very beginning masterfully applied the age-old maxim of "divide and conquer" not only to their parliamentary opposition, but also to the churches. The Protestant churches, whose Presbyterian constitution allows for greater lay representation in their governing synods, presented an easier target for infiltration and soon had their leadership dominated by crypto-communists and fellow travelers.¹³ They made their peace with the regime and signed the required "agreements" in the early fall of 1948. In this way the united front of Christians, forged by Cardinal Mindszenty with Calvinist bishop László Ravasz and Lutheran bishop Lajos Ordas, was broken. Left thus alone, traumatized by the fate of the prince-primate, and with thousands of recently arrested monks and nuns threatened with deportation to forced labor in Siberia, the Catholic episcopate too succumbed and signed an "agreement" in August 1950, only by this time the terms were much harsher than those granted to the Protes-

tants. Besides accepting total subordination to the state, the church had to pledge support for communist policies, such as collectivization of agriculture and other steps in the "building of socialism."¹⁴

In this bleak picture there was, however, one consolation. Religious fervor and loyalty to the church had never been as intense and visible as during these times of trial. True, the church hierarchy—both Catholic and Protestant—was brought to heel and forced to pay lip service to the regime and its practices. At the same time the bond between the persecuted clergy and the oppressed population was strengthened greatly by the common suffering. By all accounts the churches were never so full as during the darkest years of Stalinism. Moreover, those priests and ministers who had fallen in disfavor with the regime and as a consequence were deprived of all material sustenance found generous support among their parishioners, no matter how hard pressed and poor. In contrast the communist dictator Rákosi and the "Muscovite" clique around him were regarded as aliens, more Soviet than Hungarian, who reaped only distrust and hatred for what they had sown.

The intolerable repression resulted in the explosion of 1956. The revolution of that year was fought for freedom and independence under the national flag against the Soviet occupying forces and their Hungarian satraps.¹⁵ Revolutionary councils sprang up nationwide and pressed a reluctant Imre Nagy—the reformist "national communist" premier installed in the first days of the revolution with Moscow's blessing as a compromise—for far-reaching reforms. These would have amounted, in effect, to the dismantling of the communist system in Hungary. Perhaps Bennett Kovrig summarized best the demands and aspirations of Hungarians in 1956 in writing:

The goal of the revolution was pluralistic democratic socialism, encompassing retention of some central planning and nationalization (perhaps with workers' self-management) within a mixed economy; aid to independent farmers and free choice in the formation of agricultural cooperatives; elimination of police terror; economic and political sovereignty and state neutrality; and such basic rights as free unions, the right to strike, and cultural and religious freedom. Unfettered multiparty contests would determine government policy, and the influence of a reformed national Communist party would be proportional to its electoral appeal.¹⁶

The mounting wave of nationalism fueled the anti-Soviet and anti-communist passion of the masses¹⁷ and drove Nagy to abandon the monopoly rule of the Communist party, to bring representatives of the resurrected "bourgeois" parties into his cabinet, to promise free elections, and, on November 1, to declare Hungary's neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, while simultaneously asking for United Nations recognition and protection.

During those glorious autumn days Cardinal Mindszenty was freed from detention and recognized and honored by the Nagy government as primate of Hungary. The churches purged their leadership of collaborators and pledged support for the cause of national independence and pluralist democracy. Church bells were ringing again at noon to commemorate the victory of János Hunyadi over the "infidels" in 1456 and the national anthem "God Bless the Hungarians" was on everybody's lips. Alas, the euphoria of regained liberty and national pride was cut short by the Soviet invasion on November 4, 1956. This was followed by the merciless punishment of thousands of the best patriots, including the judicial murder of Imre Nagy and several of his closest associates.

RESURGENCE OF NATIONALISM

The lessons of 1956 were not entirely lost on the new leader János Kádár. He—and his Soviet sponsors—must have learned about the dangers inherent in pent-up tensions due to existential fear, economic hardship, and repressed national sentiments. After a period of severe retribution the controls gradually were eased. In art, literature, theater, and cinema, humanistic and nationalist themes reappeared. In this relaxed atmosphere of Kádár's "goulash communism" people, especially young students, began to ask, ever more boldly, how it came that while they were marched to the streets to demonstrate for the national independence and human rights of the Vietnamese, Angolans, black South Africans, etc., they were forbidden to commemorate Hungarian independence on March 15, the anniversary of the glorious revolution of 1848, and why was it that nobody spoke out about the violation of human rights of the Hungarians just across the border in Romania?

By the mid-1960s, apparently unable to ignore the popular pressure

any longer, the party decided to tackle the ticklish issue of nationalism. After several attempts at redefinition, party ideologues and historians did produce a new hybrid of the old Stalinist concept of "socialist patriotism." It now was proclaimed that in a one-class system socialist state patriotism was serving socialist national interest while simultaneously serving international, i.e., Soviet, interest too.¹⁸ In this way nationalism, within the admittedly ill-defined parameters of "socialist patriotism," received the party's blessing. The question became what this would mean in practice. Subtle changes had been occurring for some time that now became more pronounced and readily apparent.

National history was "rediscovered" and in it the positive role of Christianity, King St. Stephen, and the Reformation. The regime, of course, continued to espouse the Marxist-Leninist materialistic worldview and to educate young people in an atheistic spirit, but the pressure on religion was eased and a certain *modus vivendi* was worked out with the churches. In fact, one could argue that after the Rákosi period of open hostility and confrontation, church-state relations in Hungary have developed beyond simple peaceful coexistence to active cooperation in the "construction of socialism."¹⁹ Members of the government ostentatiously participate in church festivities, such as the four-hundred-year jubilee of the Hungarian Presbyterian church (celebrated in 1967 in Debrecen, the city nicknamed "the Calvinist Rome"), or the one-thousand-year anniversary feast of the birth of St. Stephen, the first Christian king, that was held in 1970 in Budapest and in the ancient capital, Székesfehérvár. Furthermore, leaders of the churches are given prominent roles in the communist-sponsored Patriotic People's Front, the official representative body of all societal organizations. More interestingly, government representatives praise the churches for their positive influence on people's morality and for their role in the preservation of the national heritage through their continuing interest in and support of art, literature, music, folklore, and customs.²⁰

A word of caution is in order here. These positive gestures toward the churches should not be assigned undue significance. The fact is that in the past thirty years Hungarian society has undergone unprecedented radical transformation. The mass migration from rural to urban environment, the repression of the churches, the atheistic education of the youth, the disintegration of the family, have caused profound alienation and disruption of the traditional religion-oriented life-style, resulting

in rapid secularization. In consequence, the importance and influence of religion and the churches on the thinking and behavior of the masses has diminished to near insignificance.²¹ Thus, it should be no surprise that the recent reawakening of national self-consciousness among Hungarians is a purely secular phenomenon whose chief apostles are the writers, historians, composers, ethnographers, and folklore enthusiasts. Even the amazing success of the *Csiksomlyói Passió*, a stage adaptation of an eighteenth-century passion play from the Székely district of Transylvania which was performed before full houses at the Castle Theater of Buda for several seasons, was more likely due to the transcendent beauty of Transylvanian folklore embodied in the text and the sets—i.e., to nationalistic appeal—rather than to its religious content. The same can be said of the rock opera *István a Király*, which was the greatest hit of the 1980s not only on stage but in the cinema and on cassette recordings. The mass demonstrations that accompanied its open-air performances were triggered not so much by allusions to the religious zeal and missionary work of the protagonist, St. Stephen, the first king of Hungary, as by the lines in the songs glorifying him as the builder of the nation, the champion of freedom from foreign rule, and defender of Hungary's national independence. Unlike the situation in neighboring Poland, in today's Hungary nationalism has precious little to do with religion or the churches.

There is, however, a significant exception to the above observation. Reassured of their national identity by Kádár at home, the chief motivating force and focal point of interest of contemporary Hungarian nationalism has become concern for the survival of the approximately 5 million compatriots (i.e., one-third of all Hungarians) living outside Hungary, and that is precisely where the churches render an invaluable service to the nation. The most burning issue agitating Hungarians everywhere today is that of Transylvania where over 2 million Hungarians (and nearly half a million Germans) must endure cultural deprivation and forcible denationalization and Romanianization.²² True, it was Gyula Illyés, the Nestor of Hungarian poets, who sounded the alarm about the fate of his compatriots in the neighboring countries and sensitized his fellow writers and the general public to the cause.²³ However, the churches alone were able to translate indignation and sorrow into effective help. Both the Catholic and the Protestant press, in Hungary and in the West, devote much space to the discussion of the plight

of the minorities. They were the first to open their columns to contributions from Magyar writers and scholars in the successor states.²⁴ Among the Hungarian parishes in Western Europe and overseas, collections are taken that, together with the donations of the churches in the Western world, are transmitted to their beleaguered sister churches.²⁵ Since in Transylvania the dominant Romanians are Eastern Orthodox, while the Hungarians are Catholic and Calvinist (the Germans are Lutheran and Catholic), religion remains the strongest bulwark against assimilation. In the words of Robert Bácsváry:

Independently of their involvement with the church, all Catholic Germans and Hungarians agree on one thing: they see in the church their last hope and the only guarantee of their identity. As long as their children are taught the gospel in their mother tongue, as long as some religious instruction is still given in the mother tongue, as long as they can still pray and sing in their churches in German or Hungarian, they preserve their identity and are also bound together as a people.²⁶

Needless to say, the same applies also to the Protestants of Transylvania, be they Calvinist, Lutheran, or Unitarian, Hungarian or German.

The Kádár regime, apparently restrained by the Soviets and also by its own ideology of "socialist internationalism," had ignored the issue for many years, until it was forced by a mounting wave of popular indignation to take action. This was done at first in behind-the-door negotiations, but when it became evident that the 1977 agreement resulting from the Oradea and Debrecen meetings between Kádár and Ceaușescu did nothing to improve the situation, prominent government figures began to voice their concern more openly. By 1986–87 they went so far as to denounce Romania publicly—without actually naming it—before the international forum of the Helsinki Review Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. There Hungary, alone among the Warsaw Pact countries, supported those resolutions by Canada and Yugoslavia which called for respect of the rights of national minorities.²⁷ At the same time the churches of Hungary, petitioned by hundreds of their parishioners to take an open stand and apparently authorized by the government to do so, issued strong statements in support of the human rights for the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries. Both the document issued by the seven Protestant and Orthodox churches

belonging to the Ecumenical Council of Hungary²⁸ and the message of the Roman Catholic bishops to their flock²⁹ expressed special concern over the fate of Hungarians in Romania and insisted that national minorities should have the right to preserve their language, culture, and religion and be able to communicate freely with their conationals across the border.

It should be noted that the sustaining role of religion and the churches in the preservation of Magyar culture is applicable equally to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the USSR; however, because of the smaller numbers involved³⁰ and the relatively greater freedom enjoyed by them (notably in the case of Yugoslavia), their situation is not perceived with as much pain and urgency by the Hungarian public. The point is though that in each and every case it is clear that support given to the minority churches reinforces the minority nationality. This fact is increasingly acknowledged by all Hungarians, be they religious believers, agnostics, or atheists.³¹

Interestingly, since the early 1970s the communist regime also has paid increasing attention to the nearly 2 million Hungarians living in the free world. It promotes cultural exchanges, fosters dance and folklore groups, provides teachers and textbooks for the needs of the émigré children, and, every two years, sponsors a Conference on the Mother Tongue to which participants from the five continents are invited, all expenses paid. In its praiseworthy effort to preserve the Magyar language and national identity among the Hungarians in the diaspora, the regime has had to rely on the cooperation of the churches, whether it likes to or not, since in practice only the churches maintain a visible institutional presence among the emigrants abroad.³² Nearly all Saturday and Sunday schools where children are taught the Hungarian language and culture are maintained by the churches.³³ Similarly, the great majority of social clubs, cultural societies, youth organizations,³⁴ and charitable associations are church-affiliated or, at least, hold their meetings and celebrations on church premises.

While many of the émigrés continue to distrust the Budapest regime and keep their distance from its diplomatic representatives and official emissaries, the majority of priests and ministers today maintain contact and exchange visits with their confrères in the old country and, what is more important, open their churches and auditoriums to bona fide visiting writers, scholars, and performers coming from Hungary

and, occasionally, from Transylvania. As a result, anybody who speaks or writes today about the survival of Magyardom, or about Hungarian literature, art, and culture alive and flourishing anywhere in the world, inevitably is bound to add a few words in praise of the churches for their invaluable contributions.

Perhaps therein lies today the role of religion in relation to nationalism in the Hungarian context: within Hungary religion has retained little significance in forming national attitudes. However, there is a growing realization and appreciation by both the regime and the general public of the crucial role that religion and the churches play in sustaining the Hungarian language and nationality under the extremely difficult conditions of minorities and diaspora abroad where roughly one-third of the nation lives.

Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslavia

Pedro Ramet

Religion is a constitutive element in the group identity and nationalism of most nationality groups for several reasons. First, it is the historical core of the culture that shaped the evolution of primitive tribes into politically conscious nations. Second, it is a badge of group identity, distinguishing "us" from "them," establishing a basis for identification or distance (so that in Yugoslavia it is possible to speak of Slovenes and Croats as being Catholic nations, and Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians as being Orthodox). Third, religious groups always have been in the forefront of the development of national languages, national literature, and the dissemination of literature in the national tongue through the printing press. Fourth, being more highly educated, more respected, and more politically conscious, the clergy naturally stepped into leadership roles and does so even today. Finally, encounters with other nationality groups with different religious practices encourage the group to think of its religion as particularly its own, even as essential to its national survival.

In multiethnic Yugoslavia religious organizations may be divided roughly into three groups, in terms of their relation to national identity and nationalism. The first group consists of the historical churches that have acted as the cultural guardians of their respective peoples for more than a millennium. There are only two churches in this group: the Roman Catholic church, closely identified with the Slovenes and Croats, and the Serbian Orthodox church. The second group consists of the ethnic churches and comprises church organizations linked with particular groups but lacking the claim to historical guardianship. Claiming only a small minority of the nationality groups to which

they cater, they are "national" in form without having any chance of playing the role of national guardians. In this group I would include the Czech Brethren, the Slovak Evangelical church (headquartered in Vojvodina), the Hungarian Evangelical church (Subotica), and the Old Catholic church (Croatia). The third group consists of non-national churches, usually of recent vintage, which tend to be disinterested in national culture as such. Among this group one finds Seventh-Day Adventists, Baptists, and Jehovah's Witnesses.

This categorization, however, excludes two very important religious organizations which, I believe, are more accurately viewed as special cases: the Macedonian Orthodox church and the Islamic community. The former, which came into being only in 1967 as a product of a schism still repudiated by the Serbian Orthodox church, is indeed national but it is not historic, since official affirmation of Macedonian ethnicity is of recent vintage (a postwar phenomenon) and since Orthodoxy has variously treated Macedonians either as Serbs or as Bulgarians (depending on whether the clergyman in question was Serbian Orthodox or Bulgarian Orthodox). The Islamic community, on the other hand, is distinct both because its institutional organization is looser and less politically conscious, and because the enveloping Islamic culture (which is, in today's Yugoslavia, taken to be constitutive of a distinct Muslim nationality) is perhaps entirely a product of the synthesis of the peculiarly religious element (i.e., Islam as a way of life) and of Turkish culture (i.e., the culture of a conqueror whose very conquest was inspired in large part by the drive to spread Islam). While Yugoslav Marxists painstakingly emphasize that there are ethnic Muslims in Yugoslavia who are not religiously Muslim, and that some of those who are Muslim by religion are of Turkish, Albanian, or even Macedonian ethnicity, the identification is a close one.

This chapter will argue that Yugoslav policy toward the various religious groups is, to a significant extent, affected by the relationship that the latter bear toward nationalism and that, at the same time, the policy adopted by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) toward each nationality group determines in large part the policy that is adopted vis-à-vis the "local" religion. This claim has only one point of contact with what LCY apologists portray as party policy and is otherwise at considerable variance with the official party version. For the party has always insisted, in spite of policy reversals, inconsistencies, and vari-

ous discriminatory decisions both positive and negative, that its policy both in the religious sphere and in the nationality sphere is a monolithic whole, consistent over time and space and ruffled at most by the headstrong deviations of local party cadres. This picture is almost completely false. The one point of contact, however, in which there is an element of truth lies in the party's admission that it takes umbrage at any involvement by church organizations in interethnic relations, either as the guardian of national values, as the purveyor of interethnic hate, or even as the conduit for interethnic communication and harmony. For the LCY the churches are to be banished to the liturgical and strictly ritual sphere as their exclusive domain, a banishment termed the "privatization" of religion, in which the party recognizes religion as a "private affair" but denies it any legitimate place in public life.¹

Obviously, however, while religious belief is certainly in some sense a "private affair," churches have always been public organizations involved in the public life of the community. To deny the churches any place in the public sphere is not merely to assail the linkage of religion and nationalism at a pivotal point but also to undercut the very basis of church life altogether.

Yugoslav nationalities policy, while described by its apologists Karđelj, Purivatra, and others² as a cohesive and unified whole, is a logical whole only in theory. In practice, the party both denies the existence of a Yugoslav nationality and applauds the denationalization of those who declare themselves "Yugoslavs" at census time, both encourages the ethnic self-consciousness of some groups (Macedonians and Muslims, and to an extent Montenegrins) and condemns the ethnic consciousness of other groups (Croats, Albanians, and sometimes Serbs), both preaches "brotherhood and unity" (*bratstvo i jedinstvo*) and stirs up, without respite, the memories of the civil war of 1941-45, the vivid recollection of which is the surest guarantee that brotherhood and unity will never be achieved.³ Even the chief insight of Yugoslav nationalities policy, viz., that a multiethnic community can only be harmonious when far-reaching powers are devolved to federal units co-terminous with constituent ethnic groups, is undercut by the party's refusal to consider the extension of federalization to its own apparatus.

Religious and nationalities policy interact in party favoritism toward the religious organizations of favored nationality groups (especially where the Macedonian Orthodox church is concerned) and in the esca-

lation of church-state frictions in cases where the church retains the role of defender of its nationality group (e.g., the Catholic church in Croatia and the Serbian Orthodox church in Serbia,⁴ though not the Catholic church in Slovenia, except insofar as that archbishopric, especially under the late Archbishop Jože Pogačnik, became involved in the defense of human rights and the assertion of church claims to a role in education).

HISTORICAL ORIGINS

Orthodoxy and Serbian Nationalism

The period of the Great Migrations, between the fourth and tenth centuries, coincided with the institutional entrenchment of Christianity in the Balkans as elsewhere in Europe. By the ninth century Christianity had acquired a dominant influence in both Croatia and Serbia,⁵ though Christians and pagans continued to live side by side in both lands for some time. It is understandable then that the process of the formation of ethnic-national identity (ethnogenesis) was associated with Christianization. Moreover, since it was the church that gave definition to the content of human culture and social mores, diluted tribal identities were supplanted readily by "national" identities founded on the conjunction of church and state. Orthodoxy became the badge of Serbdom, just as Catholicism was the mark of a Croat. The ethnogenesis of the Bosnian Muslims is a tangled web, however, whose various threads historians have failed to untangle. Croatian nationalists (such as Ivo Pilar) usually have described the Muslims as Islamized Croats who, through conversion, acquired a new locus of cultural identification that entailed the loss of Croatian national consciousness; similarly, for Pilar, as incoming Vlachs and local Croats converted to Serbian Orthodoxy, they became part of a community whose heartland was Peć and Mileševo and came to regard themselves as Serbs.⁶

Far from being an accidental by-product of the expansion of political power, confessional homogenization was consciously sought by the Balkan princes. Prince Bodin (1082–1101) sought to strengthen church organization in Serbia and, still looking West at that time, obtained papal recognition of the elevation of the bishopric of Bar to the status

of metropolite. Later, Sava, youngest son of Serbian Prince Stefan Nemanja, who had united Serbia, obtained recognition of the Serbian church as an autocephalous member of Orthodoxy in 1219. Nemanja himself vigorously suppressed the heretical Bogomil sect, which he viewed as a threat to civil order, and the Bogomils fled from Serbia. In Croatia, too, King Tomislav (910–c. 928) aspired to make the church liturgically more monolithic and organizationally more unified and therefore allied with the pope and with the bishop of Split in the early tenth century to assert the primacy of the bishop of Split throughout Croatia and to ban continued use of the Old Slavic Glagolitic liturgy, requiring the use of Latin instead.⁷ In the principality of Bosnia, where an autonomous Christian church functioned which was neither Roman nor Orthodox, both Bogomils and Dalmatian Catholic priests who refused to give up the Glagolitic liturgy found safe haven in Bosnia's relatively tolerant atmosphere.⁸ In a certain way the Bosnian church figured as a national religion, synthesizing disparate elements from Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Bogomilism, Islam, and even paganism. But the Bosnian church was never strong institutionally and thus the Bosnian regional identity that began to develop lacked a confessional anchor.⁹ By the second quarter of the fifteenth century energetic proselytization by the Franciscan order had seriously eroded the adherence of the Bosnian peasantry to the Bosnian church. By 1460, according to Fine, "most of the nobility seems to have been won over to Catholicism [and] . . . the Bosnian church stood alone without mass popular support and without the backing of nobility. . . . Even within the Church itself loyalty and interest were lacking."¹⁰ This same institutional weakness facilitated the penetration of elements of Islamic culture and faith after the Turkish conquest (1463), but that conquest also led Bosnian Catholics and Orthodox to identify with the neighboring states of Croatia and Serbia, respectively.

During the Turkish occupation the Serbian Orthodox church assumed the role of guardian of the national culture and traditions of the Serbian people. It fostered education and cultivated resentment of the Islamic conquerer. In 1593, as Austria and Turkey went to war, the Serbs staged a major rebellion in Banat. Patriarch Jovan II of Peć (whose patriarchate had been reestablished in 1557) "directly stimulated" the uprising and blessed the banners of the insurgents. In retaliation—and perhaps in the conviction that if you demonstrate your power

to destroy the religious shrines of a people, you destroy as well the power of that people to resist—the Turks opened the grave of St. Sava at Mileševo, removed the corpse, and on April 27, 1594, burned it in Vračar, near Belgrade.¹¹ When the Austrians made peace with the Turks in 1606, the Serbian revolt caved in. Yet in 1689, during a subsequent Austro-Turkish war, when the Serbs once more rose against the Turks and joined in collaboration with the Austrians, the patriarch of Peć, Arsenije III Carnojević, egged the rebels on, invited the Venetians to send in troops in support of the rebellion, and, after the collapse of the Austrian campaign, led a large migration of Serbs from the area of present-day Kosovo through Belgrade into what is today Vojvodina.

The Turks tried to dampen the nationalist temper of the Serbian Orthodox church, abolishing, in 1766, the Serbian patriarchate at Peć, and, in the years that followed, banning everything Slavic or national in Serbian liturgy and church life. They subjected the church to thorough hellenization, but this policy only ensured that the Serbian clergy would give their strongest backing to the Serbian liberation movement that began in 1804. Archpriest Matija Nenadović procured ammunition and served in the cavalry during the First Serbian Insurrection (1804–13), and Serbian monasteries were regularly used as meeting places and safe havens for anti-Turkish Serbian rebels, as headquarters for Serbian commanders, and even as weapons storehouses. In fact, the rebellious Serbs several times set up “command posts” in Serbian monasteries. In 1830 the sultan reluctantly conceded Serbs the right to internal self-government, and the following year the Serbs freed their church from Greek supervision.

Both in Ottoman Bosnia and in Habsburg Vojvodina, the Serbian Orthodox church and the Roman Catholic church competed for the loyalty of the population; in both cases confessional loyalty was equated with ethnic loyalty. As a result of the 1848 revolution, Patriarch Josip Rajačić of the Serbian Orthodox church was named “patriarch of the Serbian nation” by the Viennese court that same year. Rajačić tried to live up to the title by demanding in 1860, for example, that the Austrian Ministry of War change the name of the Romanian-Banat border regiment to the Serbian-Banat border regiment.¹²

Subsequently, as the Serbian state consolidated its independence, Serbian nationalists continued to emphasize the importance of Orthodoxy for the state and the nation. The symbiotic strength of the linkage of

religion and nationalism was so alluring that no less a figure than Vuk Karadžić, the linguistic reformer and Serbian nationalist, declared that not only were the Serbs "the greatest people on the planet," but in fact Jesus and his apostles were themselves all Serbs.¹³ Church leaders themselves became spokesmen for national expansionism. Already in 1794 a Serbian monk named Jovan Rajić had laid claim to Bosnia-Herzegovina as ethnically Serbian. Drawing back with horror at the concept of an ancient "Illyrian" people inhabiting the eastern shore of the Adriatic, a concept being propagated by some Croatian Catholic writers, the Serbian Orthodox church insisted that Serbs would not give up their name and their identity for some artificial Illyrian idea. Teodor Pavlović, a particularly vociferous opponent of Illyrism, asked in 1837 why "Serbs of the Roman law do not call themselves Serbs." By his count, there were five million Serbs, but only four thousand "true" Croats.¹⁴

The Croats and Catholicism

The active involvement of the Catholic clergy on behalf of Croatian nationalism was somewhat later in coming, though some parish priests openly supported a Croatian peasant rebellion against Emperor Maximilian in 1573.¹⁵ Vinko Pribojević (Vincentius Priboevius), a Dominican priest, was one of the first clergy to write on national themes and hypothesized, in a work published in 1525, the existence of an Illyrian people, understood by him to be Slavic in language and culture.¹⁶ Another Dominican priest, Juraj Križanić (1618–83), developed Illyrian ideology further by identifying Serbs, Croats, and Bulgarians as three stems of the "Illyrian branch" of a still broader "Slavic nation" that also included Russians, Poles, and Czechs. Influenced by Levaković, Križanić tinkered with a project of patching together elements of the speech patterns of these different peoples to produce a synthetic South Slav language—what Lauer calls "a kind of Slavic Esperanto." Križanić, like most of his ecclesiastical contemporaries, viewed Croatia as merely a geographic part of Illyria.¹⁷ Numerous other Catholic clergy became vehicles of Illyrian ideology, especially the Franciscans, who spread the political credo throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many of the clergy viewed the Illyrian mythology as an effective tool in propagating Catholicism, and the efforts by Jesuit priests F. K. Pejačević and K. Pejkić to introduce Illyrism in Bulgaria in the mid-eighteenth

century can be understood best as serving the purpose of propagating Catholicism.

Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815–1905), appointed bishop of Djakovo in 1849, has come to personify the Illyrian movement because of his active endeavors to create a political union of Croatia and Serbia. Strossmayer negotiated with the Serbian government, orchestrated an uprising in Bosnia, and championed the autochthonous Glagolitic liturgy (which had reemerged as an issue in 1848 during the revolutionary upheaval, when it was taken up as a cause by Illyrian nationalists). Strossmayer's close friend, Friar Franjo Rački (1828–94), spelled out the essence of Illyrism when he declared that Croats and Serbs had no basis for claiming to be ethnically distinct and that only the Vatican was hindering the rapprochement of Catholic and Orthodox "Illyrians."¹⁸

Strossmayer has come to symbolize the integrative, embracing strand in Croatian national ideology, in which the common language is stressed and the religious divide is overcome by drawing the Catholic and Orthodox churches together into a "national church." Not surprisingly, Yugoslav communists have repeatedly held up Strossmayer as a true Yugoslav.¹⁹

A second strand of Croatian national ideology also evolved in the course of the nineteenth century, however, and ultimately became more closely identified with the Catholic church than the Illyrian strand. The alternative to a broader South Slav state was seen by most Croats to lie in a restoration of Croatian independence. The Croatian Party of Right, created by ex-seminarist Ante Starčević, was in essence a Catholic movement working for the political independence of a Catholic Croatia.²⁰ Thus, from the mid-nineteenth century until the 1920s, the church in Croatia was riven into two factions: the progressives, who favored incorporation of Croatia into a liberal Slavic state and envisioned union with Serbia on lines drawn by Strossmayer; and the conservatives, who preferred the ecclesiastical security of union with Austria-Hungary if outright independence could not be secured, and who were loathe to bind Catholic Croatia with Orthodox Serbia. By 1900 the latter (exclusivist) faction appeared to have gained the upper hand and the First Croatian Catholic Congress, held in Zagreb that year, was implicitly anti-Orthodox and anti-Serb. "As a Croat," Baron Miroslav Kulmer told this convention, to resounding applause, "I identify Catholicism with Croatian national identity. [We must] safeguard

this foundation of the Croatian nation, which is the only [institution] capable of preserving our consciousness and nationality."²¹ So consonant were the aims of the church's Croatian Social party and Starčević's Croatian Party of Right that the two organizations were merged in 1910.

After the Habsburgs annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, there were some efforts made in the direction of encouraging the development of a Bosnian national consciousness and a distinctive Bosnian language, in order to cut the Bosnian Croats off from their ethnic kin to the north. The Croatian Franciscans in Herzegovina played a decisive role in resisting both this policy and the endeavors of Serbian nationalists, mainly through their weekly newspaper, *Glas Hercegovca* (1885-95). Croatian Franciscans played an active role in the literary life of Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Croatia proper, working on *Narodni list*, *Katolička Dalmacija*, and other periodicals.²² Catholic clergy were tangibly involved in the foundation of *Matica hrvatska* (the Croatian Cultural Society, originally named *Matica ilirska*), the Croatian National Museum, and even the first Croatian savings bank. Bishop Juraj Dobrila also contributed to the growth of national consciousness by founding the newspaper *Naša sloga*; and two other Catholic clergymen, Ivan Antunović and Boza Šarčević, established the *Bunjevačke i šokačke novine*. When World War I broke out, Archbishop Josef Stadler of Sarajevo and Bishop Antun Mahnić of Krk pressed for Croatian independence, with the former stressing that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be fully absorbed, administratively and economically, into Croatia.²³

In the interwar kingdom the church remained sympathetic to Croatian separatism, with Archbishop Ivan Šarić of Sarajevo lending strong support to clandestine preparations for Croatian secession.²⁴ Singleton reports that Šarić himself joined the secessionist *Ustaše* organization in 1934, and Bishop Josip Garić of Banja Luka may have also been a member.²⁵ *Katolički list*, the leading Catholic newspaper of Croatia at the time, greeted the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, or NDH) by the *Ustaše* in 1941. "The Croatian state is a fact," wrote *Katolički list*.

The Catholic Church, which has served as the spiritual leader of the Croatian people for 1,300 years in its difficult, sickly and joyous days, accompanies the Croatian people with joy and glad-

ness in these days as its state independence is restored. . . . All members of the Croatian nation . . . find, in the Croatian state, the fulfillment of their legitimate aspirations.²⁶

Even Zagreb's Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, though not affiliated with the *Ustaše*, initially welcomed the establishment of the NDH. But while the local hierarchy had thus reaffirmed their support for Croatian statehood, Stepinac's repeated criticism of *Ustaše* excesses and his repeated efforts to circumvent NDH policy and save Serbs and Gypsies from liquidation confute the postwar communist claim that he had collaborated with the *Ustaše*.²⁷

The linkage of Catholicism and Croatian nationality was underlined by various actors. Vlatko Maček, head of the Croatian Peasant party from 1928 to 1941, for instance, openly described Catholicism as the foundation stone of Croatian nationality,²⁸ while Dr. Nikola Rusinović, the NDH representative at the Vatican, returning to Zagreb on February 8, 1942, after visiting the Vatican on official business, would report that "the Holy See cannot imagine a Croat who is not a Catholic."²⁹

In the early postwar years Tito tinkered with the idea of encouraging the establishment of a schismatic national Croatian Catholic church that might be more amenable to regime manipulation and pressure. Instead of pursuing this, however, the communists decided to attempt to brand the Catholic church as fascist and thus to sever it from the wellsprings of Croatian nationalist feeling. The attempt failed, and the assaults on the good name of Archbishop Stepinac produced a backlash, transforming a sincere and reputable churchman into a Croatian national hero, a symbol of Croatian national aspirations.³⁰ Worse yet, from the regime's point of view, the crushing of the so-called Croatian Spring in December 1971, and suppression of all institutions (such as *Matica hrvatska* and the newspapers *Hrvatski tjednik* and *Tlo*) that had served as forums for Croatia's exclusivist nationalists, had as a by-product the strengthening of the church's role as guardian of Croatian national interests.

The Muslim Community

At the time of the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, the Muslims were the least nationally conscious of the three principal confessional groups under survey. Their position within the Ottoman

Empire had been a privileged one, and it was only with the imposition of rule by Catholic Austria that collective identity was stimulated by cultural threat. The Austrians harbored no intention to suppress Islam or to discriminate against Muslims, but, as Joint Minister of Finance Szlavy observed in a report to Emperor Franz Josef in 1881, Bosnian Muslims were dissatisfied—at least in his opinion—because after enjoying a privileged position under the Turks, they objected to being treated as equals with Christians by the Austrians.³¹

The Austrians' hope was to reinforce tendencies toward regional identity, to cut the local population off from ethnic kin abroad, and, above all, to block any spread of Serbian nationalism among the Muslims, even while impeding the development of a national consciousness among the Bosnian Muslims: they should think of themselves as Bosnians, as Austrian subjects, but not as ethnic Muslims. The Austrian authorities were, in particular, eager to instill in the population a feeling of "Bosnianness," which would weaken the ties of Orthodox and Muslims to Serbia and the Ottoman Empire respectively. They therefore welcomed the founding in 1891, by Mehmedbeg Kapetanović and several other pro-Austrian Sarajevo Muslims, of a weekly newspaper, *Bošnjak*, whose underlying principle was that all Bosnians, regardless of faith, had a common nationality. The paper was written in Serbo-Croatian, which the editors, in harmony with local custom, identified as the "Bosnian" language.³²

The Austrians also endeavored to insulate Bosnian Islam from the Ottoman caliphate and, in October 1882, created the new office of Reis-ul-ulema, as head of Bosnian Islam, with a state salary of 8,000 gulden per year. But a series of conversion incidents in 1893, 1897, and 1899 in which Muslims converted to Catholicism mobilized the Muslim community and catalyzed the Muslim autonomy movement. In December 1900 a group of prominent Muslims drew up a proposed autonomy statute and presented it to Benjámín von Kállay, joint minister of finance and ipso facto chief administrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1882–1903). The petition enumerated Muslim complaints, including the conversion of a number of mosques into Christian churches, the neglect of Muslim cemeteries, and alleged aggressive Catholic proselytization among Muslims, said to have been inspired by Archbishop Stadler of Sarajevo. Finally, the Muslims complained that the Austrian-created institution of the Reis-ul-ulema and Austrian control of appointments

to the Medzlissi-ulema and the Vakuf Commission had usurped control of religious affairs from its rightful charge, the "Islamic nation." The Muslims demanded religious autonomy and self-regulation.³³ This petition marked the beginning of the era of party politics among Bosnian Muslims and the de facto beginning of the Muslim National Organization that was formally established six years later. The groundwork had been laid for the emergence of Muslim ethnic consciousness.

Muslim religious identity had, of course, been heightened by the Austrian occupation and the conversion incidents, but it was still possible for Muslims to declare themselves Serbs or Croats when it suited them, and "some Muslims changed from one camp to the other on several occasions," calculating their tactics on the basis of shifts in the political wind.³⁴ But most of these affirmations and alliances were largely tactical and *Glas slobode*, the organ of the Social Democratic party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, could report (on May 24, 1911) that "the endeavors of Serbs and Croats to see the Muslims adopt their [respective] names have been, to date, completely unsuccessful. Only a few individuals call themselves Serbs or Croats. The rest are simply Muslims."³⁵

With the establishment of the interwar kingdom, the Muslims were relegated, both by the regime and by the socialist opposition, to the position of one branch of the "Yugoslav nation" or even, in the eyes of some Serbs, of confessionally deviant Serbs. Jovo Jakšić, an apologist for the theory of the "tri-named people" ("Serb," "Croat," and "Slovene" being, in this view, alternative names for a single "Yugoslav" people), denied thus that there were any differences besides religion to differentiate the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina—as if that were not potent enough—and suggested that Muslims be viewed as a fourth "tribe" of the Serbo-Croato-Slovenian nation.³⁶ In spite of this, when the first Yugoslav Parliament was opened, twenty-two of the twenty-four Muslim deputies from Bosnia declared themselves Croats, and the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, the strongest Muslim party, was tangibly closer to Croats than to Serbs. Later, at the fifth national conference of the Communist party of Yugoslavia (November 1940), Moše Pijade told delegates that Bosnian Muslim consciousness was largely religious and not ethnic. This judgment would later receive some corroboration in the wartime split among the Muslims, with many actively supporting

the Croatian *Ustaše*, even identifying themselves as "Croats of Muslim faith," and many joining the communist Partisans.

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND CULTURAL HOMOGENIZATION

In the case of both "historical" churches and Bosnian Islam, religion proved a defining factor in ethnic differentiation, perhaps even the single most important factor. By the end of the nineteenth century, if not long before, it appeared almost inconceivable that a Croat could be anything but Catholic, that a Serb could be anything but Orthodox, and the rival claims made upon the Muslims could not conceal the fact that Islam likewise had come to define an ethnocultural collectivity.

Paul Brass has outlined four sources of elite conflict that may stimulate the development of ethnic self-consciousness in early modernizing societies. These are (1) conflicts between local elites and an alien conqueror, (2) conflicts between rival religious elites from different ethnic groups, (3) conflicts between a religious elite and an ethnically indigenous aristocracy, and (4) conflicts between indigenous religious elites and an alien aristocratic elite.³⁷ It is seen at once that three of the four conflict patterns listed by Brass involve religious elites. The fourth pattern (indigenous religious elite vs. alien political elite) characterizes the historical evolution in both Serbia and Croatia, while the second pattern (rival religious elites) defines what was probably the central feature in the situation in which Bosnian Muslim identity arose.

Religious organizations reinforce the tendency to identify religion and nation, of course, by endeavoring to have the state suppress or discriminate against adherents of other faiths. In Serbia, for instance, proselytism among Orthodox believers was forbidden first in 1349,³⁸ while in the case of the Catholic church the reforms of Austrian Emperor Josef II, extending religious freedom to Protestants and Greek Orthodox in 1781 and requiring monarchical consent before any papal bull could be made public in his lands, so agitated Pope Pius VI that he hurried to Vienna in 1782 to admonish the emperor to reconsider his reforms.³⁹

Religious organizations also have been forces for cultural homogenization—and thus nation-building—in other ways, by dictating dress

codes and social mores and molding the national language. The Serbian Orthodox church, for instance, backed promulgation of the Serbian language in its antiquated church variant, and both the Orthodox and Catholic churches ardently advocated discrete alphabets. But where the Orthodox clergy was united in its promotion of Cyrillic, the Catholic church was divided between Glagolitic and Latinic supporters. The appearance of an Old Croatian Catholic sect in 1923 may be taken as a culmination of this long-simmering rift between papal loyalists and those inclined to resist papal regulation. But where the restoration of an independent Serbia placed the Serbian Orthodox church in a politically dominant position, the fact that Croats always have been a minority (in Hungary, in Austria-Hungary, in Yugoslavia) has tended to place the church in Croatia, insofar as it defends the interests of Croats, in the role of opposition. In an early instance of this, church leaders and lower clergy fought Magyarization in Croatia and lent support to the nascent Croatian national movement in the mid-nineteenth century.

The consequences of this evolution were that religion took on a nationalist coloration, that religious tensions could easily spill over into ethnic tensions and vice versa, and that the Yugoslav communists, hostile to religion of all kinds, found that they could not launch an assault on religion without inflaming nationalist temper.

ORTHODOXY UNDER THE COMMUNISTS

Of all the religious organizations in Yugoslavia the Serbian Orthodox church was the first to reach a *modus vivendi* with the communists, and its relations with the LCY have almost always been described, by both regime and church representatives, as "satisfactory," even "good." The one exception is that murky frontier zone where religious affirmation spills over into national sentiment and where an unmistakably *Serbian* church speaks out for Serbian interests while a *Yugoslav* regime endeavors to balance the interests of its sundry peoples, always safeguarding the interests of the ruling party itself. Thus, almost the only criticism the regime ever lodges against Serbian Orthodoxy is that it is nationalist⁴⁰—and indeed it is unabashedly so. The Serbian Orthodox church has become involved in nationalist causes on all its frontiers: in Macedonia and Montenegro, where the church continues to view the local populations as Serbs; in Croatia, where the

Croatian nationalist euphoria of 1971 stimulated anti-Croatian sentiments among the Serbian minority within Croatia, provoking a strong reaction on the part of the Serbian Orthodox church; and in Kosovo, where the church takes a strong stand in defense of church monuments and the rights of Serbs threatened by Albanian nationalist riots and violence.

The long-standing controversy between the Serbian Orthodox church and the Macedonian Orthodox church is the most serious issue affecting the Serbian patriarchate's relations with the Belgrade regime. Far from being merely an interchurch dispute, it impinges directly on Yugoslav nationalities policy, undermining the basis for the interethnic balance that legitimates the Yugoslav federal system. The crux of the matter is that the regime welcomed the creation of the Macedonian Orthodox church as a validation of its claim—contested by Bulgaria—that the Macedonian people is ethnically distinct from the Bulgarian, while the Serbian church, having already suffered one schism in the secession of the overseas dioceses, was loathe to endure yet another schism in what it considered its heartland.

After the abolition of the eight-hundred-year-old archbishopric of Ohrid in 1767, the first demand for a revived independent Macedonian church was made in 1891 by Metropolitan Teodor of Skopje, when the Macedonian eparchy of Veles was administratively part of the Bulgarian exarchate. With the creation of Yugoslavia after World War I, jurisdiction for Orthodox church affairs in Macedonia was transferred to the Serbian patriarchate. The demand for an independent Macedonian church was revived only twenty-five years later when, in March 1945, a council of local clergy and laity met in Partisan-held Skopje and adopted a resolution proclaiming the right of the Macedonian nation to a national church. Though this demand was brushed aside, the government of the new Yugoslav republic of Macedonia backed continued efforts to establish an independent Macedonian church. In 1958 a council of Macedonian clergy took a first step toward autocephaly by reestablishing the archbishopric of Ohrid, declaring the Macedonian church autonomous, though in canonical unity with the Serbian Orthodox church, and electing Bishop Dositej Stojković, a native of Smederevo, archbishop of Ohrid and metropolitan of Macedonia. The Macedonian government publicly supported these moves.

Finally, in the autumn of 1966 the Macedonians made a formal re-

quest for autocephaly, warning the Serbian patriarch, in a memorandum of December 3, 1966, that they would act unilaterally if he should deny his concurrence.⁴¹ When the patriarch nonetheless turned them down, the Macedonians summoned an ecclesiastical *sobor* in Ohrid in mid-July 1967, on the bicentennial anniversary of the abolition of the archbishopric of Ohrid, and proclaimed the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox church, seceding from the Serbian church.⁴² The government attended the *sobor* in force, sending two members of the Macedonian government, the heads of the Federal and Macedonian Commissions for Religious Affairs, and the mayor of Ohrid. Once the proclamation of autocephaly had been read, moreover, the president of the Federal Commission for Religious Affairs announced that President Tito had awarded the cordon of the Order of the Yugoslav Flag to Metropolitan Dositej. Macedonian party chief Krste Crvenkovski telegraphed his congratulations, and the Macedonian party daily, *Nova Makedonija*, wrote that the proclamation would strengthen the brotherhood and unity of Yugoslav peoples.⁴³ Another Yugoslav writer, expressing the official line, described the declaration as an important step in "the full establishment of the independence of the Macedonian people and nation."⁴⁴

The Serbian Holy Synod denounced the secession and condemned the schismatic clergy. In a series of articles in *Pravoslavlje* and *Glasnik* the Serbian Orthodox patriarchate cast doubts on the existence of a separate Macedonian people.⁴⁵ Even today some Serbian Orthodox clergy (among them certain bishops) dispute the existence of a Macedonian nation and insist that Macedonians are in fact simply "south Serbs," as they were called in the interwar kingdom.⁴⁶

This allegation is intolerable to a regime that has long treated the Macedonians with particular solicitude. The Yugoslav press reports Macedonian cultural exhibits abroad far more often than it reports exhibits of all its other peoples combined, gives excellent coverage to Macedonian church events, and in July 1982 celebrated the fifteenth anniversary of the church's autocephaly with laudatory articles in *Borba*, *Vjesnik*, and elsewhere.⁴⁷ The authorities applied pressure on the Serbian Orthodox church to give in and, at regime insistence, church commissions of the two Orthodox churches met for talks in Prokhor Pchinski and Kalishta in 1978 and 1979. The meetings evidently proved fruitless, and in early 1980 the Macedonian Commission

for Religious Affairs warned that in addition to authorities of the Serbian and Macedonian republics, governmental bodies of other republics and of the federation itself might become involved if the Serbian patriarchate remained intransigent. Subsequently, in October 1981 *Nova Makedonija* pointedly noted that

the unresolved problems between the two Churches have caused widespread displeasure not only in the Macedonian Orthodox Church but also beyond it. . . . This matter is of political significance as well and . . . its faster resolution is in the interest of the entire Yugoslav community, the strengthening of fraternity and unity among our peoples and nationalities and our community. . . . [Moreover,] this matter will have not only domestic political but also international consequences.⁴⁸

Even as the Macedonian church was pulling away from the Belgrade patriarchate, rumors began to surface that the party was favorably disposed toward staging an encore in Montenegro. After all, if Macedonian nationhood entitled Macedonia to its own autocephalous church, then one could not deny the Montenegrins a church without denying their nationhood—and to do that would destabilize the federation. Patriarch German Djorić of the Serbian Orthodox church was not prepared to witness a third schism and evoked the party's displeasure in 1970 by asserting in a public speech in Montenegro that Montenegrins are simply Serbs. The church felt itself threatened and its leading clerics were vocal in their opposition to the planned erection of a secular mausoleum on Mount Lovćen, a historical shrine in Montenegro, since they feared that the design of the building could have provided a facile first step toward the establishment of a separate Montenegrin Orthodox church.⁴⁹

It would be inaccurate to conclude from this that the Serbian Orthodox church's nationalism consists only of obstructionism. Quite the contrary—there is an active side to this nationalism as well. This ranges from celebrating the Serbian literary language,⁵⁰ to underwriting a 120,000-dinar loan to help finance construction of the Belgrade-Bar railway (a project of vital importance for Serbia and Montenegro alike),⁵¹ to commemorating Vuk Karadžić and other heroes of Serbian history.⁵² In one of its most dramatic evocations of nationalist spirit the Serbian patriarchate ceremoniously buried the remains of Tsar Dušan

the Mighty (1308–55) in an ornate sarcophagus weighing 1.5 tons in St. Mark's Church in Belgrade in 1968, as tens of thousands watched. Dušan, who had usurped the throne from his father, had no claim to sainthood, and Patriarch German made no such claim for him. The church interred Dušan as a national hero, recalling its own earlier role as guardian of Serbian culture. Patriarch German admitted as much when he told the crowd that he was laying Dušan's remains to rest in the cathedral to serve "as a perpetual sentinel at this outpost of Orthodox Serbianism, to be a vigilant protector of religion and patriotism."⁵³

More recently, after violent Albanian riots in Kosovo in April 1981 destroyed a whole wing of the ancient patriarchate of Peć, including the living quarters of the patriarch, a nuns' refectory, a sick ward, a workshop, and a large number of icons and books, and sent thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins streaming out of Kosovo, *Pravoslavlje* published an "Appeal for the Protection of the Serbian Inhabitants and Their Holy Places in Kosovo," signed by twenty-one priests. The document assailed the regime's policy in Kosovo as inadequate and reminded its readers that Kosovo's importance for the Serbs is comparable to Jerusalem's importance for the Jews. "The question of Kosovo," the appeal declared, "is a question of the spiritual, cultural, and historical identity of the Serbian people. . . . Kosovo is our *memory*, our hearth, the focus of our being." And in ominous tones the appeal added that if "Kosovo ceases to be ours . . . we cease to be what we are!"⁵⁴ *Vesnik*, the Serbian church's other newspaper, amplified this in its May 1982 issue, defending the church's right to speak out on Kosovo as "a right founded not least on the fact that the Serbian Church is an inalienable element of the national identity, conscience, and honor of the Serbian people."⁵⁵ The regime does not concede the church this right, however, as it is incompatible with the party's policy of restricting religion to the "private" sphere and of keeping the churches out of politics; not surprisingly, then, *Pravoslavlje* was quickly rebutted in the Yugoslav press.⁵⁶

Yet instead of retreating, the Serbian church continued to speak out on the subject of Kosovo, criticizing the regime and expressing concern for the welfare of the Serbian population of Kosovo. In May 1987, for instance, *Vesnik*, the organ of the Serbian Orthodox priests' association, fired a volley, charging that "even after six years of open counterrevolution in Kosovo, there is still no Yugoslav program to assure Serbian

and Montenegrin survival in Kosovo." After enumerating the number of Serbs and Montenegrins who were forced to flee the province in 1986 and recalling how many physical attacks on Serbs, explosions, and various acts of sabotage had occurred that year, the paper added, "The Serbian Orthodox Church has the legal and moral right to rise energetically to the defense of its vital interests in Kosovo."⁵⁷ The church has been quite open about its nationalism, identifying it as "the devotion and loyalty of a people to the principles by which it lives."⁵⁸ Not surprisingly, one hears Serbian clergy say, "We, in the Serbian Orthodox Church, think nationalism is a good thing. We think it is good to be nationalist."⁵⁹

Ironically, the regime may, in a sense, be pleased that the Serbian Orthodox church has taken such a clear stand against the Albanian irredentists whose actions have destabilized the province of Kosovo. Regime and church obviously have a common enemy. In fact, by early 1987 regime spokesmen began to pressure the Catholic church and the Islamic community to speak out against Albanian irredentism, even going so far as to insinuate that the Islamic religious community in Macedonia and Kosovo was sympathetic to the Albanians.⁶⁰ The Supreme Council of the Islamic Community hurried to set the record straight and to publicly disassociate itself from the Albanian nationalist upheaval,⁶¹ while the Catholic newspaper *Glas koncila* commented several months later, somewhat elliptically, that since Kosovo was inhabited essentially by Orthodox and Muslim believers, it was above all for those religious groups to comment to the extent that the situation was a matter for religious organizations. The Catholic paper added that the Catholic church naturally believed that every people had a right to live in its own homeland and should not be driven from that homeland by force.⁶²

Hence, on the one hand, the regime has been happy to put the nationalism of the Serbian Orthodox church to work in Kosovo, and has even asked the other religious organizations to get politically involved. On the other hand, the regime has not shied from exploiting the charge of "nationalism" to brand clergy it wished to undercut or, as periodically happens, to imprison. Thus, the prominent Serbian Orthodox theologian Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, who founded a highly successful pietist movement in Serbia and Bosnia, and who died in the United States in 1956, was attacked in a series of articles in *Oslobodjenje* in

September 1981, essentially because Velimirović was an articulate anti-communist and—as both church people and regime officials privately admit—in order to provide a “balance” for regime attacks on Croatia’s Archbishop Štepinac. The charge leveled against Velimirović, however, was not anticommunism but nationalist chauvinism.⁶³ Similarly, Fr. Sava Banković, who had served twenty years in prison for having allegedly sympathized with noncommunist guerrillas during the war, was returned to prison in 1973 on charges of “hostile propaganda” after making an autobiographical entry in the guest book at the Sremski Karlovci monastery.⁶⁴ Bishop Vasilije of Žiča was imprisoned for thirty days in October 1972 after having allegedly made nationalist remarks in a church sermon. And on December 30, 1980, Nedjo Janjić, another Serbian priest, went to prison for six years for singing nationalist songs during a party to celebrate the baptism of his son.⁶⁵

The Serbian Orthodox church has long been as much a political organization as a religious one, and its nationalist demeanor has always been more important than its liturgical role. To expect it to voluntarily relinquish its historic role as guardian of the Serbian people, as the party demands, is to expect it to concur voluntarily in its own atrophy.

CATHOLICISM AND NATIONALISM

Throughout the nineteenth century Catholic clergy championed the interests of Croats and Slovenes. In Croatia the Catholic church actively backed the struggle for national autonomy (threatened by Magyarization), and in Slovenia the church fought to protect the Slovenian language in the face of cultural Germanization, defending the use of Slovenian in church liturgy. The church continued to act as the guardian of the secular interests of its Croatian and Slovenian flock. In practice the linkage of Catholicism and “nationalism” is manifest in the church’s protection of (1) the interests of Croats in Croatia, (2) the interests of Slovenes in Slovenia, (3) the interests of Croats in Bosnia, Vojvodina (where it has remonstrated against “the danger of Hungarization threatening Croats in Bačka”),⁶⁶ and elsewhere in Yugoslavia, (4) the interests of Croats abroad, and (5) its own interests (in which it finds important symbols of ecclesiastical achievements denigrated by the LCY).

The missionary expansionism that fueled the church’s earlier equa-

tion of Croatian or Slovenian national identity with adherence to the Catholic faith is a thing of the past. Lately, most of the important contemporary church leaders in Yugoslavia, including Franjo Cardinal Kuharić of Zagreb, Archbishop Frane Franić of Split, Franciscan theologian Tomislav Šagi-Bunić, and Fr. Živko Kustić, editor of the weekly Catholic newspaper *Glas koncila*, have at one time or another publicly repudiated the equation of national identity with Catholicism.⁶⁷ This has not prevented party representatives from portraying the church's protection of its flock as "clerical nationalism." In a typical statement of the party line a *Vjesnik* commentator insisted that the church was still filled with

proponents of the idea of the identity of the religious and the national [who] in every way and on every occasion are trying to prove that the national and religious history are identical, for example, in other words, an organic link of the Church with the Croatian people, and accordingly, the thesis that the Church is the only true bearer of the nation and interpreter of national interests. . . . The meaning is clear: Catholicism is interpreted as the basis of the Croatian nation, its culture and history, and therefore as an alternative future of the Croatian people. The political consequences of this clerical-nationalism become obvious when one links it to its original thesis: that considering the century-long link of the Catholic Church in Croatia with Rome, the Croats as a nation are definitely oriented to the West. And it is indeed not difficult to discern what is hidden behind such a position.⁶⁸

The insinuation that the Catholic church operates as a de facto secessionist organization—coupled with regular accusations that leading Catholic clergy have fascist sympathies and are linked with terrorist *Ustaše* organizations abroad—is patently absurd, since if it were true, it is clear that the regime would not hesitate for a moment to launch an all-out campaign against the church.

The heart of the matter is that the party resents the presence of any independent institution representing the interests of a sector of the population. The party ascribes to itself exclusive legitimacy as advocate of the interests of Yugoslav society. The church's concern for human rights in Slovenia and Croatia, and for national rights in Croatia, is a challenge to the party monopoly. In order to buttress its position the

party frequently reiterates its ritual incantation that "every nationalism is dangerous." But this is a proposition that the Catholic church refuses to accept. In his papal encyclical *Populorum progressio*, Pope Paul VI condemned "exaggerated nationalism," i.e., racism, but emphasized that some nationalism is constructive. In the same vein Croatian theologian Šagi-Bunić distinguished between "healthy nationalism," which he allowed might also be termed "patriotism," and "unhealthy nationalism," and argued that Christianity "must be national, must be patriotic; Christians must be patriots."⁶⁹ The church, moreover, views itself as the legitimate representative of Catholic peoples in general, and thus of Croats and Slovenes as well. "If anyone can speak of the history of the Croatian people," Zagreb's Archbishop Franjo Cardinal Kuharić declared in 1983, "it is the Church which lives in their midst and which has been present in all the centuries of this often difficult and painful history so that this Church simply becomes the soul of that history."⁷⁰ Kuharić returned to this theme in a 1987 interview with the Catholic monthly *Veritas*, arguing there that "freedom is indivisible: religious, social, [and] national freedom are one freedom and the right of every human being. That," he added, "is the teaching of the [Second Vatican] Council."⁷¹ Even among the small number of Albanian Catholics in Kosovo (7 percent of the province's Albanian population), the Catholic clergy have shown sympathy for national culture.⁷²

The Croatian Catholic church's defense of Croatian interests enmeshed it in the politics of the Croatian Spring, 1967–71. Some clergymen, perhaps most, welcomed *Matica hrvatska's* more active profile and encouraged Croats to join the nationalist organization. The church entered into negotiations with the Croatian government of Savka Dabčević-Kučar and Miko Tripalo and was confident that Catholics soon were to be granted greater equality with atheists and wider opportunities in Croatia.⁷³ Clusters of Catholic clergy in Rijeka, Split, Zadar, and Zagreb literally were swept up by the nationalist euphoria and became involved in what came to be called the "Croatian mass movement." "Franciscan priests and reactionary intellectuals" had been rebuked already in 1970, by *Borba*, for having collected data on the number of Croats occupying positions of political responsibility in Herzegovina,⁷⁴ and several priests were criticized for claiming that the party discriminated against Croatia. Dr. Ive Bagarić drew fire for writing, in the regional church periodical *Naša*, that "Croatia for several

years has had more graves than cradles—it is dying!"⁷⁵ Legal proceedings were initiated against Friars Jeronim Setka and Krsto Križanić, together with Mate Marčinko, for publication of a "Croatian Prayer" in a 1971 issue of *Vjesnik Sv. Nikole Tavelića*, in which Croatia was portrayed as "wretched and nameless."⁷⁶ In the midst of the Croatian nationalist euphoria, Archbishop Franić of Split organized a "double anniversary of the Croatian people" in Solin, celebrating the thirteen hundredth anniversary of Croatian Christianity and the thousandth anniversary of the construction of the first Croatian university at Solin. The ceremonies were attended by seven cardinals, thirty bishops, and three hundred priests and were described as having a nationalist dimension. Regime representatives commented that this nationalist dimension was designed to win converts to Catholicism.⁷⁷ The removal of Dabčević-Kučar and Tripalo from power in December 1971 and the subsequent suppression of many periodicals and institutions that had adopted a nationalist position, including the venerable *Matica hrvatska* society, represented a setback not only for those Croats who had hoped to improve Croatia's position within the federation but also for Catholic-Marxist dialogue, which had been pursued with some vigor until then.⁷⁸

A high-ranking Croatian clergyman told me in 1982 that a number of clergymen, including himself, were convinced that Croatia continues to be discriminated against, that Croats are underrepresented at all levels of government, that the laws of Yugoslavia are applied nowhere as strictly as in Croatia, that the Serbs are ruling Croatia today, and that Croatia was better off in the Habsburg Empire.⁷⁹ This is, of course, a typical expression of the Croatian nationalist position.⁸⁰ After Archbishop Kuharić told a crowd of 250,000 Croats gathered at Nin to celebrate the eleven hundredth anniversary of papal recognition of Croatia that ninth-century Croatian Prince Branimir had "understood that the young baptized Croatian nation had the right to its own life, and the right to be free,"⁸¹ compounding this by his regular practice of talking about "our Croatian homeland," while rarely, if ever, mentioning Yugoslavia, the official Yugoslav news agency Tanjug reprimanded Kuharić for attempting to revive "counterrevolution," "clericalism," and "fascist bigotry."⁸² Predictably, a proposal to establish a "Catholic Croatian Day" was turned down, with the explanation that the church was trying to stir up nationalist hatred.⁸³ In addition, there is the annual

New Year's reception of religious leaders at the Croatian Assembly. Kuharić, as a hierarch whose jurisdiction is restricted to Croatian territory and who is addressing on these occasions representatives of the government of the Republic of Croatia, typically wishes "you and all your co-workers in the government of S.R. Croatia every fortune in the execution of your tasks and responsibilities for the progress, honor, and dignity of the Croatian people and all the inhabitants in the area of Croatia."⁸⁴ And typically he is subsequently attacked in the press for not mentioning Yugoslavia (even though no representatives of the Yugoslav federal government attend, and even though he could scarcely wish the government of Croatia success in carrying out tasks outside Croatia) or the Serbs in Croatia (even though they are only one, albeit the largest, of a number of minorities in that republic).

Almost as unpopular with the regime is the Croatian church's resolve to maintain contact with Croats abroad—whether in Germany, Australia, or elsewhere. When Archbishop Josip Pavlišić of Rijeka and Senj made a private visit to South and North America in December 1974 he was upbraided for being a guest of "notorious *Ustaše* exiles," a charge later denied by the Episcopal Conference of Yugoslavia. Again, in late 1986, *Borba* tried to portray a routine pastoral visit by Cardinal Kuharić to the Croatian community in Peru as an *Ustaše* event. In this instance, the Croatian daily *Vjesnik* sprang to Kuharić's defense and cited Yugoslav diplomats in Peru to the effect that *Borba*'s claims were "without foundation."⁸⁵ The Catholic church is in some sense nationalist, but *not in that sense*. Kuharić and others in the Croatian church are nationalist in the sense that they want to nurture and protect the spiritual values and historical memory (embedded in culture) of the Croatian people. But even this form of nationalism is vulnerable to regime criticism. Hence, publication by the Croatian church of the book *Katolička crkva i Hrvati izvan domovine* [*The Catholic Church and Croats Outside the Homeland*] in 1980 drew criticism from *Vjesnik* for its emphasis on ties of language, culture, and tradition, rather than on the political system.⁸⁶ It is revealing that when Archbishop Kuharić visited Australia in late 1981, he addressed a crowd of seven thousand people as "my Croatian brothers of Catholic and Muslim faiths," giving the lie to the regime's claim that Kuharić equates Croatian ethnicity with Catholicism and at the same time directly challenging the regime's assertion that Bosnian Muslims are a distinct nationality group.⁸⁷ The

overt nationalist temper associated with ecclesiastical events among émigré Croats was illustrated during Pope John Paul II's visit to Austria in summer 1983, when Catholic Croats residing in Austria turned out in force, displaying Croatian flags shorn of the communist red star and slogans such as "The Croats will always be loyal to the pope and to Croatia."⁸⁸

Finally, the church has become entangled in nationalist issues through the defense of its own interests. Specifically, since some of its leading clerics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, attacked by the party for genocide and other sins, have also acquired the status of Croatian heroes (Archbishop Stepinac being the most important example, but Catholic Action activist Ivan Merz and wartime Bishop Kvirin Klement Bonefačić of Split-Makarska having figured in recent debates also), the defense of its own prelates becomes, ipso facto, a "nationalist" position.

MUSLIM NATIONALISM

Muslim nationalism's situation is different for at least three reasons: (1) the absence of an institutionalized hierarchical church infrastructure; (2) the difficulty in denying the link between Islam and Muslim ethnicity (though that has not prevented the LCY from doing just that, albeit obliquely); and (3) the LCY's interest in reinforcing Muslim national consciousness as a foil against the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia. The third reason is tantamount to saying that the Muslims are both a necessary and a favored group in Yugoslavia, and thus Muslim nationalism poses a much more complex dilemma for the party than either Croatian or Serbian nationalism. Indeed, up to the mid-1970s it was evidently a widespread assumption among party people that Muslim nationalism was somehow "different," that it was "more naive," and perhaps "not dangerous."⁸⁹

Although a separate Bosnian republic was created precisely to prevent either Croatia or Serbia from dominating the postwar federation, Belgrade was slow to accord the Muslims status as a nationality group. The 1948 census allowed Muslims to list themselves as "Serbian Muslims" (161,036 did so), "Croatian Muslims" (29,071), or "Macedonian Muslims" (37,096), and it was only in the 1961 census that Muslims were permitted to declare themselves "Muslims in an ethnic sense"

(and 842,247 did).⁹⁰ Muslims (and Croats) continued to be treated as second-class citizens in Bosnia, however, until the reversal of policy signaled by the removal of police chief Aleksandar Ranković in July 1966.⁹¹ Finally, in February 1968 the central committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina elevated Muslims from "ethnic group" to "separate nation" status.

Despite outspoken criticism from some disbelieving Serbs, who refused to believe that the Muslims were a distinct nationality, the Muslims enjoyed almost unqualified party support from 1966 to early 1972, when two leading Muslim politicians in Bosnia, Avdo Humo and Osman Karabegović, were dismissed from their posts for alleged Muslim nationalism. In the wake of the 1971 census, Muslim nationalists in Bosnia had become inflamed with the desire to have Bosnia redesignated a "Muslim Republic" in the same way that Serbia is the Republic of the Serbs and Macedonia the Republic of the Macedonians.⁹² The Muslim clergy (the *ulema*) became outspoken advocates of change, and time and again they applied for permission to establish Muslim cultural institutions.⁹³ But despite LCY eagerness to have Muslim national identity entrench itself and thus cut the Muslims off from Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs, it has consistently refused to allow the establishment of a *Matica muslimanska*, even though a *Matica srpska* continues to function. This apparent inconsistency is due to LCY fear that expanding the sphere in which the Bosnian *ulema* can exert pressure on the regime would only complicate its endeavor to retain its monopoly as representative for all nationalities. The regime, in effect, wants to have it both ways: to use religion as a base for Muslim ethnicity and yet to deny the link.

The *ulema*, by contrast, note forthrightly the link between Islamic religious culture and the sense of Muslim ethnicity. From this, they conclude that they have a role to play as the communal leaders of their people.⁹⁴

Some Bosnian *ulema* have argued publicly that religious organizations can engage in "positive political activity," but the party has always insisted that any political activity on the part of religious organizations is, by definition, negative. Most observers ascribe little importance to the Islamic revival abroad in stimulating Muslim nationalism in Bosnia. But it is clear that in the 1970s, in the wake of the proclamation of the "Muslim nation" in 1968, Muslim nationalism has become

a political factor in Bosnia, and the *ulema*, as well as the staff of the Islamic newspaper *Preporod*, have repeatedly shown their independence where Muslim collective interests are concerned. By late 1980 the Yugoslav Islamic revival was affecting Croatia as well. In October certain Croatian Muslims demanded the right to "organize themselves as a separate nation" and to set up autonomous cultural organizations in Croatia—this despite the fact that there had been only 18,457 Muslims registered in Croatia in the previous census.⁹⁵ In January 1981 Imam Serko Omerbašić, president of the Ilmija Association of S.R. Croatia, felt constrained to disassociate himself from these currents and to urge Croatia's Muslims to "energetically oppose" Pan-Islamism.⁹⁶

The Islamic revival in Yugoslavia is in part a reaction to processes of assimilation and Westernization which threaten the integration of the Islamic community. If the Yugoslav Muslim awakening ought not to be viewed as an ancillary of the Islamic awakening in the Middle East, then it is clear, on the one hand, that Bosnia's special relationship with the Middle East has served to reinforce Muslim consciousness. Numerous Sarajevo enterprises have been active for years in bilateral deals with Iraq, Syria, and other Middle Eastern states. Moreover, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, who describes the Libyan system as "Koranic socialism," has displayed keen interest in the fortunes of Yugoslavia's Muslims. In November 1982, for instance, Qaddafi met with the mufti of Belgrade and other Islamic dignitaries during a visit to Yugoslavia and promised financial assistance for the construction of mosques in Belgrade.⁹⁷

Relations between the *ulema* and the regime remain uneasy. Illustrative of this is an article that appeared in *Večernje novosti*, reporting that Muslim children in Bujanovac "are being overburdened with religious instruction" and claiming that religious instruction was being used as a vehicle for the dissemination of Muslim nationalism.⁹⁸ The party wants to reinforce Muslim ethnic identity, to be sure. But the *ulema* views itself as the representative of the Muslim people, whereas the LCY wants the *ulema* to resign itself to the role of liturgical association.

In 1983 a lengthy Pan-Islamic declaration came to light. Written by a fifty-eight-year-old Bosnian lawyer, Alija Izetbegović, the declaration rejected both socialism and the concept of coexistence with other peoples. According to Izetbegović, "there is no peace or coexistence be-

tween the 'Islamic faith' and other non-Islamic social and political systems. . . . Islam clearly denies the right and opportunity of activity in its own domain to any alien ideology." He went on to reject as alien any nationalism based on folklore and language, linked authentic Muslim self-identity exclusively with Islam, and concluded that "in the Muslim world there is no patriotism without Islam."⁹⁹ Izetbegović and twelve other Muslim intellectuals, including an imam and a teacher at a Muslim religious school, were subsequently arrested for having conspired to execute the principles set forth in the "Islamic Declaration" and ultimately sentenced to terms averaging eight years in length.¹⁰⁰

A new trial of alleged Muslim nationalists was conducted in spring 1987. The accused—Fadil Fadilpašić, Munib Zahiragić, and Ibrahim Avdić—were tried for conspiring to overthrow the Yugoslav political system and establish an "ethnically pure Islamic republic" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if necessary by means of a *jihad* (holy war). They were also said to have made contact with "hostile émigrés" in Turkey and to have obtained, from those émigrés, a copy of the "Islamic Declaration." Given the gravity of the charges, it is somewhat surprising that they were sentenced to terms ranging from only two to five years in prison.¹⁰¹

CONCLUSION

Yugoslav religious policy is affected by ethnic and nationality considerations in at least three ways. First, the linkage of religion and nationalism strengthens the religious organization, reinforcing its legitimacy as a political actor and compelling the regime to calculate the effects of religious repression on individual nationality groups. Second, the LCY's desire to reinforce Macedonian and Muslim ethnic identities has led the regime to adopt a very cooperative attitude vis-à-vis the Macedonian Orthodox church and to tread softly where Muslims are concerned (e.g., far fewer Muslim clergy have been imprisoned—if any—than either Catholic or Orthodox). Regime endorsement of the religion-nationalism linkage in Macedonia is corroborated by the fact that while other universities are named for Yugoslav socialists and communists (e.g., the Edvard Kardelj University of Ljubljana, the Veljko Vlahović University of Titograd, the Djemal Bijedić University of Mostar, and the Svetozar Marković University Library of the University of Bel-

grade), the University of Skopje is named for the medieval monks, Cyril and Methodius. In a further concession to Macedonian sensitivities the LCY ruled in 1970 that it was legitimate for a Muslim who spoke Macedonian to declare himself a Macedonian—a prerogative that had been contested by the Bosnian party.¹⁰² Third, insofar as the LCY may fear that ethnic tensions in one republic will spread to other republics (as was said to be the case after the massive Albanian nationalist riots in the province of Kosovo in April 1981), the linkage of religion and nationalism may serve to stimulate an antireligious campaign.

This chapter has reviewed the position and activities, as they impinge on nationalism, of three religious bodies in Yugoslavia—the Serbian Orthodox church, the Catholic church, and the Islamic community—describing, as well, the unique position enjoyed by the Macedonian Orthodox church. The relation of the Catholic church to Slovenian nationalism was passed over chiefly because Slovenian nationalism has been fainter, so that aside from making a few declarations ruling out Slovenian secession, the Catholic hierarchy in Slovenia has concentrated on the defense of human and ecclesiastical rights. Of the remaining religious organizations in Yugoslavia, none make any tangible impact on Yugoslav nationalities policy. The LCY continues to instruct the churches to abandon politics, of course. But in a multiethnic state it is inevitable that ethnically associated churches will play political roles.

Religion and Nationalism in Romania

Trond Gilberg

Historians and anthropologists have long puzzled over the seeming disappearance of the Romanians after the withdrawal of the Roman outposts in Dacia around A.D. 271. There is little documentary evidence of their habitation over the next millennium, and this has resulted in a number of allegations by other, competing, ethnic groups that there was no continuity in historical tradition between the descendants of the Roman legions and the "Wallachs," (Romanian-speaking people of Wallachia), who reappear in the historical record in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Romanian nationalists, on the other hand, claim that there was indeed such an unbroken link; the descendants of the Dacians and the Romans retreated to the mountain redoubts of Transylvania and other inaccessible places and there nurtured their culture, their habits, and, above all, their language. In fact, the extraordinary staying power of the Romanian nation was demonstrated by the survival of this culture and the Romanian language (which is clearly Latin in structure and much of its vocabulary) in the face of severe repression by a number of rapacious invaders and occupiers. The Romanian nationalists increasingly argue that the only reason for such linguistic and cultural survival was, in fact, the superiority of Romanian culture in relation to that of the cultures of the occupiers. This argument indeed represents a mainstay in contemporary Romanian historiography, and it has become a main point in the contemporary national chauvinism of the Ceaușescu regime.¹

When the Romanians do reappear in the historical records of the Middle Ages, their ethnic homogeneity is fortified by the massive acceptance among them of the Orthodox religion. Throughout the dark

centuries of Turkish overlordship, with its endemic corruption and horrendous exploitation of the Wallach peasant masses, this religious adherence provided the peasants with a guiding light in the darkness of oppression, representing one of the most important elements of their astonishing ability to survive even the most brutal of overlords. The orthodox priests and the church hierarchy, in turn, became the chief protectors of the Romanian language and cultural tradition. It was the village priests that provided secular leadership as well, as the subjugated nation faced the exploiters, who came from other nations and other religions. The churches also provided the Romanians with the education (what little there was of it) of the peasants, and the priesthood became virtually the only vehicle of upward social mobility for ambitious individuals in the peasant masses.²

The importance of religion and the Orthodox church for the maintenance of national consciousness in Moldavia and Wallachia was matched by a similar function in Transylvania, which was under Habsburg rule for centuries. The Magyars and the Saxons had a privileged status in Transylvania, in political, socioeconomic, and religious terms, as "accepted" nations with "accepted" religions, while the Romanians and their Orthodox religion were merely "tolerated." This religious discrimination took various forms. Financially, the regime provided adequate subsidies to the Catholics, while the Saxon Protestants on the crown lands provided for their own churches and educational institutions from a base of relative economic prosperity. When Protestantism made serious inroads among elements of the Magyar population in Transylvania, it had significant support from the nobility, and thus received rather generous allotments from them. The Orthodox masses, primarily Romanians, on the other hand, lived in utter misery, discriminated against in socioeconomic and political terms, and certainly in religious matters as well. The Orthodox church was forced to maintain itself by means of the meager resources of the exploited peasantry. Furthermore, the Romanian Orthodox were under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox cardinal at Karlowitz in ethnic Serb territory—an unhappy fact that led to numerous complaints among the Romanian clergy of discrimination against them and corresponding favoritism shown toward Serb congregations. Finally, in the second half of the eighteenth century the Catholic hierarchy of the Habsburg Empire, strongly supported by the secular authorities, launched a major offen-

sive against the established Orthodox church in Transylvania and succeeded in founding a rival organization, the so-called Uniate church, that accepted the jurisdiction of Rome and not of Constantinople, even though much of the doctrine and liturgy of the Uniates remained close to that of the Orthodox.³

The severe political and religious discrimination perpetrated against the Romanians of Transylvania indicated that the leaders of the Habsburg Empire, and especially the Hungarians, fully realized the potential for a confluence of ethnicity and religion into a powerful nationalistic combination that might prove fatal to the chauvinistic aspirations of Budapest in Transylvania. The Hungarians wanted to keep the Romanian masses in a state of economic and political helotry and used the Orthodox church and religious doctrine to maintain political quiet in the despised Wallach masses; at the same time the establishment of the Uniate church showed the strong proselytizing tendencies emanating from Budapest (these tendencies became markedly more powerful during the nineteenth century, in favor of direct conversion to Roman Catholicism). Conversely, there were strong measures against any real Romanian nationalism based upon religion and the existing Orthodox hierarchy. The urgency of this "blocking policy" can be understood from the fact that the Romanians constituted the largest ethnic group in Transylvania; their growth rate was consistently higher than that of the Magyars and Germans throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁴

It seems clear that religion in general, and Orthodoxy in particular, represented a vital element of national defense for the Romanians in Moldavia and Wallachia, and also Transylvania, in the face of severe repression suffered in all three provinces by the Romanian peasant masses. But religion also became an important element in the occasional periods of greatness that the otherwise dismal Middle Ages represent in Romanian history. The political and military exploits of Michael the Brave and Stephen the Great, extolled in contemporary Romanian historiography, were undertaken with liberal references to God, the church, and the faithful, and there is little doubt that this connection helped inspire the peasant masses and soldiers who manned the victorious armies against Turks and other "infidels." Up until the second half of the eighteenth century, when a secular national revival

began in earnest among the ethnic Romanians, religion still represented the most cohesive force in this group.⁵

The establishment of the Uniate church, sponsored by the Catholic rulers in Vienna as an important source of political influence in Transylvania (as well as a mechanism for proselytism), was an important development for the masses of ethnic Romanians in that troubled region. Instead of becoming a willing instrument in the hands of Vienna, the Uniate church leaders used the emperor's need for a reliable ally in Transylvania against the recalcitrant nobility there to gain advantages for the Romanians in religious, socioeconomic, and political matters. The first Uniate church leader to use the political situation for this purpose was Ion Ionochentie Clain, who became a forceful spokesman for Romanian rights in all areas of activity. Clain's multifarious activities on behalf of the Romanian nation included frequent trips to Vienna to plead the case of his conationals in Transylvania; the "spreading of the word" of Romanian nationalism from the pulpits of a church that was no longer merely tolerated but, in fact, part of the established order in the empire; and a wide variety of publishing ventures, including grammars, dictionaries, and historical works, designed to enhance the use of the Romanian language and to maintain the idea of historical continuity in Romanian national life. The Uniate church center at Blaj became a major focus of Romanian nationalism in the eighteenth century, and it was from this center that the confluence of clerical and secular Romanian nationalism, often known as the "Transylvania School," emerged to become a most important political phenomenon in the nineteenth century.⁶

NATIONAL REVIVAL AND RELIGIOUS COHESION

During the second half of the eighteenth century a number of trends combined to produce a revival of national consciousness in much of Europe. The Balkans became a veritable hotbed of this development, fueled by the fact that many ethnic groups, with different religions, lived interspersed with each other under the political and military control of three major empires—the Habsburg, the Ottoman, and the Romanov—each autocratic and in no small way corrupt, each possessed

of a religious establishment bent upon its own expansion into the hearts and minds of the subjugated peoples of the region. The Ottoman Empire was already in an advanced stage of decomposition, ruled by dissolute and corrupt sultans who sold thrones and taxation rights throughout the still far-flung empire, thus stimulating all manner of venality and rapacity. Nowhere was this more evident than in the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, ruled by the exploitative Phanariot Greeks in the name of the Ottoman sultan.⁷

This undesirable political system had a few major, if unintended, effects. First of all, the repression of the Romanian peasantry inspired thoughts of rebellion that occasionally were transformed into actual uprisings, the most famous of which was the violent peasant revolt of 1821 led by a boyar, Tudor Vladimirescu. The repressive measures undertaken on this and other occasions helped radicalize the peasant masses still further, while the martyrdom of Tudor and others produced the legends of nationalism so necessary for future political mobilization. Second, the Turkish and Phanariot regimes, notoriously corrupt, were also limited regimes: the princes and their tax collectors cared little about political developments in the "dark masses" as long as they managed to extract their numerous taxes and contributions. This made it possible for the emerging nationalism of the Romanians to develop further, guided and pushed along by the religious leaders and the nationally conscious lay leaders of the villages and some of the cities.⁸

The history of Romanian nationalism in the nineteenth century is indeed the history of these two trends coming together: the trend of emerging national sentiment, fortified by the abiding hold of religion, among the masses of the Romanian population; and the joining of hands between the religious and lay leaders of the Wallachs to propel the downtrodden masses toward a national state of their own, with a national church established in the Romanian capital (be it Bucharest or Iași) as the ultimate symbol of the union of nationalism and religion. These trends were clearly evident during the revolutionary year 1848; in the mid-1850s, when the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia achieved political union with only a minimal tie to the Porte; and in 1876-78, when the two provinces finally were joined in the Kingdom of Romania. The first prince, Alexander Ion Cuza, accepted the crown as a manifestation of political nationalism and the blessing of the faithful, and the first king, King Charles, exhibited similar sen-

sibilities toward the church and the faithful as he ruled in the name of both religious and secular authority. His successors adopted much the same attitude as Romania struggled through the difficult decades after independence. When the Balkan Wars reduced the Ottoman Empire to utter political and military helplessness and very nearly drove the Turks from Europe, Romanian foreign policy was influenced heavily by the regime's commitment to furthering both national aspirations and the cause of Orthodoxy. And when Transylvania finally was joined with the rest of Romania on December 1, 1918, this momentous development was hailed as the spiritual as well as the temporal fulfillment of Romania's destiny.⁹ Throughout the decades between independence and unification, nationalism and religion remained the mainstays of the political elite in domestic affairs as well, regardless of the liberal or conservative coloration of the many ministries that came and went in Romania.¹⁰

In Transylvania the importance of the Orthodox church as a defender of religion and promoter of Romanian nationalism was even more marked than in the Old Kingdom (Moldavia and Wallachia). The Habsburg Empire, and especially its Hungarian branch, was bent upon converting the Romanian peasant masses. In the second half of the nineteenth century active Magyarization of other ethnic groups was official policy. All kinds of discriminatory practices were undertaken against the Orthodox Romanians in the socioeconomic, political, and religious realms, and the haughty representatives of Budapest's chauvinism repeatedly denied the existence of a Romanian nation, demanding instead the acceptance of Magyarism in all fields. It fell to the Orthodox church and its leaders to defend both the secular and the spiritual dimensions of the Romanian nation against the ferocious onslaught. In this struggle the leader of the Orthodox church in Transylvania, Andreiu Şaguna, occupied the most important position.¹¹

Şaguna's political and religious strategy was extremely resourceful, given the restrictions under which he operated. He pledged firm allegiance to the throne of Habsburg and frequently appealed to the sensibilities of Vienna against the excesses of Magyarization perpetrated by Budapest. At the same time he assiduously expanded the religious, educational, and political activities of the church in the Romanian peasant population, gradually enhancing both religious and political consciousness. This approach met with many problems, including the arrogant

nationalism of the Magyar political leadership in Transylvania and the chauvinism of their superiors in Budapest; furthermore, the rivalry between the Orthodox under the leadership of Șaguna and the Uniates under Bishop Șuluțiu was debilitating politically, but Șaguna succeeded in furthering the cause of Romanian nationalism in a number of ways, both in the secular and spiritual realms. His ambitions were crowned with the establishment of a Romanian Orthodox seat at Alba Iulia in 1864, thus freeing the Romanian Orthodox from the control of Karlowitz, the seat of the Serbian Orthodox. This great religious victory was celebrated in the Romanian population as a major political victory as well.¹² The preeminence of religious leaders in the Romanian national movement in Transylvania was not challenged by lay personalities until the 1870s, shortly before the death of the great bishop.¹³

The Uniate church also played a major role in the Romanian national movement of the nineteenth century. As discussed above, the religious and political activities at Blaj had represented a most significant inspiration for Romanian nationalism in the eighteenth century, and this continued in the nineteenth. In 1848–49, the revolutionary period that challenged the established order throughout most of Europe, the Uniate church leaders joined hands with their Orthodox colleagues, appealing for joint political action by all Romanians. The most dramatic manifestation of this unified approach was the mass convocation of church leaders, secular leaders, intellectuals, and peasants in Blaj in May 1848 in response to the demands issued in Budapest for the complete union of Transylvania with Hungary proper. The Blaj convocation decisively demonstrated the importance of both the Uniate and Orthodox churches as major vehicles of Romanian nationalism. It resulted in a declaration known as “the Sixteen Points,” a major document in the history of the Romanian national movement.¹⁴

The traditional position of the Uniate church as a major inspirer of secular nationalism is illustrated further by the fact that some of the most important forces in the national movement during the nineteenth century were intellectuals whose early inspiration had been Blaj and its cultural and educational activities. Among these famous nationalists were Simian Barnutiu, Samuil Micu-Clain, Gheorghe Sincai, Petru Maior, Gheorghe Baritui, and Timotiu Cipariu; even Ioan Ratiu, who objected to church domination of the national movement, had derived some of his inspiration from both Uniate and Orthodox sources.¹⁵

During the remainder of the nineteenth century and indeed up to the final collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I the leaders in Budapest continued their arrogant but futile policies toward the Romanians of Transylvania. The harsh measures undertaken could not undo one fundamental fact: the religious and secular leaders among the Romanians had joined hands in a powerful coalition dedicated to the goals of, first, political and religious autonomy within the empire and, subsequently, political freedom and eventual unification with the rest of Romania. When unification finally was achieved in 1918 it was greeted with the utmost enthusiasm among religious and secular leaders alike, while the masses rejoiced in the fusion of throne and pulpit in the restoration of "Historic Romania."¹⁶

Just as religion and the church had been highly important in the Romanian national movement in its ascendancy, they became crucial factors in the degeneration of Romanian politics during the 1920s and 1930s, culminating in a fascist dictatorship based ideologically upon the notion of ethnic and religious supremacy of the Romanians over other "races." The obscure (but forceful) ideologies of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, leader of the fascist Iron Guard, and the Guard's kindred organization, the "League of the Archangel Michael," which accepted the necessity of committing violence for God and Romania, demonstrated the explosive force of combined religious and nationalistic fervor in combination with doses of anti-Semitism and other forms of racism. This destructive combination of religion and nationalism came to an end with the coup d'état of August 23, 1944, and the advent of the Communist Party of Romania (PCR) to power.

COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM BEFORE CEAUȘESCU

The communist leaders who ascended to power in Romania in 1944 and consolidated their hold over the country up until 1952 could not be classified as nationalists, even though some of them exhibited certain "domesticist" tendencies. These leaders were in large measure either non-Romanian in ethnic origin (many of them were Jewish) or doctrinaire Stalinists who had no intention of voicing national aspirations of any kind in defiance of Moscow. On the contrary, the Communist party leadership in this period repeatedly denounced the excessive national-

ism of the prewar regime and endorsed the detachment of Bessarabia from Romania in 1940—a sore point with Romanian nationalists of all stripes. The internal power struggles of the party frequently took place in the context of mutual accusations and recriminations concerning “nationalist” and “domesticist” deviations, and these charges figured prominently in the purge of Lucretiu Patrascanu and his followers. We now know that one of the ringleaders against Patrascanu, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, was a “nationalist in disguise”; he became the chief inspirer of the concept of a “Romanian road” to socialism and communism that culminated in the so-called Romanian declaration of independence in April 1963 (refusing Khrushchev’s plans for economic integration and specialization within the COMECON). The trial of Vasile Luca and Ana Pauker in 1952 represented a breaking with the Muscovites within the party leadership and therefore at least theoretically a resurgence of domesticist elements on the political scene, but this was still 1952 and the height of Stalinism, and the new leaders preferred to demonstrate their loyalty to the Kremlin in no uncertain terms.¹⁷

Scholars differ as to the year in which nationalistic tendencies became important in the Romanian leadership, resulting ultimately in serious strains in the relationship between Moscow and Bucharest. Expanding nationalistic tendencies were unfolding constantly during the 1950s, so that Gheorghiu-Dej was ready and willing to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet rift to enhance Romanian autonomy within the Soviet bloc, in ideological, economic, and foreign policy matters. There was also in this period a steady increase in references to national traditions and the historical links with ancient Rome and Dacia, with Trajan, Burebista, and Decebal. At the time of Gheorghiu-Dej’s death in 1965 the nationalist revival in the political realm was thus well under way. The advent of Nicolae Ceaușescu and his family was to make nationalism (albeit in a special form) the most important political manifestation in Romanian political life.

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM UNDER CEAUȘESCU

The political and socioeconomic system inherited by Nicolae Ceaușescu in 1965 was characterized by considerable ethnic and religious diversity and a legacy of harsh regime policies toward many of the

churches of the country. In 1948 the Uniate church had been disbanded; there were repressive policies against Roman Catholics, Lutherans, and even many elements of the Orthodox church, not to mention the smaller Protestant organizations, such as the Baptists. Many priests and ministers were jailed, and the regime produced massive campaigns of atheism and promoted a "scientific" world outlook among the masses. As the regime became entrenched more firmly in the political sphere, there was a gradual relaxation of control over some churches, notably the Orthodox hierarchy, which was co-opted and increasingly used as the spokesman for the regime in the dialogue with the people at home and with other regimes beyond Romania's borders.¹⁸

The religious heterogeneity inherited by Ceaușescu was matched by ethnic diversity and particularism, and a confluence of religion and nationalism harking back to the centuries-old traditions and outlooks that had prevailed in Transylvania and the principalities. The overwhelming majority of Romanians were Orthodox, while the Hungarians were either Catholic or Protestant; the Germans were also a mix of Catholics and Protestants. The still sizable Jewish population was anchored in its religion, while other, smaller, ethnic groups represented yet different combinations of nationalism and religious preferences.¹⁹

For the new leader this kaleidoscopic political and religious situation made policy-making in this realm a difficult undertaking, presenting him with only limited options. On the one hand, the regime could accept the existing proliferation of religious preferences and ethnic diversity, thus allowing a fair amount of religious and cultural autonomy for the major nationality groups. This practice had been established under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in the form of the Magyar Autonomous Region (even though the regime countered such concessions with actual discrimination against all religions). On the other hand, the new leadership could attempt assimilation and focus on the need to break down the religious exclusivism of the minorities, thus enabling the regime to establish and maintain better political and socioeconomic control and reducing the danger of irredentism, especially among the Magyars. A third alternative would be a renewed and sustained atheistic offensive against all believers, regardless of denominational preference; such a policy would be consistent with the ideological dicta of Marxism-Leninism and also would enable the regime to establish closer control over the population without undue interference from competing struc-

tures and allegiances, provided it could be successful. Finally, the new leader might attempt the time-honored practice of "divide and rule"—expressing and executing preferential policies in favor of one religious group at the expense of others, and thus presumably solidifying his hold over the preferred group.

Regime Policies

Nicolae Ceaușescu's policy toward believers and their organizations represents a mixture of the above alternatives. The policy has not been based upon a clear program, but rather has evolved over time, taking its cues from existing opportunities and the exigencies of the day. It therefore represents a curious mix of opportunism and ideological preference, coupled with the individualistic peculiarities of the "Supreme Leader." There is, in short, a "Ceaușescuism" with respect to religion, just as there is such an "ism" in the field of development theory, and yet another in foreign policy.

The Ceaușescu era can be divided into subperiods in terms of policies toward religion in general and individual churches and organizations in particular. During the period 1965–68 the new leader was concerned primarily with consolidating his hold over the party apparatus, fending off challenges from various rivals, and expanding the hold of the PCR over the societal elites and the population in general. This was a period of coalition-building, during which Ceaușescu held numerous meetings with groups and individuals representing important tendencies and structures in Romanian life. Examples include writers, artists, actors, and sculptors, "the cultural intelligentsia" of Romania; here, Ceaușescu allowed more autonomy and some experimentation, both in the themes discussed and in the artistic techniques utilized. Other groups in the dialogue included the largest ethnic minorities, which were granted some cultural autonomy during this period, and church leaders, with whom Ceaușescu met on several occasions, particularly in 1968. That year may have been a special case, as the PCR leader sought to establish the broadest possible national coalition in face of the Czechoslovak crisis and the Soviet-led invasion of that country.²⁰

The year 1968 may have been the high-water mark of relative political "pluralism" in Romania, and it also represented a turning point. It was in 1968 that the new party leader effected a change that removed the last vestiges of ethnic autonomy in administrative terms. The en-

tire country was reorganized on the basis of the prewar county (*judet*) system; this, in turn, meant the abolition of the Magyar Autonomous Region and its division into a number of *judets*, in which a significant Romanian population was also present. Furthermore, the administrative reorganization provided Ceaușescu with the opportunity to staff the new administrative structures with his own loyal followers, thereby enhancing his power over the territorial party bodies. This was indeed a crucial step in the consolidation of his power, demonstrated at the tenth PCR congress in 1969, where Ceaușescu emerged as the unquestioned leader of Romania. The support he received from the regional party organizations was a crucial factor in consolidating power.²¹

The events of 1968–69 were important for the church organizations in Romania, and they established the general situation for religious believers in the population. The consolidation of Ceaușescu's power at the center and in the regional party apparatus made it possible for him to proceed to the next step in his political program: the implementation of the PCR leader's ideas in the fields of politics, ideology, economic developments, cultural affairs, and ethics and morality. Religion and religious institutions and structures in Romania were fundamentally affected by these developments, insofar as the years since 1969 have been devoted to the practical implementation of "Ceaușescuism" in all aspects of Romanian life.

Ceaușescuism is an all-encompassing hybrid of Marxism-Leninism, traditional Romanian nationalism, and personal views held by the PCR general secretary. This highly original package of thought is eclectic, at times contradictory, and peculiarly vulnerable to the excesses of the personality cult that reached dismaying, even ludicrous, heights by the end of the 1970s. Since so many of the dicta of Ceaușescuism are inter-related, it is almost impossible to separate out those elements that specifically relate to religion; it becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the package in toto, to distill from it those elements that have a special analytical and practical effect upon the status of religion, religious practices, and church organizations in contemporary Romania. The most important elements of Ceaușescuism follow.

Increasing nationalism, even chauvinism, based upon the Romanian national heritage. Almost from the beginning of the Ceaușescu era the new leadership injected an element of nationalism into its domestic and foreign policies. This tendency was enhanced dramatically by the

decision to launch a major ideological offensive during the summer and fall of 1971. One of the most important elements of that offensive was an effort to integrate the current regime with major Romanian historical traditions and personalities. The nationalistic elements of this campaign came to the fore in 1972-73, and were expressed in the Congress of Political Education and Socialist Culture in the summer of 1976, then built up again to a crescendo during the celebration of the centenary of Romanian independence in 1977-78. It has continued unabated until the present time.²²

The campaign has several major themes. First, it asserts that the present regime is a natural outgrowth of Romanian history; that the current leadership, particularly Nicolae Ceaușescu, is in the tradition of Michael the Brave, Stephen the Great, and even Vlad Țepeș; and that Ceaușescu is dedicated to Romanian greatness and the achievement of Romania's just position in the world—a position denied her by the designs of foreign rivals and occupiers. This theme has become standard in any and all Ceaușescu speeches; all major party documents reflect the same preoccupation with the historical tradition of "Greater Romania"; the educational system has been geared up to sound the theme at all levels; and the cultural intelligentsia and academia have been harnessed for the task of researching and extolling this particular version of Romanian history. The nationalistic, even chauvinistic, elements of this campaign have ominous overtones for the ethnic minorities, whose historical memories are attached to Budapest, Vienna, Germany, or other non-Romanian sources, but not to Bucharest and Iași.²³

Another major theme of the nationalistic campaign is the concept of the "socialist nation." The socialist nation is, presumably, characterized by a high level of political consciousness, cohesion, and a popular willingness to execute the socioeconomic, political, and cultural policies of the leadership. The culture of such a nation is superior to "bourgeois" culture, and it also represents a synthesis of the positive elements of ethnic cultures, without being directly derived from or controlled by these elements. In other words, the culture of contemporary Romania is neither Romanian, Magyar, German, nor any other ethnic configuration, but "socialist." In this kind of nation the ethnic groups must loyally cooperate in the fulfillment of the party's programs, as defined by its leader, Nicolae Ceaușescu.²⁴

The policies discussed above represent the main aspects of "Ceaușescuism." During the last few years all of the tendencies of this ideological hybrid have remained, but have become intensified to a point where they dominate daily life for all citizens of Romania. The nationalism expressed earlier has been developed further into an exaggerated form in which it no longer serves mainly as a tool to unite the population internally but also extends beyond the borders, making claims about the superiority of Romanian culture and its extensive contributions to world civilization. The intensity of these claims as well as their scope has produced a number of reactions elsewhere, thus further heightening the controversy surrounding the Ceaușescu style and alleged Romanian chauvinism.²⁵

Ideologization of all aspects of life in Romania. Starting in 1971, and continuing unabated to the present, is a massive ideological offensive designed to envelop the entire population and thus help produce the "new socialist man and woman." This campaign has resulted in increasing party interference in all aspects of human existence in Romania. In practical terms it has produced much tighter party control over the economic and cultural scenes; the PCR has intervened massively and drastically in the writing of novels and plays, in music, in cinematography, in theater production, and in other areas of artistic or cultural activity. The press, television, and radio increasingly have been subordinated to a variety of control mechanisms. One of the chief goals of this campaign has been the "proletarianization" of culture and related areas, where art, literature, etc., are produced for their educational and doctrinaire usefulness rather than for any intrinsic value. In order to ensure compliance with these ideological directions the Ceaușescu regime has established special boards of review in many theaters, newspapers, and periodicals as well as other cultural media; many of the members of such boards are workers or peasants, whose task it is to ensure the "folksy" nature of Romanian art and culture, and, thereby, the PCR's control over the artistic intelligentsia.²⁶

An important part of the campaign for Romanian greatness is the continued, indeed intensified, emphasis on ideology and the need to instill increased ideological vigilance in the population. Since the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union and the ensuing campaign there for *glasnost* and *perestroika* the PCR general secretary has repeatedly refused to contemplate economic and political reform,

persisting instead on the need for ideological commitment and tighter control. Ceaușescu has made it clear that he considers Soviet suggestions for change an unwarranted intrusion into the domestic affairs of Romania, and he has made it equally plain that such interference will be rejected. Romania, therefore, remains a citadel of ideological centralism in the swirling change that now engulfs much of the rest of Eastern Europe.²⁷

Expanded campaigns against religion and for a "rational and scientific" world outlook. In the expanded and accelerated ideological campaign one can find a stepped-up emphasis on atheistic propaganda and education and the crucial need for more determined defense against "mysticism" and superstition. This campaign, which has been conducted through the educational system and the youth organizations, in the press and other media, nevertheless seems to lack the intensity of the ideological effort. During the last decade Ceaușescu has allowed increased contact between Romanian church leaders and other religious persons and organizations abroad, while the Vatican has been granted better access to Roman Catholic clergy inside Romania; Ceaușescu himself visited the Vatican in 1973 in an effort to broaden the Romanian government's foreign policy on disarmament and arms reduction as well as a security agreement for Europe. During this decade there has been an expansion of church building and a cautious upgrading of the status and prestige of some existing bishoprics, both for Roman Catholics and the Orthodox churches. This contradictory policy clearly expresses Ceaușescu's own ambivalence on the subject of religion and ideology: on the one hand, the general secretary is one of the few remaining communist leaders in Eastern Europe who believes in the feasibility of creating the "new socialist man and woman" through ideological indoctrination, while on the other hand, the party leader recognizes the enduring importance of religion for the masses and the need to enlist church leaders in his quest for personal and regime legitimacy.²⁸

The emphasis on ideological orthodoxy has had deleterious effects on religious life and church organizations as well. During the last few years the Ceaușescu regime has razed a number of historic church buildings and monasteries in downtown Bucharest as part of the plan to remake the central parts of the city into a lasting architectural monument to the achievements of socialism and the greatness of the Ceaușescu era.

Furthermore, there is increasing control over those Protestant churches in the country which are officially recognized and increasing persecution of the so-called underground churches. The Roman Catholics have also experienced increased persecution; the Uniates are still considered "null and void" and subordinated to the Orthodox church since the forced merger of 1948; even the Orthodox church itself has experienced the wrath of Ceaușescu's newest campaign against religion. The Orthodox hierarchy has been forced further into submission and obsequious support for the regime. Most commentators with some knowledge of these developments contend that the situation is deteriorating for all believers, regardless of church affiliation.²⁹

These developments can only be glimpsed because evidence is scanty. The razing of churches in the provinces has received little publicity, but the process is certainly under way. We know of a few highly publicized cases of regime persecution of religious groups and individuals; there are doubtless more examples. It is also likely that the known cases of courageous individual expressions of opposition represent merely a tip of the iceberg of frustration, silent opposition, and embittered apathy that must engulf ever-widening circles of believers and others as a result of the present campaign. This level of frustration, taken together with the deepening alienation of the general citizenry, augurs ill for Romanian political stability in the years to come.³⁰

The quest for the superior "moral" citizen. A fundamental point in Ceaușescuism is the quest for the new socialist man and woman in the field of ethics and morality. This campaign must be seen in the context of the long traditions of regime corruption for which the principalities and Transylvania were known; these traditions were upheld (and in some cases expanded) during the period of Romanian independence up to the point of unification and indeed beyond. At the same time the population, ruled by one rapacious clique after another for centuries, developed defense mechanisms against such misrule—bribery and *bak-sheesh* prominent among them. The present regime is committed verbally to rooting out such detrimental behavior. The new citizen is to be honest, thrifty, "clean-cut" in personal behavior, and dedicated to hard work, family, and sacrifice for the collective good; undesirable traits such as corruption, squandering of resources, immoral sexual conduct, and egotism are remnants of the past and thus have no place in the new Romania.³¹

Many of the elements of this campaign in ethics and morality are also present in the teachings of churches. There is indeed an interesting confluence of emphasis in "ascetic" Marxism and many of the religious faiths in existence today. The general secretary would never admit this openly, of course, but the existence of such common ground between the party and the church is likely to make a dialogue and a *modus vivendi* possible.

The campaign for the superior moral citizen has also intensified during the last few years. The themes are the same, but the intensity of the agitation and sloganeering has increased. At the same time evidence of corruption and malfeasance in high places abounds, some of it discussed by Ceaușescu himself. Under these circumstances popular apathy turns to cynicism, and cynicism to the search for other values, often religious ones. Thus, religion becomes a viable option for increasing numbers of individuals, many of them apparently young—a particularly troublesome development for the regime.³²

The personality cult of Ceaușescu. A very prominent aspect of Ceaușescuism is the emphasis on the general secretary and his wife, and the extensive nepotism of the regime that has placed many relatives in high positions in the government, the party, the youth organizations, and the armed forces. Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu are extolled as the greatest inspirers of all Romanians (and, presumably, of the rest of humanity as well): they also hold pride of place in science, art, literature, ideology, economic analysis, and moral standards. This personality cult, which has elements of pathology in it as seen from the vantage point of a Westerner, nevertheless is consistent with the Romanian historical tradition, in which the *Domn*, or Leader, lived in Oriental splendor and claimed control over all aspects of people's lives; the church leaders, especially in Orthodoxy, often enhanced this tendency by crowning the princes and generally submitting to the secular authorities. Once again, history intrudes firmly and decisively upon the making of the "new" political and ethical order.

The attitudes and policies of Ceaușescuism have a considerable impact on the churches of Romania. The atheistic campaign is clearly detrimental to churches and their flocks, and it reveals the depth of discriminatory attitudes held by the general secretary. On the other hand, the fervent nationalism of the regime cannot be sustained without reference to religion and the churches—a point repeatedly made by the

Orthodox church in Romania. Also, Uniates have pointed to the Latin origins of their doctrine and made efforts to demonstrate these origins of the Romanian population and its culture; these are points that have been made repeatedly by political leaders as well, without attribution to the churches. The seeming confluence of attitudes on the point of nationalism and the national experience may produce a possible *modus vivendi* for the churches and the regime. At the same time it represents a threat to the party's dedication to the notion that it (and not the churches) represents the true link with the past. And Ceaușescu, a devoted nationalist in the tradition of the Old Kingdom, is not likely to reestablish the Uniates to respectability because their origins and influence are tied in so intimately with the history of Transylvania.³³

The personality cult, too, has intensified during the last few years and reached heights unknown elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The same can be said for the concentration of power in the hands of the Ceaușescu "clan," which is extended through co-optation and marriage. There can be little doubt that this process will continue as long as the present elite remains capable of ruling. And that means even less autonomy for others, including religious believers and church organizations.³⁴

THE EFFECT OF REGIME POLICIES ON THE POPULATION

The effects of the massive ideological campaign and of Ceaușescuism on the people of Romania have been profound and contradictory. The emphasis on ideology and the attempt to create greater popular commitment in this field have been rather unsuccessful, judging from the critical comments voiced by the PCR leader himself on numerous occasions. The leader's dissatisfaction with the performance of party cadres in this field is shown further by the frequent purges, personnel reassignments, and reorganizations of elements in the PCR hierarchy during the last decade.³⁵ There is little evidence to sustain claims of success in the making of new socialist men and women; on the contrary, corruption, mismanagement, waste, and violations of "socialist ethics and morality" continue to be prominent features of everyday life in Romania. The personality cult of the Ceaușescus is ridiculed now by elements of the population, and the discrepancy between bombastic program statements and actual political and socioeconomic perfor-

mance clearly has produced a good deal of cynicism and withdrawal from politics—the process of “privatization.” There is no reliable survey evidence of this available, of course, but the frequent denunciations of political apathy by Ceaușescu and others indicate a real “spiritual” crisis in the population at the moment.³⁶

One element of Ceaușescuism has had a considerable impact upon the general population, resulting in responses that are seen as favorable by the regime. The strongly nationalistic overtures of the ideological campaign of the last decade, coupled with the open association of the present regime with the Romanian past, have elicited positive responses among the ethnic Romanians and have helped shore up a regime whose economic performance has remained abysmal. The nationalistic and chauvinistic aspects of Ceaușescu’s domestic and foreign policies have fed into traditional Romanian attitudes of a separate (and superior) past and a special future, both in the Balkans and in Europe in general. But the message of nationalism, so assiduously propounded by the Ceaușescu regime, lacks an essential ingredient if it is to be fully credible to the ethnic Romanians; for them, the link between history and religion is firm and cannot be snapped simply by avoiding the subject, as the Ceaușescus largely have tried to do. Thus, this element of Ceaușescuism has a hollow ring to it, and the regime has an uneasy approach to the whole question of religion and its continuing firm position in the masses. This is not a unique problem for the Ceaușescu regime, for all communist leaders who wish to legitimize themselves by means of history and nationalism eventually must come to grips with the integral link between the national patrimony and religion, but the problem is exacerbated in Romania because of the regime’s heavy emphasis on this nationalism in both domestic and foreign policy.

Ceaușescu’s dilemma is further exacerbated by the fact that there appears to be a revival of religion in the general population of Romania. A careful study undertaken by Earl Pope certainly points in this direction, and similar observations have been made by other students of this phenomenon.³⁷ Once again, this is not a unique Romanian phenomenon but represents a general trend in many communist-ruled systems. The political apathy, the popular cynicism, the lack of legitimacy of the secular order, the incessant ideological bombardment, and the meaninglessness of frustrated materialism have combined to produce a climate in which increasing numbers of people, even young people,

have turned to religion for comfort and emotional sustenance. Religion has become once again a refuge and defense mechanism against a secular order that is less than desirable, in fact highly exploitative and, in many cases, corrupt. History seems to be repeating itself in Romania.

The Ceaușescu regime must find ways to live with this phenomenon, but the problem is so complex that available options appear highly contradictory and probably counterproductive. A frank recognition of the integral link between nationalism and religion would run counter to Ceaușescu's emphasis on the need to reduce mysticism and to promote a "scientific" *weltanschauung*, but ignoring the importance of religious feeling among the masses reduces the chances for popular legitimacy even further. If the emphasis on ideological indoctrination and the creation of new socialist men and women could be scaled down, the existence of other allegiances, such as religion, that interpose themselves between the regime and the people, would be tolerable, but such a development would run counter to Ceaușescu's populism and his vision of "direct rule" over the population.

These contradictions have produced vacillating regime policies toward the Orthodox church and religion in general. The PCR leader has occasional dialogues with church leaders, and the government appears to run the administrative relations with various church organizations with relative competence and fairness,³⁸ but at the same time the anti-religious, atheistic, and "scientific" campaign continues in order to satisfy the ideological constituencies of the regime and the personal preferences of the general secretary himself. In this context it is disturbing that some of the dissident activity manifested in Romania during the last decade has come from Orthodox Christians challenging the very heart of Ceaușescu's program of ethics and morality; even more dangerous to the regime is the fact that some of these individuals have argued along the lines of ethnic minority dissidents. Until now the differences between the religious groups and denominations in Romania have made it possible for the regime to "divide and rule," but the possibility of religious believers making a common front against the atheistic campaign cannot be discounted.

The effects on the population discussed above are long standing, and the last few years have seen little change in this regard. The intensification of the Ceaușescu offensive against religion, coupled with the heightened emphasis on ideology and the increased concentration of

power and wealth in a select group of individuals, has further alienated the masses of the population. This process of alienation is enhanced by the abysmal economic performance of the regime, which has produced a further reduction in the low standard of living and cases of hunger, malnutrition, and inadequate health care. The repressive nature of the regime must also increasingly take its toll on the population in psychological and emotional terms. All of these factors go a long way toward explaining the upsurge of religious faith and religious practices during the last few years. Religion provides the population with a mechanism to escape the dread reality of life; it furthermore establishes and maintains a set of values that seem to exist independently of the vicissitudes of political life and the antics of secular leaders. Finally, it provides a mechanism for withdrawal and quiet protest against a political order that has become repulsive to some and unacceptable to others. The story of religion in Romania in the 1980s is the story of alienation and hope, rejection and acceptance, decay and rebirth. And as such, it is a story of the amazing staying power of faith in a time and place of severe secular challenge and, even at times, outright repression.

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM AMONG THE ETHNIC MINORITIES

The heavy emphasis placed by the Ceaușescu regime on nationalism, further *Romanian* nationalism, is perceived as a threat by the ethnic minorities, whose history is vastly different from that of the Romanians. In fact, the Magyars and the Germans, the two largest and thus most important minorities in contemporary Romania, were once the rulers of Transylvania and a privileged nation within the territory, respectively, while the Romanians were the despised helots. The tables of power have now been turned, and this reversal has created dissatisfaction within these two groups, especially since they were more highly "mobilized" on a number of indicators of social mobilization (such as urbanization, education, and functional specialization). There had developed a sense of ethnic and cultural superiority among the Magyars and the Germans, and religion was part and parcel of this outlook. Thus, these two groups considered themselves superior to the Romanians not only in educational, socioeconomic, and cultural terms, but in religious preference and practice as well.

Given these preconditions, the policies of the Ceaușescu regime have been unsettling for these minority groups, though the extent of their discontent is impossible to measure, given the tight control over information on such matters exercised by the current political leadership. Occasional information does slip through, however; during the 1970s, particularly after the signing of the Helsinki Accords by President Ceaușescu, there developed a small number of groups whose members complained about the violation of several civil rights clauses, chief of which were cultural and religious rights for all ethnic groups inhabiting Romanian territory. Some of the representatives for the Magyar minority (including a former high party official of ethnic Magyar background) were quite explicit in their criticism of regime violations of civil rights; implicit in some of these statements were demands for more religious freedom. In any case, since religion is an integral part of the cultural patrimony of the Magyars (or any other ethnic group), religious attitudes and structures have become important defense mechanisms against the nationalistic policies of the Ceaușescu regime and the Romanian majority. As for the ethnic Germans, their quest for emigration to the Federal Republic is eloquent proof of their commitment to a separate ethnic heritage, of which the free exercise of religious preferences is an integral part.³⁹

There has also been an upsurge of Protestant activity in Romania during the last decade or so, paralleling developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe. A considerable stimulus for this activity has originated with various groups of fundamentalists, whose doctrines are clearly contradictory and detrimental to the current mobilization regime in the country. While these groups represent only a small fraction of the population, their dedication and the fervor with which they hold and disseminate their views may spark increased religious activism in other, larger, religious groups. Such a development would represent a major problem indeed for the Ceaușescu regime.⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

The communist leaders of Romania in the period since August 23, 1944, have adopted ambivalent attitudes and policies toward religion, believers, and religious institutions. On the one hand, Marxist-Leninist dicta demand a vigorous campaign against manifestations of such

"superstition" and "mysticism," and a number of campaigns have been conducted against religion and the churches, both in terms of administrative repression and ideological arguments. On the other hand, religion, in many forms and in many denominations, has survived throughout the population and has, in fact, experienced a relative revival in the 1970s and 1980s. A transformationist regime, openly dedicated to the creation of a new socioeconomic, political, cultural, and moral order, is caught on the horns of a dilemma in such a situation: should one attempt to eradicate such an important remnant of the old order, so that the new society can be established more easily, or must one come to an understanding with this phenomenon that has shown such amazing staying power in human history?

The painful dilemma is further exacerbated by the fact that in Romania (as in much of the rest of Eastern Europe) nationalism, ethnic particularism, and religion are inextricably intertwined; no effort to separate one from the other can be expected to achieve real success. Thus, when the Ceaușescu regime attempts to use history and Romanian nationalism as a mainstay of its own quest for legitimacy in the masses without coming to grips with the position of religion, and especially Orthodoxy, in nation formation and ethnic consciousness-building, this essential omission becomes glaringly evident, detracting from the credibility of the entire campaign. Furthermore, the confluence of ethnicity and religion among the minorities in Romania makes the chauvinism of the present regime doubly unacceptable, for it implies an attack on both the secular and spiritual nation of the minority groups (at least in the perception of many members of these groups). The result is that the current nationalistic policies of Nicolae Ceaușescu and his party carry their own abundant contradictions within them, enhancing the potential for greater dissent, privatization, and political instability in the future.

As indicated above, the regime's practices and policies have been vacillating and at times contradictory, illustrating the inherent contradictions in such a complicated situation. Perhaps no better illustration can be found of this than the self-styled propagator of a national brand of Marxism-Leninism, the chief ideological tribute of the Communist party, participating in the church funeral of his own father—a funeral that was conducted according to the full rites of the Orthodox church, under the leadership of several high clergy.⁴¹

Given the importance of both ideological and religious orthodoxy in the Romanian political and cultural system, these contradictions and the vacillating policies that emanate from them can be expected to continue for the near, and perhaps even intermediate, future. But at some time the communist regime must come to a reconciliation with its own people, and this reconciliation must include a more positive attitude toward religion and religious structures, so much an integral part of the consciousness of both the Romanian majority and the ethnic minorities.

The regime clearly has a hard time accepting this need for "peaceful coexistence" with religion and religious organizations. A major article in the main PCR theoretical journal *Era Socialista* in April 1982 discussed the persistence of religion in the Romanian population and indeed its growth, especially among elements of young people. The same article examined ways to combat this problem, essentially focusing on the need for increased "scientific" propaganda and education.⁴² The student paper *Viata Studenteasca* published evidence in the same month of considerable growth in various forms of neo-Protestantism among youth in academia.⁴³ And during the spring and summer of 1982 the daily newspaper *Scinteia* conducted a full-fledged campaign against various religious practices and antisocialist tendencies.⁴⁴

These articles (and many others), coupled with the increasingly repressive policies produced by the Ceaușescu regime in several areas, including religious affairs, demonstrate the quixotic disregard of existing realities currently characterizing the present leadership, and the corresponding difficulties that Romania now is experiencing in a number of fields. Without a considerable change of heart, the Ceaușescu clan can be expected to continue its dysfunctional policies in socioeconomic, cultural, and religious affairs. Believers in, and practitioners of, religion thus face a bleak immediate future in Romania.

Nationalism and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church

Spas T. Raikin

Bulgarian nationalism was born, bred, nursed, and sustained for eleven hundred years by the national Orthodox church. Patriarchs, bishops, and priests have served this cause under tsars and sultans for centuries. Today, with eagerness and dedication unparalleled in history, they serve the same cause under a communist government in Sofia. Nationalism, Christianity, and Marxism, by a curious twist of historical circumstances, have joined in a common front over which hovers the shadow of the Soviet Union. Nowhere in Eastern Europe is acceptance of Soviet domination manifested with greater conviction than in Bulgaria. The Orthodox church actively supports the communist government and its pro-Soviet policies. To understand this paradox one has to look more deeply into the problems of Bulgarian nationalism and the predicament of the Bulgarian nationalists in the present configuration of political forces in Europe. This predicament is exemplified best by the behavior of the church leaders during the past three decades. Behind this behavior lies a long history of church nationalism, a leadership crisis in the late 1940s and early 1950s that brought to power an ultranationalist faction, and an accommodation with the communists on a common program based upon traditional Bulgarian aspirations over Macedonia.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Bulgarians were converted to Christianity by Prince Boris (852–88). Their first concern was to obtain a national church and a patriarch. The Greeks refused to satisfy their demand and they turned to Rome. Pope Nicholas I patiently explained why he could not bestow this dignity upon the Bulgarian church, but his correspondents did not listen

to him and went back to the Greeks. A council in 870 settled the matter of jurisdiction in favor of the ecumenical see, over the objections of the West, but Boris of Bulgaria still did not receive a patriarch. His successor, Simeon I (892–927), however, had no scruples of canon law and in 918 elevated the Bulgarian church to the status of patriarchate. In 927 Constantinople recognized this unilateral act of the Bulgarians. In this way the ethnic principle was introduced as a consideration for establishment of an autocephalous church. This revolution in the practices of the Eastern church prepared the way for the Orthodox churches in the East to turn into vehicles and tools of nationalism. This nationalist revolution was carried further with the introduction of the Slavic language into the religious services in Bulgaria and, later on, in the other Slavic countries.

The patriarchate founded by Tsar Simeon I lasted for a century. In 972, when the eastern part of Bulgaria collapsed under the combined forces of Byzantium and Russia, the national patriarchs moved from Preslav to Sofia and then on to Macedonia—to Voden, Muglen, and Ohrid. Emperor Basil II (963–1025), known as “Killer of the Bulgarians,” because he had 14,000 captured Bulgarian soldiers blinded in 1014, decreed that the bishops of Ohrid, as successors of the patriarchs, should continue as heads of the autocephalous church with the title of “archbishop.” The archbishopric of Ohrid finally was closed by the Ottoman government in 1767. Even though the upper hierarchy of the diocese was taken over by the Greeks, the archbishops never relinquished their title as heads of the Bulgarian church. A second Bulgarian patriarchate was established in 1235 at Turnovo and it also was recognized by the Eastern patriarchs. With the fall of Bulgaria to the Turks in 1393, however, the Bulgarian patriarchate came to an end. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Sultan Mehmed II (1451–81) extended the jurisdiction of the ecumenical patriarch over Bulgaria. The Bulgarians found themselves saddled with a double yoke: under the political authority of the Turks and under the cultural and spiritual domination of the Greeks. This state of affairs continued for five centuries. Deprived of institutions of their own, and socially, economically, and culturally impoverished, the Bulgarians were pushed to the periphery of Ottoman society. By the middle of the eighteenth century they were on the verge of extinction.

Bulgarian history took another turn. In 1762 Paisii Khilendarski, a

monk from Mount Athos, born in the village of Bansko in the Pirin district of Macedonia, completed a *Slavo-Bulgarian History*—a brief pamphlet that was in essence a manifesto of Bulgarian nationalism. Paisii traveled all over Bulgaria and gave his history to be read and copied. He urged his countrymen to study Bulgarian history, to learn about their “fathers, ancestors, kings, patriarchs and saints,” as other nations do. He was hurt by the fact that some Bulgarians did not wish “to know about their Bulgarian nation and turn to foreign culture and foreign language . . . learn to read and speak Greek and are ashamed to call themselves Bulgarians.” “Oh, you stupid fools!” he exclaimed. “Why are you ashamed to call yourself Bulgarians, and to speak and read your own language? . . . Didn’t the Bulgarians have their own kingdom and State? . . . Of the entire Slavic nation the Bulgarians have been the most famous. They were the first to have tsars. They were the first to have patriarchs. They were the first to be converted. They conquered more land than anybody.”¹

The movement started by Paisii brought the Bulgarian nation back to the stage of history. By 1830 the Bulgarians were battling the Greeks for control of their local churches. During the following decades their energies were absorbed in a bitter struggle for an independent national church. “From the Danube to the estuary of Vardar,” wrote P. R. Slaveikov, editor of *Makedonia*, organ of the Bulgarian liberal nationalist intelligentsia in Constantinople, “there lives one nation. . . . What does the Bulgarian nation demand? [It demands] that every nation should have its own independent church. . . . Why should we not proclaim loudly that under the name of an independent Bulgarian church we seek the totality of our personal and national rights? . . . We want our Bulgarian patriarch, our Bulgarian Synod, our Bulgarian Council, which will represent our secular interests.”²

By 1869 all avenues for a negotiated settlement with the Greeks were exhausted. The key issue splitting the two nations into irreconcilable camps was the distribution of territories between the Greek and the Bulgarian churches. The Greeks would not accept any plan that would not push the Bulgarians north of the Balkan. The Bulgarians would not accept any arrangement that would not include Macedonia in their share. The decision ultimately rested with the Turks. On February 28, 1870, the sultan issued his famous *Firman* (decree) favoring the Bulgarians.³ The Greek patriarch met it with consternation and on September

16, 1872, excommunicated the Bulgarians for the sin of "philetism," i.e., nationalism.⁴ All during the Greek-Bulgarian church quarrel the ecumenical patriarchate argued that if he allowed the organization of a Bulgarian Orthodox church—he repeatedly objected to the use of the term "Bulgarian" in the official documents—it would introduce a novelty in Orthodox doctrine and practices: it would admit the ethnic principle, as opposed to the territorial delimitations, in church organization. The term "philetism," literally "clannishness," in those days stood for what we today call nationalism.

The bitter denunciations by the patriarch notwithstanding, the Bulgarians accepted the *Firman* with jubilation. Ivan Snegarov, church history professor at Sofia University and an Ohrid native, later wrote: "The entire Bulgarian nation, from Tulcha to Struga and Ohrid, felt that it had risen for a new life and glorified in one voice and one heart the justice achieved."⁵ The Greek-Bulgarian church quarrel was a test for the Bulgarian Orthodox church and its Bulgarian nationalism.

The schism proclaimed by the Greeks was ignored by the Bulgarians. They proceeded to organize their independent church. Exarchs were elected, bishops were appointed, schools were opened, plebiscites were held, and in a few years the Bulgarian exarchate was functioning as an independent national institution. Church leaders, however, focused attention on Macedonia, where they were challenged by the Greeks. In thirty years they produced statistics that showed the Bulgarian element preponderant in this province. Certainly statistics of population groups of those days are hopeless exaggerations and generally dismissed, but they show the state of mind motivating people in positions of leadership on a national level. The distribution of nationalities in Macedonia at the turn of the twentieth century, based on data collected by the Bulgarian church, was as follows: Bulgarians, 1,458,902; Greeks, 265,340; Wallachians, 57,042; and Albanians, 19,836.⁶ It is significant that the Bulgarians did not count any Serbs at that time.

The exarchate proceeded to organize the Bulgarians as well as it could. Its work was interrupted by the Congress of Berlin (1878), which returned Macedonia and much of Bulgaria to Turkey, but it continued its mission for Bulgarian nationalism in the territories still under Ottoman rule. By 1902 it maintained four high schools, two pedagogical schools, a seminary, eighty middle schools, 950 local schools, 1,481 teachers, and 50,000 students.⁷ This mission, however, ended with the

Balkan wars and World War I. On the eve of these wars, the exarchate was in charge of 1,331 churches, 294 chapels, 275 monasteries, 7 bishoprics, 1,133 priests, 1,373 schools, 2,226 teachers, and 78,854 students.⁸ But all of this was wiped out. All Bulgarian churches and schools were taken over by Greeks and Serbs. The Bulgarians in Greece were proclaimed to be Slavophone Greeks and those in Yugoslavia, Southern Serbs. All Bulgarian clergy and teachers were either expelled or had to accommodate to the new order of things. The mission of the Bulgarian exarchate for Bulgarian nationalism was all but finished. All that remained of the exarchate was an office in Constantinople that served as a symbol of Bulgarian nationalism, though an agreement between the governments of Bulgaria and Turkey during the war abolished it. The church did not dissolve it, however, and continued to appoint exarchal representatives to reside in its old headquarters. Church nationalists never gave up hope that one day the exarchate would be restored in the ethnic frontiers of a Greater Bulgaria.⁹

These hopes came close to realization in 1941. With the collapse of Yugoslavia and Greece, Bulgaria stood the chance to achieve the long-cherished dream of absorbing Macedonia. All of Macedonia, except the Salonica district, was occupied by Bulgaria. Bishops and priests followed in the steps of the civil administration. Pilgrims from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, from Sofia University, and from the Holy Synod traveled to Ohrid, kissed the land and pored over tombstones and libraries, frescoes and manuscripts to discover new information to prove the Bulgarian character of Macedonia. However, for some reason still unexplained, the Bulgarian Orthodox church never moved to integrate Macedonia permanently into its diocese and stake out, or restate, its historical and canonical claims. The exarchate was not restored. In 1944 the Bulgarians had to evacuate the occupied provinces in a hurry and things returned to the way they had been before the war.

LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN EARLY COMMUNIST TIMES

On September 9, 1944, with the invasion of Bulgaria by the Soviet army, the government of Sofia passed into communist hands. For decades the Bulgarian communists had branded the policies of nationalism pursued by the prewar regimes as great Bulgarian chauvinism. The church was guilty of the same sin. The time had come that every vestige of this pol-

icy had to be dismantled. In addition to philosophical and ideological considerations, Bulgarian church nationalism, with the schism as its symbol, appeared to be an obstacle to Soviet foreign policy objectives in the Middle East where its strategists were preparing to use the Russian church as a tool to attract friends among the Greek-dominated patriarchates of Jerusalem and Alexandria. As a first step in this direction Moscow was arranging a Pan-Orthodox conclave on the occasion of the enthronement of Patriarch Aleksii. Numerous delegations from Near Eastern Orthodox churches were invited to attend. They could not be expected to share the honor with the Bulgarian church, which, in their eyes, was still schismatic. The Soviet government would not let the Bulgarian schism interfere with its interests. Hence, the schism was to be lifted. Some authorities suspect that the initiative for this act came from as high as the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The message was passed to the Bulgarians by the commander of the southern flank of the Soviet armies, Marshal Tolbukhin. Arrangements were made with all deliberate speed. The Holy Synod passed the decision; the government changed the laws; an exarch was elected on January 21, 1945; a delegation was dispatched to Constantinople; some perfunctory negotiations were conducted; and, on February 22, 1945, the schism was lifted. Similar negotiations were attempted in the early 1930s, but brought no results. Constantinople had demanded that the Bulgarians move the exarchate to Sofia. They had refused and the matter was dropped. Now they came to the patriarch with their hands over their heads and the ecumenical see obliged them. Sofia had elected Exarch Stefan I, with his exarchal seat in Sofia.¹⁰ It all amounted to a repudiation of nationalism on behalf of the Bulgarian church. It was done on orders from Moscow. The man who performed this antinationalist act on behalf of the Bulgarian Orthodox church was Metropolitan Stefan of Sofia. But by the midsummer of 1948 he apparently had served the purposes of the government.

On September 6, 1948, Stefan suddenly resigned, toppled from power by the Holy Synod. A long statement was issued by the synod to explain the resignation. It was a scathing denunciation of the exarch that did no credit to anybody.¹¹ The government was faced with a difficult choice as to the man who could do its bidding. The synodal bishops were a cast of ultraconservatives, nationalists, and reactionaries. In 1946 Georgi Dimitrov had called them "old men with ossified brains." The Priests'

Union, led by Rev. Georgi Bogdanov, was hysterically pro-government, but had no influence within the church. Outright suppression of religion would have been a political liability in the international arena, where the communists were trying to win friends. The best alternative was to tame the Holy Synod and pick a man who would cooperate. Church-state relations were to pass through a number of obstacles until this man emerged.

Stefan was succeeded by Mikhail of Rousse. Very soon he offended the government and his place was taken by Paisi of Vratsa. It was Paisi who had toppled Stefan from power. Solid like a rock in defense of the church, conservative to the last fiber of his body, Paisi had a reputation of being an effective manager and disciplinarian who ruled the church single-handedly. In precommunist times he was the man of the government: when King Boris was on his deathbed they called Paisi to administer the last communion; when the communists came to power, it was he, and the metropolitan of Plovdiv, Kiril, who were arrested and jailed for six months. Now it was he who was called to preside over the church when the government was moving to dismantle it.

On February 24, 1949, the Law of Confessions was promulgated, strapping the church in iron chains. Article 12 of this law stipulated:

At the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, each minister of religion or other official who infringes the laws, public order, and morality, or who works against the democratic regime of the State, can be provisionally removed from his functions or suspended, independently of his responsibilities. This removal or suspension is carried out by the leaders of the respective confession on receiving the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. If the official concerned is not removed from office by the leaders of the confession, he will be discharged through administrative channels.¹²

This policy had been put into effect even before the law was issued. In February 1948 Metropolitan Andrey of the New York diocese was suspended on orders from the Bulgarian government. It is possible that behind the fall of Stefan there also may have been such an order.¹³

This law made the church hostage to the government. It required that the confessions submit to the foreign ministry their bylaws for approval within three months, as a condition of their future existence.

The Bulgarian Orthodox church took close to two years to fulfill this demand. The committee in charge of preparing the statutes of the church was chaired by Paisi. The government closely watched its work. Paisi stood like a rock and remained immovable in defending the traditional and canonical foundations of the church from the pressure of the government exerted through the representative of the Priests' Union. He would not budge from the position that the synod was the ultimate authority on all matters of church government and that this authority could not be diluted for whatever reasons. The final text, approved by the government on December 31, 1950, bears witness to his resistance, but in the process of this struggle he made many enemies, wasted himself, and soon after that resigned.¹⁴

The bylaws of the church are a remarkable document, inasmuch as they provide for a broad participation of clergy and laity in its governing bodies. But they also contain the ingredients of their destruction through manipulation of the electoral processes. The statutes provided, as a first step in the erection of a church government, for election of parish councils. Such elections were held on May 27, 1951. The much-heralded democratization of the church proved to be a sobering shock. *Naroden pastir*, organ of the union, made the following comment: "The 27th of May brought us the bitter disappointment, that we are generals without an army."¹⁵ But the apathy of the electorate did not prevent the union leaders from going ahead with their plans to take control of the governing bodies. They were determined to elect "only individuals with clear and positive attitude towards the present people's government."¹⁶ "It should not be permitted under any circumstances," another article commented, "to elect persons . . . [who are] strangers to the spirit of our times and are secret enemies of the People's Government."¹⁷ The outcome of the balloting for diocesan electors (September 30, 1951), showed that the union had taken control of the national electoral college of the church. The synod had made some inept efforts to block union candidates, but had failed.¹⁸

The most important provision of the new statutes concerned the restoration of the Bulgarian patriarchate. A Church National Council met in Sofia and on May 10, 1953, elected Metropolitan Kiril of Plovdiv as patriarch of Bulgaria. The restoration of the patriarchate was a national affair, the ultimate consummation of Bulgarian church nationalism. The powerful historical symbolism of the event overwhelmed all the

factors involved and wiped out all the dissensions that had appeared in church life since 1945. It was the final triumph of the nationalist forces in the church that overshadowed and swept aside all the claims and bids for power of the radicals. The Church National Council elected a first-class nationalist with indisputable credentials.

THE NEW NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP

Constantine Markov, the secular name of Patriarch Kiril, was born on January 16, 1901, the son of Bulgarians from Macedonia.¹⁹ Having received a solid theological education, at home and abroad, he served the church in a variety of important positions. In 1938 he was elected metropolitan of Plovdiv. In 1944, following the communist coup of September 9, he was arrested and kept in jail for six months to be tried as a war criminal by a people's court, but the trial never took place. About this time he turned away from public concerns and dedicated himself to historical studies. The titles of these studies are a testament of nationalism at its best and their contents represent a documented record of Bulgarian nationalism. The total volume of his published works amounts to over sixty-six hundred printed pages. The theme of his studies is the justice of Bulgarian aspirations over Macedonia. His heroes pose as majestic figures, like Davids and Moseses in Michelangelo style, and cast their titanic shadows over the pale of modern Bulgarian history to guide the destinies of the Bulgarian people even in our times. The main hero, however, is the Bulgarian Orthodox church, towering over princes and princelets, political leaders and political institutions, with its services to the nation. Kiril's scholarly work is pure, unadulterated nationalism.

After his release from jail Kiril for a while kept a low profile. He returned to prominence on August 28, 1946, when he addressed a public meeting at the Bachkovo Monastery on the subject of the forthcoming referendum on monarchy or republic. The next day the national press printed his long exhortation in favor of the republic. It was claimed privately that the published text was a pure invention but, as far as the public was concerned, Kiril of Plovdiv had joined with the government of the Fatherland Front. Explanations for his turnabout were never lacking. It was claimed that in his adolescent years he had been a classmate and a very close friend of Vulko Chervenkov, the son-in-

law of Georgi Dimitrov. He was even said to have been for a while an anarcho-communist.

Kiril never joined with the radical forces pressing for church reforms, but he did not show hostility to them either. He allied himself with the moderates in the Priests' Union and carefully directed the Plovdiv delegation behind the scenes. In 1947 and 1948 he visited the Soviet Union and published several articles and a book praising the communist system. While the Holy Synod was being torn apart by conflicts, Kiril was busy publishing books, was preoccupied with the shattered finances of the church, and was waiting in the wings for his time to come. He was confident that his reputation as a hierarch and a scholar would make him a formidable candidate for the patriarchal position. His time came in 1953.

The election of Patriarch Kiril in 1953 brought the internal crisis of the church to an end. The awesome prestige of his title, his competence as an administrator, and his credentials as an outstanding scholar overshadowed every ambition and every jealousy still lingering in the halls of the church. All dissidence in the church vanished, once and forever. Union leaders, who once led a nasty campaign against the synod, either left the priesthood or were integrated into the structure. During his eighteen years of leadership all passions in the church subsided and eventually died out. When he passed away on March 7, 1971, the patriarchal throne was occupied quietly by the present tenant, Patriarch Maxim.²⁰ The event passed virtually unnoticed. Things were settled in a pattern that has not changed for the past thirty years. There are no indications that anything will change in the foreseeable future.

There is something ominous in the pattern of church life in Bulgaria today. Seen through the speeches of patriarchs and bishops, this life represents a strange, uneventful, surrealistic dream. One has the feeling of walking through the Zimmermann's *Die Wiese* church in Bavaria, where angels, saints, and biblical figures, in the swinging style of the rococo world, are swept in song and dance into a fairy-tale cast of fantasy. Even the faintest glimpse of the ordeal that the church is going through could hardly be caught in the servile accounts of blessings and praises, sung by the highest functionaries of the church. One has to read the address of the newly elected Metropolitan Ioanikii of Sliven, made on the occasion of his investiture on May 20, 1980, in order to understand the dismal abyss to which a spiritual leadership of

a nation could fall. His address is a political manifesto that even Karl Marx could not have composed without blushing. In his address Metropolitan Ioanikii spoke of his "feelings of gratitude towards the people's democratic government," of the "positive attitude of the civil authorities towards the Bulgarian Orthodox church," of the "profound respect, the high honor and heartfelt gratitude which the entire Orthodox flock, jointly with our entire beloved nation, honestly and sincerely feels towards our people's government." He further spoke of "the memories of pre-war Bulgaria . . . for the suppressed civil liberties . . . [that] provoke a just indignation in every honest man."²¹

Metropolitan Ioanikii is a member of the new leadership of the Bulgarian Orthodox church that emerged on the scene in the 1960s and 1970s, following the bitter struggles for power of the late 1940s and early 1950s. These struggles were fought between two nationalist factions, those of Kiril of Plovdiv and Paisi of Vratsa. The party of Kiril won a big advantage when it joined forces with the new metropolitan of Sliven, Nikodim, elected in 1947 with government support. Nikodim had a strong following within a faction of monks associated with the Triavna monastery and its amiable Abbot Clement. The good abbot kept them together and turned them into a tightly knit power center that effectively influenced all future church appointments. Nikodim promoted the members of this group to high positions in the church administration. He placed Metropolitan Filaret at Vidin, Metropolitan Pancrati at Stara Zagora, Metropolitan Maxim at Lovech (and made him also a patriarch of Bulgaria in 1971), Metropolitan Gregori at Lovech, Metropolitan Kalinik at Vratsa, Metropolitan Ioanikii at Sliven, and Prof. Todor Subev as Bulgarian representative at Geneva. Patriarch Kiril placed his former protosyngels Stefan and Varlaam, respectively, at Turnovo and Plovdiv, and Metropolitan Pimen at Nevrokop.

The group of Paisi lost ground and was pushed to secondary positions. Bishop Parteni was dispatched for five years or so to the United States and then recalled. Bishop Joseph was sent to America to battle with exiles and Macedonians and then isolated in New York with one single parish. Bishop Simeon was sent to the United States, then was recalled and appointed patriarchal vicar in Western Europe, with headquarters in Budapest. While abroad these bishops acted as tourist agents for the government, arranging pilgrimages to Bulgaria. Archimandrits Serafim and Vassili, at one time the most promising young leaders of

the church, vanished into oblivion—Serafim managed to become professor of dogmatic theology, while Vassili, after a tour of the concentration camps for his outspoken sermons at Alexander Nevsky, retired in obscurity. Archimandrit Miron, protosyngel of the Sofia diocese, was dragged in the middle of the night out of diocesan headquarters and for a long time his whereabouts remained unknown. He reemerged in retirement. Bishop Nikolai, once considered the most brilliant clergyman of the church, who in different circumstances would have been a worthy successor to Patriarch Kiril, could not go further than the rectorship of the Theological Academy and peaceful retirement. Theologically conservative, this group espoused the most extreme, the most ultranationalist line in politics.

The equally ultranationalist Kiril-Nikodim group, which gained power in the 1950s and 1960s, consisted of opportunists who conveniently posed as anticommunists. They skillfully exploited the argument that they had no other choice but to play the game of the government, while, at the same time, taking advantage of every opportunity and privilege extended to them. There are no valid criteria to determine whether they fool the government or the public, but they obviously have the best of two worlds. On the other hand, the group of Paisi consisted of intellectuals and theologians, most of them having published several books. The followers of Kiril-Nikodim are intellectual mediocrities. These men pick the new metropolitans of the church and thus perpetuate a kind of leadership that they themselves represent.

The most tempting advantage that accommodation to the political realities in Bulgaria offers to the younger church leaders is the chance to study theology in the Soviet Union. Having received free education at the seminary and the Sofia Theological Academy, the young monks, the future bishops and metropolitans, can look confidently for a scholarship to go to Moscow. Another reward for accepting the communist regime is an appointment as patriarchal vicar in Russia. Metropolitan Joseph of New York has served there. Bishop Simeon has been a patriarchal vicar in Moscow. Bishop Dometian, former vicar of the patriarch in the United States, has spent years in the Soviet Union. Metropolitan Ioanikii of Sliven, Metropolitan Filaret of Vidin, Bishop Gelasii, Bishop Nestor, and Bishop Joseph (present patriarchal vicar in the United States and Canada) have all studied for two or more years in Moscow.²²

THE NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP'S PROPAGANDA MISSION

This government-supported and Moscow-educated Bulgarian clergy serves the communist regime as an effective tool for communist propaganda. While the world tends to excuse them for parroting the party line in order to secure for themselves a place in the system, sometimes they go so far overboard in their zeal that it is impossible to distinguish between the fakery, the servility, and the genuine conviction. In 1978 Metropolitan Nikodim published an article in *Tsurkoven vestnik*, official journal of the church, insisting that "almost all American senators and congressmen are descendants of slaveowners. . . . It is for this reason," insisted the Oxford-educated metropolitan, "that they seek to enslave the Third World nations, to make them slaves of the United States."²³

The central preoccupation of the church leaders in Bulgaria in this regard seems to be the promotion of propaganda issues important to the Soviet government, where Sofia and Moscow share identical views. Church leaders seem to be the most suitable representatives for the Soviet line at international gatherings on questions of disarmament and peace. Patriarch Maxim is a member of the World Peace Council and deputy chairman of the Bulgarian National Peace Committee. He has attended numerous World Peace Conferences.²⁴ The leaders of the Bulgarian church will never fail to attack the United States, in one form or another, for its policies on the subject of peace and disarmament. On November 13, 1979, Metropolitan Pancrati addressed seventy-six delegates at the Sofia conference of the Christian Peace Movement and while congratulating the peace initiative of Brezhnev, he had only scorn for the Western powers.²⁵ Particularly obsessed with such ideas is the metropolitan of Vratsa, Kalinik, who wrote several editorials on the subject.²⁶ Metropolitan Pancrati delivered a long address on the same subject at the World Peace parliament conference in Sofia, September 23, 1980, attended by two thousand delegates from 120 countries.²⁷

The international activities of the Bulgarian Orthodox church are conducted through the World Council of Churches where it has emerged as one of the chief agents of communist-sponsored functions. The Bulgarian representatives have been highly lauded for their services. The leader of the Christian Peace Movement, introduced to Todor Zhivkov

by Patriarch Maxim after the conference at Sofia, assured the first party secretary and president of the republic: "Our Bulgarian friends, ecumenical friends, are not only the best, but also the most capable diplomats." Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev seconded him.²⁸ The Bulgarian government most generously supports these activities. It extends every courtesy and every technical and financial assistance to the synod to organize international conferences in Sofia.

One of the side effects of these activities is, of course, the impression that the Bulgarian Orthodox church is a living body and, thus, alleged acts of persecution of religion are pure nonsense. The appearance of the patriarch with his long white veil, accompanied by metropolitans, at international gatherings is an impressive testimony to a vigorous living church. At the World Peace Parliament of Nations, mentioned above, Metropolitan Pancrati made an impromptu speech to dispel "some quite offensive . . . biased allegations of interested countries in the West, to the effect that in the Socialist world there is a systematic violation of religious freedoms. . . . I state categorically," continued Metropolitan Pancrati, "that the religious freedoms in our country . . . and the rights of all believers are guaranteed indeed." He proceeded to deplore the suppression of the "basic rights and freedoms for tens of millions in the Western World."²⁹ This statement was made without any apparent reason. Its obvious purpose was to strengthen the credentials with which the church speaks in promoting the foreign policy objectives of the communist powers.

No less important a mission assigned to the Bulgarian Orthodox church by the government of Sofia is its work among emigrants and exiles residing in the Western countries. The objectives of this mission seem to be to inspire among them a spirit of loyalty and affection for the motherland; to explain to them in a credible manner the policies of the communist authorities in Bulgaria; to counter and muffle all suggestions of religious persecution and oppression, of lack of freedom at home, of social and economic misery; to encourage pilgrimages to the homeland; and to play on the deep-seated feelings of nostalgia. The purpose of this mission is to divide, to confuse, to discredit, to demoralize, to paralyze, to restrain, and to immobilize any and all antigovernment activities conducted by political exiles. Without the church serving as a natural leader and catalyst of such activities, as a recognized symbol and inspiration for national unity, with credibility and respect sup-

ported by a centuries-long faithful service to the Bulgarian people, the exile cause has lost a powerful lever for an all-out effort and united front against the communist regime in Sofia. In this respect the Bulgarian Orthodox church, guided by the communist government, has been eminently successful. The Bulgarian Orthodox churches abroad have been all but eliminated as a factor in the exile resistance to communism.

During the Stalinist times the church, on orders from the government, did not interest itself in ecclesiastical affairs abroad and severed relations with the then Metropolitan Andrey of New York. In 1963 he was reinstated in a reversal of policies, was offered attractive financial inducements, and was given several assistants from Sofia. In a few years these emissaries—Bishops Joseph, metropolitan of New York (1972–87), Parteni, and Simeon, subsequently patriarchal vicar in Western Europe—managed to split every single Bulgarian community in America and Canada, expelled the American priests from their churches and set up two dioceses—New York and Akron—under the jurisdiction of the Sofia synod. They brought priests from Bulgaria to take charge of the synodal parishes and took firm control of Bulgarian religious life in America. The Holy Synod in Sofia passed a decision that only Bulgarians, born and educated in Bulgaria, could serve the parishes in the United States and Canada. In parish after parish the local parishioners were challenged by the agents of Sofia and in parish after parish the pro-Sofia faction won the majorities. This faction exploited accumulated resentments in the Bulgarian communities against the Macedonian Patriotic Organization, the only surviving legal arm of the old IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) that had dominated the Macedonian-Bulgarian church communities in America and Canada for decades. It also played the tune of a nonpartisan, nonpolitical, apolitical, and purely religious interest in church affairs, where the Bulgarians would find shelter under the wings of the mother church. The most powerful component of this argument was the sense of ethnic identity and nationalist feelings underlying it. The antisynodal congregations were organized by Bishop Kyrill as an independent diocese under the jurisdiction of the Russian Synod in Exile. In 1979 it joined the Orthodox church in America.

To strengthen the work of the Sofia church in America, Patriarch Maxim paid a long visit to the New York and Akron dioceses in 1978.

He led an impressive delegation of three metropolitans (Filaret of Vidin, Pancrati of Stara Zagora, and Kalinik of Vratsa), his ever-present private secretary protodiakon Dr. Vasil Veliyanov, and Prof. Todor Subev. He gave to this visit a highly patriotic appearance, and at almost every stop appealed to the nationalistic feelings of the Bulgarians in America and Canada. He recalled the glorious past of the Bulgarian nation and called to all to "bow down with humility before the altar of Bulgarian sanctity, the heroes of spirit and self-sacrifices in the name of faith and church, of nationhood and Slavic brotherhood." He implored the American Bulgarians: "You, while away from the borders of the motherland, are also her beloved children in virtue of your ancestral faith, of your blood and the unbreakable spiritual bonds with the mother church." There was an air of hidden hostility and disdain, resentment and reserve in his speeches and sermons throughout the visit. There were no meaningful references to America for the sake of American-born Bulgarians, and an obvious lack of knowledge and references to the blessings and virtues that American Bulgarians enjoy in their country. The patriarch treated his listeners as if they were held prisoners in a foreign land, longing to come back home and escape this most disagreeable place. At least this was the impression left by the published account of this visit, written by P. V. Veliyanov.³⁰

How important a tool for attracting and holding the Bulgarian diaspora the church is, is evident from the profusion of articles and pictures of churches, monasteries, icons, saints, and heroes of its past, prominently displayed in issue after issue of *Slaviani*, a publication of the government circulated among Bulgarian emigrants. At a time when the church at home is treated with a total blackout, where no pictures of patriarchs, metropolitans, and bishops, no mention of church activities, and no articles on church events ever appear in the public press, *Slaviani* continually shows the white-veiled patriarch, the cassocks of metropolitans and bishops, and an endless array of religious objects in a patriotic setting. *Slaviani* is not circulated in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian abroad is saturated with reminders of past church glory. This crescendo of publicity for the church and religious subjects and topics of historical and artistic content must have something to do with the mission assigned to the church outside of Bulgaria: to win and hold the emigrants, if not in support of the government, at least in a political limbo, in safe neutrality.

To achieve this objective *Slaviani*, in cooperation with the church in Sofia, tries to convince the Bulgarians abroad that religious life in Bulgaria proceeds under normal conditions. In its May 1978 issue it published an article by Subev alleging that the patriarchate in Bulgaria conducts its affairs in conditions of freedom, as guaranteed by the constitution of the country and the Law of Confessions. The theology professor sought to persuade the Bulgarians abroad that regular religious services are held freely, that sermons are delivered freely in thousands of churches and monasteries, that religious periodicals and books are published and circulated freely, that theological schools are functioning freely, and that synodal businesses producing church goods are operating freely. The church, he continued, is subsidized by the state. This statement also was published, verbatim, in the church journal, as the metropolitan of Stara Zagora Pancrati's speech, on May 10, 1978, at the solemn celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the patriarchate.³¹ Other statements with similar content and more specific information have been printed in *Slaviani*. It was reported that the Theological Seminary and the Theological Academy were training, respectively, 120 and 130 students, that the church publishes *Tsurkoven vestnik* and *Dukhovna kultura*, and that the church has 2,600 parishes, 3,720 churches, and about 120 monasteries.³² All this information, however, published in 1980, does not differ from the statements made by Patriarch Maxim in an interview published in *Slaviani* in 1977.³³ Apparently nothing changed in three years.

Some information offered by Patriarch Maxim was highly significant. He specified that the church was served by 1,700 priests and 400 monks. Even in the best of times the Bulgarian church has never had 400 monks. Even if the number of active priests, 1,700, is accepted, though it seems to be an exaggeration, it is a 30 percent or more decline in comparison with 1948 when the Bulgarian church reportedly was served by over 2,446 men.³⁴ Patriarch Maxim did not tell the truth, or he did not know it, which is improbable. Around the same time as this interview Metropolitan Pimen of Nevrokop spoke on Mexican television where he was visiting and gave different figures. He said the number of priests was "about fifteen hundred" and the number of monks and nuns two hundred. These numbers, given by Bishop Pimen for 1978, are repeated in a government propaganda publication circulated in August 1987. It would appear that in ten years the rank and file of the Bul-

garian Orthodox church has not changed at all.³⁵ The truth, certainly known to Maxim and Pimen, is probably worse, considering the fact that a large number of priests were inherited from prewar times and many of them have either died by now or have retired. Many of them have abandoned their positions and settled in other, more lucrative and less deprecated, professions. The synodal bishops in America openly complain that many of those who graduate from the seminary today, after serving in the army, never return to the church. The theological schools graduate at most fifty students a year, half of them already ordained priests. They never could meet the demands for new clergy (e.g., the Varna diocese recently advertised seventeen vacancies).³⁶ This indicates that there is a shortage of qualified priests. If this number holds for all of the eleven dioceses, which in all probability it does, then the church is faced with extinction. There is no way to determine the crisis afflicting the rural parishes. The fact that very few, if any, of the seminarians opt for ordination shows the dimension of the crisis facing the nationalist leadership of the Bulgarian Orthodox church. In a matter of ten, or even five years, by the natural course of events, the clergy of the Bulgarian church could be decimated. The existence of the church, as a viable institution, is in jeopardy indeed.

The claim for the existence of religious publications is not better founded. *Tsurkoven vestnik* and *Dukhovna kultura* are highly professional theological journals in which, besides official addresses and statements of church leaders, stylized sermons replete with biblical quotations, and a few historical essays, there is nothing for the ordinary reader. *Dukhovna kultura* was once a highly respectable journal. Now it is monopolized by theology professors for consideration of highly specialized topics in academic style, inaccessible to the common reader. Two thousand copies of this monthly periodical of twenty-two pages are distributed to the professionals. Such is also the case with *Tsurkoven vestnik*, a bimonthly of eight pages; it circulates only among the clergy. The case with the theological schools is no more encouraging.

The financial status of the church is, likewise, pathetic. Much is made of church monopolies and church industries, but they are involved merely in the production and sale of candles, incense, icons, vestments, and liturgical utensils for priests and churches. At one point the salaries of the priests were paid with candles allotted for sale. The worshipers, however, could avail themselves of these goods, candles

particularly, only when they attended religious services. Considering the fact that church attendance is nowhere near capacity, to put it mildly, and that Bulgarian Christians are not the most generous donors in Sunday collections and fund-raising drives, the only reliable support for the church comes from the state's subsidy. In the 1950s, when the subject of financing the church was still under consideration, representatives of the pro-government line in the church argued that the acceptance of money from the state in precommunist times amounted to political commitment. This issue no longer is discussed in the church press, since all support of the church is coming from the communist state. The state subsidy must be of quite a substantial amount to pay the salaries of the patriarch, the eleven or twelve metropolitans, the twelve bishops, the synodal and diocesan personnel, and the theological and seminary professors, plus room, board, and fees of students, travel, conferences, visits from foreign dignitaries, etc. No figures ever have been published by either the church or the government, beyond the admission that the total amount of the subsidy constitutes 13 percent of the entire budget of the church, but the exact amount of the subsidy remains a secret. Whatever it is, it obviously must be supplemented in the form of other allowances, in order to enable the church to carry on activities outside its concerns and to survive as a showcase for communist propaganda. This answers the question as to why the state should foot the bill of the church, when the Communist party has waged, and continues to wage, a relentless struggle for the extinction of religion.

It is a simple deduction to suggest that the generosity of the communist government in subsidizing the church is merely a payment for its services with the audiences that it addresses. What makes these services particularly valuable to the communists is the credibility with which the church speaks on the issues in question. The issues of peace and disarmament are vested in the very nature of the church and its message. When the black cassock and the patriarchal veil appear behind the Soviet line in international gatherings of unsuspecting Western churchmen, they are worth more than any eloquent peroration at a rally of the Communist party. The credibility of the church leaders with the Bulgarian emigrants is of even greater value. The political system in Bulgaria may be questioned, but who could question the established credentials of the Bulgarian Orthodox church as a symbol of ethnic

and cultural identity, as a pillar of national unity, and as the ultimate refuge of Bulgarian nationalism and patriotism? Any other institution and ideology of the Bulgarian past and present may be criticized and questioned, but who would find anything for which to criticize the Bulgarian Orthodox church? This credibility has been used to serve the cause of Bulgarian nationalism in a communist disguise.

IN SERVICE TO BULGARIAN NATIONALISM

The Bulgarian Orthodox church has served Bulgarian nationalism for a thousand years in conditions of infinite diversity. It is a service that it has agreed to perform for the present communist regime in Bulgaria with enthusiasm and without reservations. It is not the gospel that the patriarch and bishops in Sofia hold high for the Bulgarian people at home and abroad. It is the national cause in its church wrappings that they, jointly with the communist government, propagate today. Patriarchs, metropolitans, bishops, and theologians have become heralds of traditional Bulgarian nationalism. This is the one theme that dominates their speeches and their writings, and where they appear to be honest, sincere, and loyal proponents of traditions and ideas held by the Bulgarian church without reservation for centuries, transcending political regimes, social systems, and historical destinies.

It is an incontrovertible dogma for Bulgarian church leaders that Bulgarian religion and Bulgarian nationhood are identical realities, two streams running close to each other, in parallel with each other, depending on each other, interacting with each other, with the Bulgarian nation providing the body and the Orthodox church providing the soul of one and the same Bulgaria. The doctrine of the close identity of church, state, and nation in Bulgarian history has been held by every Bulgarian historian from Paisii to our days and by every leader of the Bulgarian Orthodox church, past and present.³⁷

One of the recurrent themes in the Bulgarian church press today is the parallel continuity of church and nation. Church leaders do not spare any effort to repeat for the thousandth time the claim that the patriarchate of 1953 is canonically and historically directly related to the patriarchates of the first and second Bulgarian empires and the archbishopric of Ohrid.³⁸ The historical continuity of the patriarchate is extended further over the territorial integrity of the Bulgarian lands.

The church is perceived as a guardian and repository of Bulgarian national values that transcend political frontiers and historical contingencies. The centerpiece of these values, an integral part of the Bulgarian historical heritage entrusted to the church, is Macedonia. The present leaders of the Bulgarian Orthodox church—patriarch, metropolitans, bishops, and theology professors—are wallowing in this perception of their mission and repeatedly point to numerous examples from history to evoke the authority of heroes in ecclesiastical garb. The most often recalled are the images of Saints Cyril, Methodius, and Clement of Ohrid.

Nowhere in the Slavic world is the cult of these saints celebrated with greater solemnity and national fervor than in Bulgaria, both in religious and secular festivities. By engaging in these nationalist exhortations the church seeks to project the idea that the founders of Bulgarian culture and civilization were, before anything else, clergymen, and, second, that they were born in Macedonia and spoke and wrote in the language of the Macedonian Slavs, the Old Bulgarian Language. By trudging along the path of traditional Bulgarian nationalism the leaders of the Bulgarian Orthodox church thus hope to win, for the church and for themselves, a place of dignity and respectability in the communist society of today.

There is no public occasion where church leaders would not praise the work of Saints Cyril and Methodius as Bulgarian contributions to Slavic and world civilization. Metropolitan Pimen of Nevrokop spoke of them as "born Bulgarians from a Bulgarian family."³⁹ Metropolitan Pancrati led a high-powered delegation of academicians and diplomats in a pilgrimage to the grave of St. Cyril at the San Clemente Church in Rome. His speech, published as an editorial in *Tsurkoven vestnik*, called the two brothers "Slavo-Bulgarians."⁴⁰ The same journal published a long article from Prof. Emil Georgiev, the most prominent member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and specialist on the subject, in which he spoke of the work of Saints Cyril and Methodius as an "achievement of the Bulgarian genius . . . a contribution of the Bulgarian nation to the common Slavic, and general European evolution."⁴¹

It has become a means of swearing loyalty to the Bulgarian church and to Bulgarian nationalism for all bishops and metropolitans, when addressing an audience, to repeat again and again the now famous

appellation of St. Clement of Ohrid: "the first bishop of the Bulgarian language." This phrase was coined by a Greek archbishop of Ohrid, Theophilactus, in the eleventh century. Bishop Simeon, addressing Patriarch Maxim during his visit to this country in 1978, spoke of St. Clement as "the first Bishop of the Bulgarian language in our holy church, enlightener of the beautiful Macedonian land."⁴² Patriarch Maxim himself, addressing a large congregation at Detroit, implored the almost exclusively Macedonian-born audience: "We are called to follow this path of light by the great patron of your church—St. Clement of Ohrid—the first bishop of the Bulgarian language . . . founder of our national hierarchy and splendid culture."⁴³

Macedonia figures in every statement and article by high church functionaries in reference to historical and patriotic occasions. It is viewed always as the cradle of Bulgarian culture. The Academy of St. Clement at Ohrid in the ninth century, in the words of an official statement of the Holy Synod, was "organized in the bosom of our Holy Church."⁴⁴ Addressing the church congregation at Indianapolis, Patriarch Maxim said: "We, emissaries of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, have come to this far-off [country] . . . because here we find living zealous patriots of ours, beloved children of our Holy Church . . . from golden Macedonia, flat Moesia and aromatic Thrace." Bishop Simeon responded: "Their faith is the faith of our ancestors from Macedonia."⁴⁵ Five Bulgarian metropolitans—Joseph of Varna, Nikodim of Sliven, Pimen of Nevrokop, Stefan of Turnovo, and Varlaam of Plovdiv—and the patriarchal secretary, Dr. Veliyanov, issued a statement, published both in *Tsurkoven vestnik* and *Slaviani*, to refute some allegations of a Skopje priest, Dr. Slavko Dimevski, and said, in reference to the late patriarch Kiril: "The Holy Patriarch is a Macedonian Bulgarian, while Dr. Dimevski is a 'Macedonian' from a Macedonia which is Bulgarian in history, language, spirit, culture and church life."⁴⁶

The Bulgarian Orthodox church still maintains symbolic claims over Macedonia by ordaining bishops (metropolitans-to-be) with titles of inactive ancient sees located in that region. Presently, such titles are held by Branitski Gerasim (rector of the Theological Seminary), Velichki Iosif, Lefkiiski Partheni, Stobiiski Arseni (secretary-general of the Holy Synod), Znepolski Dometian (patriarchal vicar in the United States), Dragovitiiski Ioan (former rector of the Theological Academy), Krupnishki Gelassii, Glavinitski Simeon (patriarchal vicar in Western Eu-

rope), and Smolenski Nestor, among others. Of course, these are only symbolic titles, but symbols are kept alive in support of the Bulgarian aspirations vis-à-vis Macedonia. It is the driving force of Bulgarian nationalism. The Bulgarian church is serving this cause with all its heart and all its soul, and all the energy and credibility it can muster.

Although the Bulgarian government evidently has shelved all its demands vis-à-vis Greek Macedonia, Yugoslav Macedonia remains an open question. The war of words between Belgrade and Sofia over Macedonia these days often reaches a deafening pitch. Sofia contests the Yugoslav claim that the Macedonians constitute a distinct ethnic group. If this claim were admitted by the Bulgarians, then the entire population of the Pirin district of Bulgaria or much of it, at any rate, might have to be recognized as Macedonian and be granted appropriate legal status, with all the rights and privileges pertaining thereto, as was reluctantly done between 1944 and 1948.⁴⁷ No Bulgarian government, acting on its own free will, would ever do that.

The Bulgarian Communist party, always forced to adapt its stand on the subject to Soviet interests in the Balkans,⁴⁸ has changed its position at every turn after World War I. In the interwar period, it tried every possible subterfuge to meet the standards of the Comintern.⁴⁹ In 1941 it used Metodi Shatorov to integrate the Macedonian Communist party into its structure.⁵⁰ In 1944, pressured by both the Yugoslavs and the Soviets, the Bulgarian party agreed to permit the dispatch, from the Yugoslav side, of ninety-three teachers to Pirin Macedonia. These teachers offered classes in Macedonian language and history, introduced courses for illiterate peasants, and lectured on life in Yugoslav Macedonia. They also established a Macedonian publishing house, created a Macedonian newspaper (*Pirinski vestnik*), and founded a Macedonian National Theater at Gorna Djumaja for the presentation of Macedonian plays.⁵¹ Not surprisingly, the 1946 Bulgarian census allegedly recorded a high concentration of Macedonians in the Pirin district, though the precise figures never have been revealed.⁵² In 1956, prior to the April plenum, at a time when Nikita Khrushchev was still hoping to entice Yugoslavia back into the Soviet orbit,⁵³ and when any attempt of Bulgaria to repudiate Macedonianism in the Pirin district would have been tantamount to sabotage of Soviet foreign policy, the Bulgarian census still showed 187,789 Macedonians. The census of 1965 showed only 8,750.⁵⁴

By 1975 there were only 1,400 of them left.⁵⁵ The failure of the Soviet Union to attract Yugoslavia back to the fold apparently freed the Bulgarian Communist party to reassert itself.⁵⁶ But the Bulgarian Orthodox church never wavered in its nationalism and never conceded this point. In 1946, when Macedonianism came to reign at the university, the theological faculty became the refuge for recalcitrant nationalist professors of philology and linguistics. When the Macedonian clergy in Yugoslav Macedonia organized an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox church in 1967, claiming to be the restored archbishopric of Ochrid from earlier times,⁵⁷ the Holy Synod in Sofia turned a cold shoulder.

Modern Bulgarian nationalism, ever since the liberation of 1878, has been torn between East and West. Bulgaria, led by German princes, sided with Germany in two great European wars, and lost. During World War II London considered plans to liquidate it as an independent country.⁵⁸ It was only the Soviet occupation in 1944 that saved Bulgaria from partitioning and annihilation. If Bulgarian nationalism today has any chance, it is with the Soviet Union. The Bulgarian nationalists who oppose communism and the pro-Soviet orientation of Bulgaria these days are the most tragic figures on the Bulgarian political stage. They either must give up their nationalism and throw their lot in with the uncertain West, or, for the sake of nationalism, embrace the Soviet Union and communism. This seems to be the choice made by the leadership of the Bulgarian Orthodox church, which has become the most ardent proponent of Russophilism in Bulgaria—evidently, in the hope and with the expectation that the Soviets would endorse Bulgarian nationalism.

The Bulgarian Orthodox church has long served the cause of Russophilism. Bulgarian hierarchs fought the German princes of Battenberg and Coburg and were, in turn, imprisoned or exiled. Today they sing praises to "Grandfather Ivan" who "shines as an eternal bright sun of freedom." "Today," claimed an article in *Tsurkoven vestnik* in 1978, "the entire happy Bulgarian nation enjoys a well-being built on the fidelity and friendship of Diado Ivan."⁵⁹ That same year Metropolitan Kalinik spoke of the "common destiny of Bulgarians and Russians" and quoted the late Patriarch Kiril as having said that "the brotherhood between the Soviet Union and the Bulgarian nation will be forever inseparable."⁶⁰ Patriarch Maxim never misses the opportunity to swear

allegiance to Russia and the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Russian church reciprocate with similar assurances of their affection for Bulgaria and the Bulgarians. When Patriarch Maxim arrived in Moscow for the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Russian patriarchate—these festivities seem to be purposely staged—he was met at the airport by Patriarch Pimen himself, six Russian metropolitans, and the Soviet Minister for Religious Affairs at the head of this massive display of attention.⁶¹

CONCLUSION

Nationalism has been a deeper faith for the Bulgarian Orthodox church throughout the centuries than the gospel truth. It is its saving grace now, when its leaders have placed all their energies, their prestige, and their credibility to serve a system that has vowed to destroy the church. It has been argued that, faced with the hopelessness of its position, the church has discovered in nationalism its last refuge for survival. By espousing this philosophy and actively working for the Bulgarian national cause in a communist environment, the church, at least, could stand with dignity before its centuries-long history and claim respectability in a society that denies the value of its message. Bulgarian church leaders could claim confidently that they are not doing anything less than their predecessors have done in feeding, sustaining, and keeping alive their secular faith—Bulgarian nationalism. It is the only, and the last, service that they still can perform for the Bulgarian people, even if they do not find public recognition for it at the highest levels of government in Sofia. On October 20, 1981, at the official celebration of the thirteen hundredth anniversary of the Bulgarian state, Todor Zhivkov, president of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, failed to mention the Bulgarian Orthodox church, except in a brief derogatory reference to the *popovete* (the priests). He gave credit to all forces, institutions, individuals, and movements that have inspired and sustained the Bulgarian nation in its long history, but omitted the church.⁶² While he was delivering his address, Patriarch Maxim was sitting far behind, in the fourth row, some 114 party and other leaders ahead of him in the place of honor for this historic occasion. The patriarch should have been the first among the most honored guests. By this official snub, by no means an accident,

the leader of the Bulgarian communist state indicated to the nationalist leadership of the Bulgarian Orthodox church that its services to the government and to the nation are dispensable and that even for the sake of nationalism and history the church would not be spared, that it is marked for extinction.

The Fate of Islam in the Balkans: A Comparison of Four State Policies

Zachary T. Irwin

The situation of Islam in the Balkans reflects the legacy of Ottoman rule and the recent political history in four socialist states. Existing scholarship about Balkan Muslim peoples does not suggest a simple comparison.¹ Recent policies toward the Muslim peoples of this area have attracted relatively little attention, and there is no systematic account of the Ottoman impact on the Balkans. Even to speak about a "Muslim policy" in southeastern Europe requires great caution in order to distinguish ethnic from religious questions. In this chapter I will describe some political aspects of Islam in Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania and ask whether these aspects have a larger significance for Islam and socialism.

There are great disparities in the size and character of Balkan Muslim communities, a fact that complicates the most simple description. In Yugoslavia, Muslims of different nationalities constitute about 16 percent of the population and include the federation's third largest nationality, the Slavic "Muslims" of Bosnia-Herzegovina.² Until recently Yugoslavia pursued a policy of relative tolerance toward most Islamic religious expression and granted considerable autonomy to Islamic organization. Yugoslav policies are contrasted with the situation in Albania, the world's first avowedly "atheistic" state.³ Since 1967 Albania's vigorous campaigns of "atheization" have fallen equally hard on the Sunni Muslims of the north and the less numerous Shi'ite Bektashi in the south. But Albania is a predominantly Muslim country (70 percent), an important consideration in comparing the Muslim situation with that of the smaller Catholic and Orthodox sects. In Romania, Muslims belong predominantly to two ethnic groups, the Tatars and

Turks (amounting to about 0.2 percent of the population).⁴ Like Romanians of the Jewish faith, Romanian Muslims enjoy religious privileges comparable to Muslims in Yugoslavia. Bulgarian Muslims include approximately 700,000 Turks, 18,000 Slavic Pomaks, and 12,000 Gypsies.⁵ Nearly one out of ten residents of Bulgaria is a Muslim.

Bulgaria's situation highlights the complex relation of religious and national identity. Bulgarian Turks have been the object of virtual expulsion, negotiated repatriation with Turkey, and enforced "Bulgarianization." Slavic Pomaks differ in language and settlement from Turkish Bulgarians and, because they are Slavic, have endured intense pressures of assimilation from the Bulgarian authorities. Religious Orthodoxy is a key component of Bulgarian identity, and it appears that the Bulgarian leadership views Islam as a denial of Bulgarian nationality. Albania's repression of religion reflects its relative insignificance for Albanian national consciousness—which is not to deny that official persecution of the adherents of any faith is intolerable. However, the comparison becomes more striking by considering Yugoslavia. Belgrade has promoted a "Muslim" identity among Slavic Muslims as a countervailing national identity to Serbo-Croatian rivalry both in the federation as a whole and within the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yugoslav Muslims of all nationalities, including Albanians and Macedonians, have enjoyed ecclesiastical autonomy unique under socialism, despite Yugoslav insistence that Muslim ethnicity exists independent of Islam. Both Yugoslavia and Romania have been relatively tolerant toward organized Muslim religious expression, and both have endeavored to exploit an Islamic association in relations with foreign states.

In comparing policies adopted toward Balkan Muslims one must acknowledge the absence of a single pattern of "church"-state relations. In order to systematically probe the differences in regime policies toward the Muslims in these states, I shall focus on three questions: (1) Which relevant features of Ottoman rule and Islamicization have a bearing on the current composition of the Muslim community and its place in the state's national history? (2) How does the communist parties' conception of "socialism" affect their religious and ethnic policies in general and toward Muslims specifically? (3) How do interstate or transnational considerations affect both state policy and attitudes of the community itself?

THE OTTOMAN LEGACY

Broadly speaking, Balkan Muslims consist of both Slavic Muslims and non-Slavic immigrants from imperial times. With the exception of the Albanian Bektashi, all are Sunnis of the Hanafite rite.⁶ Among Slavic Muslims it is difficult to exaggerate the role of religion in maintaining a Muslim identity. This assertion is not a simple redundancy. Quite aside from communist party pressures toward national homogeneity, few Muslims—Slavic and non-Slavic alike—have shown much attachment to secular Turkey. Religion (and religious culture) remains the sole component of their distinctive identity. Although there are nearly ten thousand Turkish borrowings in modern Serbo-Croatian, Ottoman rule had only marginal linguistic impact on Bulgarian and Romanian.⁷ To be sure, Turkish Balkan Muslims have continued to speak Turkish, although their lower levels of education and predominantly rural status account for less social integration. As the Balkan states gained national independence, Muslims experienced a reversal in their social status. Under Ottoman rule many had been relatively privileged landowners, civil servants, or urban craftsmen. Within a few generations of Balkan independence most Muslims had become peasants, except for some in certain areas of Albania and Yugoslavia. There was little except religion to promote a separate identity among Slavic Muslims. The Jelaviches refer to the "striking lack of physical evidence of the almost five-hundred-year [Turkish] occupation."⁸

The important role of religion was the single greatest legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The tenacity of religious belief among Muslims under socialism may be traced to the challenge of a faith that refuses to distinguish religious from social and political institutions. The Ottoman system of administration reinforced the absence of a secular-religious distinction. The Muslim *dhimmi* (protected people, viz., Christians and Jews) system exchanged the autonomy of non-Muslim religious communities for tribute and recognition of Muslim suzerainty, and it became the basis of the Ottoman religious *millet*s (administratively autonomous units based on religious organization). It is difficult to make accurate generalizations about the *millet* system without respect to time and place, but historians generally consider it to have been an obstacle both to mass conversion as well as to the development of a distinctive ethnic identity.⁹ The empire had little sustained interest in

religious conversion as long as the Muslim overlord received payment in land or discriminatory tax. Only the Orthodox *millet* was subject to the child levy or *devshirme*. Peasants (*raya*) who converted to Islam avoided both the *devshirme* and the discriminatory tax, but as Stanford Shaw observes, "the Muslim *rayas* were no closer than the non-Muslim *rayas* to the Ottoman rulers in language, culture, customs, and mores [so that] the upper class Ottomans were equally far from both, and treated them, as a result, with equal scorn."¹⁰ Religious bonds between Balkan Muslims and their Turkish rulers were strained by the tendency of many Balkan Muslims to incorporate Christian and pagan practices and beliefs into their religious practice. It is likely that the *millet* system reinforced religious peculiarities among local Slavic and non-Slavic Muslims alike. The greatest distinction for a Slavic Muslim was to rise to the status of a tax farmer, an administrator, or a *Sipahi* (cavalryman). These privileges were reserved for relatively few individuals, but a striking number of Christian converts became grand viziers in Istanbul.¹¹

The cases of mass conversions to Islam are limited to the Albanian and Bosnian Slavs. Recent work by John Fine casts doubt on the identification of Islamic conversion and the persecuted medieval heresy of Bogomil Manichaeism. Fine considers it possible that the heresy had so weakened Catholic and Orthodox influence that the Bosnian population was susceptible to Turkicization and Islamicization. There is evidence of the synthesis of Christian and Muslim practices among believers.¹² A smaller number of Slavic Muslims trace their origins to the assimilation of the Turkish conquerors and the *devshirme*. At the time of the Austrian occupation of Bosnia there were between 6,000 and 7,000 aristocrats (*begovi* and *agé*); 85,000 serfs, including 60,000 Orthodox Serbs and 23,000 Catholic Croats; and 7,000 free Muslim peasants.¹³ As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albanians converted to Islam rather than submit to Orthodox pressure from the Slavic north. Prior to the Turkish conquest, the *ghegs* (the chief tribal group in northern Albania) had found in Roman Catholicism a means of resisting the Slavs, and though Albanian Orthodoxy remained important among the *tosks* (the chief tribal group in southern Albania), many lords chose to retain their lands through religious conversion. In addition to these factors, Albanian conversion was affected by the character of Albanian society and the role of the Bektashi *dervish* orders. The tribal structure of

social organization and allegiance encouraged mass conversion following the conversion of a *gheg* leader. Bektashi missionaries undertook vigorous efforts in the South. Shi'ite Bektashism affirmed the unity of God in all monotheistic religion and the brotherhood of all men. This universal strain appealed to Albanians owing to their weakly defined sense of religious identity. It is not unusual for a single Albanian family to include both Muslim and Christian members or, as some Slavic Muslims, to profess both faiths depending on circumstances.¹⁴

The empire settled Tatars and rebellious Turcoman Yuruks in Thrace, Macedonia, and Dodrudja. Turkish immigrants were settled around Skopje and on frontier marches. There is some excellent documentation concerning the Islamicization of the march around Skopje. Following the battle of Marica in 1371, Skopje became a march for the conquest of Serbia and Bosnia. The picture that emerges from Ottoman registries between 1450 and 1544 indicates a gradual process of conversion.¹⁵ Between those dates the number of households in Skopje increased 140 percent, and the relative share of Muslim households increased from 69 percent to 81 percent. In Tetovo the Muslim share increased from 27 to 40 percent, and in Prilip Muslims increased from 2.7 to 31 percent of the total number of households. Ninety-three percent of all Christian households were engaged in agriculture, while Muslims were predominantly involved in military, religious, or craft occupations. While the larger cities were confessionally mixed, the villages were confessionally homogeneous (Catholic, Orthodox, or Muslim). The importance of the gradual process of conversion in Macedonia consists in its meaning for mixed populations. Balkan Muslims were geographically, socially, and religiously separated from other *millets*; they failed to develop a sense of ethnic consciousness. For non-Muslims, ethnic consciousness was associated with the culture preserved in their Orthodox churches and the memory of a political unit existing before the conquest. Balkan Muslims became intensely parochial, and relatively few returned to Anatolia as the empire dissolved into independent states.

ALBANIAN MUSLIMS

Albania presents a paradox: despite the fact that a majority of the population is Muslim (70 percent), the Albanian authorities have "abolished

religion." Elsewhere in the Balkans, Muslims are far more likely to maintain their religious practices and beliefs.¹⁶ According to Article 37 of the 1976 constitution, "the state recognizes no religion whatever and supports atheist propaganda for the purpose of inculcating the scientific materialist world outlook in people."¹⁷ However repressive the Albanian regime, its openly declared war against religious expression may be understood within the context of Albanian history. Unlike other Balkan peoples, Albanian nationalism could not look to a pre-Ottoman political unit associated with the church. Originally the Albanians had been Orthodox Christian, but some northern *gheg* tribal leaders converted to Catholicism as a means of resisting Slavic pressures of assimilation. Stavro Skendi has associated the receptivity to Islam of Catholics and Orthodox alike to the "confessional vacillation of the lords and the weakness of the clergy."¹⁸ Albania was converted to Islam between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries; northern and central *ghegs* accepted Sunni orthodoxy while the southern *tosks* became both Sunni and Shi'ite Bektashi Muslims.¹⁹

It is commonplace that travelers in Albania found its Muslims to be less devotedly religious than conscious of their common language. In the words of one observer, "Albanian Muslims were no fanatics, they were Albanians first and Muslims afterwards, and they vied with their Christian fellow-countrymen of both the Greek and Latin rite in devotion to the rugged country of their birth."²⁰ Of course, such descriptions are idealized. An important firsthand account of the 1920s relates a profound intolerance on the part of the Sunni Muslims toward Christians and Bektashi.²¹ In a deeper sense religious diversity was an obstacle to national unity.

Initially nationalism grew under the Roman Catholic and Bektashi leadership of the Prizren League, an association organized to defend Albania against territorial losses envisioned in the Treaty of San Stefano. But the nationalists sought an independent state following the Young Turks' repression of the movement in 1908. Bektashi nationalists in the south and Catholics in the north confronted an inert Sunni peasantry in the central lowlands.²² The Bektashi nationalist Naim Frasheri sought to make Bektashism into a bridge of common interest toward independence between Christians and Muslims.²³ He was not successful, for Albania's independence relied less on an internal movement than on a means to afford a counterbalance to the designs of Italy, Greece, and

Serbia. According to the secret Treaty of London (April 26, 1915), Albania was to have been divided among those powers. Woodrow Wilson found the plan not only an affront to self-determination, but also likely to aggravate relations between Muslims and Christians should they be ruled by a foreign power.²⁴

Independent Albania's first constitution (1920) guaranteed religious freedom and declared no official religion. When the Turkish Republic suppressed the dervish orders and closed Bektashi monasteries, the *dede* (grandfather) moved the sect's headquarters to Tirana. In January 1922 an assembly of five hundred Bektashi clerics formally renounced allegiance to Turkey.²⁵ Sunni Muslims showed no affinity for secular Turkey, and both sects were organized under a single Sunni grand mufti. In 1929 the community was reorganized into a general council of a president and four grand *mufti*. The significance of the statute was principally to subordinate *shari'at* law to Albania's adoption of the Swiss Civil Code and to obligate the Muslim clergy to carry out the directives of the state. In particular, the clergy were ordered "to contribute to develop the national brotherhood among Albanians of all faiths" and "to encourage Muslims to conform to modern civilization."²⁶ Regardless of whatever objections the reorganization provoked among the clergy, or the success achieved in suppressing undesirable social practices, the statute established the principle of secular control of the Muslim hierarchy.

Upon assuming power in 1944, Albanian communists found the religious situation relatively well suited to their purposes. Albania's first two postwar constitutions (adopted in 1946 and 1964) guaranteed the citizens' freedom of "conscience and faith," separated church and state, and prohibited the establishment of confessionally based political organizations.²⁷

The Albanian Muslims scarcely resisted communist authority. Enver Hoxha acknowledged that Islam was "not a serious obstacle" to communist power in the postwar years. "Even before the occupation of the country, but more so afterwards, the hierarchy of the Muslim faith was weak, without the least experience to give us trouble."²⁸ All religious communities were to be recognized by the Council of Ministers and their laws approved by the state. Decree 723 on Religious Communities provided that their leadership be responsible to the state and "through activities develop in their followers a sentiment of loyalty

towards the peoples' power and the Peoples' Republic of Albania."²⁹ To ensure absolute obedience to the law, the communist leadership acted harshly. As early as August 1945 all church properties were seized, including libraries and printing facilities. The *muftis* of Tirana, Durres, and Shkoder were imprisoned or shot for alleged wartime collaboration. Even two Bektashi leaders who had fought with the partisans died mysteriously with the grand *dede*.³⁰ Compliant Sunni and Bektashi leaderships were appointed separately. Muslim educational institutions or charitable organizations were proscribed. No contacts were permitted with Muslims in predominantly Muslim countries. Instead, the grand *mufti* of the Sunni community led a delegation of Albanian Muslims to the USSR, where he supported the Stockholm Peace Appeal and urged that all Muslims follow the example.³¹ The Bektashi *dede* echoed his support.

By the early 1960s Islam appeared likely to pass away beneath a formal structure of four Sunni "first-class" *muftis* and a single chief Bektashi *dede*. In 1963 an observer reported, "it is rare today to see any of the faithful acknowledging their faith by public prayer. Albanian Islam is in its death throes." He added that of the 530 mosques active prior to the war, only a few dozen were active by the early 1950s.³² Prior to Albania's "Cultural Revolution" in 1967 there had been little to distinguish Albanian antireligious propaganda from that of other socialist states. The antiprogressive character of "religion" was argued often by examples from all faiths in Albania. But Albania's situation in the socialist bloc, her affinity with China, and the Albanian communists' cultural radicalism laid the basis for Albania's equivalent of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In 1966 Politburo member Ramiz Alia submitted a report calling for a struggle against "bureaucracy," as well as against "liberal" and "revisionist" ideas.³³ By implication the report extended to religion. In his speech of February 6, 1967, Enver Hoxha asserted that all religious sects had come into Albania through foreign invaders and "served the ruling classes of the country. . . . The history of our people demonstrates clearly how much suffering, distress, bloodshed, and oppression have been visited upon our people by religion."³⁴ A 1977 penal code provided for imprisonment for three to ten years for the possession of religious literature; Amnesty International reports recent cases of individuals imprisoned for this offense, as well as of Muslims convicted of "anti-state agitation and propaganda."³⁵ Fol-

lowing the speech a series of organized meetings and confrontations demanded the closure of all religious institutions and their conversion to other purposes. Religious expression was depicted as antinational.

Compared with the apparently successful struggle against "bureaucracy" in Albanian political life, the assault on religion would seem less successful. A recent article concedes "confusion between the abolition of the material and organizational bases of religion . . . [and] eradication of the religious world view, mentality and practice."³⁶ The article anticipated a "long and difficult" struggle because of "numerous and complex factors" that would "keep alive" religious viewpoints "and from time to time reactivate them." There are no active mosques or churches, but religious life has not been snuffed out entirely. Yugoslav Albanians have observed that Albania's Muslims continue to celebrate holidays openly in rural areas and in some towns.³⁷ Periodically, the press denounces evidence of religious practice with the added criticism of inadequate propaganda. Recently it admitted, "in some areas and by some people religious customs, standards, and rites are still preserved and expressed in various forms. . . . We must accept the fact that religious concepts still wrench the feelings of some young people. There are whole regions and villages where this difficulty is not being overcome properly."

The examples given of "backward customs" and religious influence do not, of course, amount to any form of public worship. In fact, the principal evidence of the article consisted of instances of parents obstructing the marriages of young people "of different ex-religions."³⁸ One source admitted that in 1980 some 96 percent of registered marriages took place between partners of the same "former" religious faiths; it extolled mixed marriage as "defiance of religion" and a "factor for strengthening the moral, political and ideological unity of our people."³⁹ Additional religious "remnants" include the use of religious names, burial customs, and unwritten "patriarchal laws" concerning women.⁴⁰ Albania's emphasis on persuasion of believers rather than outright persecution has meant a continuing assault on the vestiges of religious consciousness. Albanian history has been rewritten to associate religion with "submission and humiliation by foreigners," and national poets, such as Pashko Vase, affirm that "the religion of the Albanian is Albania."⁴¹ It is impossible to know how effective Albania's "atheization" has been. A French journalist, Michel Sidhom, spent

several weeks in Albania late in 1981. His report revealed a society without any outward sign of active religious life. Initial attempts to ask Albanians about Islam were met with silence or hostility. But another foreigner, a visiting Algerian scientist, disclosed that the five pillars of Islamic faith were secretly practiced among many Albanians, despite the draconian punishment for making "religious propaganda."⁴²

There has been no fundamental change in Albania's antireligious policy since Enver Hoxha's death in 1985. Renunciation of "atheism" as state policy would require a formal constitutional change. Hoxha's successor, Ramiz Alia, is closely associated with Albania's 1967 cultural revolution, and he has committed the country to a continuation of Hoxha's policies. A lengthy article in the party's theoretical journal *Ruga e Partisë* before the ninth party congress called for the "intensification" of struggle against religious "remnants." Certain religious "preconceptions and practices" were "still sufficiently extreme and harmful to merit the attention of the party." The sources of such behavior were depicted in the family, certain "declassed" elements, such as former clerics, and "certain recent degenerates." At the same time Albania's interest in diplomatic relations with West European states may coincide with a less strident antireligious line. Hamid Beqja, a psychology professor at the University of Tirana, admitted to a British journalist that "religious consciousness" could not be prevented "through legal means." "Every man in his own house may practice religious rites."⁴³ Whether or not Beqja's remarks indicate a softening of religious policy is uncertain, but the fact that the interview was given indicates an accommodation not present before Hoxha's death. ✓

Albanian religious life shows no indication of a renewal because of the repression, and because Islam is not associated with national revival. It is significant that among the recent Yugoslav Albanian demonstrators in Kosovo very few protested by expressing allegiance to Pan-Islamic sentiment.⁴⁴ There have been rumors that the portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini appeared in occasional demonstrations. Albania enjoys good relations with Iran, but it has consistently denied the significance of "religious ideology in the revolution."⁴⁵ Nevertheless, an examination of Albania's antireligious propaganda has revealed a distinctive absence of examples from Islamic tradition, and according to Stephen Bowers this feature is a result of Tirana's wish to avoid a "direct Albanian-Arab confrontation."⁴⁶ There is little doubt that Al-

banian authorities value diplomatic relations with Middle East states; yet less harsh attacks on Muslims relative to those against Orthodox and Roman Catholic Albanians may be alternatively explained by a less defiant Muslim attitude toward "atheization."

YUGOSLAV MUSLIMS

Muslims in Yugoslavia include Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Serbs; but Muslims of the Slavic nationality (*Muslimani*) are the largest group adhering to Islam, 1.99 million of the estimated 3.6 million Yugoslav citizens of the Muslim faith.⁴⁷ I will deal with the ethnic Muslims. Official policy recognizes the Muslims as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, but in practice the distinction between religion and nationality has not been maintained easily. Distinguishing nonreligious Muslims from other peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina invests the national component with marginally different patterns of speech and customs (see table 16.1). Prior to 1968 the League of Communists had not even accorded the Muslims the distinct status of a nation. The confusion and inconsistency about Muslim nationality is reflected in postwar counts of the republic.

From the first census Yugoslav authorities approached the question of nationality in the republic with caution, owing to its potential to aggravate relations between Serbs and Croats and because of disagreement within the League of Communists concerning the status of Muslims. In 1948 Muslims were represented poorly within the league's leadership. Between 1948 and 1971 the Muslims' status varied from "ethnically undetermined" (*Neopredjeljeni*) to simple denial of a distinct status (*Jugosloveni neopredjeljeni*) in 1953, to Muslims in the ethnic sense (*etnička pripadnost*) in 1961, and finally to Muslims in the national sense (*u smislu narodnosti*) in 1971. The transition represents the consequences of several factors: the abandonment of "Yugoslavism" as a satisfactory approach to interethnic relations, the increasing political consciousness of Muslims in the republic and their growing status in the league, and finally an apparent decision that a vigorous Muslim identity represents the best means of preventing Serbian and Croatian rivalry over the republic as well as among the peoples within it.

According to the 1981 census, 81.5 percent of all Muslims reside in

Table 16.1 Population of Bosnia-Herzegovina⁴⁸

	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981
Total	2,565,277	2,847,790	3,277,935	3,746,111	4,125,000
Serbs	1,136,116	1,264,372	1,406,053	1,393,148	1,320,000
Serb-Muslims	71,991	—	—	—	—
Croats	614,123	654,229	711,660	772,491	758,000
Croat-Muslims	25,295	—	—	—	—
Muslims (ethnically undetermined)	788,403	—	—	—	—
Yugoslavs (ethnically undetermined)	—	891,800	275,883	43,796	326,280
Muslims (in the ethnic sense)	—	—	842,247	—	—
Muslims (in the national sense)	—	—	—	1,482,430	1,630,000

Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they constitute a plurality of the population, 39.5 percent. Over the last decade the percentage of Muslims remained virtually unchanged within the republic, although the share of Serbs decreased from 37.2 to 32 percent and that of Croats from 20.6 to 18.4 percent. Surprisingly, those declaring themselves "Yugoslavs" increased sevenfold (to 7.9 percent of the republic's population) between 1971 and 1981.⁴⁹ The sources and significance of the increase in Yugoslavs are uncertain but, by 1981, the question of Muslim nationalism had become politically divisive. Representatives of different nationalities disputed the danger of Pan-Islamic nationalism for the federation.

Traditionally, Muslims distinguished themselves from Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs on religious grounds but, unlike these nationalities, they demonstrated little ethnic consciousness. Muslims showed no affinity for Turkey but called themselves "Turks."⁵⁰ They did not play a particular role in the movement for an independent Yugoslavia. According to the Yugoslav historian Enver Redžić, the absence of a strong national consciousness among Muslims was a result of several reinforcing factors, including the division of the Muslim intelligentsia among the Serbian and Croatian national movements, as well as the national movement of their own coreligionists; the absence of a Muslim bourgeoisie or working class; and the cohesiveness of Muslim

religious organizations.⁵¹ After 1918 a Yugoslav Muslim Organization (YMO) was organized to protect the cultural and religious interests of Muslims, especially the inherited right of the aristocracy. Prior to the assassination of Stjepan Radić in 1928, the YMO allied with the Croatian Peasant party, but under the royal dictatorship the YMO joined the Yugoslav Radical Union. The YMO opposed Serbian dominance and in 1939 endorsed the Cvetković-Maček *Sporazum* (understanding) that attempted to solve the problem of Croatian autonomy by creating the self-governing ban (province) of Croatia. The YMO became alienated from the *Sporazum* when its leader, Džufer bej Kulenović, failed to obtain a separate Muslim ban that included the Sandjak region claimed by Serbia.⁵² Dissatisfied Kulenović joined the *Ustaše* regime and Bosnia-Herzegovina was incorporated into Croatia.

The conservatism of the YMO reflected a defensive and inward-looking attitude of most Bosnian Muslims. But unlike any other Balkan Muslim group, they enjoyed the combination of religious cohesiveness and political significance. In the judgment of Ivo Banac the YMO enjoyed "total mastery" of politics in the Bosnian Muslim community, but it did so as a confessional rather than as a nationalist party, and as a "necessary answer to the discriminatory policies of centralist [Serbian] administrations."⁵³ A minority identified with fascism—enough to create an SS brigade—but many were passive victims of Serbian forces acting independently of Draža Mihailović. Muslim parochialism had been a political liability, but in wartime it ensured that the community did not become identified with fascist Croatia. The Muslim religious establishment produced no leader associated with forces opposed to the partisans, and in the postwar era avoided the liabilities that hampered Catholic and Orthodox accommodation with the new regime.

However, the problem was more complicated in Yugoslavia than elsewhere in the Balkans. In Albania the Muslim organization could be approached from a religious viewpoint, and institutional Islam could be subverted and transformed into a pliable tool of regime policy. In Bulgaria and Romania the initial communist policy was to accept Muslims as a national minority according to the Stalinist criteria of nationality, i.e., that they possessed a language, territory, economic life, and a community of culture. Yugoslav communists could not consider Slavic Muslims a "community of culture" based on religion, nor recognize a distinct Muslim language where none existed. The dilemma was ad-

mitted in 1938 by Edvard Kardelj when he acknowledged that while the Muslims could not be considered a nation, they did not consider themselves Serbs or Croats. He insisted that "from the viewpoint of every factor, they consider themselves a special ethnic group."⁵⁴ Nonetheless, the "special group" was not accorded any distinct recognition for two major reasons: individual Muslims were undistinguished among the ranks of the partisans and the partisan leadership could not reach a consensus.⁵⁵ Muslim identity continued to be defined in strictly religious terms.

In 1945 the Islamic Religious Community (IRC) was reorganized. Because of the IRC's initial anticommunist composition, a confrontation with the authorities seemed inevitable; instead, communist authorities simply ceased financial support and prevented the IRC from collecting funds.⁵⁶ The approach was effective. By August 1947 the Reis-ul-ulema met with Tito to offer cooperation and promises of loyalty. A new religious statute was adopted that created a Supreme Vakuf Assembly headed by the Reis-ul-ulema along with the regional assemblies in Bosnia, Serbia (including the Kosmet), Macedonia, and Montenegro. The community was granted a subsidy, permitted to manage its remaining property, and spared the abusive antireligious propaganda current elsewhere in Eastern Europe at the time.⁵⁷ In return the IRC leadership assisted the state in suppressing Islamic practices considered incompatible with socialism, such as the veiling of women. In addition, the IRC supported Yugoslavia's nonaligned foreign policy by the leadership's reception of Presidents Nasser and Sukarno during state visits.⁵⁸ Muslim delegations visited Islamic nonaligned countries, and as early as 1950 individual dignitaries made the hajj to Mecca.⁵⁹

The issue of a Muslim nationality was not resolved easily, as the changing status of Muslims in the first three postwar censuses indicates. The Republican League of Communists admitted the existence of "difficulties and confusion" among Muslims because of the denial of national choice.⁶⁰ Only after the ouster of Vice President Ranković in 1966 was national choice assured. In May 1968 a league communiqué stated: "Practice has shown the harm of different forms of pressure and instances from the earlier period when Muslims were determined to be ethnic Serbs or Croats. It has been shown and present socialist practice confirms that Muslims are a distinct nationality."⁶¹

The Yugoslav regime continues to affirm Muslim ethnicity, the sin-

gle most important doctrinal innovation in Yugoslav nationality policy since 1945. The decision is mainly the result of three factors. First, the ouster of Ranković, a Serb, removed a major obstacle both to Albanian and Muslim national self-assertion. Subsequently, the Serbian and Croatian party leaderships recognized the Muslims. Second, the 1971 census registered a plurality of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was significant in that a vigorous Muslim identity offered the best long-term prophylaxis against irredentist claims and conflicts of Croatia and Serbia. A Croatian communist considers that a "developed" Bosnia-Herzegovina has helped to "neutralize Great-Serbian and Great-Croatian aspirations"⁶² toward the Republic. The Croatian nationalist historian Franjo Tudjman has given some indication of these potential claims in a recent work. Tudjman says that "large parts" of Croatia were incorporated into Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Turks and that the two republics make up an "indivisible geographic and economic entity." He adds that "the majority of the Muslims is in its ethnic character and speech incontrovertibly of Croatian origin."⁶³ Finally, the decision to recognize the Muslims' new status was part of a general devolution of authority to the republics that required that Bosnia-Herzegovina preserve a balance between Croatia and Serbia, preventing these two republics from dominating the federation.

The change in national status has left several undesirable features from the communist viewpoint that will not be resolved easily. Affirmation of the Muslim nationality has created problems for other republics. The 1981 census revealed an increase of Muslims elsewhere amid reports of pressures on the Muslims to declare their nationality in some other way. *Nova Makedonija* put the question bluntly more than a decade earlier: "If Muslims in the S.R. Macedonia who speak the Macedonian language are part of the young Muslim nation, why should not Orthodox Macedonians be part of another nation?"⁶⁴ Although there is no apparent likelihood that Macedonian national identity was being threatened, *Nova Makedonija* had called into question a basic assumption of the league's Muslim policy: that it would be a self-evident matter to distinguish nationality and religion. But by the 1980s Albanian nationalism confronted Macedonian authorities with a less tractable problem. Alleged Albanian "irredentists" were more threatening than the consequences of Muslims in Macedonia choosing not to be Macedonian. In 1986 the Macedonian Socialist Alliance celebrated the

"Muslim Renaissance" in the Debar municipality where "Islamicized Macedonians represent a good portion of the population."⁶⁵ The report acknowledged prior "misconceptions" of considering the local population Albanian—a fact that "greatly damaged the national awakening process of Macedonian Muslims."

The reaction of Serbs and Croats to national developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been more unsettling. A member of the Republic's Commission on internationality relations refers to the "very dangerous phenomenon" of "negative polarization" among the three nationalities. Serbs and Croats, in this view, turn for support to Belgrade and Zagreb "because of a quite subjective or simulated feeling of being oppressed by the Muslim intelligentsia."⁶⁶ In fact, the sense of "oppression" may have promoted trends of Serb and Croatian migration from Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Serbian demographer Miroslav Lalović, the overwhelming majority of migration from the republic since 1971 has consisted of Serbs and Croats, while only "a very small share" were Muslims. Lalović maintains that since 1981 the direction of migration has been "influenced more by nationality than by jobs and higher earnings."⁶⁷ In fact, some 26,000 Muslims have migrated to Bosnia-Herzegovina from other republics. Little doubt exists that convictions for Serbian nationalist offenses in Bosnia-Herzegovina represent an anti-Serbian mood similar to that among Albanians in Kosovo. The Orthodox newspaper *Pravoslavlje* recently reported on a case against a priest in Tuzla with the question, "Is Bosnia-Herzegovina becoming another Kosovo for Orthodox Serbs and Serbian priests?"⁶⁸

Yet nowhere has the association of religion and identity been more complete than among Muslims, who see little non-Islamic basis for a "Muslim" nationality. In 1971, for instance, certain clerics had rejected the distinction and at least one imam had insisted pointedly that Islam is the foundation of Muslim ethnicity.⁶⁹ In calling for the "steadfastness" of the Muslims not to abandon their religious identity, voices in the IRC offered their first direct challenge to the LCY. What is perhaps more interesting is that such assertiveness on the part of the clergy before 1979 sharply contrasted with the caution of Catholic and Orthodox representatives. But in that year communist authorities initiated a campaign against Muslim "clericalism." Hamdija Pozderac, the sole ethnic Muslim in the LCY Presidium, sharply condemned the concept of a "Pan-Islamic" consciousness.⁷⁰ Fuad Muhić, a

professor of law at the University of Sarajevo, identified the source of such ideas as "Khomeini-style socialism."⁷¹ The editorial staff of the Islamic organ *Preporod* was replaced along with several less cooperative imams. Throughout 1980 and 1981 there were repeated attacks on Islamic "clericalism" along with criticism of similar forces in the Catholic and Orthodox establishments.⁷² Broadly understood, "clericalism" involves any religious expression that infringes on the league's monopoly of political expression. Muslim dissent has become as great a problem as other forms of nationalism, but, unlike others, it retains an almost exclusively religious identity.

It appears, however, that the league itself has become divided over the issue of Muslim nationalism. The Croatian intellectual, Milan Kangrga, has alleged that Pan-Islamic tendencies are rooted within the Bosnian League itself and enjoy the "direct protection of official policy" in a bid to dominate the republic as an ideological "vanguard."⁷³ Needless to say, the assertion is rejected vigorously by Muslim spokesmen from the regime who continue their criticism of Islamic "clericalism."⁷⁴ The polemics are not unusual in Yugoslavia, but, coming in the wake of the Albanian demonstrations in 1981 and 1982, such disagreement poses a potential threat to the federation. In particular, Bosnia-Herzegovina could become a focus of Serbo-Croat conflict if nationality disagreements about Islam outside the republic should provoke fragmentation along nationality lines within it. Evidence exists, however, of a tacit compromise about the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina among some dissenting nationalists. A member of the Republic's League Presidium, Hrvoje Istuk, has acknowledged a nationalist "opposition" seeking to reorganize the regime as a "confederation of several Yugoslav States." Istuk alleges that a territorial redivision would provide for "annexation" of the heterogenous area of the Sandžak to a Muslim state, probably in exchange for the surrender of other territories to Serbia and Croatia.⁷⁵ Presumably religious organization would serve as the basis of national identity in a reorganized confederation, i.e., Muslims would be considered the "sole bearers" of statehood in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Croatian communists would negotiate a "pact" with the Catholic church with both Croatia and the New Muslim republic; Orthodox Serbs in eastern Bosnia would be recognized as "the most Serb in its spirit of all Serb regions."⁷⁶ It is difficult to generalize about the support of such ideas in Yugoslavia, but it is possible to

interpret construction of Zagreb's "magnificent" mosque as Croatia's implicit acknowledgment of Islamic political significance and of the legitimacy of foreign Islamic interest in Yugoslavia.⁷⁷ After six years of construction, a destructive fire, and great controversy, the mosque opened in the fall of 1987, and, according to Yugoslav sources, 75 percent of the building's costs were borne by "believers" within Yugoslavia and the balance from abroad.⁷⁸

Acceptance of funds from foreign Islamic states seems inconsistent with the official criticism of Pan-Islamic doctrine; yet it is consistent with both federal and republican interest in maintaining normal economic and political relations with the Middle East. Although government and league officials condemn Pan-Islamic influence in Yugoslavia, Muslim religious officials respond to foreign allegations of mistreatment of Muslims by Yugoslav authorities.⁷⁹ "Khomeini socialism" is condemned without depicting it as an obstacle to Belgrade's relations with Teheran. Nevertheless, foreign involvement in Pan-Islamic dissent is unmistakable. In July 1983 the trial of thirteen "Young Muslims" revealed an underground organization allegedly linked to Iran and European émigrés. The defendants were charged with attempting to "turn Bosnia-Herzegovina into a purely Islamic Republic."⁸⁰ The prosecution produced a detailed program for this objective, an "Islamic Declaration." The trial handed down sentences of up to fifteen years for acting against Yugoslavia's "brotherhood and unity . . . with a view to destroying Bosnia-Herzegovina as a socialist republic and thus undermining Yugoslavia's social order."⁸¹ It is difficult to determine exactly what the conspirators had accomplished, for the chief defendant, Alija Izbegović, had allegedly drafted the declaration in 1970. Yet only six months before the trial he had visited Iran.⁸² The declaration makes no reference to Yugoslavia. Instead, it addresses all Muslims in the assertion that "Islam is not a nationality, but a supranational community." Within that community a society was Islamic to the degree to which Islam determines its internal relations and to which pan-Islam determines its foreign policy.⁸³ To be "Islamic" meant a rejection of the "dogmatists" among existing clergy unwilling to lead the community in "moral renewal" and the "modernists," typified by Kemal Atatürk, who had in fact betrayed Islam. A new Muslim intelligentsia must arise to found an Islamic order that would be "neither socialist, nor capitalist."⁸⁴ An analysis of the declaration suggests certain points of com-

parison with the thought of Muhammad Iqbal (1875–1938) and earlier Indian Muslims.⁸⁵ Iqbal's ideal for Pakistan is cited in the declaration as a "dress rehearsal for the creation of an Islamic order." Significantly, Iqbal had envisioned a Muslim state within an Indian federation—a possible model for the Young Muslims' plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia. None of those convicted were accused of "separatism," an omission indicating that the "Islamic state" would exist within a confederation.

In early 1987 Yugoslav authorities announced the arrest of several more "Young Muslims." The charges were similar, as were the age and background, to those convicted in 1983, and again there was evidence of foreign involvement (Libya).⁸⁶ In view of the overall deterioration of national relations in Yugoslavia, it is likely that Pan-Islamic sentiment will continue to appeal to the country's Slavic Muslims. Many Yugoslav Muslims have traveled or been educated in foreign Islamic states, and they continue to be poorly represented within the league's top leadership. Since the 1985 resignation of the IRC Reis-ul-ulema, Dr. Ahmed Smajlović, several successors have been appointed, amid reported objection within the Higher Islamic Council that the body had been overly compliant with communist policy.⁸⁷

BULGARIAN MUSLIMS

Bulgarian Muslim life presents a sharp contrast with the cases of Albania and Yugoslavia. Religious expression is not proscribed but suffers from political repression similar to that practiced in the Soviet Union. In 1984 Bulgarian authorities initiated a policy of compelling Muslims to adopt Slavic names along with further measures against Islamic practice. According to Amnesty International the campaign designated many "non-official" mosques to be closed or destroyed and prohibited Islamic customs such as circumcision.⁸⁸ "Clericalism" in the Yugoslav sense is unimaginable in Bulgaria, as is the nationalist expression of Slavic Muslim Bulgarians, the Pomaks. Far from being irrelevant to identity, Islam is a core component of Bulgaria's Turkish and Slavic Muslims. There are four major Muslim peoples in Bulgaria: about 700,000 Turks, 120,000 Pomaks, 5,000 Tatars, and 120,000 Muslim Gypsies.⁸⁹ It is impossible to make an exact determination because of the absence of census figures on nationality. At the time of its inde-

pendence Bulgaria's population was about 28 percent Muslim.⁹⁰ Fluctuations in the size of the Turkish population reflect peculiar features of Bulgaria's situation: (1) the loss or acquisition of territories with a high Turkish population such as Eastern Rumelia in 1885, and the loss of Southern Dobrudja in 1913 and its return in 1940; and (2) the forced or voluntary repatriation of the Turkish minority.

Bulgarian nationalism suffered from several historic liabilities. Compared with the Greeks and the Serbs, the Bulgarians had been relatively separated from Western influence. Bulgaria's accessibility to the center of Turkish power gave the empire a great advantage in repressing a Bulgarian national movement.⁹¹ It is difficult to overemphasize the formative role of the struggle with the Turks, and later the Greeks, in shaping the Bulgarian consciousness. According to Marin Pundeff, the Turkish removal of Bulgarian national leaders had the consequence of "democratizing" the movement's struggle against the Turks.⁹² Anti-Turkish sentiment became a key element in the Bulgarian renaissance of the nineteenth century, following the rediscovery of Bulgarian identity in the work of Father Paisii and Bishop Sofroni. An autonomous exarchate was created in 1870. In the judgment of a communist writer, religion became "more or less the vehicle of national sentiment"; Islamization was equivalent to "denationalization," and Bulgarians clung to Orthodoxy "under the threat" of forced conversion.⁹³ The obvious question is whether those who were converted to Islam were any less Bulgarian, especially after a generation of socialist rule. Clearly there was no basis to declare Slavic Pomaks Turkish, and the constitution (in Article 71) guarantees all citizens equal treatment without respect to "nationality, origin, faith or property status." A Bulgarian tract has called for a struggle against Islam and asserts that the faith "still poisons the consciousness" of believers and "impedes their national self-recognition."⁹⁴

Bulgarian communist historians emphasize the involuntary nature of conversion. "Pomak" was held to be derived from the word *po-muka* (torture) and the verb *pomuchvam* (to torture, torment, or tease) instead of from the Slavic word *pomogach* (helper) derived from *pomogam*. A Pomak was one "forcefully made to do something."⁹⁵ Islamicization of the Bulgarians in the official view occurred in several waves of violence in 1422, 1512, 1512-20, and 1666-1700, each time in "greater duration and cruelty."⁹⁶ Although the manner of conversion

of Bulgarian Pomaks is uncertain, one standard work affirms a process similar to that in Bosnia and Macedonia, i.e., gradual conversion combined with conversion of some Bogomils, and Fine's work demonstrates the influence of the Bogomil heresy in Bulgaria.⁹⁷

However much the Turks had been associated with Bulgaria's oppression, the first constitution (1879) guaranteed all Bulgarians equal treatment before the law and recognized the role of separate ecclesiastical administration in managing the affairs of non-Christians. As many as fifty thousand Turks may have returned to Turkey in 1878, i.e., about one-tenth of the total. The same religious autonomy under Bulgarian law remained in effect during the interwar period. Recalling that 18 percent of the population was Turkish in the early 1920s, one observer found "little racial [*sic*] hostility manifest between Turks and Bulgarians. When Turkey and Bulgaria fought side by side in the World War some of the animosity that remained from the Turkish oppression passed away."⁹⁸ The same observer found the Pomaks less accepted because of their "fanatical mohammedanism" and their association with the most brutal aspects of Turkish rule. Like Yugoslav Muslims, Bulgaria's Turks were politically active, holding ten seats of 246 in the 1923 *sobranie*, some top positions in the government, and leadership positions in well-developed clerical institutions.⁹⁹

The Turkish and smaller Pomak communities posed no serious problem to Bulgaria's national integration. A 1925 treaty with Turkey provided for voluntary immigration and for Turks to leave without restrictions on their property. Between ten and twelve thousand persons emigrated annually until 1940.¹⁰⁰ When the Communist party came to power, emigration fell off sharply. All national privileges of Turks were abolished in schools and along with *vakuf* (religious endowment) property, making the Muslims dependent on the state. Article 10 of the Law on Religious Denominations provided that "only persons who are Bulgarian nationals and who are honest, reliable and have not been deprived of their rights by a final judgment of a court may be ministers of denominations and hold office in any denomination."¹⁰¹ Religious policy treated the Muslim hierarchy without particular distinction at first. A new chief *mufti* was appointed by the state to preside over two *kadis* and twenty-six local *mufti*, and leading clergy joined the Fatherland Front.¹⁰² The 1947 constitution included provisions concerning freedom of religion, minority rights, and the prohibition of using religion

for political purposes. Henceforth, Turks were considered a national minority rather than a religious group.

The regime decided to deal with the majority of Muslims through forced repatriation to Turkey rather than by political domination. On August 12, 1950, the government decreed that 250,000 Bulgarian Turks were to leave the country within three months. Within fifteen months, when Turkey closed its frontier to further migration, some 140,000 Turks had resettled in Turkey.¹⁰³ The forced emigration removed the two Turkish groups least acceptable to communist Bulgaria: the religiously devout Muslims and the prosperous landowners from Dobrudja. Bulgaria's policy was not unprecedented, for at the same time millions of Germans were being expelled to the western zone from East Europe. In Bulgaria the expulsion gave impetus to agricultural collectivization and social "modernization."

Between 1951 and 1968 Turkish immigration virtually ceased; from 1952 to 1961, an official source reports only sixteen Turkish emigrants.¹⁰⁴ Bulgarian-Turkish relations followed in close tandem with improvements in Soviet-Turkish relations in 1968. In that year Turkey and Bulgaria signed an agreement permitting the emigration of categories of relatives of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin who had emigrated to Turkey prior to 1952.¹⁰⁵ By the end of 1971, 23,000 Turks had left, and by the time the agreement expired in 1978 a total of 81,299 had emigrated—almost three times as many as the 30,000 reportedly specified in the agreement.¹⁰⁶ However, at the present rate of emigration it is unlikely that the problem of the minority could be resolved. Within the last six years Bulgaria's overall birthrate has grown at only 2.8 per thousand, while that of provinces with a high concentration of Pomaks or Turks has reached as high as 17.9 per thousand.¹⁰⁷ After a halt in immigration in 1979 Bulgaria announced a resumption early in 1982.¹⁰⁸ In April a Turkish-Bulgarian communiqué recognized the "expiration" of earlier agreements for "mass immigration," adding the signatories' commitment to "resolve favorably, individual requests for joining separated families."¹⁰⁹ Shortly after the visit of the Turkish foreign minister to Sofia in 1983, *Rabotnichesko Delo* acknowledged that the consular section of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry had received "several individual questions" from Bulgarians of Turkish origin concerning emigration.¹¹⁰ Without further comment the paper maintained there had been "no change" concerning the principle of "family reuni-

fication." Obviously Turkish interest in the matter had not diminished.

The 1984 campaign for "Bulgarization" of Muslims emerges from decades of assimilative pressure. Bulgarian Muslims, Turks and Pomaks alike, have been the object of intense pressures to assimilate and to abandon their faith. Between 1956 and 1965 there was a drastic reduction in the number of priests, from 2,393 to 462 for Turks and from 322 to 95 for Pomaks.¹¹¹ In 1964 a party decree on the "Improvement of Work of the Komsomol among Turkish Youth" organized detachments of Komsomol workers in Muslim provinces to combat bourgeois Turkish antinationalism and to strengthen fraternal relations among Bulgarian youth.¹¹² There have been reports of Turks convicted for distributing propaganda for "Turkish nationalism" and for slandering Bulgaria.¹¹³ On July 17, 1970, a party decision to further promote "patriotic education" for Slavic Muslims compelled them to change their names to Slavic equivalents.¹¹⁴ One Turkish emigrant claimed that the campaign was extended to Turks as well, and that those resisting had their identity cards seized or were threatened with arrest.¹¹⁵ One publication has attempted to depict a process of rapid atheization among Bulgarian Pomaks (the term is no longer in use) and their assimilation as an "indivisible part of the Bulgarian nation."¹¹⁶ In 1976 Amnesty International reported the imprisonment of more than five hundred Pomaks for resistance to assimilation.¹¹⁷

As recently as November 1984 a Bulgarian official admitted the existence of "Turks" in the party Central Committee and publication of a "bilingual [Turkish-Bulgarian] newspaper."¹¹⁸ But the campaign for assimilation, for a "unified Bulgarian socialist nation," had started, perhaps in August of that year when the municipality of Stambolovo adopted a local ordinance forbidding the wearing of *Shalvari*, traditional Turkish trousers, and the use of the Turkish language in public places.¹¹⁹ Reports date the start of the name-changing campaign to December 1984 in southern regions; it extended north to Varna and Dobrudzha in February 1985.¹²⁰ Subsequently, party secretary Dimitar Stanishev claimed that the "process of voluntary assumption of Bulgarian names by our compatriots had gained a broad momentum . . . spontaneously and comprehensively throughout the country."¹²¹ With the elimination of worship and other religious customs in Turkish areas, distinctive names remained the last vestige of separate identity. Multiple sources refer to a campaign of force, often by encirclement of Turkish villages,

in which individuals are compelled at gunpoint to sign affidavits requesting the name change.¹²² Various estimates of those killed range in the hundreds.¹²³ The émigré Halil Ibisoglu, a former member of the Bulgarian National Assembly, was warned that if he opposed the party's decision, he would not only lose his assembly seat but "never be able to see my wife and child."¹²⁴ Bulgarian spokesmen specifically warned that emigration was forbidden.

Communist motives for the campaign's timing are uncertain. According to Ibisoglu, high Turkish birthrates relative to Bulgarian Slavs provoked official concern that "the Turks might sue for autonomy someday or possibly even a separate state within the context of Bulgaria."¹²⁵ In early 1985 a Yugoslav journalist reported an attempt in the Bulgarian province of Khaskovo "to create a special republic and [organize] its secession, as in Cyprus."¹²⁶ The report is unconfirmed, but if correct, it suggests a certain parallel with dissent in Yugoslavia, despite the difference of Bulgaria's official violence. Diplomatically, the campaign has provoked expressions of official concern from the Turkish government and a sharp deterioration in bilateral relations.¹²⁷ Bulgarian sources in turn have accused Ankara of human rights abuses against Turkish Kurds and Bulgarians.¹²⁸ Following extensive international protest Bulgarian authorities permitted a delegation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to visit Bulgaria in June 1987, after several delays, but there has been no indication of a softening of established policy.¹²⁹

ROMANIAN MUSLIMS

The origins of the Romanian Muslim community date from the fourteenth century, when Tatars migrated from the declining Empire of the Golden Horde, and from successive settlements of Tatar, Turcoman, and Turkish peoples organized by the Ottoman settlement.¹³⁰ According to the 1977 census, Romania's Muslim population consists of 20,750 Turks and 20,508 Tatars, most of whom are concentrated in the province of Constanta in northern Dobrudja.¹³¹ The natural rate of increase of the Tatars is nearly double that of the Romanian population as a whole; however, census figures for the Turks register a slight decline between 1956 and 1966 (211 persons) suggesting moderate emigration. But between 1966 and 1977 the Turkish population in Constanta in-

creased by 19 percent, from 14,118 to 17,387. Romania strongly discourages the emigration of the more professionally "developed" ethnic Germans, and it is likely that this policy extends to other nationalities. About two-thirds of the Turkish population is identified as "urban" or "suburban," and more than half of the Tatars are "rural." Both nationalities have remained in the part of northern Dobrudja retained by Romania after the loss of southern Dobrudja (Sillistria) in 1940. The latter territory was more than 50 percent Turkish.

Although Romanian nationalism was no less anti-Turkish than any Slavic national movement, territories with Muslim peoples were not arenas of national struggle but of great power intrigues. Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries the Voivoda (governor) of Moldavia and Wallachia enjoyed considerable autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty. Ottoman attempts to exert greater control in the provinces ultimately led to Romania's proclamation of independence in 1877 and its alliance with Russia in the Russo-Turkish war of that year. The subsequent Treaty of San Stefano awarded northern Dobrudja to Romania and provided for the passage of Russian troops in transit to Bulgaria. The transit provision was struck at the Congress of Berlin, although the congress confirmed independent Romania's possession of Dobrudja, imposing the condition that confessional differences not exclude anyone from the enjoyment of civil and political rights.¹³² The clause was directed against Romanian anti-Semitism, but it also benefited Romanian Muslims. Following Bulgaria's loss of southern Dobrudja in 1913, Romania emerged from World War I with over 200,000 Muslims out of a total population of 7 million. The majority of Muslims were Turkish (178,000), apolitical, and well-organized religiously. Travelers in interior Romania noted how much "religious freedom" Muslim Turks enjoyed. A Constanta *medresa* boasted an enrollment of 150. Descriptions of local customs suggested a highly conservative community that clung to tradition.¹³³ When the communists assumed power in 1945, Romanian Muslims experienced less dislocation than any other Balkan Muslim people.

In accordance with Decree 176 of 1948, all of the property of religious organizations passed to the state.¹³⁴ The four Muslim *muftiliks* were reorganized into a single organization in Constanta. But Romanian Muslims, like the Muslims of Yugoslavia, escaped serious confronta-

tion with communist authorities. Unlike Romanian Roman Catholics or Protestants, Muslims had no ties with any foreign state or religious body. The loss of southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria spared Romania the potentially disturbing effect of an additional large minority besides the Magyar and German populations. Unlike these peoples, Romanian Muslims were able to avoid the centripetal impact of Romania's "socio-economic mobilization" that promoted the assimilation of other minorities.¹³⁵ (In 1966, only about 5 percent of Magyars and Germans identified Romanian as a "mother tongue.")¹³⁶ In 1949 separate schools were established for Tatar children, intended for Turkish pupils as well, but because of a decline in educational standards and apparent neglect the schools were closed in 1957—a decision that "caused little commotion" in the judgment of one expert.¹³⁷ In practice, the regime was able to reach accommodation with the Muslim religious community because the Turkish and Tatar minorities were politically and numerically of little significance. Compared with other religions, there are unmistakable signs of official favor. In Romania there are more than seventy mosques, mostly in the province of Constanta and elsewhere along the Black Sea. Turkish and Tatar languages are used for religious services, and the government has printed a Romanian edition of the Koran.¹³⁸ The chief *mufti* in the city of Constanta presides over a synod of twenty-three members. The grand *mufti*, Iacub Mehmet, is a member of the National Council of Socialist Democracy and Unity Front, and the Bucharest *imam*, Regep Sali, is a member of the Central Committee.¹³⁹ Yugoslavia and Romania alike have given a prominent place to Muslim clerics in their national front organizations and, as in Yugoslavia, Muslim students have traveled abroad to study for the imamate. Despite the outwardly impressive establishment, Muslim religious life shows little vitality. An eyewitness account found that major Islamic celebrations, "although still observed . . . were confined to the family home with an almost total neglect of the formal ritual observances required on these occasions."¹⁴⁰ However, there is an important difference: a Romanian Muslim delegation has been received in Iran¹⁴¹ and has joined the Libyan Muslim organization "The Call of Islam" and the Saudi "World Islamic Solidarity." While the LCY has attacked the idea of "Khomeini socialism" and would not sanction religious contacts with Iran, it is apparent that the Romanian party perceives no danger. There

is no evidence available of opposition to the confinement of religious practice to the mosque and home in exchange for clerical cooperation in official contact abroad.

CONCLUSION

Islam in the Balkans is preeminently a religious phenomenon that has lacked the prerequisites of national identity. Muslims could not look to a preexisting political unit for national identity in the way that Christian Serbs and Bulgarians were able to draw inspiration from medieval empires. Unlike the Romanians and Albanians, they lacked national heroes who had challenged the Turks. Moreover, Muslims lacked the class structure of a bourgeoisie or a proletariat that Marxists have associated with a national movement. Muslims were predominantly peasants without an aristocracy, with the exception of those in Bosnia-Herzegovina and southern Dobrudja. Work conducted by William Lockwood in Skopje Polje among Muslims revealed that *nacija* (nationality) often was used to refer specifically to religion.¹⁴²

As an ethnic group, Muslims share a religious tradition, but only in Bosnia-Herzegovina and southern Dobrudja did they ever compose more than half the people in a specific territory. In Bosnia they eventually gained recognition as a group by political fiat, but in Dobrudja they were denied recognition by expulsion. With the exception of these instances, Muslims pursued what Anthony Smith has described as a strategy of "isolation," i.e., the community remained aloof from society as a whole.¹⁴³ Muslims in Bulgaria and Romania, regardless of nationality, may be compared with Armenian, Druze, and Ba'hai communities in the Middle East: they have sought little more from the state than autonomy in the management of their communal affairs. Although Albanian Muslims were a majority, the tribal structure of Albanian society and Sunni-Bektashi differences created a similar fragmentation. Bektashi leaders who gained distinction in the national movement were identified as Albanians rather than Muslims.

With the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina and southern Dobrudja, Muslims have failed to develop a separate ethnic consciousness. The Islamic faith could not be compartmentalized from the experience of daily life, and Islam offered a comprehensive worldview. Where Muslims were politically involved, as in interwar Yugoslavia, they sought

autonomy rather than confrontation with the non-Muslim majority. Muslim passivity was overcome only when Slavic Muslims were mobilized by communist authorities to act on behalf of "Muslim interests." Even in Yugoslavia, Muslims were undistinguished among the League's leadership, and, until his death in 1977, Prime Minister Djemal Bijedić was the sole Muslim to emerge as a major political figure in the federation. Although Muslims comprise 37.5 percent of the total population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they constitute only 33.9 percent of the Republican League membership. Serbs, with less than 35 percent of the population, constitute 47 percent of the membership.¹⁴⁴ Resignation of Hamdija Pozderac, the country's leading Muslim official, from the federation's vice presidency in September 1987 further deprives Muslims of representation at the federal level.¹⁴⁵

There are two possible explanations for the lack of Muslim political involvement. The Ottoman *millet* system discouraged wider political involvement; more fundamental, however, was the anomalous relation of Muslims to national movements. Muslims could not regard a secular nation-state as a terminal community of identity while it was governed by non-Muslims. Among non-Muslims, religious Orthodoxy became the basis for the Balkan peoples' national response to the Ottoman rule, and where Orthodoxy was lacking (Albania), the national movement was relatively retarded. Conversely, in Asia and the Arab world, Islam became an important basis for the national response to colonial rule.¹⁴⁶ Muslims in the Balkans, regardless of their attitude toward the Ottoman Empire, suffered from their historic association with imperial rule.

Communists have found little of value in the Muslim peoples. R. V. Burks has documented the Turkish populations' relative lack of support for communist parties in interwar elections.¹⁴⁷ One-fifth of the Yugoslav Turks had emigrated to Turkey by 1954.¹⁴⁸ The Bulgarian Turks have been mentioned. Pomaks were nomads who were compelled to give up their Muslim identity. Bosnian Muslims were too numerous to be incorporated as Serbs, Croats, or Yugoslavs, despite the confusion about their identity. Romanian Turks and Tatars were too small a population to pose a challenge to the Romanian Stalinist regime. They were ignored safely until it became desirable to display their group as a sign of religious toleration or as evidence of Romania's allegedly tolerant nationality policy. Albania's Muslim majority afforded the only possi-

ble challenge to the creation of a "new Albanian man." The Bektashis' political activities were a particular danger because of the sect's universalism. Crawford Young has observed the "overriding moral purpose and sanction" claimed by the centralized authority under socialism, an authority incompatible with the "compartmentalized solidarities" of a cultural pluralism.¹⁴⁹

The absence of a strong tradition of Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turkish sentiment among the Muslims confirms the importance of religion over national identity. Despite an active political interest in the "outside Turks" manifested by Ankara,¹⁵⁰ there was relatively little emigration prior to communism. Secular Turkey was a Turkish refuge, not a chosen homeland. It is possible that only the extraordinary repression practiced in Bulgaria has compelled the Turkish population to look to Turkey both as a refuge and a homeland. Significantly, there was no evidence of Pan-Islamic sentiment in Yugoslavia prior to the 1970s. Without the leadership of certain Bosnian *imams* and Belgrade's tolerance of contacts with the Muslim world, it is unlikely that Yugoslav Muslims would have shown much interest in transnational Islam. Yugoslavia (before 1979) and Romania have shown little concern that contacts with Muslim dignitaries could have undesirable consequences.

Finally, the situation of individual Muslim communities has been bound up with general political conditions within each state. Yugoslav Muslims are the most integrated of the four communities and the most sensitive to broader political trends. Disagreement within the League of Communists about nationality questions tends to ensure that the question of Pan-Islamic sentiment likewise will become a subject of debate within its ranks.¹⁵¹ Conversely, federation-wide questions concerning the place of "technocracy" in politics and women in social life have been echoed in Yugoslav Muslim doctrine.¹⁵² It is unlikely that the recent prosecution of the "Young Muslims" in Yugoslavia would have been politically significant apart from the general deterioration of nationality relations in the 1980s. The cases of Albania and Bulgaria are fundamentally different from that of Yugoslavia. Both of these countries appear subject to Stalinist practice concerning nationality. According to Mihailo Marković, Stalinism in nationality relations has meant that "the biggest nation drastically dominates the center and represses any resistance, no matter how justified, as a bourgeois-nationalist deviation." Marković also points out Stalin's acceptance of

the "strange doctrine" of a "dictatorship of 'revolutionary' over 'reactionary' nations."¹⁵³ In view of the lingering Stalinist and pro-Maoist influences within the Bulgarian party through 1967,¹⁵⁴ and its similar presence in Albania, their policies toward Islam become more intelligible. From the Stalinist viewpoint Bulgarian Turks and Pomaks represented a reactionary contradiction to the necessary role of the leading nation. In Albania it was necessary for that role to be created by eliminating the rival and divisive influence of religion. Finally, the case of Romania is especially interesting in that only in 1954 did Romanian authorities formally abandon any attempt to assimilate Romania's small Tatar minority by developing a Tatar literary language, with the result that the overwhelming majority of Tatars and Turks have avoided assimilation and continued the use of their language.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, even the case of Romania suggests the utter incompatibility of communist rule and transnational religious sentiment, for there is evidence of a policy of favoring Tatar identity over Turkish identity.¹⁵⁶ As long as Turkey remains noncommunist, the Romanian regime can be expected to view pan-Turkic sentiments with hostility.

Part IV Conclusion

Conclusion

Pedro Ramet

The contributors to this volume started from the premises that religious organizations in the communist world have served as vehicles for the preservation, defense, and reinforcement of ethnic sentiment and that the religio-nationalist symbiosis thus entailed has been a source of particular frustration to the communist elites. Communism's hostility toward religion has multiple sources, the symbiosis with nationalism being only one of them. More particularly, communism views religion as a threat to its organizational and ideological monopoly and as an impediment to its utopian program.

Religion, like nationalism, is a highly complex social phenomenon, capable of assuming sundry forms. One might speak, for instance, of *folk religion*, with its strong communal emphasis and a clergy committed to the national culture: Polish Catholicism would seem to be a good example of this. Again, one might be justified in speaking of *culture religion* (like the Shinto), or *civic religion* (as in Protestant groups of England and the United States), or again of *state religion*, where the hierarchy functions as an agency of the state (with post-Petrine Russian Orthodoxy being a fair example).¹ Finally, one may wish to speak of *transcendental* or *mystic religions* which are other-worldly and contemplative in orientation.

Given this plethora of religious forms, the risk of oversimplification when it comes to defining just what is meant by "religion" is great. Yet the issue must be confronted, since we use the word meaningfully and obviously mean something quite specific by it. Although chapter 1 pointedly excluded belief in a god from the list of prerequisites that constituted the definition of "religion" offered there and although one

contributor observed that "religion does not have to refer to a belief in the supernatural [since] it is only a link between you and the ideal in which you believe,"² all contributors to this volume are in agreement that empirically, belief in a supernatural realm has been a central organizing factor for religions. Therefore it seems appropriate to revise the definition of religion offered in chapter I of this book and to define it, rather, as

an interrelated set of assumptions about the nature and meaning of human existence, which are thought to have absolute validity, and which are actively propagated by an institution or organized sect which locates the legitimacy of those assumptions, and of certain behavioral imperatives derived from them, in the commands of a superior being or group of superior beings, existing in a supernatural realm.³

This rather cumbersome definition draws attention to a curious paradox that has divided religions—viz., if morality has absolute validity in and of itself, then what, if anything, does the command of God add to it? Alternatively, if the validity of morality stems exclusively from God's command, then does not a religion of that species reveal itself as barefaced authoritarianism? I believe that suppositions about the existence or nonexistence of particular beings, although elevated to centrality in religious dogmas, serve as the underpinning of a moral-cultural system and not, as is often alleged, as its source. But the recurrence of the derivation of morality from divine command in popular religion prompts the caution that religion is apt to be what people think it is; it may be a form of human liberation for some, even as it remains a form of authoritarian reductionism for others.

It was noted earlier that insofar as the claims of a religion are absolute, those who do not subscribe to the given religion and observe its rituals are viewed as outcasts, as reprobates. Religions maintain their hold on people by claiming to be "best"; the claim has unavoidable consequences for the attitude toward those who refuse the "best," the "one, true religion." Likewise, for Marxists, the possession of the "best" ideology—"scientific" dialectical materialism—disposes Marxists to treat non-Marxists and, more particularly, nonatheists, as second-class. Indeed, Marxist-Leninist ideology requires that theists be treated as second-class citizens.

Marxist elites are, of course, hostile to religious organizations not only because their autonomy places them beyond the CP's organizational hegemony but also because they are apprehended, rightly, as ideological rivals. Numerous observers, both East and West, have remarked that Marxist ideology has evolved into a "state religion" in communist countries.⁴ It is for this reason that church and state in the Eastern bloc have searched for no more than a *modus vivendi*—bare mutual tolerance—and again for this reason, in part, that any *modus vivendi* thus achieved will be pragmatic and tenuous.

There is a third source of church-state mutual antagonism in the communist world, viz., the programmatic utopianism that dictates social homogenization as the key to achievement of full communism. The logic of programmatic homogenization runs as follows. For Marx, as is well known, the central problem that constitutes the cunabula of the socialist enterprise is the problem of human alienation.⁵ Marx argued that an individual could not hope to achieve self-realization (the positive value supposedly being advanced in Marxism) unless alienation (whereby a person becomes estranged from the means of production and from his own products, from others, and ultimately from his own nature) be eliminated. Moreover, Marx continued, the elimination of alienation entailed the elimination of mediation, for it is the mediators—capital, state, and church—that perpetuate economic, political, and social alienation, and which must therefore be destroyed if the individual is to achieve self-realization and express his own uniqueness. There is a further problem with mediators, viz., that they "invariably" (according to Marx and Engels) are the tools of the dominant class, instruments, thus, of class oppression.⁶

In order to eliminate mediation, however, it is necessary to overthrow the class system of which it is an integral part, i.e., to eliminate conflicts of interest. But the elimination of conflicts of interest entails, for Marx and his successors, the elimination of those social differences that give rise to conflicts of interest,⁷ under the rubric of the *single legitimate interest*. But the elimination of social differences amounts to no less than a program of social homogenization whereby ethnic, linguistic, class, and religio-ideological differences are to be eroded steadily in the interest of creating a "new socialist man." Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu gave conscious expression to this Marxist-Leninist oestrus when he observed (in 1972): "We must con-

stantly think of the necessity . . . for an increasing homogenization of society, both in the social and [in the] national sense, in order to work for the creation of a unified communist order."⁸

There is an important difference between Marx's attitude regarding social homogenization and that of contemporary Marxist-Leninists. Whereas Marx viewed homogenization as an ineluctable, if progressive, historical tendency in which religious difference figured as but the epiphenomenon of class oppression, revealing that the assault on religion was, for Marx, neither a sufficient nor even an especially worthwhile enterprise,⁹ his successors have targeted religious organizations for concentrated repression, persecution, or subversion through co-optation. Marx's "historical necessity" has been transformed, at the hands of Marxist-Leninists, into "programmatic necessity," and the suggestion of determinism in Marx has been suppressed in favor of an active program of social transformation.

Given the sundry sources of communist hostility toward religion, it is of some interest to observe systematic differences in policy toward different religious groups, most particularly the ambiguous position of glorious impotence enjoyed by the leading Orthodox churches. The position of the Romanian and Bulgarian Orthodox churches, for instance, as pointed out in the chapters by Gilberg and Raikin, has been "glorious" in the sense that they can conduct liturgy openly, can publish various theological and church periodicals, and can meet with foreign clerics at home or abroad. But they, like the Russian, Polish, Czechoslovak, and Georgian Orthodox churches, are impotent when it comes to being able to assert their prerogatives against the government. Moreover, even "glorious" co-optation does not provide security against arbitrary governmental policies, as the Romanian Orthodox church has discovered: in the last ten years that church has lost many historic places of worship, and in Bucharest alone at least twenty Orthodox churches have been razed. There are other sources of friction in the Romanian church-state nexus, and in August 1987 Patriarch Teoctist joined the leaders of other denominations to complain about the "lack of allocations from the government for the construction and maintenance of religious facilities."¹⁰ In this respect the situation in Yugoslavia is quite different, and in the past few years the Serbian Orthodox church has been permitted to undertake a number of important church construction projects, including resumption of the con-

struction of the St. Sava Church in Belgrade.¹¹ Part of the reason for this general impotence is that, in contrast to the Catholic and Protestant churches, the Orthodox have few champions in the West and cannot count on Western support in a showdown with the regime.

Yet despite their impotence, or perhaps in fact *because* of it, the Orthodox churches have been drawn into a kind of collusion with the regimes in this area. There are, of course, historical reasons for the difference between Orthodox churches and other religious organizations in this regard. In one sense the Marxist system appears as an inversion of the centuries-old tradition of *Caesaro-papism*, in which the state was dominated by the church. More particularly, the tradition must be traced, in the Balkans, to the *millet* system adopted by the Ottomans, which did not merely delegate administrative and educational duties to the churches, but in fact made them adjuncts of the state, the appointed administrative partners of the Sublime Porte. In Russia the so-called Spiritual Reglement promulgated by Peter the Great in 1721 effectively gave the government control over the Russian Orthodox church's organization, possessions, and policies, reducing it likewise to a kind of office of state.¹² These developments cultivated a tradition in Orthodoxy of partnership with the state.

The Catholic church, on the other hand, found itself thrust in the nineteenth century into the role of advocate of suppressed nationalities—in Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, and to an extent in Romania—which encouraged a posture of opposition to political authority and reinforced the fusion of religious affiliation and nationality in these regions. Only in Hungary and Bohemia-Moravia did the Catholic church enjoy a partnership with political authority. In the former, where the Magyars were culturally favored and politically assertive, the church maintained its strength; in the latter, where the Czechs were culturally despoiled and politically suppressed, the church's hold on its people slackened.¹³ Today it is only in Hungary that the Catholic church has entered into a "co-optive" relationship with the state, while among Czechs the church is viewed as antinational.

Symptomatic of this difference in political heritage between Catholicism and Orthodoxy is the fact that whereas the Catholic church became actively involved in creating and sustaining political parties throughout East Central Europe, the Orthodox church declined to create an Orthodox political party in the belief that this would only serve

to foster division within the nation. Meeting in the Yugoslav town of Karlovci in 1921, hierarchs and representatives of the Russian church (ninety-two in all) debated adoption of a unified political program; Fr. Sergei Bulgakov and his associates entertained notions of founding a Christian-Socialist party, but were opposed in this by a group inspired and led by Metropolitan Eulogi, with the result that the Russian church failed to devise a unified policy at all.¹⁴

In the initial phase of Bolshevik rule the Russian Orthodox church was accorded no special privileges. Indeed, through the sponsorship of the "Living Church" movement and the encouragement of splinter groups, the regime showed itself eager to weaken the church in any way possible. The church's utility in rallying Russian nationalism led to a partial rehabilitation of the church during World War II, and, at war's end, with Eastern Europe newly occupied, the Kremlin saw potential utility in the Russian Orthodox church promoting bloc cohesion in the new territories. Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin sounded the new theme in 1945, telling Patriarch Aleksii: "Our government esteems the great public service rendered by your Eminence. But the people expect much more from your Eminence and the Church. Moscow is already the world center of international politics. It must also become the spiritual nucleus."¹⁵ The Kremlin hoped that the forced conversion of the Uniates to Orthodoxy¹⁶ and the subordination of East European Orthodox churches to the Moscow patriarchate would undercut religious-based resistance and thereby further the consolidation of Soviet hegemony in the area. The church, for its part, was eager to play this role. This Kremlin strategy elevated the Russian Orthodox church to primacy among Orthodox churches of the bloc.¹⁷ In a typical expression of this policy, a decree issued by Tirana on May 4, 1950, encouraged the Albanian Orthodox church to maintain contacts with fraternal Orthodox churches in the socialist camp but implicitly forbade any relations with Orthodox churches in noncommunist lands, and in effect placed the Albanian Orthodox church under the authority of the Moscow patriarchate.¹⁸ The Orthodox churches in the Soviet Union, Slovakia, and Romania were of course happy to take over the Uniate parishes they suddenly inherited, but, as Khrushchev's antireligious campaign showed, co-optation is best thought of as a phase in communist religious policy. It clearly provides the church no guarantee against persecution.¹⁹

Despite Paul VI's active policy of *Ostpolitik*, the Kremlin has always recognized in the Catholic church an ideological and political rival—a sentiment certainly reinforced by the election of Karol Wojtyła to the papacy in 1978. The Kremlin similarly distrusts Protestant groups and has achieved a most uncertain *modus vivendi* with “official Islam” (while Sofia has shown itself to be blatantly hostile toward Islam in Bulgaria). But Orthodoxy has appeared in a different light. There was, in addition to the factors already discussed above, further reason for this, viz., the affinity for things Russian that was felt and fostered by Orthodox churches throughout Eastern Europe. Rooted in nineteenth-century Slavophilism, this affinity linked religious messianism (still alive among Orthodox churchmen) and Moscow-centrism (visions of a Third Rome) to provide a basis both for Russian nationalism and for Pan-Slavic solidarity. In a recent expression of this Pan-Orthodox affinity (and of Kremlin sympathies), the Soviet consul in Zagreb turned out for the ordination in early 1982 of the new Serbian Orthodox bishop of Zagreb.²⁰

While it is possible to identify certain broad patterns or tendencies in church-state relations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and possible to speak of the identity of long-range goals, one must be careful not to underestimate the importance of local factors in the framing of religious policy. In Poland, for example, the sheer power of the Catholic church exempted it from repression and postponed the confrontation with the communist regime for three years.²¹ When, moreover—to take a more specific example—the Kraków publishing house Wydawnictwo Literackie published C. Soloukhin's book *Meeting with Icons* in 1975 (a treatment of religious culture in the USSR that had already been published in the Soviet Union), the Instruction, Evaluation, and Control Group of Poland's Main Administration for Control of the Press, Publications, and Public Performances (GUKPIW) complained that the decision to permit publication in Poland did not take into consideration the stronger presence of the church in Polish national life. “The granting of approval for the publication of this book is a great mistake on the part of the censors,” the control group wrote.

The fact that it was published in the Soviet Union cannot be used as justification, because inhabitants of the Soviet Union take this subject differently from the way the Polish reader does. Every gov-

ernment in conducting its own domestic policy handles its own problems in different ways. The officials of a given country, in permitting sensitive subjects to be raised, [must] have first of all their own citizens in mind.²²

Similar considerations of local conditions could be multiplied, but the essential argument being made here is that nationalism takes on a different configuration in different contexts. It thus functions differently, say, in multiethnic versus ethnically homogeneous countries, and figures as a pivotal variable in the Soviet–East European region, shaping the social and political role of religious organizations and coloring the religious policies of communist elites.

Among the sundry issues touched upon in this volume are three focal analytical questions: (1) Should the symbiosis of religion and nationalism be viewed principally from the standpoint of the religious organization in question, or is it more usefully viewed from the vantage point of the nationalist? In other words, is the subject more usefully probed by stressing how nationalism is a natural activity of the church and how it may serve church purposes, or is the subject better served by stressing how religious organizations serve the purposes of nationalism? (2) Is the interface of religion and nationalism static or dynamic? (3) Does religion temper or absolutize nationalism?

At least four alternative definitions of nationalism have been offered in this book. Drawing upon Dimitry Pospelovsky, I defined nationalism (in chapter 1) as “collective affectivity focused on the cultural-linguistic group, manifested in the attribution of central importance to the national culture—including its religion—and in the aspiration to promote the national culture.” Thus defined, the religionational symbiosis appears completely natural. I offered a second definition in chapter 11, describing nationalism there as the “collective attitude toward the national heritage,” with national heritage defined, in turn, as “the collective memory of a community focusing on those people, events, cultural products, and symbols which are seen as formative of the nation and its place in the international order.” As can be seen, these two definitions are in reality equivalent. Along related lines, Kęstutis Girnius (in his chapter on Lithuania) defined nationalism as “a set of beliefs and attitudes according to which certain political and cultural values believed to be essential for the flowering of a nation are

considered to have such intrinsic worth that actions and policies that endanger them are held to be impermissible in most circumstances." And finally, in chapter 7, Stephen Jones defines nationalism as "a set of beliefs which attribute intrinsic or supreme worth to the nation [as] defined by certain common cultural and ethnic attributes and attitudes." All of these definitions highlight the importance of national culture, the first three placing culture in a primary position, and the fourth viewing culture as constitutive of nation. The first two definitions interpret nationalism as *affectivity*; the latter two definitions portray it as *beliefs*. All of the definitions are metaethically neutral. All of them are, finally, sufficiently broad to encompass both "positive" nationalism (the kind of cherishing of culture and concern for the national community described by Chrypinski) and "negative" nationalism (exemplified, for instance, in the rabid excesses of the Croatian *Ustaše* during World War II or in the coercively assimilatory Romanian nationalism of the Ceaușescu period).

With respect to the first analytical question (point of view), most of the contributors to this volume chose to approach the subject essentially from the standpoint of the religious organization. Chrypinski probably best exemplifies this approach in comparing the relationship of church and nation to the relationship between body and soul. In this approach, emphasis is placed on the fact that the church grows up among the people and is thus a national body, a tribal-national church, so that nationalist concerns are intrinsic to it. For Gilberg, thus, "religion in general, and Orthodoxy in particular, represented a vital element of national defense for the Romanians." And again, as Chrypinski put it, so intrinsic to the local church's concerns has the welfare of the Polish people been that one must speak of the Polish church, rather than the church in Poland.

Pospelovsky and Girnius, on the other hand, have tended toward the other approach, i.e., to ask how nationalists find the church useful or not useful. The reasons for this choice certainly have to do with the nature of the historical context. The Slavophiles, after all, represent a discrete nationalist current, while, as Girnius notes, "the Catholic church has not always been a unifying factor in Lithuanian life; nor has its role vis-à-vis Lithuanian nationalism been unequivocal." In the Lithuanian case it is "a contingent fact that contemporary Catholicism is beneficial to nationalism." In this connection László's observation that the

national reawakening in Hungary is "a purely secular phenomenon" is interesting, insofar as it suggests that it is possible to divorce religion and nationalism in Hungary, though László emphasizes that for Hungarians living in minority situations, this nexus remains a symbiotic, fundamental, unbroken, living reality.

Beck and Raikin take yet a third approach, asking how the regime views the nationalist mythos of the church and to what extent the regime can exploit the glories of the church's past for its own purposes. Beck, for instance, finds that the Honecker regime fostered a revival of Luther in order to interpret Luther in a "progressive" light and thereby give present East German socialist reality historical depth and legitimacy.

Those authors who explicitly address the second question (static or dynamic) uniformly view the religion-nationalism nexus as dynamic. Markus, for instance, describes variations in church attitudes in Ukraine, revealing that the Catholic church espoused Polish nationalism during Russian and Soviet occupation. He also identifies alternative currents—separatist and integrationist—in Ukrainian Orthodox circles. Critchlow points to a surprising aspect of this dynamic in his identification of a recent tendency of certain mullahs in Central Asia to appeal to regional consciousness (Turkmen, Uzbek, etc.). And Gitelman notes that while Soviet Jews in the 1950s "were Jews officially and socially, but Russians culturally," there was a tendency in the 1960s and 1970s for Soviet Jews to seek to rediscover their Jewish culture. My own chapter on Czechoslovakia, while not denying the dynamism of the religio-national relationship, places the stress elsewhere, viz., on the emergence of patterns in that relationship over the course of centuries and on the difficulty of escaping from deeply rooted patterns.

There was less agreement²³ on the third question, the effect that religion has on nationalism, though part of the reason for the complex panoply of explanations advanced reflects not concrete disagreement, but the sheer complexity of nationalism. Certainly, it makes all the difference if one speaks of the church's role in sustaining national culture, in promoting the national language, and in caring for its ethnic congregation ("positive" nationalism) as opposed to the church's putative relationship toward a nationalist frenzy of chauvinistic excesses ("negative" nationalism). The latter clearly needs to be tempered; the former does not.

Chrypinski, Critchlow, Gilberg, Gitelman, Irwin, Jones, Markus, Raikin, and I all depicted contexts in which religious organizations have promoted the national culture. As Chrypinski put it, in describing the Polish case, the church believed it had a duty to work "to preserve national existence and the historical continuity of national life," while also exerting its influence "on the nation by preaching the gospel, educating the people in the values of Christianity, providing examples of moral behavior, and helping people spiritually." This association with the nation is apt to entail an overt hostility toward forms of "internationalism" or "cosmopolitanism." The Russian samizdat journal *Veche*, for instance, commented as follows:

Cosmopolitanism is spiritual slavery. The universal man is a lie. Only God, Jesus Christ, can be the universal man; but man as a universal is an idol, which puts itself in place of God. It is Antichrist who arises out of cosmopolitanism, who promotes freedom to all but enslaves everybody. Cosmopolitanism is the preparation of the road for Antichrist.²⁴

When it comes to negative nationalism, contrary examples were cited. Pospelovsky, for instance, cited the fact that a strong religious revival in Poland has been accompanied by a movement away from the intense nationalism of the interwar period. He argued that once the religious element is removed from nationalism, nationalism is apt to be negative and to dissolve into fascism. Chrypinski lent support to this view, citing church opposition to the 1968 anti-Semitic campaign in Poland. On the other hand, as Peter Merkl noted at the conference, the clerico-fascist movements of the interwar period demonstrated that the clergy are not immune to fascism and that religion can be manipulated even in the service of negative nationalism. Again, Gilberg and I provided additional examples of the activity of specific religious organizations in fueling ethnocentric attitudes. Markus, finally, struck an integrative chord, noting the internal complexity within churches and synthesizing both propositions to argue that "church and religion have often been articulators and supporters of imperial universal designs. But within the same church, and among adherents of the same religion, movements have emerged to hinder such designs." This opposition may arise from ethical motives or from cultural motives. With respect to the latter, it is important to remember that supranational-

ism, the homogenizing ideology of imperial states, tends to threaten the religious organizations of minority groups to the extent that the culture and survival of those groups, in general, is threatened; thus, a church is apt to base its attitude vis-à-vis the nationalism of a particular group on considerations of the confessional changes likely to be effected by imperium. The upshot of this is that there is no necessary mode in religion's attitude toward nationalism.

Finally, these chapters bring home the point that although the churches' concern for national values is genuine, it is the regimes that most emphasize the nationalist aspect of church behavior (as Beck, in particular, makes clear), while the churches typically view themselves as chiefly spiritual institutions. The churches are by nature, as noted in chapter 1, political actors as well; hence, the assault on religion tends, where successful, to drive the church into a largely liturgical strait-jacket, and, where unsuccessful, to increase the politicization of the church. Where the church styles itself the guardian of national culture, the program of social homogenization makes the church a central foe.

Just as Muhammad's gospel was as much a political ideology serving to lay the basis for a new social system as a new theology, so too the early Christian church

was not just a voluntary association for "religious" purposes. It was rather the New Society, even the New Humanity, a *polis* or *politeuma*, the true City of God, in the process of construction. And each local community was fully aware of its membership in an inclusive and universal whole. The Church was conceived as an independent and self-supporting social order, as a new social dimension, a peculiar *systema patridos*, as Origen put it. Early Christians felt themselves, in the last resort, quite outside of the existing social order, simply because for them the Church was an "order", an extra-terrestrial "colony of Heaven" on earth.²⁵

Islam and Christianity constituted, in their cunabulas, social revolts with political aspirations and, at least for the latter, a strong utopianism inspired the early converts.

Contemporary religious organizations thus may be seen as vestigial political organizations in at least two ways: in the sense that, primordially, religion arose as the primary vehicle of sociopolitical organization,²⁶ and in the more specific sense in which Islam and Christian-

ity per se were developed—to challenge the moral/social systems of their day, positing new mores and laying new foundations for political legitimacy and political behavior. If religious organizations are vestigial political organizations, then the cultural ethos and social identity evoked by religious ties are genetically traceable to political purpose, and the clash between church concepts of nationality and state concepts of nationality becomes intelligible as the insoluble rivalry between alternative bases of collective loyalty. The state may of course exploit and manipulate religious feeling as a foundation for nationalism, just as the church may exploit and manipulate the state as a guarantor of confessional/ethnic homogeneity, so that both institutions may find their purposes served in nationalism. But the concepts themselves remain at variance. The situation is different in multiethnic and multiconfessional societies where such a symbiosis of purpose can only be accomplished at the expense of certain “minority” groups—witness the tsarist doctrine of Orthodoxy and Nationality.

The cultural engagement of religious institutions generally, which characterized also the activity of religious bodies in the Slavic world until the advent of communism, reflects the arrogation of formative and socializing functions to institutional authority, and thus is latently political. The steady assumption of cultural and educational functions by state mechanisms reflects the steady erosion of the direct political power of churches and their retreat to the spiritual. This retreat has not been total and is capable of reversal, according to particular circumstances. The Marxist drive to accelerate this process and to drive it to its “logical” conclusion would divorce spirituality from morality (turning the churches into anomalous, nonmoral, cosmological societies serving the state) and would divorce church from nation. But one might reverse Esad Ćimić’s comment that “religion is an integral part of national culture”²⁷ and observe that, conversely, national culture is also an integral part of religion.

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. Barbara Hargrove, *The Sociology of Religion* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: AHM Publishing, 1979), p. 4.
2. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, *A Discourse on Political Economy*, trans. G. D. H. Cole (Chicago: William Benton, 1952), pp. 371–75; and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 168.
3. Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), pp. 21–43.
4. Ivan S. Lubachko, *Belorussia under Soviet Rule, 1917–1957* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1972), p. 159.
5. Vasył Markus, "Religion in the Soviet Ukraine: A Political Problem of Modernizing Society", in *Nationalism and Human Rights in the USSR*, ed. Ihor Kamenetsky (Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, 1977), p. 156.
6. Ironically, however, as D. Kašić has pointed out, many Serbian Orthodox believers in Pavelić's Croatia were suspicious of the new church and felt that if they were going to change churches, they preferred to convert to Catholicism, which offered more reliable protection from *Ustaše* liquidations. See Fikreta Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše i NDH* (Zagreb: S. N. Liber and Školska knjiga, 1977), p. 178n; also Ante Pavelić, *Hrvatska Pravoslavna Crkva* (Madrid: Domovina, 1984).
7. V. Stanley Vardys, *The Catholic Church, Dissent, and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1978), pp. 11–13.
8. *Tercuman* (Istanbul), April 1, 1980, p. 3, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), *East Europe Report*, no. 75548 (April 23, 1980), p. 15.
9. Hungarians constituted 96 percent of the Hungarian population in 1980, while Romanians accounted for 88 percent of the population of Romania in 1977. The Bulgarian regime denies the existence of any significant minorities in Bulgaria, but an impartial western observer estimated in 1976 that ethnic minorities accounted for 13.8 percent of the Bulgarian population. See Laszlo Ribanszky, "Nationalities in Hungary: Few in Number but Pampered," *Radio Free Europe Research*, October 28, 1980, p. 2; Romanian Situation Report No. 20, *Radio Free Europe Research*, June

- 22, 1977; and John Georgeoff, "Ethnic Minorities in the People's Republic of Bulgaria," in *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe*, ed. George Klein and Milan J. Reban (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1981), p. 79n.
10. See Dimitry Pospelovsky, "Some Remarks on the Contemporary Russian Nationalism and Religious Revival," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1984), p. 73.
11. Quoted in Viktor Novak, *Velika optužba (Magnum Crimen)*, vol. 2 (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1960), p. 56.
12. *Katolički tjednik*, quoted in Fred Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 197.
13. Lazar Milin, *Razgovori o veri*, quoted in *NIN*, February 20, 1972, p. 16.
14. See Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its Meaning and Ideology*, 2d ed. (New York: Random House, 1960), especially p. 127.
15. Joseph F. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia," in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, ed. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970), p. 173.
16. The council has seven departments: for Orthodox churches (Russian, Georgian, Old Believers); for Islam and Buddhism; for the Catholic, Protestant, and Armenian-Apostolic churches, Judaism, and sects; for "international contacts"; the legal department; bookkeeping; and a general department. See Albert Boiter, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, Washington Papers, vol. 8, no. 78 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980), p. 48.
17. On the structural aspects of Yugoslav religious policy, see Pedro Ramet, "The Dynamics of Yugoslav Religious Policy—Some Insights from Organization Theory," in *Yugoslavia in the 1980s*, ed. Pedro Ramet (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).
18. There are some 500 thousand Polish Uniates, mostly of Ukrainian descent. See Markus, "Religion in the Soviet Ukraine," pp. 155–56; Gerhard Simon, "The Catholic Church and the Communist State in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," in *Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe*, ed. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and John W. Strong (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 202; Rudolf Grulich, "Unierte Gläubige in kommunistisch regierten Ländern," *Digest des Ostens*, no. 11 (1980), pp. 1–5; *Družina* (Ljubljana), August 17, 1975, p. 1; and *Keston News Service*, no. 155 (September 1, 1982), p. 10.
19. Michael Bourdeaux, "Roman Catholics and Uniates," in *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A Handbook*, ed. George Schöpfli (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 476.
20. *Rabochaya gazeta* (Kiev), April 17, 1981, p. 3, trans. in JPRS, *Soviet Report*, no. 78159 (May 26, 1981), p. 22.
21. Denis Dirscherl, "The Soviet Destruction of the Greek Catholic Church," *Journal of Church and State* 12, no. 3 (Autumn 1970), pp. 423, 426.
22. See *ibid.*, pp. 427–28; Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), pp. 97–98; Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Religion and Nationalism in the Contemporary Ukraine," in *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe*, ed. George W. Simmonds (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1977); Vasyl Markus, "Religion and Nationality: The Uniates of the Ukraine," in *Religion and Atheism*, ed. Bociurkiw

- and Strong; and "Zur religiösen Unterdrückung in der Westukraine," *Glaube in der 2. Welt* 8, no. 9 (September 1980).
23. See Jane Ellis, *The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).
 24. *The Church and State under Communism*, vol. 2 (Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania), prepared by the Law Library of the Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 1–2, 12.
 25. *Univerzul*, October 15, 1948, as quoted in Emil Ciurea, "Religious Life," in *Captive Rumania*, ed. Alexandre Cretzianu (London: Atlantic Press, 1956), p. 195.
 26. "Zwischen Anpassung und Unterdrückung," *Herder Korrespondenz* 32, no. 8 (August 1978), p. 414.
 27. Ion Ratiu, "The Uniates in Romania," *The Tablet*, February 27, 1982, p. 199.
 28. "Die Lage der griechisch-katholischen Ukrainer in Rumänien," *Glaube in der 2. Welt* 5, nos. 7–8 (July–August 1977), p. D54.
 29. See Pedro Ramet, "Innenpolitische Determinanten der sowjetischen Interventionspolitik: Zu den Auswirkungen der tschechoslowakischen und polnischen Krise auf den Westen der UdSSR," *Osteuropa* 35, no. 3 (March 1985).
 30. Michael Bourdeaux, "The Uniate Churches in Czechoslovakia," *Religion in Communist Lands* 2, no. 2 (March–April 1974), pp. 4–6; *Rude Pravo* (Prague), April 12, 1968, trans. in *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas* 7, nos. 7–8 (April 15–30, 1968), p. 78; Galia Golan, *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 292; and Markus, "Religion and Nationality," p. 113.
 31. Quoted in Eugen Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 74.
 32. Boiter, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, p. 72.
 33. Zvi Gitelman, "Moscow and the Soviet Jews: A Parting of the Ways," *Problems of Communism* 29, no. 1 (January–February 1980), p. 21.
 34. Boiter, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, p. 74.
 35. *Los Angeles Times*, December 22, 1976, p. 19; and *Keston News Service*, no. 281 (August 6, 1987), p. 14.
 36. Michael Bourdeaux, "Jews," in *Soviet Union*, ed. Schöpflin, pp. 489–90. See also Bennett Kovrig, *The Hungarian People's Republic* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 144.
 37. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, August 15–16, 1982, p. 6; and *Financial Times* (London), March 31, 1988, p. 2.
 38. Maxine Pollack, "Anti-Semitism in Poland," *The Tablet*, January 30, 1982, pp. 99–100.
 39. G.S., "Bulgarian Jews—A Doomed Minority," *Radio Free Europe Research*, May 3, 1985.
 40. For a listing of Monophysite churches and a discussion of the difference between Chalcedonian and Monophysite churches, see Pedro Ramet, "Autocephaly and National Identity in Church-State Relations in Eastern Christianity," in *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Pedro Ramet (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988).

41. Peter J. Babris, *Silent Churches* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Research Publishers, 1978), p. 158.
42. All statistics from Ramet, *Eastern Christianity*.
43. Interview, Belgrade, July 1987.
44. C. J. Peters, "The Georgian Orthodox Church," in *Eastern Christianity*, ed. Ramet, p. 307.
45. Official figures of the council of the Russian Orthodox church, as given in Salo Wittmayer Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion* (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 200.
46. If the annexed territories are counted, then, as official Soviet figures show, there were some 4,225 licensed Orthodox churches in the USSR in 1941. *Ibid.*, p. 206; D. Konstantinow, "Die Russische Orthodoxe Kirche heute," *Ost-Probleme* 18, no. 13 (July 1, 1966), p. 388.
47. One of the best studies of the Russian Orthodox church is Dimitry Pospelovsky, *The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982*, 2 vols. (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1984).
48. Boiter, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, p. 17; Konstantinow, "Die Russische Orthodoxe Kirche," p. 388; Otto Luchterhandt, "Geknebelt, und dennoch lebensfähig: Die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ära Breschnew," *Herder Korrespondenz* 36, no. 5 (May 1982), p. 235; and Philip Walters, "The Russian Orthodox Church," in *Eastern Christianity*, ed. Ramet, p. 91.
49. "Cadres of the Church and Legal Measures to Curtail Their Activities," a secret report by the Council on Religious Affairs, part 1, *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas* 19, nos. 9-11 (1980), p. 149.
50. Novosti Press Agency, September 20, 1968, trans. in *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas* 7, nos. 17-18 (September 15-30, 1968), pp. 149-50.
51. *New York Times* (June 10, 1988), p. 3; and *Financial Times* (London, June 11, 1988), p. 2.
52. Raoul Bossy, "Religious Persecutions in Captive Romania," *Journal of Central European Affairs* 15, no. 2 (July 1955), p. 162; and Ciurea, "Religious Life," p. 167.
53. Rumanian National Committee (Washington, D.C.), *Information Bulletin*, no. 46 (January 1953), p. 11; and Radio Vatican, January 6, 1953, as cited in Ciurea, "Religious Life," p. 173.
54. Bossy, "Religious Persecutions," p. 164.
55. Kenneth Jowitt, in *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), p. 198, insists that Romania's independent course be dated from 1962, and not from 1945 or even 1955.
56. Keith Hitchins, "The Romanian Orthodox Church and the State," in *Religion and Atheism*, ed. Bociurkiw and Strong, pp. 314-25; and Miranda Villiers, "The Romanian Orthodox Church Today," *Religion in Communist Lands* 1, no. 3 (May-June 1973), pp. 4-5.
57. See, for instance, the review article by Mircea Muthu in *Steaua* (Cluj-Napoca), February 1982, p. 39, trans. in *JPRS, East Europe Report*, no. 80679 (April 27, 1982), pp. 50-53.

58. Djoko Slijepčević, *Die bulgarische orthodoxe Kirche, 1944–1965* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1957), pp. 9, 18.
59. *Narodna mladež*, March 11, 1970, quoted in Wolf Oschlies, "‘Überwundene Religion?’—Zur Gegenwartssituation von Religion und Kirche in Bulgarien," *Evangelische Theologie* 35, no. 5 (September–October 1975), p. 442.
60. Thus, in early 1979 a statement signed by five Bulgarian Orthodox metropolitans attacked an article which had appeared in the Yugoslav daily *Borba* for having asserted that the Kresnen-Raslog uprising of 1878–79 had been Macedonian in character rather than Bulgarian. *Tsurkoven vestnik*, February 1, 1979, pp. 4–6.
61. Vladimir M. Rodzianko, "The Golgotha of the Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia, 1941–1951," *Eastern Churches Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (Summer 1953), p. 71.
62. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, *The Church and State under Communism*, vol. 3, Yugoslavia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 18, 21.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22; and Radovan Popović, "Iza crkvenih dveri," *NIN*, no. 1588 (June 7, 1981), p. 25.
64. Rudolf Trofenik, "Staat und Kirche in heutigen Jugoslawien," *Osteuropa* 8, nos. 7–8 (July–August 1958), p. 496.
65. See Patriarch German's interview with *8 Novosti*, June 6, 1981, excerpted in *Vesnik: Organ Saveza udruženog Pravoslavnog sveštenstva Jugoslavije*, July 1981, p. 3.
66. For an elaboration, see Pedro Ramet, "The Serbian Orthodox Church," in *Eastern Christianity*, ed. Ramet, pp. 232–48.
67. Interviews, Belgrade, July 1982.
68. Tanjug, October 20, 1981, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), October 21, 1981, p. 15.
69. *Pravoslavljje*, September 1 and 15, 1972, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 57287 (October 18, 1972).
70. Ciurea, "Religious Life," p. 174.
71. Peter A. Toma and Milan J. Reban, "Church-State Schism in Czechoslovakia," in *Religion and Atheism*, ed. Bociurkiw and Strong, p. 280.
72. Trofenik, "Staat und Kirche," p. 497. See also *Glas koncila*, September 13, 1981, p. 2.
73. Simon, "Catholic Church," p. 205; and Stefan Rosada and Jozef Gwozdz, "Church and State in Poland," in *Church and State behind the Iron Curtain*, ed. Vladimir Gsovski (New York: Praeger, 1955), p. 198.
74. Emmerich András, "The Cultural Lag in Society and Church in Hungary during the Post-War Period," in *Churches in Socialist Societies of Eastern Europe*, ed. Norbert Greinacher and Virgil Elizondo, Concilium: Religion in the Eighties (New York: Seabury Press, 1982), p. 8.
75. George N. Shuster, *Religion behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 240–41; George Rosu, Mircea Vasiliu, and George Crisan, "Church and State in Romania," in *Church and State*, ed. Gsovski, p. 284; and Jean G. H. Hoffmann, *Églises du Silence* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1967), p. 153.
76. Bernhard Tönnies, "Religious Persecution in Albania," *Religion in Communist Lands* 10, no. 3 (Winter 1982), p. 249; Bernhard Tönnies, "Der Glaube an Gott lebt

- auch in Albanien," *Kirche in Not* 29 (1981), p. 206; and Gjon Sinishta, "Grave Violations of Religious Rights in Albania," *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe* 3, no. 5 (July 1983), pp. 9-12.
77. See Caroline Ward, "Church and State in East Germany," *Religion in Communist Lands* 6, no. 2 (Summer 1978), p. 89.
 78. *Új Ember*, February 3, 1980, p. 1, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 75414 (April 1, 1980), pp. 22-25; and Vincent C. Chrypinski, "Church and State in Gierek's Poland," in *Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland*, ed. Maurice D. Simon and Roger D. Kanet (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 245-47.
 79. *The Church and State under Communism*, vol. 2, p. 22.
 80. *Deutsche Tagespost*, December 18-19, 1953, as cited in Ciurea, "Religious Life," p. 190.
 81. Paul Mailleux, "Catholics in the Soviet Union," in *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union, 1917-1967*, ed. Richard H. Marshall, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 363-64.
 82. Albert Galter, as cited in Roman Solchanyk and Ivan Hvat, "The Catholic Church in the Soviet Union," in *Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies*, ed. Pedro Ramet (manuscript under review).
 83. *The Church and State under Communism*, vol. 2, p. 29.
 84. *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 37.
 85. *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 22. For a more detailed discussion of the early phase of church-state relations in Yugoslavia, see Pedro Ramet, "Catholicism and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia," *Religion in Communist Lands* 10, no. 3 (Winter 1982); and Stella Alexander, *Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
 86. *Rheinischer Merkur*, February 17, 1978, p. 13; *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, June 18, 1975, p. 7; and Anton Hlinka, *Freedom Denied: Czechoslovakia after Helsinki*, trans. H. E. Oborg (Uhlidingen-Muhlhofen: Stefanus, 1977), p. 27.
 87. András, "Cultural Lag," pp. 8-9; and Emmerich András, "The Situation of the Catholic Clergy in Hungary," in *Churches in Socialist Societies*, ed. Greinacher and Elizondo, pp. 58, 60.
 88. Jan Nowak, "The Church in Poland," *Problems of Communism* 31, no. 1 (January-February 1982), p. 5.
 89. Karl Hartmann, "Der Polnische Episkopat und die Oder-Neisse Gebiete," *Osteuropa* 21, no. 3 (March 1971), pp. 165-67; and Michael D. Kennedy and Maurice D. Simon, "Church and Nation in Socialist Poland," in *Religion and Politics in the Modern World*, ed. Peter H. Merkl and Ninian Smart (New York: New York University Press, 1983), pp. 133-34. See also Joachim Piegsa, "Die Rolle der Kirche in Polen," *Politische Studien* 33, no. 264 (July-August 1982).
 90. See Janusz Bugajski, "Poland's Anti-Clergy Campaign," *Washington Quarterly* 8, no. 4 (Fall 1985).
 91. I have omitted Bulgaria from this listing since its Catholic church is so small as to be insignificant—which makes the Bulgarian Catholic church unique among Catholic churches of Eastern Europe.

92. Rudolf Grulich, "Katholische Kirche in Rumänien," *Kirche in Not* 26 (1978), p. 145.
93. *Pravda Ukrainy*, October 19, 1977, pp. 3–4; and *Život strany*, February 13, 1978, pp. 46–49, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 70937 (April 12, 1978), pp. 37–45.
94. *Pro fratribus*, 1980, no. 34, p. 6.
95. *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania*, June 29, 1977, reprinted in Vardys, *Catholic Church*, pp. 270–71.
96. Christel Lane, *Christian Religion in the Soviet Union* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), p. 211; and Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Religious Dissent and the Soviet State," in *Religion and Atheism*, ed. Bociurkiw and Strong, pp. 71, 73–74.
97. Malik Sabirovich Fazylov, *Religiya i natsional'nyye otnosheniya* (Alma Ata: Kazakhstan Publishing House, 1969), pp. 39, 71–74, 80.
98. I have developed this argument systematically, using statistical measures from all the Soviet republics, in my essay, "Linguistic Assimilation in Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (Autumn 1979). See also Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (New York: Monad Press, 1974); and Stephen M. Horak, "Belorussia: Modernization, Human Rights, Nationalism," in *Nationalism and Human Rights*, ed. Kamenetsky, pp. 144, 149.
99. E.g., I. A. Matsyavichius, "Katolitsizm i sovremennaya ideologicheskaya bor'ba," *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 8 (August 1976), p. 162.
100. Quoted in Vardys, *Catholic Church*, pp. 158–59.
101. *Nauka i religiya*, no. 4 (April 1980), p. 60, as cited in Oxana Antic, "The Soviet Press on the Catholic Church in Lithuania," *Radio Liberty Research*, December 29, 1980, p. 2n; and Marite Sapiets, "Religion and Nationalism in Lithuania," *Religion in Communist Lands* 7, no. 2 (Summer 1979), p. 78.
102. Sapiets, "Religion and Nationalism in Lithuania," p. 82.
103. *Vestsi Akademii Navuk Belaruskai SSR*, Sryya Gramadskikh Navuk, no. 5 (1981), p. 137.
104. *Nauka i religiya*, no. 6 (June 1980), trans. in JPRS, *Soviet Report*, no. 76263 (August 20, 1980), p. 65.
105. *Elta Information Bulletin*, May 1981, p. 15, and February 1982, pp. 10–11.
106. See, for instance, *Tvorba*, March 24, 1982, p. 6, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 80972 (June 3, 1982), pp. 10–11; and *Pravda* (Bratislava), March 25, 1982, p. 3, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), March 29, 1982, pp. D4–D6.
107. *Keston News Service*, no. 151–54 (August 31, 1982), pp. 5–6.
108. The figures for Czechoslovakia and East Germany are as of 1971, as reported in Smail Balić, "Eastern Europe: the Islamic Dimensions," *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs* 1, no. 1 (Summer 1979), p. 31. The figure for Poland is as of 1987, as reported in *Keston News Service*, no. 272 (April 2, 1987), p. 11. The Romanian figure, for 1977, is an estimate given by Frederick De Jong in his "Islam at the Danube: History and Present-Day Conditions of the Muslim Community in Romania," *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas* 25, no. 3 (Summer 1986), p. 136.
109. "News in Brief," *Religion in Communist Lands* 5, no. 4 (Winter 1977), p. 272.
110. See the chapter by Zachary Irwin in this volume.
111. *Times* (London), February 8, 1985, p. 10; February 16, 1985, p. 6; February 20, 1985,

- p. 9; and April 17, 1985, p. 9; *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, March 15, 1985, p. 7; and *Arabia*, March 1985, pp. 10–13.
112. Author's calculations from *Vestnik statistiki* [Moscow], 1980, no. 7, pp. 41–42. Tallying up the figures of all the traditionally Muslim groups listed by the Soviets, deducting 20 percent of the Kurds (who are non-Muslim), and adding in half of the Abkhaz yields a figure of 43,768,973, or 16.7 percent of the Soviet population of 262,084,654 in 1979. But this figure excludes the Muslim South Ossetians (who are listed together with Orthodox North Ossetians in the census report), a small group of Muslim Georgians (once known as Ingiloy), Dungans, Iranians, and Adzhars, as well as Muslims among the Mari, Mordvins, Udmurts, and Chuvash, and less numerous Muslim peoples.
 113. Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire* (London: C. Hurst, 1985), pp. 32–33; confirmed in Ronald Wixman, "Applied Soviet Nationality Policy: A Suggested Rationale," in *Turco-Tatar Past, Soviet Present*, ed. Ch. Lemerrier-Quellejey, G. Veinstein, and S. Enders Wimbush (Paris: Editions Peeters, 1986), p. 453. See also Alexandre Bennigsen, "Islamic or Local Consciousness among Soviet Nationalities?" in *Soviet Nationality Problems*, ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 178–79.
 114. Wixman, "Applied Soviet Nationality Policy," p. 455.
 115. Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire*, p. 92.
 116. N. Ashirov, "Islam i natsional'nyye otnosheniya," *Nauka i religiya*, 1974, no. 2, trans. into German under the title "Islamische Probleme in Sowjetasien," *Osteuropa* 25, no. 4 (April 1975), p. A207.
 117. R. Mavlyutov, "Musulmanskie prazniki i obryady," *Nauka i religiya*, 1978, no. 9, trans. into German under the title "Der Islam in der Sowjetunion," *Osteuropa* 30, no. 5 (May 1980), pp. A273–A277.
 118. N. Ashirov, "Musulmanskaya propoved segodnya," *Nauka i religiya*, 1978, no. 12, trans. into German under the title "Der Islam in der Sowjetunion," *ibid.*, p. A269.
 119. *Turkmenskaya iskra*, May 30, 1976, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (CDSP) 28, no. 23 (July 7, 1976), p. 1.
 120. *Pravda*, January 16, 1987, trans. in CDSP 39, no. 3 (February 18, 1987), p. 8.
 121. *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, February 12, 1987, trans. in CDSP 39, no. 9 (April 1, 1987), p. 11; and *Keston News Service*, no. 284 (September 24, 1987), p. 18.
 122. Peters, "Georgian Orthodox Church," pp. 290, 308.
 123. David Koridze, "Über die Verbrechen im grusinischen Patriarchat," *Glaube in der 2. Welt* 5, no. 10 (October 1977), pp. 124–25; and Peter Reddaway, "The Georgian Orthodox Church: Corruption and Renewal," *Religion in Communist Lands* 3, nos. 4–5 (July–October 1975), pp. 17, 19.
 124. Reddaway, "Georgian Orthodox Church," pp. 16, 21.
 125. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, August 25, 1981, p. 3.
 126. Quoted in Peters, "Georgian Orthodox Church," p. 305.
 127. *Ibid.* See also Peter Hauptmann, "Aus der Georgisch-Orthodoxen Kirche," *Kirche im Osten* 24 (1981), esp. pp. 183–85.
 128. Peters, "Georgian Orthodox Church."
 129. *Keston News Service* no. 130 (September 11, 1981), pp. 5–6.

130. "La Situation du Catholicisme en Hongrie," *L'Est Européen* 20, no. 179 (September–October 1981), p. 14.
131. See Pedro Ramet, *Cross and Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), chap. 4.
132. András, "Catholic Clergy," pp. 60–61.
133. *Keston News Service*, no. 271 (March 19, 1987), p. 25.
134. *Ibid.*, no. 280 (July 23, 1987), p. 22.
135. *Slovo Lektora*, May 1982, pp. 41–42; and Makhmadula Kholovich Kholov, "The Vital Force of the Fraternal Union," *Nauka i religiya*, 1982, no. 8, trans. in JPRS, *Soviet Report*, no. 82124 (October 29, 1982), pp. 45–46.
136. *Rolnicky noviny* (Bratislava), July 4, 1985, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. EPS-85-083 (August 14, 1985), p. 55.
137. Re East German rehabilitation of Friedrich the Great, Bismarck, and Luther, see James M. Markham, "Who Owns the Past?" *New York Times Magazine*, April 27, 1986.
138. Erich Honecker, as quoted in *Rheinischer Merkur*, May 22, 1981, p. 20. See also Wolfgang Geierhos, "Die DDR und Luther," *Deutsche Studien* 20, no. 80 (December 1982).
139. Re German efforts to overcome the past, see Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Do the Germans Have a 'National Character'?" *Encounter*, March 1987; and Peter Schneider, "Hitler's Shadow: On Being a Self-conscious German," *Harper's*, September 1987. For discussion of the independent peace movement, see Klaus Ehring and Martin Dallwitz, *Schwerter zu Pflugscharen* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1982); Ramet, *Cross and Commissar*, chap. 5; and Pedro Ramet, "The Evangelical Church, the State, and the Peace Movement in East Germany," *Crossroads*, no. 22 (1986).
140. Joyce Marie Mushaben, "Swords to Plowshares: The Church, the State, and the East German Peace Movement," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 17, no. 2 (Summer 1984), p. 133.
141. Radio DDR, November 8, 1981, quoted in Ronald D. Asmus, "The GDR and Martin Luther," *Survey* 28, no. 3 (Autumn 1984), p. 133.
142. Friedrich Winterhager, "Thomas Müntzer und die Gegenwart in Beiden Deutschen Staaten," *Deutsche Studien* 24, no. 96 (December 1986), p. 384. See also *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, February 3, 1988, p. 4, and March 12, 1988, p. 4.
143. I am thinking of the struggle over the state's proposed Concordat with the Vatican.
144. Interview, Belgrade, July 1982.
145. This proposition makes sense of the tendencies within the co-opted Georgian Orthodox church to sympathize with nationalist currents.

CHAPTER 2

1. Gustav A. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, trans. Peter Heath (New York and London: Praeger, 1963), p. 23.
2. This is the second definition of religion given by *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, 2d ed.

3. R. R. Palmer and Joel Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 309.
4. The shoemaker should not go beyond his last. Two other versions of this proverb are also known: *ne sutor ultra crepidam* and *ne supra crepidam sutor iudicaret*.
5. *Gleichschaltung* was a "process . . . accomplished step by step in the first months after the National Socialist seizure of power. The assumption of the office of Chancellor by the Führer of the movement formed the basis for this development. . . . By this system of union [of party and state functionaries] . . . the unity of party and state was achieved." Ernst R. Huber, *Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich*, as quoted in Carl Cohen, ed., *Communism, Fascism, Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 403–4.
6. For the early history of the Slavs, see Francis Dvornik, *The Slavs in European History and Civilization* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962).
7. After Simeon's death the First Bulgarian Empire collapsed and the patriarch of Constantinople reasserted his supremacy over the Bulgarian dioceses.
8. It is not quite clear what title Saint Sava assumed, archbishop or patriarch, but he was considered the head of a national church. When the Nemanja state fell apart, the patriarch of Constantinople again assumed supremacy over the Serb Christians. The See of Peć was closed after the Ottoman conquest but was reestablished in 1557 due to the intervention of the famous Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokollu (1564–79), who had not forgotten his Serb origins. It was Archbishop Arsenije III Carnojević who, in 1690, moved from Peć to S. Karlovci, where this archbishopric continued to be the center of Serb ecclesiastic and cultural life.
9. Mehmed II first ruled when his father retired, gave up the throne when his father resumed the rule, and ascended the throne again when he died. On his reforms the best short study is Halil Inalcik, "Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time," *Speculum* 26 (1960), pp. 408–27.
10. The policy of Muslim toleration in dealing with Christians and Jews is based on Muhammed's dictum found in verse 62 of Sura 2 of the Koran.
11. On the *millet* system see H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), chap. 14 (vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 207–61).
12. A short summary of the position of the Orthodox church in the Ottoman Empire can be found in Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Church* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), pp. 96–111. The authoritative work on the subject is Stephen Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
13. The Serb patriarchate in Peć was reestablished by the Ottomans in 1557, but moved to S. Karlovci under Habsburg rule in 1690. The Serbs, therefore, considered the archbishop of Beograd as the head of their church after 1815. The Bulgarian exarchate was established as a result of heavy Russian pressure in Istanbul in 1870, eight years before the reemergence of an independent Bulgarian state.
14. The most famous "nationalist" churchman is Father Paisii of Khilendar (1722–98), who finished his *Slavo-Bulgarian History* in 1762. Bulgarians consider him the father of their renaissance, but the direct influence of this work, handwritten at the Zograf Monastery on Mount Athos, is questionable. While those Bulgarian

- clergymen who became nationalists used his work in their sermons, modern Bulgarian scholarship credits the hajduk movement with the establishment of an effective, strong, modern nationalist movement. See Velcho Velchev, *Paissi of Hilendar, Father of the Bulgarian Enlightenment* (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1981), for a recent but old-fashioned evaluation of Paisii; and Bistra Cvetkova, *Hajdutstvoto v B'lgarskite Zemi pred 15/18 vek* [The Hajduks in the Bulgarian Lands in the 15–18th Centuries] (Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo, 1971), for the newer view of the origins of Bulgarian nationalism.
15. For the origin of Moldavia and Wallachia see, among others, R. W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Rumanians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), chap. 2; and Andrei Otețea, ed., *The History of the Romanian People* (New York: Twayne, 1970), pp. 163–80.
 16. For events in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Transylvania, see the following two works of Keith Hitchins: *The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780–1849* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969) and *Orthodoxy and Nationality: Andreiu Șaguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846–1873*, Harvard Historical Studies, vol. 94 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).
 17. For example, for the crucial decade in Polish history preceding the First Partition, the role of the episcopate in politics is well presented by Diane B. Bailey, "The Politics of the Roman Catholic Episcopate in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1762–1772" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1977).
 18. The best single-volume treatment of the history of partitioned Poland is Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918*, vol. 7 of *A History of East Central Europe*, ed. Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974).
 19. The Illyrian movement dates from the activities of Ljudevit Gaj (1809–1872). For this and the Yugoslav movement in general, see Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Mirjana Gross, "Social Structure and National Movements among the Yugoslav Peoples on the Eve of the First World War," *Slavic Review* 37, no. 4 (December 1977), pp. 628–43. Also useful is Ivo J. Lederer, "Nationalism and the Yugoslavs," in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, ed. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 396–438.
 20. The most important anti-Habsburg military actions originating in Transylvania were those led by István (Stephen) Bocskay (1604–6), Gábor (Gabriel) Bethlen (1618–22), and Ferenc (Francis) II Rákóczi (1704–11).
 21. The best work on the Hussite-Taborite movement is Howard Kaminsky, *A History of the Hussite Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). For a good short summary, see R. W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Czechs and Slovaks* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1943; reprint, 1965), pp. 56–75.
 22. For the history of conversion to Islam in the Balkans, see Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), pp. 50–55.

23. On Muslim politics under Austro-Hungarian rule, see Robert J. Donia, *Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1878–1914* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1981).

CHAPTER 3

1. Chapter 1 of this volume.
2. See Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Norman Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1979); Jeremy Cohen, *The Friars and the Jews* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982); and Malcom Hay, *The Foot of Pride* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950).
3. *Iskra*, no. 51 (October 22, 1903).
4. See his *Critical Remarks on the National Question* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951).
5. "Di anti-religieze kampanie," *Emes*, October 18, 1922.
6. See Zvi Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), chap. 5.
7. For details, see Zvi Gitelman, *A Century of Ambivalence: Jews in Russia and the Soviet Union* (New York: Schocken, 1988), chap. 3.
8. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967).
9. For details, see Bernard Weinryb, "Poland," in *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites*, ed. Peter Meyer, Bernard Weinryb, Eugene Duschinsky, and Nicolas Sylvain (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1953).
10. Eugene Duschinsky, "Hungary," in *Jews in the Soviet Satellites*, ed. Meyer et al., p. 440.
11. Nicolas Sylvain, "Rumania," in *Jews in the Soviet Satellites*, ed. Meyer et al., pp. 527ff.
12. The memoirs of one of the most important secular Jewish leaders, the veteran Polish communist Hirsh Smolar, have been published as *Oif der letzter pozitsie, mit der letzter hofenung* (Tel Aviv: Y. L. Peretz, 1982).
13. According to a former deputy chief of the Romanian intelligence services, Israel paid a "basic price" of \$2,500 in cash for each person allowed to go to Israel. "Rumanian Recalls Deal for Emigres," *New York Times*, October 14, 1987.
14. Personal interview, Bucharest, March 1985.
15. Several years ago an exhibit of artifacts from the State Jewish Museum in Prague toured England and the United States under the title "The Precious Legacy."

CHAPTER 4

The original incarnation of this chapter was "A Comparative Enquiry into Neo-Slavophilism and Its Antecedents in the Russian History of Ideas," *Soviet Studies*

- 31, no. 3 (1979). Reprinted here with the kind permission of *Soviet Studies*. The author wishes to thank the Summer Russian Workshop of the University of Illinois, the Inter-University Centre for European Studies (Montreal), the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Harvard Russian Research Center for research support at the time this essay was being revised for the first edition of this book. The author wishes to thank the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Western Ontario for a small grant, permitting research at the University of Toronto library, in connection with updating for the present edition.
1. Peter Christoff, *The Third Heart* (Paris: Mouton, 1970), pp. 27–28.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 46; and Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 64–67, 69–75.
 3. Christoff, *Third Heart*, p. 53.
 4. "Vserossiiskii sotsial-khristianskii soiuz osvobozhdeniia naroda," *Posev*, no. 1 (January 1971), p. 38.
 5. John Dunlop, *The New Russian Revolutionaries* (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland, 1976), pp. 243–93.
 6. Mikhail Antonov, "Uchenie slavianofilov—vysshyi vzlet narodnogo samosoznaniia v Rossii v doleninskii period," *Veche*, January 19, May 19, and September 19, 1971, in *Radio Liberty, Arkhiv samizdata*, AS 1013, pp. 16–35; AS 1020, pp. 4–27; AS 1108, pp. 5–49. On "A Nation Speaks," see my "The Resurgence of Russian Nationalism in *Samizdat*," *Survey*, no. 1 (Winter 1973), pp. 59–63.
 7. Oral testimony of former vskhson members' acquaintances.
 8. "Na seminare literaturnykh kritikov" [at the Moscow Central House of Writers], *Politicheskii Drevnik* (Amsterdam) 1 (1972), pp. 502–8. Also V. Pavlov, "Spory o slavianofil'stve i russkom patriotizme," *Grani*, no. 82 (1971), pp. 183–211.
 9. Semen Frank, "De Profundis," *Iz glubiny* (illegal Moscow pub., 1921; reprint, Paris: YMCA Press, 1967), pp. 328–30. Also "Na seminare kritikov," pp. 502–6.
 10. Frank, "De Profundis," pp. 324–26.
 11. Christoff, *Third Heart*, pp. 106–7; Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, pp. 198–99 and *passim*.
 12. Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov (Moscow, 1912), p. 2; see also pp. 110–20 and 138–43.
 13. The organic connection is depicted excellently in Donald Treadgold, *The West in Russia and China*, vol. 1 of *Russia 1472–1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. xix–xxi. According to Andrei Siniavsky, the communist ideal is the loftiest achievement of the secularized human mind, hence its bloody catastrophe. "Chto takoe sotsialisticheskii realizm," *Fantasticheskii mir Abrama Tertza* (Inter-Language Literary Associates, 1967), p. 405 and *passim*.
 14. *Veche*, no. 8, AS 1665, pp. 37–39.
 15. Berdiaev, *Khomiakov*, p. 4.
 16. Vladimir Solov'ev reproached Khomiakov for juxtaposing "ideal Orthodoxy with the real Roman Catholicism"; see Berdiaev, *Khomiakov*.
 17. Fr. Dimitry Dudko, "Kreshchenie na Rusi," *Vestnik RSKhD*, no. 117 (1976), pp. 188–208. Also, Siniavin on the Leningrad movement, *Posev*, no. 3 (March 1977), pp. 9–14.

18. Fr. Sergii Zheludkov, *Pochemu i ya khristianin* (Frankfurt/M.: Possev, 1973), passim.
19. Dudko, "Kreshchenie na Rusi," passim.
20. I. Denisov, "Slovo otstupnikov," *Vestnik RSKhD*, no. 99 (1971), pp. 112–13. On Moscow Orthodox religiophilosophical discussion circles of young intellectuals and their persecution, see "Delo Argentova," *Vestnik RSKhD*, no. 119 (1976), pp. 281–308. Fr. Dudko held unofficial religious discussions with his parishoners at his home on Sundays. Bienshtock, a former participant in Moscow religious circles, converted to Orthodoxy from Pentecostalism on his arrival in the United States. In his report at a Russian Students Christian Movement retreat (Sea Cliff, N.Y., April 15, 1977) he provided information on interconfessional and intercity *agape* meetings.
21. Valerii Leviatov, "Kak ia prishol k Bogu," *Grani*, nos. 111–12 (1979), pp. 324–29; Zoia Krakhmal'nikova, "Vozvrashchenie bludnogo syna," *Nadezhda. Khristianskoe chtenie* (Samizdat, no. 2; reprint, Frankfurt/M.: Possev, 1979), pp. 386–436; oral testimony to this author by Tat'iana Goricheva, Frankfurt/M., September 1980, one of the founders of the Leningrad religiophilosophic seminar and of the Christian feminist *Maria* movement, a professional philosopher who returned to Orthodox Christianity at twenty-six years of age. She was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1980. See also her *Talking about God Is Dangerous* (London: scm Press, 1986).
22. Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, p. 578.
23. Dimitry Pospelovskiy, "Vol'nye mysli o sbornike *Iz-pod glyb*," *Grani*, no. 97 (1975), pp. 174–222 and passim.
24. Glimpses of the idea of some union of the Orthodox rather than the purely Slavic nations appear occasionally in Khomiakov. It replaced the concept of a united Slavdom in L. Leont'ev and in 1920 was adopted by the émigré movement of the Eurasians. See also Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, p. 520.
25. "O novykh nachalakh filosofii," in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii I. Kireevskogo* 1, ed. M. Gershenzon (Moscow, 1911), p. 209.
26. For Berdiaev's critique of Khomiakov's collectivism, see *Khomiakov*, p. 200. Also Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, pp. 198–99.
27. Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, p. 577.
28. Ibid.
29. Berdiaev, *Khomiakov*, p. 28.
30. E.g., passages on patriarchal ruralism in Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 32–54.
31. "Does Russia Have a Future?" in *From under the Rubble*, ed. A. Solzhenitsyn (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), pp. 280–95.
32. Vladimir Osipov, "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu zhurnala *Vestnik RSKhD*," *Vestnik RSKhD*, no. 106 (1972), pp. 294–95. Also, Melik Agursky, "Mezhdunarodnoe znachenie Pis'ma k vozhdyam," *Vestnik RSKhD*, nos. 112–13 (1974), pp. 218–21.
33. Comparing a drunken bout of Soviet fishermen at Easter with the way the Christ's Resurrection had been celebrated in his youth, Astafiev exclaims: "What has happened to us? Who has thrown us into the abyss of evil and misfortune? Who has extinguished the light of virtue in our souls . . . the icon-lamp of our conscious-

- ness. . . . The present light leads us only to a fiery Hell. . . . To whom should we address our prayers asking for forgiveness? Didn't we once possess . . . the ability to forgive, even to forgive our enemies?" In another story he calls "for rain of molten lead . . . to pour on the modern desecrators of churches, the blasphemers, haters of mankind, persecutors of pure morals and culture." *Nash sovremennik*, no. 5 (May 1986), pp. 118, 133.
34. "Beseda chlenov sp sssr s M. S. Gorbachevym" (Moscow, samizdat 19.6, 1986, AS 5785). Compare with the report on that meeting in *Pravda*, June 21, 1986, which talks only in general terms of Gorbachev's stress on the importance of a multi-faceted and revolutionary *perestroika*.
 35. Leonid Borodin, "O russkoi intelligentsii," *Grani*, no. 96 (1975), pp. 248–49.
 36. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Dve press-konferentsii* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1975), pp. 59–87.
 37. See my "Vol'nye mysli," as well as the two above-mentioned symposia: *Vekhi* and *Iz glubiny*.
 38. Berdiaev, *Khomiakov*, pp. 32, 53; Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, p. 249; Stephen Lukashovich, *Ivan Aksakov: A Reluctant Slavophile* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 29.
 39. It was in this context that Berdiaev and other *Vekhi* authors said that the atheistic and agnostic Russian intelligentsia was on "a different wave length" from the rest of the nation, was incomprehensible to the nation, and was leading it toward the abyss.
 40. This attitude toward the economic problems was stressed to this author by both officials and regular members of Solidarity in Poland in the summer of 1981. There are many other similarities between the Solidarity and the Russian soil-bound and neo-Slavophile orientations. Dmitry Likhachev, a leading scholar of Russian culture, a practicing Orthodox Christian, the president of the state-supported Culture Fund, and generally recognized as a moral leader in Russia today, summed up succinctly the general tenor of the contemporary reform-oriented intelligentsia and scholars in the Soviet Union when he stated: "Without a change in the climate of our culture, our economy will not be able to move a single step ahead." "Trevogi sovesti," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, January 8, 1987, p. 11.
 41. See n. 30 above. This author has recently encountered Soviet reformist intellectuals with access to very high establishment circles who maintained that the current *perestroika* is the first step in the realization of Solzhenitsyn's program: a gradual transformation of ideocratic totalitarianism into pragmatic authoritarianism. Whether they are right is one issue, but the most important point is that this opinion (without being called for by me) indicates that in these important circles Solzhenitsyn's *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* has not been forgotten and is being used as a measuring stick of the actual Soviet reforms.
 42. Strictly speaking, both wings are heathen, because even the "pro-Christians" see the church as an ideological tool, not as the Mystical Body of Christ.
 43. See Dmitry Pospelovsky, "Nationalism as a Factor of Dissent in the Soviet Union," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 2, no. 1 (1974), pp. 100–106; Ivan Samolvin, "A Letter to Solzhenitsyn," in *The Political and Religious Thought of*

- Russian "Samizdat"—An Anthology*, ed. Michael Meerson-Aksenov and Boris Shragin (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland, 1977), pp. 420–37.
44. E.g., Iurii Loshchits, "Vzyskuiushchaia pravdu"; Apollon Kuz'min, "Pisatel' i istoriia"; Vladimir Shubkin, "Neopalimaia kupina"—all in *Nash sovremennik*, no. 1 (1981), pp. 163–69; no. 4 (1981), pp. 148–65; no. 12 (1981), pp. 176–88, respectively. This was the same year that Vladimir Soloukhin's famous "Kameshki na ladoni" appeared in the same journal (no. 3). Subsequent attacks in *Kommunist* on Soloukhin and the whole trend of apologia for the church forced the journal to discontinue the most outspoken publications of this kind until 1986.
 45. See Dimitry Pospelovskiy, *Soviet Studies on the Church and the Believer's Response to Atheism* (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 50; and Likhachev's article in *Srednevekovaiia Rus'* (Moscow), 1976 (unavailable to this author for the exact page reference at the time of this writing).
 46. Pospelovskiy, *Soviet Studies*, pp. 50–51; particularly Z. Tazhurazina, "Lad'ia na gorodskom gerbe," *Nauka i religiia*, no. 9 (1982), p. 23; also N. S. Gordienko, "Kreshchenie Rusi": *Fakty protiv legend i mifov* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1984), particularly pp. 34–52.
 47. P. I. Ivanov (?), "Pis'mo sviashchenniku Alexandru Meniu," *Mnogaia leta*, no. 1 (1980), samizdat ms., pp. 217–28; G. M. Shimanov, "Lie Abramson," *Mn. leta*, no. 2 (1981), samizdat ms., pp. 131–63; Shimanov, *Protiv techeniia* (Keston College Samizdat Archives; Moscow, samizdat, 1975), passim.
 48. V. P. (Moscow), "Zashchita russkoi kul'tury ili bor'ba s 'zhido-masonami'?" *Russkaia mysl'*, May 15, 1987, p. 5; E. Losoto, "V bespamiatstve," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, May 22, 1987, p. 4; Zeev Vol'fon, "Kto unichtozhil tserkvi v Rossii?" *Russkaia mysl'*, September 4, 1987, p. 13; oral unofficial information to this author from an informed Soviet citizen. Vol'fon, a Zionist now living in Israel, was the author of a samizdat photo album on the destroyed churches in Moscow and its vicinity, dedicated to Solzhenitsyn's sixtieth birthday. In the article he describes how during the preparation of the album he tried to enlist the assistance of the professional photographer Dimitri Vasiliev, now one of the leaders of *Pamiat'*. Vasiliev refused, claiming his interests were academic, not factual-topical. Neither did he get any help from the "great patriot," Il'ia Glazunov. Now, attacking Jews and Zionists, Vasiliev quotes from Vol'fon's text in that album. See *Al'bom razrushennykh i oskvernennykh khramov* (Frankfurt/M.: Possev, 1980).
 49. "Vypiska iz vystupleniia t. Yeltsyna B. N. 11 apreliia s.g. pered propagandistami Moskvyy," *Russkaia mysl'*, July 25, 1986, pp. 4–5. A few weeks earlier a shorter version of this speech (circulating in samizdat alone) appeared in French translation in *Le Monde* (Paris).
 50. The Soviet journalist Losoto (n. 48 above) says that for the *Pamiat'* people "the fatherland is Orthodoxy, . . . not socialism" and they request "the reopening of churches with the chiming of bells, now."
 51. Iu. Kaz'min, "Men'she slov, bol'she dela," *Pravda*, August 11, 1987. What was unprecedented was that the article reported that Yeltsyn's "central report" of the day "was interrupted in according with the wishes of the conference participants. A

- sharp and businesslike criticism followed. The speech was concluded only after those who had wanted to speak spoke up."
52. Aleksandr Ginzburg, "Davai' otpor kar'eristam i pravozashchitnikam" (a summary of material from the Moscow *Express-khronika* and other neosamizdat periodicals), *Russkaia mysl'*, no. 3701 (November 27, 1987), pp. 1–2.
 53. Report in *Ogoniok*, no. 27 (July 4–11, 1987), p. 1. On Iakovlev's "fame" as an enemy of the Russian orientation, see the main text and notes 64 and 68 below. Gorbachev's attacks on Yeltsyn were reported widely both in the Soviet press and in the Western media in November 1987. See also Gorbachev's NBC interview, November 30, 1987.
 54. "Kto dolzhen pokayat'sia?" *Zemlia*, no. 2 (November 25, 1974); *Vol'noe slovo*, no. 20 (1975), pp. 30–31.
 55. V. Borisov, "Personality and National Awareness," in *From under the Rubble*, ed. Solzhenitsyn, pp. 202–28.
 56. For a more detailed study of National-Bolshevism from the early days of Soviets in power, see M. Agursky, *Ideologiya Natsional-bol'shevizma* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1980). Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1978), sees National Bolshevism as a simple repetition of Pan-Slavism and envisages a similar degeneration of neo-Slavophilism into an imperialistic pro-regime doctrine. What he fails to recognize is that Slavophilism had fundamental common ground with the tsarist government of the nineteenth century, such as the reforms of Alexander II, Orthodoxy, faith in monarchy, promotion of the national culture, and traditions and history, although their interpretations of these differed from that of the official policies. No such common ground exists between the Soviet state and the soil-bound and/or neo-Slavophile currents.
 57. Such interrogations are a regular feature in the lives of priests in the USSR, according to the oral testimony to this author by Fr. Konstantin Tivetsky (San Francisco, June 1980), a 1980 émigré from Moscow, where he had served as priest for over twenty-five years. Testimony on Dudko's reactions to KGB "conversations" prior to his arrest was by Valentina Lass (Boston, June 1980), a close friend of the Dudko family who had emigrated in early 1980. See also Nikita Struve, "Chto sluchilos' s.o. Dimitriem Dudko?" *Vestnik RSKhD*, no. 132 (1980), pp. 230–32.
 58. For example, Richard Pipes, Robert C. Tucker, and Stephen F. Cohen.
 59. See my "Nationalism as a Factor of Dissent"; and my "Resurgence of Russian Nationalism."
 60. Osipov, "Russkii khudozhnik Il'ia Glazunov," *Veche*, no. 9 (1973), AS 1665.
 61. *Vestnik RSKhD*, nos. 91–92 (1969), pp. 51–52. See also Pavlov (n. 8 above), pp. 183–211. On the whole, the cruder, more inaccurate, and more chauvinistic articles on the subject appeared in *Molodaia gvardiia*; the more sophisticated ones, in *Voprosy literatury*.
 62. Unsigned editorial, *Kommunist*, no. 17 (1970), pp. 97–99.
 63. At the time L. Rebel, a French journalist, argued that the Russian Nikonov's removal from the *Molodaia gvardiia* editorship was ideologically more significant than that of Tvardovsky from *Novy mir* (*Nouvelle critique*, no. 53 [1972]). *Veche* agreed. Only

- whereas Rebel was jubilant over this victory over Russian "chauvinism," *Veche* lamented this as suppression of Russian patriotic revival (no. 6, AS 1599, p. 123).
64. "Protiv antiistorizma," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, November 15, 1972.
 65. Mikhail Kheifets, "Russkii patriot Vladimir Osipov," *Kontinent*, no. 28 (1981), pp. 140–70. What must have raised KGB hopes that Osipov would play the role were his erroneous approvals of Stalin's alleged rehabilitation of Russian nationalism. *Ibid.*; and Osipov, "Ploshchad' Maiakovskogo, stat'ia 70-ia" (Maiakovsky Square, Art. 70), *Grani*, no. 80 (1971), p. 135.
 66. Kheifets, "Osipov," pp. 170–71; and n. 48 above.
 67. This view also is shared by Agursky, who was subjected to KGB interrogations in connection with the Osipov case. Agursky's oral testimony to this author, Stanford University, April 1983.
 68. Peter Reddaway, "The Development of Dissent and Opposition," *The Soviet Union since the Fall of Khrushchev*, ed. Archie Brown and Michael Kaser (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 145. Another illustration of a strong anti-Russite line was the case of the brutal beating by KGB thugs of academician Dimitry Likhachev, a leading Russian medievalist and one of the founding members of the Society for the Preservation of Historical Monuments. He also provided Solzhenitsyn with firsthand information on the Solovki concentration camps. See *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii*, no. 41 (August 3, 1976), p. 68.
 69. Kharchev's U.S. statement in *Keston News Service*, no. 283 (September 10, 1987), pp. 23–24. For Gorbachev's ambiguity on reforms see above, n. 53. The main change is in relation to the party. Whereas in the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee plenum he spoke about the necessity of democratization within the party and replacement of appointments by true and secret elections from several candidates to administrative positions (this passage did not appear in the Soviet press, only in a TASS report distributed to foreign press agencies), now he has ceased to speak of any reforms within the party, let alone on any curbing of its privileges and monopoly.
 70. Churchill and Roosevelt are seen in Eastern Europe and the USSR as the great villains of Yalta responsible for the postwar crucifixion of Eastern Europe and for the mass repatriation of Soviet citizens by force from the West.
 71. *Posev*, no. 8 (1977), pp. 54–57.
 72. See also M. Nazarov, "Stavte voprosy konkretnee" ("Ask More Concrete Questions"), *Posev*, no. 10 (1978), pp. 9–11; and Fr. Dudko's praise for Glazunov in *Russkaia mysl'/La pensée russe* (a Paris Russian weekly), August 24, 1978. In Struve's view, Dudko's praise for Glazunov is a landmark in his National Bolshevik temptation: "Glazunov . . . is a vicious phenomenon. It is impossible to paint saints and portraits of Brezhnev at the same time, like it is impossible to serve two masters simultaneously." See *Vestnik RSKhD*, no. 132, p. 232.
 73. As far as the moderate nationalists-*pochvenniki* are concerned, it is significant that their top authority and spiritual leader Likhachev has become the top spokesman on morals and history of culture in the Soviet media; the leading ruralist writers have been "elected" to the governing bodies of the Soviet Union of Writers in 1986. The more opportunistic nationalist Glazunov has had more personal exhibitions of

his art both inside the USSR and abroad since Gorbachev came to power than ever before. On the *Pamiat'* Losoto significantly writes: "because of certain reasons . . . the Lenin District Party Committee of Moscow was *forced* [emphasis mine] to provide its hall to the *Pamiat'* meeting." Numerous speakers at the May 1987 plenum of the Soviet Union of Writers board, both non-Russians and Russians, spoke up in favor of local republican patriotisms and the right of their expression, favoring the spread of all levels of education in the republican languages, making their mastery obligatory for Russians living in the non-Russian republics. See "Sovremennost' i literatura," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, May 6, 1987, pp. 2–11, particularly the speeches of Nil Gilevich (Belorussian), Borys Oleinyk (Ukrainian), Viktor Rozov (Russian/Jewish), Ulmas Umarbekov (Uzbek), Stanislav Kuniaev (Russian), Iurii Bondarev (Russian). Kuniaev condemned all attempts at Russification using precisely that term. See also Janis Peters (chairman of the Latvian Union of Writers), "Edinstvo ravnykh," *Pravda*, September 16, 1987; and the relatively tolerant reports on the August 23 (1987) public demonstrations of protest against the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and the subsequent Soviet occupation of the Baltic republics in Riga, Tallin, and Vilnius. E.g.: O. Meshkov, G. Ovcharenko, and D. Shniukas, "S chuzhogo golosa," *Pravda*, September 1, 1987, pp. 3, 6.

74. I. Glazunov, "Poisk cherez traditsiiu," *Pravda*, September 27, 1987. The editors of *Moscow News* at their meeting with Moscow writers characterized *Pamiat'* as a result "of the extremely high price the Russians have had to pay for internationalism," and said that there were all sorts of tendencies in it, including clear anti-Semitism. The attempt of *Pamiat'* to incorporate a Leningrad patriotic, nonformal group, "Society for the Salvation of Leningrad," met with the latter's refusal. "Vstrecha redkollegii i avtorov gazety 'Moskovskie novosti' s moskovskimi pisateliami" (June 10, 1987), *Russkaia mysl'*, September 4, 1987, pp. 6–8.
75. Zoia Krakhmal'nikova, "Vozvrashchenie bludnogo syna," *Nadezhda*, no. 4 (1980), pp. 347–48.
76. O. Altaev's key article from this symposium appeared in English translation in *Survey*, no. 1 (Winter 1973), pp. 92–122.
77. See "Bor'ba s t.n. rusofil'stvom . . .," *Veche*, no. 7 (*Vol'noe slovo*, no. 17), pp. 19–51; Osipov, "Piat'vozrazhenii Sakharovu," April 1974, AS 1696; and "General Skobelev kak polkovodets i gosudarstvennyi deiatel'," *Veche*, nos. 2–4 (AS 1020, 1108, 1140). Here the great general is praised for his condemnation of the partition of Poland and for his vision of a strictly voluntary confederation of the Slavic nations with autonomy of each constituent state. See *Vol'noe slovo*, no. 4 (1972), pp. 64–65.
78. P. Derzhavin, "Zametki o natsional'nom vozrozhdenii," *Vestnik RSKhD*, no. 106 (1972), pp. 261–62.
79. Borodin, "O russkoi." His former coprisoner Anatoli Radygin told this author that this conception, only implied in the cited article, is in fact his *profession de foi*. Borodin was one of the most influential members of vskhsn. See Dunlop, *New Russian Revolutionaries*, pp. 39–40.
80. See n. 32 above and Agursky's "Otkrytoe pis'mo v zhurnal *Veche*" (Moscow, 1973, AS 1481).

81. See n. 32 above.
82. N. V., "Otryvki iz dnevnika," *Veche*, no. 4 (January, 1972), AS 1140, p. 43. "N. V." may be one of Osipov's own pseudonyms.
83. Many grievances to this effect are found in *Veche*. *A Nation Speaks* stresses that because Moscow is simultaneously a capital of Russia and the USSR, even the Russian republican offices are not free from non-Russians, with the Ukrainians in particular dominating. Belov, "Spasut li Kaspii Vozhe i Lacha?" *Russkaia mysl'*, July 15, 1982, pp. 10–11. For further development of the same theme defending Russian national culture through ecology and condemning plans to divert northern Russian rivers southward, allegedly to irrigate Central Asia, see Likhachev and V. Ianin, "Russkii sever kak pamiatnik otechestvennoi i mirovoi kul'tury," *Kommunist*, no. 1 (January 1986), pp. 115–19. Oleinyk (n. 73 above) adds to the Russian grievances the fact that of all Soviet republics only the Russian one lacks its own national academy of sciences. These protests succeeded in procuring a government decision to scrap the project in 1986.
84. E.g., "Rol' N. Ia. Danilevskogo v mirovoi istoriosofii." *Veche*, no. 5, AS 1230, pp. 5–32; Mikhail Ruzhenkov, "Passionarnaia teoriia L. N. Gumileva," *Veche*, no. 8 (*Vol'noe slovo*, no. 17), pp. 92–96; A. Vaniagin, "Rozhdenie nauki," *ibid.*, pp. 96–119. See also Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, pp. 4, 520–21.
85. *Zemlia*, no. 1 (August 1974).
86. "Religiia v SSSR" (Moscow, samizdat, November 20, 1981) in *Russkaia mysl'*, December 24, 1981, p. 7.
87. No other publication in the USSR, official or unofficial, has given as much space and attention to the study, presentation, analysis, and revision of the Slavophile and similar patterns of thought as did *Veche* and *Zemlia*.
88. Osipov on the liquidation of *Veche*, AS 1725 (March 7, 1974); the anti-Osipov's group statement of *Veche*'s liquidation after having issued only its no. 10, AS 1792 (July 9, 1974).
89. Paramonov's written and oral testimony to this author, April 1978.
90. Oral testimonies by former members of this seminar: Tat'iana Goricheva, Frankfurt/M., September 1980; Vadim Filimonov, Vienna, January 29, 1979; Lev Rutkevich, Vienna, January–February 1979. Their periodicals included *Chasy*, *Khudozhestvennyi arkhiv*, and 37. See *Posev*, no. 3 (March 1977), pp. 9–11; *Vestnik RSKhD*, no. 123 (1977), pp. 70–174.
91. *Zhenshchina i Rossiia*, no. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1979), reprinted in *Vol'noe slovo*, no. 38 (1980), pp. 3–34. The full text of the journal includes some poetry clearly inspired by Indian occult traditions (Hindu, Buddhist). According to most Christian neophytes from the ranks of Soviet Russian intelligentsia, Oriental occult is a typical transition period from materialism and/or nihilism to Christianity. It also was no coincidence that Hinduism was among the subjects studied in the initial stages of the Leningrad seminar.
92. *Maria*, no. 1 (Leningrad and Frankfurt/M., 1981).
93. Igor' Siniavin, "Iuliia Voznesenskaia v edinoborstve s KGB," *Posev*, no. 3 (March 1977), pp. 12–14; and "Novye prigovory," *Posev*, no. 7 (July 1977), p. 15.

94. "Khristianskii seminar," *Vol'noe slovo*, no. 39 (1980), especially pp. 70–77; and *Vestnik RSKhD*, no. 127 (1978), pp. 248–51.
95. "Khristianskii seminar," pp. 108–16.
96. "O seminarakh A. Ogorodnikova," *Posev*, no. 2 (February 1979), pp. 5–6; and "Khristianskii seminar," pp. 3–12, where a joint conference of the Moscow Seminar with the Leningrad one in February 1979 with the aim of coordinating their activities also is mentioned.
97. "Iz zapisi suda nad Vladimiron Poreshem" ("From a Transcript of the Poresch Trial"), *Vol'noe slovo*, no. 39 (1980), pp. 87, 99.
98. When Solzhenitsyn writes about an (enlightened) authoritarian system for Russia, he does not do so out of any idealization of authoritarianism but out of the belief that a nation's development evolves only out of its native historical experience, and that democracy is the apex of such gradual progression, a fragile flower that cannot be expected to appear overnight and to survive in a country lacking the necessary traditional institutions and historical experience. See his television interview (CBS, June 17, 1974) cited in A. Solzhenitsyn, *Mir i nasilie* (Frankfurt/M.: Possev, 1974), pp. 89–92.
99. Likhachev and Ianin, "Russkii sever" (n. 83 above); "Im neobkhodimo doverie," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, May 20, 1987. For the decree scrapping the project, see *Pravda*, August 16, 1986. See also R. Vorob'ev, "Porazhenie perebroschikov," *Posev*, no. 10 (1986), pp. 41–44.
100. K. Vol'nyi, *Intelligentsia i Demokraticeskoe dvizhenie SSSR* (USSR, samizdat, 1970), AS 607; also E. Vagin (a leading ex-member of vskhson), "Seminar 'Budushchaia Rossiia'" (Rome, November 15, 1976), *Nasha strana* (Buenos Aires), nos. 1410–12, p. 3, and Denisov, "Slovo otstupnikov," *passim*.
101. See proceedings of the 8th Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, July 2, 1986 (practically the whole issue). See also E. Mirkovich, "Soiuz pisatelei," *Posev*, no. 8 (August 1986), pp. 3–4; R. Redlich, "Po povodu s'ezda sovetskikh pisatelei," *Posev*, no. 9 (September 1986), pp. 41–46; and n. 33 above.
102. A samizdat philosopher, A. Borisov (perhaps this is a misprint, the author being the same Vadim Borisov from Solzhenitsyn's *From under the Rubble?*), develops a theologicophilosophical thesis on the nation. See his "Opyt teleologicheskogo opravdaniia natsii," in *Moskovskii sbornik*, ed. Leonid Borodin (samizdat, 1974), pp. 88–92. Vadim Pigalev, a historian, stresses that the Slavophiles were against Russification and in favor of retention of national cultures and identities of each people. See his "Chto oni ishchut u slavianofilov?" *Nash sovremennik*, no. 10 (October 1986), pp. 157–61. Likhachev distinguishes between nationalism and patriotism in his *Zemetki o russkom* (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1984), pp. 39–44; and again in his article in defense of the "nonformal associations": "Im neobkhodimo doverie," n. 99 above.
103. "Ot pokaiania k deistviu," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, September 9, 1987, p. 2.
104. Aleksandr Nezhnyi, "Russkaia sviatynia," *Moskovskie novosti*, June 7, 1987, p. 16; "Veka istorii i chudo krasoty," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, September 2, 1987, p. 12. Vasil Bykov, a leading Soviet prose writer on war themes and himself a heroic officer

in World War II, declared in an interview that the moral standards by which we live to this day are those of the Ten Commandments: "Pravda zhizni," *Knizhnoe obozrenie*, June 20, 1986, p. 8.

105. E.g., I. Kryvelev, "Koketnichaia s bozhen'koi," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, July 30, 1986, p. 4; Editorial, "Protiv religioznogo durmana," *Pravda vostoka* (Tashkent), September 2, 1986, p. 1; "Vospityvat' ubezhdennykh ateistov," *Pravda*, September 28, 1986, p. 1; "Rech' tov. E. K. Ligacheva na Vsesoiuzom soveshchanii zavduishchikh kafedrami obshchestvennykh nauk," *Pravda*, October 2, 1986, pp. 1-3.
106. Kryvelev took particular exception to Astafiev's prayer for a rain of lead to fall upon the heads of the desecrators of churches and blasphemers (n. 33 above), "in other words, atheists," adds Kryvelev. And another Soviet author (tongue-in-cheek) attacks Kryvelev: "Does this mean that for Kryvelev 'desecration' and 'blasphemy' are synonyms of scientific atheism?" Andrei Nuikin, "Novoe bogoiskatel'stvo i starye dogmy," *Novyi mir*, no. 4 (1987), p. 250.

Felix Kuznetsov, the chairman of the Soviet Union of Writers' Moscow branch, complained of the cultural nihilism of *Komsomol'skaia pravda* at the above 1987 Writers' Board Plenum. It had refused to publish his rebuttal to Kryvelev on the grounds that the prochurch writings of some literary figures were harmful to Soviet society. *Literaturnaia gazeta*, May 6, 1987, p. 2.

107. Among the indirect pointers in this direction may be mentioned an article in the chief academic historical journal dedicated to the fortieth anniversary of the "Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge" (*Znanie*, for short) without once mentioning atheism or antireligious struggle, whereas the main purpose and one of the chief activities of the society ever since its foundation has been struggle against religion. The other indicator is an article on Chernobyl in which the author visits the Kiev St. Vladimir Cathedral and sees the deep worship of a packed congregation which reminds him of the Battle for Stalingrad when he had dropped into a suburban church filled with similarly worshipping Christians. The article also contained what was then the first interview since World War II with a bishop (the metropolitan of Kiev); it was very sympathetic to the church and its positive response to national tragedies. See, respectively, Iu. K. Fishevsky, "Vazhnyi rykhag priobshcheniia trudiashchikhsia k znaniiam," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 (1987), pp. 29-39; Iu. Shcherbak, "Bez domyslov i nedomolvok," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, July 23, 1986.
108. N. 73 above (Oleinyk's speech on p. 2); see also K. Markarian, "Po chuzhomu stsenariiu," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, August 26, 1987, p. 4. On November 18, 1987, there was the third wave of nationalist demonstrations in Latvia, on the occasion of the sixty-ninth anniversary of Latvia's independence. This time there were numerous police brutalities and arrests of probably several hundred demonstrators (who, apparently, were all later released). But the fact is that the demonstrators openly called for the restoration of full independence to Latvia. This is something that the Soviet regime would never tolerate.

Even then, on the eve of the demonstrations the leader of the Riga Human Rights unofficial organization was invited by the Soviet Novosti Press Agency to address an international press conference defending the right of Latvia to full sovereignty, and

subsequent issues of *Moscow News* and *Literaturnaia gazeta* criticized the police brutalities of November 18. This is all unprecedented. See Ginzburg, "Davat' otpor kar'eristam."

CHAPTER 5

1. For the best accounts of the activity of Lithuanian Catholics in the postwar period, see V. Stanley Vardys, *The Catholic Church, Dissent, and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1978); and V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuania's Catholic Movement Reappraised," *Survey* 25, no. 3 (Summer 1980), pp. 49–73.
2. For example, the recommendations of a theoretical-practical conference on "The Practice of Ideological Work and Methods of Improving It," sponsored by the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist party and held in March 1974, asserted: "The Church portrays itself as the true guardian of the cultural heritage of the past, of national traditions and customs. It frequently identifies religious traditions with national ones and portrays itself as a defender of national interests." *Ideologinio darbo praktika ir jos tobulinimas* (Vilnius, 1974), p. 337.
3. Some more independent philosophers have claimed that the continued existence of religion must be due to still-existent conditions in society itself. See Jokūbas Minkevičius, "Istorinis religijos likimas," in *Religijotyros įvadas*, ed. A. Rybelis (Vilnius, 1981), p. 165. Jonas Repšys argued for an even more radical position, suggesting that the continued existence of religion is to be explained by imperfections in the structure of Soviet society itself. Jonas Repšys, "Marksizmas, ateizmas, žmogus," *Problemos* 1, no. 2 (1968), pp. 20–22.
4. A statement to this effect was made by Antanas Sniečkus, then the first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist party, at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1971. See *Lietuvos Komunistų partijos XVI suvažiavimas* (Vilnius, 1971), p. 50. The current first secretary, Petras Griškevičius, made a similar claim at the eighteenth congress. *Tiesa*, January 30, 1981.
5. Genrikas Zimanas, *Per suklestėjimą į vienybę* (Vilnius, 1971), p. 310.
6. One could say that nationalists believe some of their activities to be protected by rights similar to those Robert Nozick attributes to individuals. According to Nozick, rights should be considered inviolable side-constraints on morally permissible actions that cannot be overridden on utilitarian or consequentialist grounds. A person with a right is free to act on it even if the consequences of the action are not maximally beneficial to all affected by it. Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 25–36.
7. Such a claim seems to have been implied by the Catholic dissident Vytautas Skuodis in his trial, described in the samizdat publication *Perspektyvos*, no. 22 (1981).
8. Although *Perspektyvos* published many articles of a socialist orientation, the Catholic Skuodis seems to have had a leading role in publishing and editing the journal. It should be noted that if only a very limited number of beliefs can be classified as expressing "a Catholic point of view," then their presence or absence in a particu-

- lar samizdat journal or article does not provide sufficient inferential grounds for asserting or denying that the author is or is not a Catholic in the sense of being a member of the church.
9. This kind of radical claim can be found in the samizdat journal *Aušra*, no. 23 (July 1980).
 10. *Aušra*, no. 8 (October 1977).
 11. The period 1890–1945 is the only one in recent history during which Lithuanians had different political and ideological outlooks as well as the opportunity and ability to express them. The term “anticlericals” is awkward but will have to do for want of a more felicitous expression. The anticlericals included most atheists and socialists but also a number of practicing Catholics who opposed what they construed to be the church’s desire to dominate Lithuania’s social and political life.
 12. The Soviet agent Juozas Markulis, who infiltrated the upper echelons of the resistance movement, insinuated to the partisans that the Catholics in their ranks intended to get control of the whole movement and to “clericalize” it. The most complete account of Markulis’s treachery is given by the partisan leader Juozas Lukša in his “MGB pinklės Lietuvos rezistencijoje,” published in the 3d edition of his *Partizanai* (Chicago: Į laisvę fondas, 1984), pp. 462–509.
 13. The party also recognizes this. Thus, Genrikas Zimanas writes, “The Church is the only haven for nationalist ideology, the only legal political organization in our society that supports nationalist ideology.” See Zimanas, *Per suklestėjimą*, p. 327.
 14. The most notable exception is Vytautas Skuodis, an associate professor of geology at the University of Vilnius, sentenced in 1980 for his role in publishing the samizdat journals *Perspektyvos* and *Alma Mater*. The Lithuanian Helsinki Group, which at its founding was clearly a secular organization, played only a secondary role in the development of the Lithuanian opposition movement. Even here Catholics had the most active role.
 15. A concerted atheist drive was begun in Lithuania in February 1963.
 16. The declarations, in which priests of the various dioceses of Lithuania announced their intentions not to comply with the regulations, are published in the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania* (hereinafter *CCCL*), no. 38 (May 1979).
 17. *CCCL*, no. 41 (January 1980). Another petition campaign for the return of the church had garnered 76,000 signatures by January 1987.
 18. *Tass*, July 23, 1987.
 19. *CCCL*, no. 67 (July 1985).
 20. See the classified Soviet document on religion in Lithuania published as a supplement to *CCCL*, no. 66 (April 1985).
 21. *Ibid.*
 22. Ordinary Catholics recognized the contributions of Tamkevičius and Svarinskas. More than 80,000 persons from 134 localities signed petitions calling for their release. Information concerning the protests is in *CCCL*, nos. 58–60.
 23. *CCCL*, no. 51 (March 1982).
 24. For information on the partisan war, see V. Stanley Vardys, “The Partisan Movement in Postwar Lithuania,” in *Lithuania under the Soviets*, ed. V. Stanley Vardys

- (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 85–110. A more detailed account is contained in my *Partizanų kovos Lietuvoje* (Chicago: J. laisvę fondas, 1987).
25. Thomas Remeikis mentions some Soviet statistics in *Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania 1945–1980* (Chicago: Institute for Lithuanian Studies Press, 1980), pp. 39–41.
 26. It is noteworthy that when Lithuania enjoyed its greatest amount of literary freedom, in the 1960s, the partisan war was the favorite topic of prose writers.
 27. In “Trečias, kurio nėra,” published in *Perspektyvos*, no. 20 (1980), Gintautas Iešmantas, an avowed socialist, disputed the Soviet claim that there is no third road between capitulation to Western capitalism and membership in the Soviet Union. He argued that national independence is both possible and desirable. Iešmantas was tried and sentenced in 1980 on the charge of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.
 28. *Alma Mater*, no. 1 (January–March, 1979).
 29. The appeal was printed in *Aušra*, no. 19 (November 1979).
 30. Kęstutis Girmius, “The Draft Recommendations to the Tashkent Conference: A New Wave of Russification?” *Radio Liberty Research*, June 19, 1979.
 31. *Ibid.*
 32. *Aušra*, no. 11 (May 1978).
 33. *Aušra*, no. 12 (August 1978).
 34. *Aušra*, no. 15 (Summer 1979).
 35. Lionginas Šepetys, “Kilni istorijos mokytojų pareiga,” in *Šiuolaikinė ideologinė kova ir istorijos dėstymo uždaviniai mokymo įstaigose*, comp. Liudmila Faturova and Antanas Raupys (Kaunas, 1979), p. 5.
 36. *Aušra*, no. 19 (November 1979).
 37. *Alma Mater*, no. 1 (January–March 1979).
 38. The comparison can be found in *Aušra*, no. 10 (March 1978) and *Aušra*, no. 20 (January 1980). The original account is to be found in the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle, written at the end of the thirteenth century, lines 2225–63. The chronicle is now available in an English translation by Jerry C. Smith and William L. Urban, *The Livonian Rhymed Chronicle* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).
 39. Such complaints are aired in *Aušra*, no. 16 (May 1979) and no. 19 (November 1979), as well as *Alma Mater*, no. 1 (January–March 1979).
 40. The statement of Krasnovas, Geda, and several other writers are published in “Istorinė proza: dabartis ir perspektyvos,” *Pergalė*, no. 2 (February 1987), pp. 101–13. From January to July 1987 hardly an issue of the cultural weekly *Literatūra ir menas* did not contain one or more statements on Lithuanian history or the historical novel, most quite critical.
 41. A summary of the discussion concerning Lithuania’s cultural heritage was published in *Pergalė*, no. 7 (July 1987), pp. 139–58.
 42. Jonas Gečas, “Kada ateis šventė,” in *Švyturys*, no. 21 (November 1987), p. 10.
 43. Romualdas Ozolas, “Neviltingosios tiesos šviesa,” *Literatūra ir menas*, no. 8 (February 21, 1987), p. 2.
 44. *CCCL*, no. 42 (March 1980), and *Aušra*, no. 23 (July 1980).
 45. *Aušra*, no. 19 (November 1979).

46. Marytė Karalienė, "Moterys ir seima Tarybų Lietuvoje," *Komunistas*, no. 2 (February 1985), pp. 63–64.
47. Ann Sheehy, "The Preliminary Census Results of 1979 for the Baltic Republics," *Radio Liberty Research*, June 26, 1979; and Saulius Girnius, "Demographic Changes," *Baltic Situation Report* no. 8, *Radio Free Europe Research*, December 9, 1986.
48. Antanas Merčaitis, "Kas paaiškėjo, kai mus surašė . . .," *Švyturys*, no. 13 (1980), p. 16.
49. *Tautos kelias*, no. 1 (April 1980).
50. *Aušra*, no. 23 (July 1980).
51. The fate of Lithuanian villages in Belorussia has been analyzed extensively in Lithuanian samizdat, including two special publications devoted to this question. One, entitled "Apie lietuvių padėtį Baltarusijos respublikoje" (1978), claims that Lithuanian history is being written now in Belorussia, i.e., what is happening in Belorussia today will happen in Lithuania in the future.
52. Lithuanian samizdat have argued that the standard of living in independent Lithuania was comparable or even superior to that of Soviet Lithuania in 1978. See "Gyrimasis, faktai ir tikrovė," *Tautos kelias*, no. 1 (April 1980).
53. *Tiesa*, April 18, 1982.
54. Genrikas Zimanas, "Internacionalistinis ir patriotinis auklėjimas," *Tarybinis mokytojas*, May 1, 1982.
55. Petras Griškevičius, "Persitvarkymo centre—žmogus," *Pergalė*, no. 2 (February 1987), p. 9. Similar disapproval was expressed in May. See his "Demokratija ir meninė kultūra," *Literatūra ir menas*, no. 19 (May 9, 1987), p. 3.
56. *Alma Mater*, no. 4 (October–December 1979).
57. The poet Eugenijus Matuzevičius asserted that cowardice was responsible for the work not being published, while the novelist Juozas Baltušis, a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist party, admitted publication was stopped but insisted that he could not find out who was responsible for the decision. The comments of Matuzevičius, Baltušis and other writers and critics are recorded in "Literatūrinis palikimas: Rūpesčiai ir problemos," *Pergalė*, no. 7 (July 1987), pp. 139–58.
58. See Vardys, *Church, Dissent, and Nationality*, pp. 180–81.
59. Vytautas Uogintas, "Lietuvos TSR paminklų apsaugos ir kraštotyros draugijos centro tarybos ataskaita V suvažiavimui," *Kraštotyra*, 1978, pp. 7–16.
60. *Aušra*, no. 15 (February 1979).
61. *Aušrelė*, February 1978.
62. *Aušra*, no. 23 (July 1980).
63. *CCCL*, no. 10 (n.d.). This issue was published at the end of 1974.
64. *Aušra*, no. 12 (August 1978).
65. Some proponents of the internal-tie view insist that although the nation as a whole cannot survive after renouncing Catholicism, there can be and are some patriotic atheists.
66. *CCCL*, no. 17 (n.d.). This issue appeared in 1975.

67. *Aušra*, no. 26 (February 1981).
68. "Kam tarnauja ateistinė akcija Lietuvoje," *Tautos kelias*, no. 3 (1981).
69. The new trend was first evident in articles, such as Antanas Balsys, "Lietuvių tauta ir katalikybė," *Tarybinis mokytojas* (July 28–30, 1982); and Jonas Aničas, "Klerikalinis antikomunizmas ir 'Lietuvio kataliko' koncepcija," *Literatūra ir menas*, May 1, 1982. This approach has become more sophisticated. For example, Protestantism is credited with the major contribution in the development of a written language. Other cultural achievements that have occurred under the auspices of the church are no longer denied, but Soviet authors argue that the innate creative talent of the people, and not religious inspiration, was the primary motivating force.
70. The fear is not groundless. During the Central Committee plenum, April 16, 1982, First Secretary Petras Griškevičius studiously used the word "political" to characterize the activities and goals of the more active Catholic dissidents. *Tiesa*, April 18, 1982.
71. See the account in the samizdat journal *Vytis*, no. 6 (1980).
72. Balsys, "Lietuvių tauta."
73. *Aušrelė*, 1978.
74. *Perspektyvos*, no. 9 (1979).
75. In its earliest the *Chronicle* was very circumspect in its criticism of various priests, preferring generalities to explicit condemnations.
76. Remeikis, *Opposition to Soviet Rule*, pp. 161–63.
77. Gintautas Iešmantas admitted in his trial that he was responsible for writing the proclamations of the Association of Lithuanian Communists (for the Secession of Lithuania from the USSR). An account of his trial is in *Perspektyvos*, no. 22 (1981).
78. *CCCL*, no. 51 (March 1982). For some Soviet statistics that indicate a cessation in the decline in the number of Catholics, see Kęstutis Girmius, "Some Soviet Statistics on the Number of Catholics in Lithuania," *Radio Liberty Research*, October 18, 1979.

CHAPTER 6

1. The antiquated terms *Ruthenia*, *Ruthenian* (Rus', Rus'kyi) are synonymous with the modern terms *Ukraine*, *Ukrainian*, and preceded the latter.
2. A comprehensive treatment of church history in Ukraine in relation to East European developments can be found in A. M. Amann, *Abriss der ostslawischen Kirchen* (Vienna: Verlag Herder, 1950); for a condensed treatment see "Church, History of the Ukraine," in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp. 472–85.
3. The founder and ideologist of Ukrainian autocephaly, Metropolitan V. Lypkivskyi, emphatically stressed national particularities of religion in Ukraine. He stated that "the popular enthusiasm for the Ukrainian church derives from a typical national feature: the people started to like their own church for its national particularism. This means that even now the people continue to view their church through the

eyes of their seventeenth century ancestors who considered their Ukrainian church as their national attribute." See *Istoriia Ukrainskoi Tserkvy* (Winnipeg: Trident Press, 1961), p. 55.

4. Close ties between Ukrainian autocephaly and the nascent national revival were demonstrated by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw in "Soviet Church Policy in the Ukraine, 1919-1939" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1961), as well as in his article "Ukrainianization Movements within the Russian Orthodox Church and the Autocephalous Orthodox Church," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3-4 (1979-80), pp. 92-111.
5. Vasylyl Markus, "The Suppressed Church: Ukrainian Catholics in the Soviet Union," in *Marxism and Religion in Eastern Europe*, ed. Richard T. George and J. P. Scanlan (Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston: D. Reidel, 1976), pp. 119-20.
6. The label comes from the name of national leader Symon Petlura, who led the struggle for independence in 1918-20 in Ukraine and with whose name the aspirations for an autocephalous church are connected.
7. In 1980 fifteen eparchies had administering bishops and three eparchial sees were vacant (i.e., other bishops were in charge of their administration). That status of the Orthodox hierarchy in Ukraine was compiled on the basis of the monthly journal *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk* (Kiev, 1976-79) and *Pravoslavnyi Tserkovnyi Kalendar* 1979 (Moscow, 1979). The 1987 status is based on information given by O. Zinkevych and O. Voronyn, *Martyrologiia Ukrainskykh Tserkov*, vol. 1 (Toronto and Baltimore: V. Symonenko, Smoloskyp Publishers, 1987); from the so-called Furov Report, "Iz otcheta Soveta po delam religii—Chlenam TSK KPSS," published in *Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniia* (Paris, New York, Moscow), no. 130 (4) (1979); and also based on the perusal of *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk* (1984-87).
8. Archbishop Makarii Oksiiuk of Lviv issued a pastoral letter in 1950 to the West Ukrainian eparchies reminding the former Uniate priests of "sixteen points" to be corrected in church rituals and liturgical use. See V. Markus, "Religion and Nationality: The Uniates of Ukraine," in *Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe*, ed. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and John W. Strong (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 107.
9. *Ukrainsky Visnyk*, 7-8, 1974 (Paris, Baltimore, London: Smoloskyp, 1975), p. 143.
10. An optimistic official view of the Russian Orthodox church in Ukraine was presented by Archbishop Makarii Svystun in *Pravoslavie na Ukraini* (Kiev: Ukraina Society, 1980). The pamphlet also has appeared in English under the title *Orthodox Church in Ukraine* (Kiev, 1980).
11. Scattered information on the present situation of Evangelical Baptists and other Protestant denominations in Ukraine can be found in the bimonthly journal *Pislanets Pravdy* (Chicago), the quarterly *Prisoner Bulletin* (Elkhart, Ind.), the monthly *Liudyna i svit* (Kiev), and in samizdat sources.
12. Valuable data on Roman Catholics in Ukraine were reported by J. Mirski, "O sytuacii katolikow w zssr," *Kultura* (Paris), no. 6 (1977), pp. 26-44. This author covered the subject in "The Religious Situation of Ukrainians in Poland and of Poles in Ukraine," in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, ed. Peter Potichnyi (Edmonton

- and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980). The article has been republished in the Polish samizdat journal *Obóz* (Warsaw), no. 1 (September 1981).
13. This author presented a survey of religious groups in present-day Ukraine in a paper entitled "Current Religious Movements in the Soviet Ukraine," delivered May 25, 1979, at the annual conference of the Canadian Association of Slavists, Saskatchewan.
 14. Today there is no formal organization or an underground organized community of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous church in the USSR; its sympatizers are in the official Russian Orthodox church trying to Ukrainianize it, although they voice a preference for a national church. See the names and writings later in the text.
 15. The sad situation of Ukrainian Catholics is described in a collective letter (signed by the "faithful of the Ukrainian Church in the USSR") to Pope John Paul II, first published in the Polish samizdat *Spotkania*, no. 16 (1981), and in *Glaube in der 2. Welt* 10, no. 4 (1982), pp. 127–30. It also has been covered in a moving illustrated report by Cardinal Josyf Slipyi, late head of that church in exile, in "The Church of the Martyrs," *The Mirror* (Königstein), no. 2 (1981).
 16. V. Bodnar, "Osobennosti razvitiia ateizma v kulturnoi revoliutsii v natsionalnoi respublike (na materialakh zapadnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi SSR)," in *Ateizm i sotsialisticheskaia kultura* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 51–52.
 17. Markus, "Religion and Nationality," p. 111.
 18. *Pokutnyky* are briefly but comprehensively discussed by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Religion and Nationalism in Contemporary Ukraine," in *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin*, ed. George W. Simmonds (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1977), pp. 86–87. Information on "Arkhieri Emaniul" is found in the *Pokutnyky* document "Letter from Heaven," to which Bociurkiw makes references.
 19. See Soviet attacks against *Pokutnyky* in a pamphlet by A. Shysh, *Uniaty-Pokutnyky: Khto vony!* (Uzhhorod, 1978); and *Liudyna i svit*, no. 4 (1978).
 20. Bodnar, "Osobennosti," p. 52.
 21. These activities are amply documented by the *Ukrainian Press Service*, published in Paris, and by *Visti z Rymu*, published monthly in Rome.
 22. Local and regional papers described in detail "public hysteria" of pilgrims coming from far places to pray and to see the "miracle." One of the reporters attributes such unusual reaction of common people to the "instigation of the Uniate zealots." Cf. *Radianske Slovo* (Drohobych), May 6, 1987. See also *New York Times*, October 13, 1987, p. 1.
 23. Rev. M. Havryliv, *Every Person Is First of All a History: Autobiography of a Ukrainian Catholic Priest in Contemporary Ukraine* (Rome: Ukrainian Press Service, 1987).
 24. Interview with Yo. Terela, November 26, 1987.
 25. *Kirche Intern* (Vienna), November 1987.
 26. *Liudyna i svit*, no. 9 (1980), pp. 60–61.
 27. *Ukrainske Pravoslavne Slovo* (South Bound Brook, N.J.), September–October 1987.
 28. *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, no. 12 (1980), pp. 26–27.

29. M. Mchedlov, *Katolitsizm* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 242–43.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 245.
31. I. Myhovych, *Uniatska Tserkva i ukrainskyi burzhuaznyi natsionalizm* (Kiev, 1981), p. 141.
32. In 1981 a film titled *The Secret of Saint George Cathedral* was produced for showing in Western Ukraine. It was a strong attack against the late Metropolitan Sheptytsky.
33. A. V. Biskup, *Propovidnyk vorozhnechi* (Lviv: Kameniar, 1986).
34. A. Biskup, "Uniatski radiodyversanty," *Liudyna i svit*, no. 12 (1980), p. 59.
35. The letters exchanged between the patriarch of Moscow and the Holy See concerning the latter issue are found in *Informatsionnyi Biuletyn*, no. 2 (Moscow patriarchate, Department of External Relations), April 8, 1981.
36. V. Tancher, "Ateizm i ateistychne vykhovannia," *Filosofska dumka*, no. 2 (1974), p. 53; see also Tancher, *Religioznye perezhitki i ikh preodolennia* (Kiev, 1979).
37. *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), no. 28 (1968).
38. V. Mykhailov, "Internatsionalne i ateistychne vykhovannia u trudovykh kolektyvakh," *Liudyna i svit*, no. 4 (1978), p. 7.
39. I. Myhovych, "Rozvinchuiuchy ideolohii uniatsva," *Liudyna i svit*, no. 10 (1981), p. 56.
40. *Ukrainsky Visnyk*, 1–2, 1970 (Paris and Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1971), pp. 56–63.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
43. English translations of Valentyn Moroz's works: *Chronicle of Resistance in Ukraine* (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1970); *Report from the Beria Reserve* (Chicago: Cataract Press, 1974); *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz* (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1974). French edition: *Chronique de la résistance* (Paris: Éditions PIUF, 1977).
44. Moroz, *Chronique de la résistance*, p. 131.
45. Romaniuk, *Voice in the Wilderness*, pp. 19–69.
46. *Zupynit' kryvosuddia. Sprava Levka Lukianenka*, ed. S. Sadovsky (New York: Suchasnist, 1980), pp. 86–91; letter to Metropolitan Filaret in *Svoboda* (Jersey City, N.J., October 27, 1978).
47. J. Terela, *Notes from a Madhouse* (Baltimore, Washington, Toronto: Smoloskyp, 1977), p. 1; quoted here and translated by author from *Suchasnist* (Munich), nos. 7–8 (1977), p. 217.
48. Some *samvydav* literary works of Ukrainian poets and writers were published abroad: I. Kalynets, *Poezii z Ukrainy* (Brussels: Lettres et Art, 1970) and *Pidsumovuiuchy movchannia* (Munich: Suchasnist, 1971); M. Rudenko, *Khrest* (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1977), *Prozrinnia* (Baltimore and Toronto: Smoloskyp, 1978) and *Za gratamy, Poezii* (Munich: Suchasnist, 1980); O. Berdnyk, *Blakytnyi koval* (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1975), *Ukraina Sichi Vichnoi* (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1977), *Sviata Ukraina* (Baltimore and Toronto: Smoloskyp, 1980), and *Prometei* (Munich: Ukrainske Vydavnytstvo, 1981); V. Stus, *Zvmovi dereva* (Brussels: Lettres et Art, 1970), *Svicha v svichadi* (Suchasnist, 1977), and *Palimpsesty, Virshi 1971–1979 rokiv* (Suchasnist, 1986); M. Horbal, *Detali pishchanoho hodynnyka, poezii ta pisni* (Suchasnist, 1983).

49. Y. Sverstiuk, *Sobor u ryshtovanni* (Paris/Baltimore: PIUF and Smoloskyp, 1970). Sverstiuk wrote his essay *The Cathedral in Scaffolding* to defend O. Honchar and his novel *The Cathedral* (1969) against unjustified criticism and to expand his own humanistic and national views on Ukrainian culture. The novel, which exalts Ukrainian past and national traditions, has been published in three editions in the Soviet Ukraine (the fourth was confiscated after publication) and in four editions outside the USSR. Sverstiuk evaluates Honchar's work thus: "The fundamental meaning of O. Honchar's novel lies in the search for the support point of spirituality and for the sources of humanness, as well as in the exploration of traditions and sacred places to which, in a world of disrupted standards, people cling in order to preserve their being and essence" (p. 29). As a result of *glasnost'*, Honchar's novel was rehabilitated in 1987 and its Russian translation was scheduled for publication.

CHAPTER 7

1. A national church is one that claims to represent the religious interests of a single ethnic group. In the USSR, apart from the Georgian and Armenian examples, we might include the Lithuanian Roman Catholic church, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church, and the Lutheran churches of Estonia and Latvia.
2. This is not always the case. The Lutheran churches of Latvia and Estonia, for example, have not fulfilled this role. For discussion of possible reasons, see Tõnu Parling, "Nationalism in Soviet Estonia since 1964," in *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin*, ed. George W. Simmonds (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1977), pp. 116–34; and Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Institutional Religion and Nationality in the Soviet Union," in *Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective*, ed. S. Enders Wimbush (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 181–206.
3. Sidney Monas, in his article "Religion and the Intelligentsia," in *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union*, ed. Dennis J. Dunn (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 105–35, makes a similar point.
4. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Study of Ethnic Politics in the USSR," in *Nationalism in the USSR*, ed. Simmonds, pp. 21–22.
5. Christianity became the state religion of the Armenian kingdom of King Tiridates III in A.D. 301. Georgia was converted a little later, in A.D. 330.
6. The Armenian *millet*, also known as the National Constitution, was directed by an elected Armenian National General Assembly. The president of the assembly was the Armenian patriarch of Constantinople. The *Polozhenie* was more restrictive than the National Constitution and ensured greater subordination of the church to the state; however, it did give the Armenian church certain privileges and broad control over Armenian educational and ecclesiastical life. For discussion of both the *millet* and *Polozhenie*, see K. V. Sarkissian, "The Armenian Church," in *Religion in the Middle East: Three Religions in Concord and Conflict*, ed. A. J. Arberry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), vol. 1, pp. 482–520; and Manuel

- Sarkisyanz, *A Modern History of Transcaucasian Armenia* (Nagpur, India: Udyama Commercial Press, 1975), pp. 55–57.
7. The Georgian catholicosate was abolished by imperial decree in July 1811. Ecclesiastical reforms by the newly appointed Russian exarch in West Georgia did produce some unrest among the peasantry in 1819, but remained restricted to the western regions. See S. F. Jones, "Russian Imperial Administration and the Georgian Nobility: The Georgian Conspiracy of 1832," *Slavonic and East European Review* 65, no. 1 (January 1987), pp. 53–76.
 8. For the best discussion of the internal organization of the Armenian church, see Malachia Ormanian, *The Church of Armenia: Her History, Doctrine, Rule, Discipline, Liturgy, Literature, and Existing Condition*, trans. from French by G. Marcar Gregory (London: Mowbray, 1912), esp. chap. 31.
 9. See, for example, the account of Sir John Chardin, "The Travels of Sir John Chardin through Mingrelia and Georgia into Persia," in *The World Displayed* (London: Carnan and Newberry, 1777), vol. 15, pp. 97–100. For a general assessment of the Georgian church during this period, see W. E. D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People: From the Beginning Down to the Russian Conquest in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tribner, 1932), pp. 272–73.
 10. For a discussion of the Armenian doctrinal differences with Eastern Orthodoxy which led to the split in 451, see Ormanian, *Church of Armenia*, pp. 101–4; and Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 26–27.
 11. Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 160.
 12. The Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutium (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) in Armenia and the Georgian section of the Russian Social Democratic and Labor party in Georgia.
 13. In 1903 the Russian governor-general of the Caucasus, Prince Grigory Golitsyn, removed Armenian church control of its properties. This produced enormous resistance throughout the Armenian community, leading to a spate of terrorism. The measure was rescinded in 1905. In May 1908 the Russian exarch of Georgia was assassinated (by suspected nationalists) and a number of outspoken clerics were exiled as a result. Georgians continued to petition the tsar for the return of autocephaly until 1917.
 14. The bishop of Tiflis (Tbilisi) and future catholicos Nerses Ashtaraketsi (1843–57) campaigned throughout his office for an autonomous Armenia and led Armenian volunteers against the Turks in the Russo-Turkish war of 1827–28. Catholicos Mkrtich I (Khrimian: 1871–92), patriarch of Constantinople, also became a major spokesman for Armenian nationalist aspirations on the international stage. Georgian clerics took a less prominent position in national politics, but a number were exiled for their continuing resistance to Russification measures against the Georgian church. The future catholicoses of Georgia, Kirioni II (1917–18) and Ambrosi (1921–27), were both in exile in 1908–17. Sarkissian, "Armenian Church," pp. 485–87. Walker, *Armenia*, pp. 398–99 and 405 gives short biographies of the two Armenian catholicoses. On the activity of the Georgian clergy in this period, see

- M. Tamarati, *L'Église géorgienne des origines jusqu'à nos jours* (Rome: Société Typographico Editrice Romaine, 1910), pp. 384–96.
15. For a discussion of the differing attitudes of Marx and Lenin toward religion, see J. M. Bochenski, "Marxism-Leninism and Religion," in *Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe*, ed. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and John W. Strong (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 1–17.
 16. Figures cited by the Reverend Dr. Rafael Ivanitsky-Inguilo, "The Georgian Autocephalous Orthodox Church," in *Religion in the USSR*, series 1, no. 59 (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, July 1960), p. 78; and Mary Matossian, *The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962), pp. 147–48. For discussion of Armenian and Georgian church-state relations in this period, see C. J. Peters, "The Georgian Orthodox Church," in *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Pedro Ramet (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 286–308; and Matossian, *Impact of Soviet Policies*, pp. 90–95, 147–51.
 17. In 1941 the Nazis allowed the formation of a Belorussian Autocephalous Orthodox church and a Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church the following year. Both churches were useful instruments in the stimulation of anti-Russian nationalism among Belorussians and Ukrainians.
 18. In 1941 Catholicos Kalistrate of Georgia called for the "strength to expel the enemy from our midst" and declared that "God is with us." The church also sent 150,000 rubles to the Red Army. *Ivari vazisa* (Journal of the Georgian patriarchate), no. 1 (1985), pp. 15–17. There was similar cooperation between church and state in Armenia; in return for church political and financial support during the war, priests were allowed to return from exile and churches were reopened. See Sarkisyanz, *Modern History*, pp. 323–24; and R. G. Suny, *Armenia in the Twentieth Century* (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1983), pp. 64–65.
 19. *Sakartvelos eklesiis kalendari* (henceforth *SEK*) (Tbilisi: Sakartvelos sapatriarko, 1980), p. 394.
 20. For these figures, see Michael Bourdeaux et al., *Religious Liberty in the Soviet Union. The World Council of Churches and the USSR: A Post-Nairobi Documentation*, Keston Books, no. 7 (Kent: Center for the Study of Religion and Communism, 1976), pp. 4–5. There was indication of some recovery in 1963 when a New Testament and prayer book were published and a two-year religious training school was opened.
 21. Gerald J. Libardian, "Armenia and the Armenians: A Divided Homeland and a Dispersed Nation," in *Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers*, ed. William O. McCagg, Jr., and Brian D. Silver (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 37. There was some consternation in the Armenian community when Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky claimed the same territories for Georgia at the UN in 1947. R.D., "The Question of the Armenian Boundaries and the Repatriation," *Armenian Review* 1, no. 1 (1948), pp. 103–7.
 22. A large Jewish diaspora did not prevent Soviet anti-Jewish policies, however. On the income of the Armenian church, see USSR/Arm.c (no title, 4 pages of A4 longhand) in file SU/Arm at Keston College, Kent.
 23. For an account of the conflict with the catholicosate of Cilicia, see Sarkissian,

- "Armenian Church," pp. 516–17; and R. Darbinian, "Soviet Efforts to Control the Armenian Church Abroad," *Armenian Review* 9, no. 2 (June 1956), pp. 3–15.
24. V. N. Dadrian, "An Appraisal of the Communist Formula 'National in Form, Socialist in Content' with Particular Reference to Soviet Armenia," *Armenian Review* 16, no. 3 (September 1963), p. 12; and V. N. Dadrian, "Nationalism in Soviet Armenia: A Case Study of Ethnocentrism," in *Nationalism in the USSR*, ed. Simmonds, p. 215.
 25. Alan Scarfe, "National Consciousness and Christianity in Eastern Europe," in *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics*, ed. Pedro Ramet, 1st ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1984), p. 35.
 26. See chapter 1.
 27. *Keston News Service*, no. 187 (November 17, 1983), p. 8; and Elizabeth Fuller, "Moscow Critical of Ideological Shortcomings in Armenia," *Radio Liberty Research*, November 14, 1984, p. 2.
 28. Reverend Raymond Oppenheim, "Comment" on E. Oganessyan, "The Armenian Church in the USSR," *Religion in Communist Lands* 7, no. 4 (Winter 1979), pp. 242–43.
 29. See "The Echmiadzin Catholicos Subscribes to a Petition on Cuba," *Armenian Review* 16, no. 1 (Spring 1963), pp. 6–8; *Current Abstracts*, 1979, no. 4, p. 11 (condemnation of Chinese invasion of Vietnam); and *Keston News Service*, no. 146 (April 1982), p. 4 (a call for Israeli troops to withdraw from Palestine).
 30. The diaspora in Lebanon amounts to approximately 135,000, although this number has decreased since the eruption of civil war in the 1970s. Armenian church and government authorities have shown a united concern for the Lebanese Armenian community. Roman Solchanyk, "Armenians Protest Against Developments in Lebanon," *Radio Liberty Research*, November 29, 1978.
 31. The Soviet government through the Council of Religious Affairs (Armenia has its own council attached to the Armenian Council of Ministers) controls the number of working churches and the seminary intake, and regulates travel by the clergy. Vasken 1 admitted in 1979 that "the state does not permit the construction of any churches." (*Armenian Weekly*, January 13, 1979). The churches have not been allowed to teach religion or take part in charitable work since the 1920s.
 32. *Religious Freedom*, August 1978. See also file SU3/Arm at Keston College, Kent.
 33. See, for example, *Kommunist* (organ of the Communist party of Armenia), July 1, 1973, and June 3, 1975; and Fuller, "Moscow Critical." See also Elizabeth Fuller, "Ideological Sector in Armenia Under Fire," *Radio Liberty Research*, October 23, 1986; and "Armenia's Demirchyan: Reforming Indifferently?" *Radio Liberty Research*, August 13, 1987.
 34. For the text of the CPSU resolution, see "V tsentral'nom komitete KPSS," *Pravda*, October 21, 1984, p. 1. For an up-to-date account of atheistic organizational work and progress in the Armenian SSR, see "Shkola Ateizma," *Kommunist* (Armenia), April 4, 1986, p. 4.
 35. For an excellent discussion of the Soviet state's interpretation of the national-religious nexus among Soviet minorities, see Bociurkiw, "Institutional Religion and Nationality," pp. 181–206.

36. See Dadrian's discussion of two antireligious articles in the Soviet Armenian press which exemplify this concern: "Nationalism in Soviet Armenia," pp. 239–40.
37. The extent of corruption and demoralization in the Georgian church is cataloged in a report by a former assistant procurator in Tbilisi, David Koridze. The report alleged the illegal election of Catholicos David V in 1972 and the falsification of his predecessor's will, embezzlement of church property (in which government officials were involved), and simony. The scandal eventually came into the open in 1979 when Bishop Gaioz was convicted of selling 288,000 rubles' worth of church valuables and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment and exile. For an analysis of Koridze's report see Peter B. Reddaway, "The Georgian Orthodox Church: Corruption and Renewal," *Religion in Communist Lands* 3, nos. 4–5 (July–October 1975), pp. 14–23. For an official report of the trial, see *Zaria Vostoka* (the Russian-language organ of the Communist party of Georgia), June 14, 1979, p. 4.
38. See Michael Bourdeaux, "The Georgian Orthodox Church," *Radio Liberty Script*, no. 246 (December 22, 1976); and "Dr Gamsakhurdia Writes to RCL," *Religion in Communist Lands* 4, no. 4 (Winter 1976), pp. 48–51, in which the Georgian dissident claims that "between 1965–69, I and my friends drew many young people toward an interest in religion [and] at Eastertide . . . all the churches overflowed. The income of the church increased . . . and so did the number of those applying to enter the Seminary." *Ibid.*, p. 48.
39. See S. Jomarjidge, "Sakartvelos komunisturi partiis morhvatsheba akhlagazrdebis ateisturi arhzrdis sakmeshi" (The Activity of the Georgian Communist Party in the Atheist Upbringing of Youth), in *Akhlagazrdebis ateisturi arhzrdis sakitkhebi* (Tbilisi: Tbilisis universitetis gamomtsemloba, 1985), pp. 14–29.
40. G. Bandzeladze, "Ra movitsonor da ra davgmot?" *Sakartvelos komunisti* (the theoretical journal of the Georgian Communist party), 1981, no. 4, p. 62.
41. See, for example, Ilia's speech at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on the fortieth anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. *Jvari vazisa*, 1985, no. 1, pp. 15–17, where he associated the "nation's joy" with the "church's joy."
42. In one interview with Western reporters Vasken 1 confessed his own Russian was poor, and a senior cleric at the Echmiadzin Seminary admitted he knew no Russian at all. *The Times* (London), March 17, 1970, p. 10.
43. *Armenian Weekly*, January 13, 1979.
44. One Radio Liberty report claims that the half million Armenians in Karabagh do not have a church and have not been visited by the present catholicos. *Radio svoboda: Materialy issledovatel'nogo otdela*, 1985, no. 209.
45. In 1979 Vazken 1 condemned the "treason" of Armenians who left their "mother country" for the West. "Armenians do not have the right to diminish the population of the Mother Country," he declared. Cited in Anahide Ter Minassian, "Nation et religion: L'église arménienne," *Études*, June 1980, pp. 809–10.
46. Cited in Ter Minassian, "Nation et religion," p. 810.
47. Claire Mouradian, "Problèmes linguistiques et culturels en Arménie depuis Staline: Résistance nationale ou intégration soviétique?" *Slovo*, 1984, no. 5, pp. 111–38.
48. *Jvari vazisa*, 1980, no. 2, pp. 5–6.
49. *Jvari vazisa*, 1981, no. 2, pp. 7–8.

50. *SEK*, 1976, p. 32.
51. *Sainpormatsio biuletini* (Information Bulletin of the Georgian Patriarchate), 1986, no. 2, p. 5.
52. *Jvari vazisa*, 1985, no. 2, p. 19.
53. T. Khandareli, "Kartuli martlmadidebeli eklesia tanamedrove etpapze da akhalgazrdoba," in *Akhalgazrdebis ateisturi arhzrdis sakitkhebi*, p. 146.
54. *Ibid.*
55. For the official Soviet stance against the thesis that Georgian nationhood existed in the premodern period, see A. Surguladze, "Kartveli eris chamokhalibebis shesakheb," *Matsne* (Historical Series), 1967, no. 5, pp. 342-70; and Abel Kikvidze, *Sakartvelos istoria 1801-1890* (Tbilisi: Tbilisis universitetis gamomtsemloba, 1977).
56. Brian D Silver, "Population Distribution and the Ethnic Balance in Transcaucasia," in *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change*, ed. R. G. Suny (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), p. 383. For an analysis of the nationality and language aspects of the 1979 census in Armenia, see Elizabeth Fuller and Ann Sheehy, "Armenia and Armenians in the USSR: Nationality and Language Aspects of the Census of 1979," *Radio Liberty Research*, June 11, 1980.
57. For an account of Mikoyan's speech, see Matossian, *Impact of Soviet Policies*, p. 201.
58. For an assessment of the latest campaign, see Fuller, "Moscow Critical," "Ideological Sector," and "Armenia's Demirchyan."
59. Fuller, "Armenia's Demirchyan."
60. Elizabeth Fuller, "Armenian Writers' Congress Focuses on Language Teaching," *Radio Liberty Research*, June 16, 1981.
61. "Rodina—bol'shaia i malaia," *Pravda*, May 7, 1987, pp. 3, 6.
62. Libardian, "Armenia and the Armenians," p. 41.
63. Cited in Suny, *Armenia*, p. 81.
64. Elizabeth Fuller and Anoush Petrossian, "The Ninth Congress of the Armenian Union of Writers," *Radio Liberty Research*, June 24, 1986.
65. See the report in *Russkaia Mysl'*, February 8, 1979, p. 1. For an analysis of the strength and program of the NUP, see David Kowalewski, "The Armenian National Unity Party: Context and Program," *Armenian Review* 31, no. 4 (April 1979), pp. 362-70; and "Organizatsiia nezavisimosti Armenii 'Natsional'no-Ob'edinienskaia Partiia' v 10-i godovshchine svoego sushchestvovaniia" (Erevan, 1976), samizdat article filed in SU3/Arm, Keston College, Kent.
66. "Armianskaia gruppa sodeistviia vypolneniiu polozhenii zakliuchitel'nogo Akta Khel'sinskogo soglasheniia," *RFE-RL: Materialy samizdata*, no. 3059 (November 28, 1977).
67. Anahide Ter Minassian, *La question arménienne* (Paris: Editions Parenthèses, 1983), pp. 228-29. Little is known about this organization apart from its basic programmatic aim of an independent Armenia.
68. "Organizatsiia nezavisimosti Armenii," p. 7.
69. "V.S.P.V.V. Katalikosu vsekh Armian Vazgenu i d'iakona sviatoi Echmiadzinskoi

- tserkvi Roberta Khachikovicha Nazariana," *Materialy samizdata* No 3165, February 13, 1978.
70. "The Armenian Apostolic Church," undated typescript, file SU/Arm, Keston College, Kent. One Armenian cleric told a Western reporter that half of all marriages take place in church. See J. Wilkins, "Armenia's Religion," *The Tablet*, August 6, 1977, p. 741.
 71. See John H. Miller, "Ethnicity and Religion under Communism: USSR," in *Religion and Politics in Communist States*, ed. Robert Miller and T. H. Rigby (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1986), pp. 28–48.
 72. Robert Kaiser, in *The Guardian* [Manchester], January 4, 1972, p. 3.
 73. For an analysis of the 1979 results of the census relating to Georgia, see Ann Sheehy, "Data from the Soviet Census of 1979 on the Georgians and the Georgian SSR," *Radio Liberty Research*, May 2, 1980. In 1959–70 there has been a net outflow from the republic of Russians and Armenians. The Russian proportion of the population has declined from 10.1 percent to 7.4 percent. For a discussion of the tenacity of Georgian national consciousness, see J. W. R. Parsons, "National Integration in Soviet Georgia," *Soviet Studies* 34, no. 4 (October 1982), pp. 547–69; and R. G. Suny, "Georgia and Soviet Nationality Policy," in *The Soviet Union Since Stalin*, ed. Stephen Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Robert Sharlet (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 200–26.
 74. "National Problems of the USSR," in *Glasnost*, a samizdat insert in *Russkaia Mysl*, no. 3690 (September 1987).
 75. Bohdan Nahaylo and C. J. Peters, *The Ukrainians and the Georgians*, Minority Rights Group, Report no. 50 (London, 1981), pp. 17–18.
 76. The Abkhaz perception of discrimination and neglect by the Georgians led to protests and petitions to secede from Georgia in the late 1970s. See Suny, "Georgia and Soviet Nationality Policy," p. 220; and Roman Solchanyk and Ann Sheehy, "Kapitonov on Nationality Relations in Georgia," *Radio Liberty Research*, June 1, 1978.
 77. See, for example, A. Bakradze, "Chven," *Literaturuli Sakartvelo*, March 20, 1987; and "Kavkasionis saurheltekho," *Komunisti*, May 6, 1987, where concern is expressed for the possible loss of unique national monuments.
 78. Nahaylo and Peters, *Ukrainians and Georgians*, p. 17. See also Elizabeth Fuller, "Appeal for the Retention of the Georgian Language in Academic Life," *Radio Liberty Research*, December 17, 1980.
 79. Nahaylo and Peters, *Ukrainians and Georgians*, p. 17; Ann Sheehy, "The National Languages and the New Constitutions of the Transcaucasian Republics," *Radio Liberty Research*, May 3, 1978. See also *Chronicle of Current Events*, no. 48 (March 1978), p. 26; and *Keston News Service*, no. 132 (September 1981), p. 4.
 80. This citation is taken from an open letter from Gamsakhurdia to the editors of a Georgian newspaper, *Mebrdrole* [The Fighter]. The document recently reached the West. The full title of the undated article is "The Fingerless Policeman and the Crazy Congregation (Open Letter to the Editors of the Zugdidi Newspaper, The Fighter)." The document is available at Keston College, Kent (in Georgian).

81. See Elizabeth Fuller, "Expressions of Official and Unofficial Concern over the Future of the Georgian Language," *Radio Liberty Research*, April 7, 1981, and *Le Monde*, April 6, 1981, p. 3.
82. The latest indication of this is the production of a new underground journal entitled *Samkrello* (The Bell Tower). The journal has not reached the West yet, but the title carries significant symbolic meaning. Gudja Abuladze, a dissident imprisoned in 1985 for "extortion," was described in the charge laid against him as an "activist of the national-religious movement of youth in Georgia." *Glasnost'*, p. 4.
83. *Akhlagazrdebis ateisturi arhzrdis sakitkhebi*. Public opinion surveys in the USSR must be treated with caution. However, this collection gives unpalatable facts about the religiosity of Georgian youth, which suggests a relatively frank approach. This does not mean, of course, that the respondents answered honestly.
84. Shevardnadze, for example, at the twenty-fifth congress of the Georgian Communist party in 1976 talked of "a certain reorientation in the convictions of a part of our population, particularly our youth" (*Zaria Vostoka*, January 23, 1976), and *Sakartvelos komunisti* admitted in 1981 that under Ilia II "the churches have come to life" (*Sakartvelos komunisti*, 1981, no. 4, p. 62).
85. *Akhlagazrdebis sakitkhebi*, pp. 82-83, 119.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
87. *Ibid.*
88. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
90. Khandareli, "Kartuli martlmadidebeli eklesia," p. 145.

CHAPTER 8

1. Iakovlev speech, *Komsomolets Tadzhikistana*, April 8, 1987, p. 2. Iakovlev was speaking at a plenum of the Communist party of Tajikistan in Dushanbe. Gorbachev speech, *Pravda Vostoka*, November 25, 1986, p. 1. Expulsions from Communist party of Uzbekistan, *Pravda Vostoka*, August 12, 1987, p. 2.
2. *Vesti iz SSSR*, no. 6 (1987) pp. 1-4. The source is a human rights news bulletin published in Munich by Cronid Lubarsky, a former Soviet dissident.
3. Alexander also is called by the Arabic name "Zulqarnain" ("Two Horn") from the mythical belief that he had horns concealed beneath his helmet. A mention of "Zulqarnain" in Sura XVIII of the Koran is thought to refer to Alexander, who has sometimes been held to be a "prophet" or "Muslim saint." See *Ozbekistanda Iltimailar/Fanlar/Obshchestvennyye Nauki v Uzbekistane*, no. 1 (1980).
4. A contemporary vernacular short story by a young Uzbek writer depicts the dilemma of an eighth-century Turkic warrior who clings to fire worship, resisting Islam as an "alien" religion despite efforts of fellow Turks to convert him in the name of ethnic unity. He maintains that it is not fitting to pray in a tongue different from that bequeathed by his ancestors, saying that religion is the fatherland (*vatan*) in your heart, and language the fatherland on your tongue. The story expresses

- nostalgia for a day of earlier glory when the empire of the Turks extended "from Korea to Greece, from the Altay to Beijing," and they had their own gods, being not yet divided among Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, and Buddhism. See Alisher Ibadinov, "Quyash ham alay" (Sun and Fire), *Gulistan* (Tashkent), no. 9 (1980).
5. V. I. Massal'skii, *Rossia*, Tom XIX (Turkestanskii krai) (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 336–37, cited in Baymirza Hayit, *Turkestan im XX. Jahrhundert* (Darmstadt, 1956), p. 305.
 6. Hayit, *Turkestan*, pp. 304–5.
 7. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
 8. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Changing Soviet Image of Islam: The Domestic Scene," *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs* 2, nos. 2 and 3, no. 1 (Jeddah, Winter 1980 and Summer 1981), pp. 9ff.
 9. Nugman Ashirov, *Islam i natsii* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1975), pp. 87–88.
 10. T. S. Saidbayev, *Islam i obshchestvo* (Moscow: "Nauka," 1978), pp. 179, 226.
 11. *Pravda*, July 14, 1980, p. 3.
 12. A. Akhmedov (Ahmedov), *Sotsial'naiia doktrina Islama* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1982), pp. 113–33.
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. *Ibid.*
 15. From a version of Karmal's report to a national conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, March 14, 1982, printed in *Kommunist*, no. 5 (1982), translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report* (Political and Sociological Affairs), June 11, 1982.
 16. L. F. Mongarova, "Struktura sovremennoi gorodskoi sem'i Tadzhiikov," *Sovetskaia etnografia*, no. 3 (1982), p. 13.
 17. *Ozbekistanda ijtimaii fanlar* (The Social Sciences in Uzbekistan), 1979, no. 11, and 1981, no. 11.
 18. Saidbayev, *Islam i obshchestvo*, p. 186.
 19. *Ibid.*
 20. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
 22. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
 23. *Pravda*, July 14, 1980, p. 3.
 24. Saidbayev, *Islam i obshchestvo*, p. 200.
 25. See J. Critchlow, "Minarets and Marx," *Washington Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (Spring 1980).
 26. Ashirov, *Islam i natsii*, pp. 45–46.
 27. *Ibid.*
 28. Gh. Nabiyeu, "Ilmii ateistik tarbiya" (Scientific Atheistic Indoctrination), *Yash leninchi*, July 8, 1982.
 29. *Ibid.*
 30. Saidbayev, *Islam i obshchestvo*, p. 181.
 31. *Naseleniie SSSR po dannym vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1979 goda* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1980), pp. 21–22.

32. *Narodnoie khozayaistvo SSSR na 1980 god* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1981), pp. 466–67.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
34. Saidbayev, *Islam i obshchestvo*, p. 184.
35. A. Artykov, "Qur'an haqida tanqidii mulahazalar" (Critical Thoughts about the Koran) (Tashkent: "Qizil Ozbekistan," "Pravda Vostoka," va "Ozbekistan Surkh" birlashgan nashriyati, 1963), pp. 27–33.
36. *The Koran*, trans. J. M. Rodwell (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1909), p. 349.
37. "Islam modernizmi" (Islamic modernism), *Ozbek Sovet Entsiklopediiasi* (OSE), vol. 5 (Tashkent: OzSSR Fanlar Akademiiyasi, 1974), p. 98.
38. "Islam sotsializmi" (Islamic socialism), *ibid.*, p. 99.
39. Artykov, "Qur'an haqida," p. 28.
40. OSE, vol. 5, p. 98.
41. Artykov, "Qur'an haqida," p. 30.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
43. Ashirov, *Islam i natsii*, pp. 48–49, 58, 60–61, 79, 81–82, 87–88.
44. Akhmedov, *Sotsial'naia doktrina Islama*, p. 123.
45. Ashirov, *Islam i natsii*, p. 65.
46. Alexandre Bennigsen, "Muslim Conservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime: The Sufi Brotherhoods in the North Caucasus," in *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices*, ed. Jeremy R. Azrael (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 334–48.
47. S. M. Demidov, *Sufizm v Turkmenii* (Ashkhabad: "Ylym," 1978), p. 5.
48. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *Les Musulmans oubliés: L'Islam en Union soviétique* (Paris: François Maspero, 1981), p. 242.
49. "Diniy-mistik adabiyat" (Religious-Mystical Literature), OSE, vol. 4, p. 49. See also "Ahmad Yassawi," in *ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 617.
50. A. J. Arberry, "Mysticism," in *Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 606.
51. Demidov, *Sufizm v Turkmenii*, p. 5. Demidov cites I. P. Petrushevskii's 1966 work *Islam v Irane v VII–XV vv.* (Leningrad), as a source for foreign scholars' views corroborating the Central Asian influence in the origin of Sufism: "Dozy (1904) and Carra de Vaux (1902) saw the origins of Sufism in Iranian (Zoroastrian-Manichaean) influence and in an 'Aryan' (Iranian) reaction against Arabism and Islam as the religion of the Semitic Arabs, in which there can be found a suggestion of racist theories of religion. The researchers Hartmann (1916) and Horten (1927–28) linked Sufism with Indian sources: Hinduism, Vedantic philosophy and Buddhism. R. Hartmann considered that the starting region of Sufism was Central Asia, the meeting place of Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Islam, whence the influence of Indian mysticism and its ascetic practices had penetrated via the Persians into Islam."
52. William Fierman, "Uzbek Feelings of Ethnicity: A Study of Attitudes in Recent Uzbek Literature," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 22, nos. 2–3 (1981), pp. 181–229.
53. Ann Sheehy, "Uzbek Novel Found Ideologically Unsound," *Radio Liberty Research*, August 25, 1982. The author analyzes the controversy around Mamadali Mahmu-

dov's novel *Olmas qayalar* (Immortal Cliffs) published in 1981 in the Uzbek literary monthly *Sharq yulduzi*, nos. 10 and 11.

54. Chingiz Aitmatov, *I Dol'she veka dlitsya den'* (Frunze: "Kyrgyzstan" Publishing House, 1981), p. 83.
55. Matityahu Peled, "Islam and Revolution," in *Jerusalem Post* (international edition), February 18–24, 1979. The author is a professor of Arabic literature at Tel Aviv University.

CHAPTER 9

I wish to express my thanks to Michael Ziemann for his guidance on understanding Martin Luther in the sixteenth century as well as the German Democratic Republic today. A note of special appreciation must also be extended to Pedro Ramet for his unceasing assistance during the writing of this chapter.

1. In his book *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 86–87, author Peter Gay noted how some German historians of the Weimar Republic drew "on a widening repertory of heroes" to instill a spirit of folkish enthusiasm among the people—"heroes" such as Martin Luther, Bismarck, and Friedrich II of Prussia.
2. For an overview of early Marxist interpretations of Luther in the GDR, see Robert F. Goeckel, "The Luther Anniversary in East Germany," *World Politics* 37, no. 1 (October 1984), pp. 114–16, as well as Michael J. Ziemann's unpublished paper "Martin Luther—Forefather of the German Democratic Republic?" (Seattle Pacific University, 1984).
3. "Neuorientierung der deutschen Christenheit," in *Handbuch der DDR* (Berlin/DDR: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1968), pp. 94–95.
4. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* (East Berlin) 33, no. 10 (October 1985), p. 882, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), *East Europe Report*, no. EPS-85-119 (November 29, 1985), p. 72. This article on "Current Problems of Collaboration between Communists and the Faithful" by Hans Lutter and Olof Klohr repudiated the claims of "conservative forces . . . particularly in the FRG," who believe that the GDR is either an "atheistic state" which oppresses Christians or the "incarnation of Antichrist."
5. Fritz Kapp, "Neue Ziele für DDR-Historiker?" *Deutsche Studien* 22, no. 85 (March 1984), p. 84.
6. Zdenek Vasicek, "A New Type of History," *Index on Censorship* 14, no. 6 (December 1985), p. 20.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
8. *Einheit* (East Berlin) 39, nos. 9–10 (September–October 1984), p. 920, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. EPS-84-144 (November 23, 1984), p. 19.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
10. *Die Welt* (Bonn), October 2, 1984, p. 5, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. EPS-84-144 (November 23, 1984), p. 49.

11. Manfred Stolpe, "Kirche im Bewährungsfeld," *Kirche im Sozialismus* 13, no. 4 (August 1987), p. 135.
12. Friedrich Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany*, trans. Moissage J. Olgin (New York: International Publishers, 1966), p. 62.
13. Friedrich Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, trans. Clemens Dutt (New York: International Publishers, 1940), p. 3.
14. For more details on current interest in Luther's link to anti-Semitism, see the *New York Times*, October 16, 1983, p. 37.
15. Quoted in Goeckel, "Luther Anniversary," p. 114.
16. John Dornberg, *The Other Germany* (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 334.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 335.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Endel Kallas, "New Evidences of a Secular Luther," *Lutheran Forum*, Lent 1984, p. 21.
20. *Neue Heimat*, May 1983, p. 28. Honecker's choice of words adds an interesting touch of irony; the word translated as "transformation" (*Verwandlung*) also means "transubstantiation"—a doctrine of the Roman church which Luther opposed.
21. "Aus einem Interview mit Ernst Engelberg: Zur Bismarck-Renaissance in der DDR," *Informationsdienst*, no. 136 (November 1985), p. 14.
22. *New York Times*, July 1, 1983, p. 2.
23. *Neuer Weg* (East Berlin) 40, no. 2 (1985), p. 51, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. EPS-85-039 (March 28, 1985), p. 98.
24. *Neue Zeit* (East Berlin), October 5, 1982, p. 2, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 82346 (November 30, 1982), p. 3.
25. Kallas, "New Evidences," pp. 22–24.
26. Pedro Ramet notes that "in 1967 the state had actually sabotaged the [Reformation] celebrations by denying tourist visas to foreign applicants." See his article "The Evangelical Church, the State, and the Peace Movement in East Germany," *Crossroads*, no. 22 (1986), pp. 41–42. Another aspect of the Church's dissatisfaction was found in the belief that the state "totally ignored the Christian and theologian [that] Luther was." *Der Spiegel*, March 7, 1983, pp. 109, 113, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 83282 (April 18, 1983), pp. 30, 32.
27. *Sonntag* (East Berlin) 36, no. 48 (November 28, 1982), trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 82872 (February 16, 1983), p. 18.
28. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Dresden), September 17, 1982, p. 2, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 82626 (January 12, 1983), p. 4.
29. Hubert Kirchner, *Luther and the Peasants' War*, trans. Darrell Jodock (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 6.
30. For an example of the subjective-objective division of Luther, see A. Laube's article in *Sonntag* (East Berlin) 36, no. 44 (October 31, 1982), p. 7, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 82872 (February 16, 1983), p. 22. For a critique of this approach, see Rainer Wohlfiel, "Das wissenschaftliche Lutherbild in beiden deutschen Staaten," *Deutschland Archiv* 16, no. 11 (November 1983), p. 1158.
31. Wohlfiel, "Wissenschaftliche Lutherbild," pp. 1145–46.

32. Detlef Urban, "Bemerkungen zur einer Lutherfilm im DDR-Fernsehen," in *Deutschland Archiv* 16, no. 12 (December 1983), p. 1253.
33. *Sonntag*, October 31, 1982, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 82872 (February 16, 1983), p. 21.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, October 1985, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. EPS-85-119 (November 29, 1985), p. 71.
36. *Sonntag*, November 28, 1982, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 82872 (February 16, 1983), p. 18.
37. In 1982, for example, the Union of Evangelical Churches maintained 48 hospitals, 272 retirement homes, and 105 homes for the mentally handicapped. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, November 23, 1982, p. 1, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 82490 (December 17, 1982), p. 43.
38. Ulrich Neuhausser-Wespy, "Geschichtsbewusstsein als Intergrationsfaktor," *Deutsche Studien* 25, no. 98 (June 1987), p. 177.
39. For more details, see Ramet, "Evangelical Church," pp. 31-48; and Ronald Asmus, "Is There a Peace Movement in the GDR?" *Orbis*, Summer 1983, pp. 301-41. For a thorough presentation of the church-state conflict over the militarization of society in a historical framework, see Horst Dähn, *Konfrontation oder Kooperation! Das Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche in der SBZ/DDR, 1945-1980* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982).
40. Asmus, "Is There a Peace Movement," p. 325.
41. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, November 14, 1984, p. 8, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. EPS-85-005 (January 10, 1985), pp. 18, 19. Stolpe recognized a joint statement of September 1, 1979, by Lutheran church leaders in both German nations as "a significant indicator of common responsibility for peace of the German Protestant Church."
42. Matthias Hartman, "Anstöße zum Neuen Denken," *Kirche in Sozialismus* 13, no. 4 (August 1987), p. 147.
43. *Neue Zeit*, October 5, 1982, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 82346 (November 30, 1982), p. 9.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Endel Kallas, "What Does This Mean? Luther Reassessed in the GDR," *Lutheran Forum*, Lent 1983, p. 25.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
47. Arvan Gordon, "The Luther Quincentenary in the GDR," *Religion in Communist Dominated Lands* 12, no. 1 (Spring 1984), p. 83.
48. One such question reads: "For centuries the Church has claimed power in a political sense, citing theological grounds for doing so. In this way the Church has obscured its true role. In the GDR there is separation of State and Church. In what way can and should the Church operate in the political sphere?" *Ibid.*
49. Peter Wensierski, "Nach dem Lutherjahr: Gewachsenes Selbstbewusstsein der DDR-Kirchen," *Deutschland Archiv* 16, no. 12 (December 1983), p. 1249.
50. *Ibid.*

51. Wensierski concluded his article by suggesting that greater involvement by church leaders in matters of the state may lead to the bishops rather than party officials bearing responsibility for church-state conflicts.
52. Gordon, "Luther Quincentenary," p. 85.
53. *Neue Zeit* (East Berlin), February 12, 1986, p. 3, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. EER-86-053 (April 8, 1986), p. 68.
54. *Der Spiegel*, May 18, 1987, p. 76.
55. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, October 1985, in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. EPS-85-119 (November 29, 1985), p. 66.
56. Hartman, "Anstösse zum Neuen Denken," p. 150.
57. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, October 24, 1986, p. 7.
58. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, September 25, 1987, p. 2.
59. *Iwe Tagesdienst* (West Berlin), May 1985, p. 2, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. EPS-85-063 (June 3, 1985), p. 59.
60. Hans Düfel, "Das Lutherjubiläum 1883," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 95, no. 1 (1984), p. 86.
61. Quoted in Neuhäusser-Wespy, "Geschichtsbewusstsein," p. 177.

CHAPTER 10

1. For details, see Z. Anthony Kruszewski, *The Oder-Neisse Boundary and Poland's Modernization* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 35-87.
2. Boleslaw Kominek, *W służbie Ziemi Zachodnich* (Wrocław: Księgarnia Archidiecezjalna, 1977), pp. 65-66.
3. "Kosciol na Dolnym Slasku," *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Kraków), December 13, 1981, pp. 4-5.
4. Kominek, *W służbie*, p. 132.
5. E.g., preservation of the Schneidemuehl prelacy *nullius*. For broader treatment of this point, see Jan Zaborowski, *Kosciol nad Odra i Nysa*, 2d ed. (Warsaw: Novum, 1970), pp. 46-64.
6. Kominek, *W służbie*, p. 18.
7. Ryszard Marek, *Kosciol rzymsko-katolicki wobec ziem zachodnich i polnocnych* (Warsaw: PWN, 1976), pp. 15-16.
8. Karl Hartmann, "Der Polnische Episcopat und die Oder-Neisse Gebiete," *Osteuropa* 21, no. 3 (March 1971), p. 166; Edmund Moszyński, "The Church on the Western Territories," *Polish Perspectives* 16, no. 3 (March 1973), pp. 19-20; and Zyrill Boldirev, "Staat und Kirche in Polen," *Osteuropa* 11, no. 1 (January 1961), p. 27.
9. Joachim Piegsa, "Die Rolle der Kirche in Polen," *Politische Studien* 33, no. 264 (July-August 1982), p. 389.
10. Jan Nowak, "The Church in Poland," *Problems of Communism* 31, no. 1 (January-February 1982), p. 3.
11. Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, in speech of April 30, 1977, as quoted in *Prymas Tyrsaclecia* (Paris: Notre Famille, 1982), pp. 139-40.

12. *Listy Pasterskie Episkopatu Polski, 1945–1974* (Paris: Éditions du Dialogue, 1975), pp. 66–67.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 750–61.
14. *Prymas Tysiaclecia*, pp. 148–51. See also “Society for Academic Courses: The Flying University,” *Survey* 24, no. 4 (Autumn 1979), pp. 114–26.
15. *Księga Jubileuszowa 50-lecia Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Natukowe KUL, 1969), *passim*.
16. Stefan Wyszyński, *Kosciol w służbie Narodu* (Rome: Corda Cordi, 1981), p. 286.
17. Another third came from the Society of Friends of KUL.
18. Poland/Situation Report no. 9, *Radio Free Europe Research*, May 29, 1981, p. 9.
19. Jozef Tischner, *Polski kształt dialogu* (Paris: Editions Spotkania, 1981), p. 93.
20. The number of priests ordained from diocesan seminaries 1945–78 inclusive was 12,931, and from monastical seminaries 1972–78 inclusive was 947. See Witold Zdaniewicz, *The Catholic Church in Poland, 1945–1978* (Poznan: Pallotinum, 1979), pp. 36, 45.
21. *Lad* (Warsaw), November 15, 1981, p. 4.
22. *Ibid.*, July 25, 1982, pp. 1, 4.
23. E.g., the 1974 Warsaw Sacro-song, which lasted for four days, attracted two thousand performers and more than fifty thousand spectators.
24. Interview with Bishop Jozef Glemp, in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, June 21, 1981, p. 5.
25. *Listy Pasterskie Episkopatu*, pp. 38–39.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 52–56.
27. *Listy Pasterskie Prymasa Polski, 1946–1974* (Paris: Éditions du Dialogue, 1975), pp. 30–46.
28. Andrzej Micewski, “Kardynał Wyszyński a rok 1968,” *Tygodnik Powszechny*, October 18, 1981, p. 3.
29. Interview with Bishop Glemp, n. 24 of this chapter.
30. Maciej Letowski, “Kto zagraza Solidarnosci,” *Lad*, September 13, 1981, p. 4.
31. Pastoral letter of December 14, 1980, “Biskupi polscy wzywaja do chrzescijanskiej odpowiedzialnosci na Ojczyzne.”
32. Andrzej Micewski, *Kardynał Wyszyński, Prymas i Maz Stanu* (Paris: Éditions du Dialogue, 1982), p. 428.
33. Sergiusz Kowalski, “Polski syndrom,” *Solidarnosc*, July 10, 1981.
34. Adam Michnik, *Kosciol—Lewica—Dialog* (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1977).
35. *Kultura* (Paris), October 1980, pp. 4–7.
36. Communiqué from the meeting of the episcopate’s Main Council of December 15, 1981.
37. See, for example, B. Mahin, “Religiya v ideynom arsenale antikommunizma,” *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie*, no. 12 (December 1982), pp. 117–18.
38. Communiqué of the 213th Plenary Conference of the Polish Episcopate, Jasna Gora, May 2, 1986.
39. Ks. Tadeusz Styczen and Red. Edward Balawajder, *Jedynie prawda wyzwala: Rozmowy o Janie Pawle II* (Rome: Polski Instytut Kultury Chrzescijanskiej, 1986), p. 87.

40. Message from Jozef Cardinal Glemp, February 15, 1986.
41. Communiqué issued after the 227th Plenary Conference of the Polish Episcopate (Białystok, June 1988).
42. Especially the paper read by Rev. Czesław Bartnik from the Catholic University of Lublin at the conference on "The Common Christian Roots of the European Nations," Rome, November 3–7, 1981; and two articles by Rev. Jerzy Lewandowski in *Lad*, July 26, 1981, and in *Chrzescijanin w Swiecie* (Warsaw), no. 100 (July–August 1981).

CHAPTER 11

I am deeply indebted to Peter F. Sugar for his comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

1. See David W. Paul, *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1979).
2. Hungarian Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, May 8, 1981, pp. 5–9.
3. Victor S. Mamatey, "The Battle of the White Mountain as Myth in Czech History," *East European Quarterly* 15, no. 3 (September 1981), p. 335.
4. Howard Kaminsky, *A History of the Hussite Revolution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 24.
5. Ludvík Němec, *Church and State in Czechoslovakia* (New York: Vantage Press, 1955), pp. 85–86; and Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 136, 182, 351.
6. Quoted in Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1944), p. 111.
7. A. H. Hermann, *A History of the Czechs* (London: Allen Lane, 1975), p. 38.
8. "Czechoslovakia," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), vol. 4, p. 592.
9. J. N. D. Kelly, *The Oxford Dictionary of Popes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 278.
10. Matthew Spinka, "The Religious Situation in Czechoslovakia," in *Czechoslovakia*, ed. Robert J. Kerner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), p. 285.
11. Joseph F. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia," in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, ed. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970), p. 174.
12. Tomáš G. Masaryk, *The Meaning of Czech History*, trans. from Czech by Peter Kussi, ed. René Wellek (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974), p. 7.
13. "Czechoslovakia," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, p. 594.
14. Victor S. Mamatey, "The Establishment of the Republic," in *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918–1948*, ed. Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luža (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 6–7.
15. Masaryk, *Meaning of Czech History*, pp. 7, 10.
16. See Hugh LeCaine Agnew, "Enlightenment and National Consciousness: Three

- Czech 'Popular Awakeners,' " in *Nation and Ideology: Essays in Honor of Wayne S. Vucinich*, ed. Ivo Banac, John G. Ackerman, and Roman Szporluk (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1981).
17. "Czechoslovakia," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, p. 594.
 18. Josef L. Hromadká, *Thoughts of a Czech Pastor*, trans. from Czech by Monika and Benjamin Page (London: SCM Press, 1970), p. 41.
 19. Némec, *Church and State*, p. 124.
 20. *Ibid.*, pp. 127–30.
 21. Eugen Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 22–27.
 22. See Anna Josko, "The Slovak Resistance Movement," and Victor S. Mamatey, "Summary"—both in *History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, ed. Mamatey and Luža.
 23. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Slovak Nationalism in Socialist Czechoslovakia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 22, no. 2 (June 1980), p. 235.
 24. Némec, *Church and State*, p. 206.
 25. *Ibid.*, pp. 201–2; and "Czechoslovakia," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, p. 596.
 26. Karel Hruža, "Scientific Atheism," from a four-hour session at the Ministry of Education in Prague, excerpts trans. from Czech in *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas* 25, no. 1 (Winter 1986), p. 11.
 27. Erika Kadlecová, *Sociologický výzkum religiozity Severomoravského kraje* (Prague, 1965), as cited in Otto Ulč, *Politics in Czechoslovakia* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1974), p. 124.
 28. Cited in Ulč, *Politics in Czechoslovakia*, p. 125.
 29. Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, February 16, 1984, pp. 11–12.
 30. Eugen Voss, ed., *Die Religionsfreiheit in Osteuropa* (Zollikon, Switzerland: G2W-Verlag, 1984), pp. 213–14. See also Albert Rasker, "Protestantism in Czechoslovakia," *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe* 3, no. 4 (May 1983), p. 12. Karel Hruža, by then the former minister for religious affairs, reported in 1984 that there were 24,000 Jehovah's Witnesses in Czechoslovakia ("Scientific Atheism," p. 12). But the Swiss Institute *Glaube in der 2. Welt* put the figure at 7,680 for 1982, and it seems unlikely that the sect would have more than tripled its strength in two years.
 31. Némec, *Church and State*, pp. 253ff.
 32. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 253.
 33. Trevor Beeson, *Discretion and Valour: Religious Conditions in Russia and Eastern Europe*, rev. ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), p. 241.
 34. For his own words to this effect, see Hromadká, *Thoughts*, p. 87.
 35. *Priestervereinigung "Pacem in terris"*—*Eine kritische Analyse* (Munich: Sozialwerk der Ackermann-Gemeinde, 1983), p. 18; Karel Kaplan, "Church and State in Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1956," pt. 1, *Religion in Communist Lands* 14, no. 1 (Spring 1986), pp. 62, 68–69; and Némec, *Church and State*, pp. 278–92.
 36. Kaplan, "Church and State," p. 68.
 37. Quoted in Némec, *Church and State*, p. 377.
 38. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 390.

39. Alexander Tomsy, "Der Katholizismus in der Tschechoslowakei," in *Religionsfreiheit und Menschenrechte*, ed. Paul Lendvai (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1983), pp. 125-26.
40. *Priestervereinigung*, p. 19; and H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 600-602.
41. Quoted in *Priestervereinigung*, p. 45.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38, 50.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-23.
46. Until 1982 about 50 percent of Czechoslovakia's Catholic priests were members of Pacem in Terris. By early 1987, only 10 percent remained members. *Keston News Service*, no. 274 (April 30, 1987), p. 13. For more details, see Pedro Ramet, *Cross and Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 163-65.
47. For details, see Ramet, *Cross and Commissar*, chap. 8.
48. For details, see Pedro Ramet, "The Czechoslovak Church under Pressure," *The World Today* 38, no. 9 (September 1982), pp. 358-59.
49. *Aktuelnosti Kršćanske Sadasnjosti AKSA* (Zagreb), July 9, 1982.
50. *Keston News Service*, no. 287 (November 5, 1987), p. 14.
51. *Ibid.*, no. 266 (January 8, 1987), p. 13.
52. *Ibid.*, no. 286 (October 22, 1987), p. 9.
53. *Le Monde* (Paris), July 8, 1986, p. 6; and *Keston News Service*, no. 289 (December 3, 1987), p. 18.
54. *Informace o cirkvi*, 1987, no. 9, as cited in Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, November 27, 1987, pp. 20-21.
55. *The Economist* (London), December 19, 1987, p. 47; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), December 19-20, 1987, p. 7; and *New York Times*, December 19, 1987, p. 4, and December 20, 1987, p. 14.
56. AKSA, April 26, 1985.
57. Radio Prague, April 10, 1985, quoted in Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, May 13, 1985, p. 3.
58. AKSA, April 26, 1985.
59. J. P. Hensley, "Slovakia's Catholic Resurgence," in *New Leader*, July 1-15, 1985, p. 10; *Profil* (Vienna), July 15, 1985, p. 40; and *Informace o cirkvi*, 1985, no. 8, trans. into German under the title "Repressionen und Schikanen: Zur Lage der Katholischen Kirche in der Tschechoslowakei," *Osteuropa* 36, no. 7 (July 1986), p. A393.
60. Paul Wilson, "Plastic People," oral presentation at a conference on "Contemporary Religious Movements in Central Europe," University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, October 4, 1987.
61. *Keston News Service*, no. 282 (August 20, 1987), p. 11.
62. *Nova Mysl* (Prague), 1986, no. 9, pp. 105-14, as cited in Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, November 14, 1986, p. 23.
63. *Pravda* (Bratislava), September 17, 1982, p. 2, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), September 23, 1982, p. D10.

64. "Clericalism, therefore, cannot be understood as an autonomous phenomenon which is independent of the class division of society. Contemporary Catholic clericalism, whether the Church is aware of it or not, objectively serves capitalism and acts as an apologist for bourgeois society." *Nova Mysl*, 1984, no. 10, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *East Europe Report*, no. EPS-85-003 (January 7, 1985), p. 37.

CHAPTER 12

1. For the nationality problem of Greater Hungary, see C. A. Macartney's short but illuminating treatment in *Hungary, A Short History* (Chicago: Aldine, 1962), pp. 182–90. For more detailed analyses see the standard works by R. W. Seton-Watson, *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London: Constable, 1908) and *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy* (London: Constable, 1911); Oscar Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929); the introductory chapter in C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1919–1937* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 1–40, preceded by an extremely useful bibliography on pp. xiii–xxi; and Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950). Among the numerous Hungarian studies the most thorough is by Gábor G. Kemény, *A magyar nemzetiségi kérdés története; a nemzetiségi kérdés a törvények és tervezetek tükrében, 1790–1918* (The History of the Hungarian Nationality Question; the Nationality Question in the Mirror of Laws and Bills, 1790–1918) (Budapest: Gergely, 1947).
2. See my study, "Nationality and Religion in Hungary, 1867–1918," *East European Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (March 1983), pp. 41–56.
3. The most comprehensive accounts in English of the interwar history of Hungary, and also of the fate of Hungarians in the lost territories, are by C. A. Macartney, *October Fifteenth; a History of Modern Hungary, 1929/1945*, 2 vols., rev. ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1956–57) and Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*. See also Gábor Salacz, *A Magyar katolikus egyház a szomszédos államok uralma alatt* (The Hungarian Catholic Church under the Domination of the Neighboring States) (Munich: Aurora, 1975); Leslie László, *Church and State in Hungary, 1919–1945* (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1973).
4. Examples of falsification and distortion of history and its damaging effect on the national consciousness are given by György Haas, "Nemzeti tudatunk a 70-es esztendő végén" (Our National Consciousness in the Late Seventies), *Katolikus Szemle* (Rome) 32, no. 4 (Winter 1980), pp. 293–308. Less critical is George Bárány, "Hungary: From Aristocratic to Proletarian Nationalism," in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, ed. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 259–309. In Bárány's view there was a rather remarkable continuity in the national ethos even under communism.
5. Fear and hatred of the conquerors and occupiers also applies to their language. The average Hungarian shows an almost incurable dislike of the Slavic languages. This

- may explain the amazing fact that after some thirty-five years of obligatory Russian in all schools at all levels, it is still difficult to find in Hungary someone with even a rudimentary knowledge and speaking ability in Russian.
6. After years of exile in Moscow, Rákosi and his closest collaborators, Gerö, Farkas, and Vas, returned to Hungary and to power on the "baggage train" of the Red Army. They were dubbed "Muscovites," meaning that they were totally subservient to their Soviet masters. Rákosi later bragged about his own cleverness in not having frontally attacked the opposing majority, but rather cutting them up bit by bit, "like Hungarian salami [which] should be cut into very thin slices."
 7. A complete edition of his speeches, pastoral letters, official correspondence, and various other documents is available in Hungarian and German: Josef Vecsey, ed., *Mindszenty Okmánytár* (Mindszenty Documents), 3 vols. (Munich: Ledermüller Oliver, 1957). A selection of these is to be found in *Cardinal Mindszenty Speaks: Authorized White Book* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1949).
 8. The number of participants in the festivities of the Marian Year of 1947–48 was estimated to have reached 4.5 million. Since Mindszenty appeared in person and spoke to the crowd in every town and at every shrine, he must have been heard by well over 2 million people.
 9. *Cardinal Mindszenty Speaks*, pp. 118–21.
 10. *Ibid.*, pp. 112–16, 198–204. He also protested the deportation of the Swabians (ethnic Germans) from Hungary, *ibid.*, pp. 139–42. When his interventions with the authorities proved fruitless, he issued a joint pastoral letter with all the bishops, in which they solemnly condemned the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and Germans from Hungary and their resettlement away from their ancient homeland. *Ibid.*, pp. 143–48.
 11. *Ibid.*, pp. 223–30.
 12. The government's case was presented in the so-called Yellow Book, *Documents on the Mindszenty Case* (Budapest: Hungarian State Publishing House, 1949) and in the so-called Black Book, *The Trial of József Mindszenty* (Budapest: Hungarian State Publishing House, 1951). During the sensational show trial Iván Boldizsár, then head of the Ministry of Information, at a press conference on February 4, 1949, complained about the BBC for its broadcasting that "Mindszenty will stand as a brilliant example, a hero in the annals of world freedom" and asked the foreign correspondents to "make it plain to your readers that Mindszenty is not a brave man or a hero. . . . You should make it clear that he is actually very weak and pitiful. You should try to make it plain that he is not a hero of freedom." *New York Times*, February 5, 1949, p. 2.
 13. Perhaps the most notorious was János Péter, the Calvinist bishop of the Trans-Tisza District (Debrecen), the most prominent post in the Hungarian Presbyterian church. Ignominiously deposed during the 1956 revolution, he did not "pardon" his congregation later on when "order was restored" and he refused their "humble request" for his return. Instead, he became Kádár's minister of foreign affairs and publicly stated that in his heart he always was an atheist! A most revealing collection of writings by the Protestant leaders of the time—full of praise of and gratitude

toward the communists—was published under the title *Five Years of Protestantism, 1945–1950* (Budapest: Hungarian Church Press, 1950). It should be noted that there were fellow travelers also among the Catholic clergy; however, since the episcopate remained faithful and obedient to the Holy See, the so-called peace priests never attained the same importance and usefulness for the regime, either for domestic or for foreign propaganda purposes, as did the Protestant leadership.

14. See Leslie László, "The Agreement between the Hungarian Government and the Catholic Episcopate" (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1958). The texts of the agreements with the churches are printed in Vladimir Gsovski, ed., *Church and State behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: Praeger, 1955), pp. 134–41.
15. A careful analysis of the 225 major demands broadcast by the revolutionary radio stations between October 23 and November 9, 1956, shows the overriding concern for national independence and political reform (in the sense of greater democratic freedoms), with surprisingly low priority given to economic betterment. This confirms the impression that the revolt was against foreign domination and an alien political system imposed on an unwilling population. Imre Kovács, ed., *Facts about Hungary* (New York: Hungarian Committee, 1958), pp. 89–106.
16. Bennett Kovrig, "Hungary," in *Communism in Eastern Europe*, ed. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew György (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 79.
17. I am in total agreement with Nándor F. Dreisziger who in "Commentary on Peter Pastor 'Official Nationalism in Hungary since 1964'" insists that a sharp distinction must be made between, on the one hand, the views and motives of the party and the government, including the army's high command and, on the other, the Hungarian masses, "which were driven by Russophobia and traditional nationalism. If we do not make this differentiation, we come dangerously close to accepting the Trotskyist interpretation that the 1956 uprising was a workers' revolution for the attainment of a truly communistic society." In *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin*, ed. George W. Simmonds (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1977), pp. 442. I might add that, with few exceptions, the generally accepted view in East and West is that, while Imre Nagy and other communist intellectuals might have toyed with "national communism" on the Yugoslav or Polish models, this was not what the Hungarian population wanted. Their representatives, notably István Bibó, minister of state in Imre Nagy's last cabinet, advocated the "Third Road" for Hungary, namely national independence, neutrality, and a political system of pluralistic democracy. Furthermore, those who stubbornly maintain that Hungarians in 1956 wanted to preserve communism and fought only against its abuses should consider the following question: Why in less than ten years (and precisely the years of the worst communist terror and economic misery) would the four-fifths of the population who rejected communism in the relatively free elections of 1945 and again 1947, have changed their minds so radically? To argue that in ten years a new generation had taken over is obviously absurd.
18. Pastor, "Official Nationalism in Hungary," p. 411.

19. Leslie László, "Towards Normalization of Church-State Relations in Hungary," in *Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe*, ed. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and John Strong (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 291-313.
20. Leslie László, "Religion in a Communist Consumer Society: The Case of Kádár's Hungary," *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe* I, no. 5 (September 1981), pp. 1-3. See also Paul Mojzes, *Christian-Marxist Dialogue in Eastern Europe* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 66-73.
21. Miklós Tomka, "Handing on the Faith," in *Churches in Socialist Societies of Eastern Europe*, ed. Norbert Greinacher and Virgil Elizondo (New York: Seabury, 1982), pp. 70-73. This volume is no. 154 of the multilingual series *Concilium: Religion in the Eighties*.
22. See the excellent, concise study by George Schöpflin, *The Hungarians of Rumania*, Minority Rights Group, report no. 37 (London, 1978).
23. A collection of his lectures and articles, addressed to Hungarians and foreign audiences on this theme, was published under the title *Szellem és erőszak* (The Spirit and Brute Force) (Budapest: Magvető, 1978).
24. It was the Catholic monthly *Vigilia* that first began to publish works by Transylvanian authors in the early seventies; today it carries contributions from Hungarians anywhere, East and West. In the West the prestigious quarterly *Katolikus Szemle* (Catholic Review) (Rome) has for many years devoted an entire section of every issue to the problems of the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring states. The same applies to the Protestants and their press. For example, the 1973 Congress of the Hungarian Protestant Free University in Europe, held in Bern, was devoted entirely to this theme. The papers presented there were published in two volumes under the title *Nemzetiségi kisebbség—kisebbségi egyház* (National Minority—Minority Church) (Munich: Aurora, 1973).
25. For example, badly damaged, dilapidated Transylvanian Calvinist churches were restored thanks to donations from the Hungarian United church (Presbyterian) of Canada. On the Catholic side the most generous foreign aid is furnished by German and Austrian Catholic organizations.
26. "National Minorities and the German Catholic Church in Rumania," in *Churches in Socialist Societies*, ed. Greinacher and Elizondo, pp. 25-26.
27. Alfred Reisch, "Hungary Seeks to Make Minority Rights an International Issue," *Radio Free Europe Research*, April 3, 1987, pp. 11-17.
28. *Reformátusok Lapja*, December 21-28, 1986.
29. *Új Ember*, January 4, 1987.
30. Official statistics about nationality or mother tongue are notoriously unreliable. Estimates about the number of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia range between 400,000 and 600,000; in Yugoslavia between 500,000 and 600,000; in the USSR between 150,000 and 200,000; in Romania between 1,800,000 and 2,100,000. For a fairly recent review of the situation of these minorities, see Elemér Homonnay, "The Hungarians in the Communist Successor States since 1964," in *Nationalism in the USSR*, ed. Simmonds, pp. 420-40.
31. It is interesting to note that by now even the Communist government appreciates the role of the churches in the defence of the Hungarian minorities. See the state-

ments by State Secretary Imre Miklós, chairman of the State Office for Church Affairs, as quoted by Edith Markos, "Official Seeks Church Cooperation on Social, Minority Problems," *Radio Free Europe Research*, May 18, 1987, p. 25.

32. See Leslie László, "Subversion or Bridge-building? A Study of the Communist Use of Churches for Propaganda Abroad and Its Effect on the Hungarian Communities in North America," in the *Proceedings of the Second Banff Conference on Central and East European Studies*, March 2–5, 1978, vol. 3, pp. 89–102.
33. The only full-fledged Hungarian high school in the West, at Burg Kastl, Germany, with over five hundred boys and girls in its boarding school, is supported by the Catholic church (and is also subsidized by the Bavarian and the German federal governments). The best attended weekend Hungarian language school in North America is the one operated in St. Elizabeth parish in Toronto, with an enrollment of about four hundred children each year.
34. The Boy Scouts (and Girl Guides), banned in Hungary since 1946, embrace thousands of young Hungarians in all continents, always in close cooperation with the local Hungarian churches.

CHAPTER 13

Part of the research for this chapter was made possible through the assistance of a research grant from the American Council of Learned Societies, financed in part by the National Endowment for the Humanities.

1. Ivan Cvitković, "Stavovi suvremenih teologa o odnosu religije i religijskih zajednica prema politici u socijalizmu," *Politička misao* 15, no. 4 (1978), p. 653.
2. Edvard Kardelj, *Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja*, 2d ed. (Belgrade: Kultura, 1957); Edvard Kardelj, "O naciji i međunacionalnim odnosima," *Treći program*, no. 40 (Winter 1979); Atif Purivatra, "Stav komunističke partije Jugoslavije prema nacionalnom pitanju u Bosni i Hercegovini," in *Nacionalni odnosi danas*, ed. Milan Petrović and Kasim Suljević (Sarajevo: Univerzal, 1971); Krste Crvenkovski, *Međunacionalni odnosi u samoupravnom društvu* (Belgrade: Sedma sila, 1967); Hamdija Pozderac, *Nacionalni odnosi i socijalističko zajedništvo* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1978); and Jovan Raičević, "Savez komunista Jugoslavije i nacionalno pitanje," in *KPJ-SK: Razvoj teorije i prakse socijalizma, 1919–1979* (Belgrade: Savremena administracija, 1979). See also Walter Lukan, "Zur nationalen Frage eines kleinen Volkes: Edvard Kardeljs Darstellung zur Entwicklung der nationalen Frage bei den Slovenen," in *Österreichische Osthefte* 15, no. 4 (November 1973), and 16, no. 1 (February 1974).
3. This was admitted by Božidar Gagro, president of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Croatia, when he told *NIN* in early 1982 that memories of World War II constitute one of the most important obstacles to overcoming tensions and frictions, especially where relations between the state and the Catholic church are concerned. Reported in *Aktualnosti Kršćanske Sadašnjosti*, Informativni bilten (hereinafter, *AKSA*), March 19, 1982.
4. I was told by certain Serbian Orthodox clergy in Belgrade in July 1982 that the

- rosy picture painted by the regime of harmonious and unruffled relations between the Serbian Orthodox church and the LCY is, even leaving aside the issue of the Macedonian Orthodox church, fallacious and illusory. This was reaffirmed when I visited Belgrade in June and July 1987.
5. See Branislav Djurdjev, *Uloga crkve u starijoj istoriji Srpskog naroda* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1964), p. 55.
 6. Ivo Pilar, *Die Südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg* (Vienna: Manzschke K. u. K. Hof-, Verlags- u. Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1918), pp. 170, 185, 195, 213, 313–14. A recent example of the argument that Bosnian Muslims are Croats is Mladen Dolić, "Narodna svijest i žrtve Bosansko-hercegovačkih muslimana," *Republika Hrvatska* (Buenos Aires) 36, no. 154 (September 1986). For an argument that Bosnian Muslims are Serbs, see Lazo M. Kostić, *Etnički odnosi Bosne i Hercegovine* (Munich: Iskra, 1967). For an elaborate analysis of competing theories about the ethnicity of Bosnia's Muslims, see Pedro Ramet, "Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia's Muslims," *Nationalities Papers* 13, no. 2 (Fall 1985).
 7. Interestingly enough, the Croatian monasteries were excluded from the ban. See *Mali ključ povijesti crkve u Hrvata*, 3d ed. (Zagreb: Nadbiskupski duhovni stol, 1981), p. 117.
 8. *Ibid.*, p. 136; John V. A. Fine, Jr., *The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1975), pp. 3–4, 15, 51–52; and Jaroslav Šidak, *Studije o 'crkvi bosanskoj' i bogumilstvu* (Zagreb: S. N. Liber, 1975), pp. 87, 89.
 9. *Pregled* (Sarajevo), April 1970, translated in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), *Translations on Eastern Europe*, July 6, 1970; and Fine, *Bosnian Church*, pp. 10–11, 14–15, 18–19.
 10. Fine, *Bosnian Church*, p. 342.
 11. Harold W. V. Temperley, *History of Serbia* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), p. 125; and Djurdjev, *Uloga crkve*, pp. 144–45.
 12. Keith Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality: Andreiu Șaguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846–1873* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 185–86.
 13. Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 264.
 14. Ivan Mužić, *Hrvatska politika i jugoslavenska ideja* (Split, 1969), pp. 15, 9.
 15. This section draws liberally from my essay, "From Strossmayer to Stepinac: Croatian National Ideology and Catholicism," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 12, no. 1 (Spring 1985).
 16. Reinhard Lauer, "Genese und Funktion des illyrischen Ideologems in den südslawischen Literaturen (16. bis Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts)," in *Ethnogenese und Staatsbildung in Südosteuropa*, ed. Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1974), p. 119.
 17. See Ante Kadić, "Križanić and His Predecessors—The Slavic Idea among the Croatian Baroque Writers," in *Juraj Križanić (1618–1683): Russophile and Ecumenic Visionary*, ed. Thomas Eckman and Ante Kadić (The Hague: Mouton, 1976).
 18. For a detailed discussion of Strossmayer, see Charles Joseph Slovak III, *Josip Juraj*

- Strossmayer, *A Balkan Bishop: The Early Years, 1815–1854* (Unpublished Ph.D. diss.: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1974).
19. In 1982, Stevan Nikšić and Milan Milošević defended Strossmayer against unnamed critics and repudiated Croatian nationalist claims that Strossmayer's "Yugoslavism" was actually a poorly disguised species of Croatian nationalism. See *NIN*, no. 1625 (February 21, 1982), p. 12.
 20. See Mario S. Spalatin, "The Croatian Nationalism of Ante Starčević, 1845–1871," *Journal of Croatian Studies* 16 (1975).
 21. Quoted in Mužić, *Hrvatska politika*, p. 43.
 22. Andrija Nikić, "Franjevci u Hercegovini od 1878. do 1892. godine," *Kačić* 10 (1978), pp. 180, 219.
 23. Viktor Novak, *Velika optužba (Magnum Crimen)* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1960), vol. 1, pp. 53, 58–66.
 24. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 155–56.
 25. Fred Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 196.
 26. Quoted in Fikreta Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše i NDH* (Zagreb: S. N. Liber and Školska knjiga, 1977), p. 215.
 27. See Ernest Bauer, *Aloisius Kardinal Stepinac: Ein Leben für Wahrheit, Recht, und Gerechtigkeit* (Recklinghausen: Georg Bitter, 1979); O. Aleksa Benigar, *Alojzije Stepinac, Hrvatski kardinal* (Rome: Ziral, 1974); Anthony O'Brien, *Archbishop Stepinac: The Man and His Case* (Dublin: Standard House, 1947); and Richard Pattee, *The Case of Cardinal Aloisius Stepinac* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1953). A very slanted biography is Ivan Cvitković's *Ko je bio Alojzije Stepinac*, 2d ed. (Sarajevo: Oslobodjenje, 1986).
 28. Novak, *Velika optužba*, vol. 2, p. 125.
 29. Quoted in Carlo Falconi, *The Silence of Pius X*, trans. Bernard Wall (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 327.
 30. Ivona Dončević, "Scherben jugoslawischer Einigkeit," in *Kroatische Berichte*, January–April 1981, p. 14. For details, see Benigar, *Alojzije Stepinac*, pp. 502–3.
 31. Robert J. Donia, *Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1878–1914* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1981), p. 98. Under Ottoman law, the testimony of one Balkan Muslim carried the same weight as that of twenty Christians.
 32. As a research scholar, Benjámín von Kállay concluded that Muslim Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats were all members of the same nationality. As governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he banned his own book (in which he had argued the grounds for South Slav unity) and forbade its distribution in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Herbert Adams Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe, 1911–1914* (New York: Century, 1916), p. 160n.
 33. Donia, *Islam under the Double Eagle*, pp. 140–41.
 34. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
 35. Quoted in Kasim Suljević, *Nacionalnost Muslimana* (Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 1981), p. 153.
 36. Jovo Jakšić, *Ustavno pitanje u Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade, 1934), p. 14, as cited in Suljević, *Nacionalnost Muslimana*, p. 165.

37. Paul R. Brass, "Ethnic Groups and Nationalities," in *Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe*, ed. Peter F. Sugar (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1980), p. xx.
38. Robin Okey, *Eastern Europe, 1740-1980* (London: Hutchinson, 1982), p. 106.
39. Jaszi, *Dissolution*, p. 69.
40. See, for instance, *Politika*, May 10, 1972, p. 8.
41. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, "The Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia: The Problem of the Macedonian Church," *Eastern Churches Review* 1, no. 4 (Winter 1967-68), pp. 380-81.
42. See "Makedonska crkva samovoljno se otcipila od majke Srpske crkve," *Pravoslavljje*, September 15, 1967, pp. 1-2.
43. Pavlowitch, "Orthodox Church," p. 382; and "Die 'autokephale Mazedonische Kirche,'" *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa* 16, no. 8 (August 1967), p. 139.
44. Done Ilievski, "The Fifth Anniversary of the Macedonian Orthodox Church," *Macedonian Review* 2, no. 2 (1972), p. 213.
45. *NIN*, March 5, 1972, p. 25, trans. in *Joint Translation Service*, no. 6190.
46. Interviews with the author, Belgrade, July 1982 and July 1987.
47. *Borba*, July 18, 1982, p. 3; and *Vjesnik*, July 19, 1982, p. 12.
48. *Nova Makedonija*, *Sabota* supplement, October 10, 1981, p. 5, trans. in *IPRS, East Europe Report*, no. 79748 (December 29, 1981), p. 38.
49. Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia*, p. 229; and Christopher Cviic, "Recent Developments in Church-State Relations in Yugoslavia," *Religion in Communist Lands* 1, no. 2 (March-April 1973), p. 8.
50. See *Vesnik: Organ Saveza udruženog Pravoslavnog sveštenstva Jugoslavije* [hereinafter, *Vesnik*], January 1-15, 1971, p. 10; and February 1, 1971, p. 7.
51. See *Vesnik*, April 1, 1971, p. 7.
52. See, for example, *Vesnik*, January 15, 1967, p. 4; February 1, 1967, p. 2; March 1, 1967, p. 8; and August 1-15, 1971, p. 5. Also *Politika*, December 12, 1970, p. 6, trans. into German under the title "Die Kirche als Gralshüterin Nationalen Bewusstseins," *Osteuropa* 21, no. 5 (May 1971), pp. A335-A336; and *Pravoslavljje*, May 15, 1987, p. 2.
53. Quoted in Michael B. Petrovich, "Yugoslavia: Religion and the Tensions of a Multi-National State," *East European Quarterly* 6, no. 1 (March 1972), p. 122.
54. *Pravoslavljje*, May 15, 1982, p. 1.
55. *AKSA*, May 4 and 21, 1982. See also *Pravoslavljje*, February 15, 1982, p. 2.
56. See *Danas*, June 1, 1982, pp. 23-24, and June 22, 1982, pp. 24-25; and *Vjesnik*, *Sedam dana* supplement, May 29, 1982, p. 19, and June 19, 1982, p. 19.
57. *Vesnik*, May 1987, pp. 1, 3.
58. *Pravoslavljje*, July 15, 1987, p. 13.
59. Interview with the author, Belgrade, June 1987.
60. Reported in *AKSA*, May 8, 1987.
61. *NIN*, no. 1900 (March 22, 1987), pp. 20-22.
62. *Glas koncila*, August 2, 1987, p. 2.
63. Interviews with the author, Belgrade, July 1982 and July 1987. See also *Oslobodjenje*, September 18-24, 1981.

64. *Yugoslavia: Freedom to Conform* (New York: U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, August 1, 1982), pp. 13–14.
65. On appeal, the prison term was eventually reduced to 2.5 years.
66. Tanjug, October 28, 1972, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 57563 (November 20, 1972). See also *Borba*, October 24, 1970, p. 11.
67. *The Guardian* (Manchester), April 17, 1978, p. 7; *Nedjeljna Dalmacija*, June 6, 1971, pp. 5, 10, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 53764 (August 5, 1971); *Glas koncila*, June 15, 1969, p. 1; *Croatia Press* 32, nos. 1–2 (April–June 1979), p. 4; and *Glas koncila*, July 12, 1981, p. 2, excerpted and trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 78682 (August 5, 1981), p. 44.
68. *Vjesnik*, February 27, 1980, p. 5.
69. Tomislav Šagi-Bunić, "Kršćanstvo i nacionalizam," *Glas koncila*, June 15, 1969, pp. 4, 6. See also Tomislav J. Šagi-Bunić, *Katolička crkva i hrvatski narod* (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1983).
70. Quoted in *Danas*, as cited in Tanjug, January 11, 1983, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), January 12, 1983, p. 17.
71. Franjo Cardinal Kuharić, in interview with *Veritas*, March 1987, excerpted in *Glas koncila*, March 8, 1987, p. 3.
72. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, June 23 and July 2, 1983, as summarized in *Nova Hrvatska*, July 17, 1983, p. 15.
73. *Oslobodjenje*, January 12, 1972, p. 5; and *Washington Post*, January 23, 1972, p. A-25.
74. *Borba*, October 9, 1970, p. 6.
75. *Naša*, December 25, 1971, quoted in *Oslobodjenje*, March 11, 1972, p. 17, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 55581 (March 30, 1972).
76. *Borba*, January 21, 1972.
77. *Vjesnik*, *Sedam dana* supplement, April 28, 1979, p. 19.
78. *Washington Post*, January 23, 1972, p. A-25.
79. Interview with the author, Zagreb, July 1982.
80. See Stipe Šuvar, *Nacionalno i nacionalističko* (Split: Marksistički centar, 1974), pp. 222, 332–34.
81. Quoted in *Die Welt* (Bonn, September 11, 1979), p. 5.
82. Tanjug, July 27, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), July 28, 1981, p. 113.
83. *Borba*, June 6, 1981, p. 11.
84. Quoted in *Danas*, February 10, 1987, p. 24.
85. *Borba*, November 10, 1986, p. 2; and *Vjesnik*, November 11, 1986, p. 5.
86. *Vjesnik*, April 14, 1980, p. 5.
87. AKSA, December 4, 1981.
88. *Večernji list* (Zagreb), September 14, 1983, as cited in AKSA, October 16, 1983.
89. *NIN*, no. 1208 (March 3, 1974), trans. into German under the title "Streit um die Anerkennung der bosnisch-herzegowinischen Mohammedaner als Nation," *Osteuropa* 25, no. 4 (April 1975), pp. A238–A240.
90. "Staat und Nationalität in Jugoslawien," *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa* 19, no. 8 (August 1970), pp. 113–14.

91. "Moslem dissent in Yugoslavia," *Foreign Report*, October 17, 1970, p. 6.
92. Fuad Muhić, interview in *Start*, no. 283 (November 28–December 12, 1979), pp. 13–14.
93. *Borba*, May 10, 1972, p. 5; and interview with the author, Sarajevo, June 1980. Similarly, a proposal to organize an association of Muslims who had been to Mecca was disapproved by Bosnian authorities on the grounds that it was unnecessary, discriminatory, and potentially dangerous. See *Oslobodjenje*, October 5, 1971, p. 3, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 54338 (October 28, 1971).
94. Ivan Cvitković, *Savez komunista i religija*, 2d enl. ed. (Sarajevo: Oslobodjenje, 1985), pp. 35, 46, citing Džozo Husein, "Islam i Musliman," *Glasnik vrhovnog islamskog starješinstva* 33, nos. 5–6 (1970); and *Preporod*, no. 26 (1971).
95. Stipe Šuvar, "There Is Never Enough Equality," *Naše teme*, no. 11 (November 1980), trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, no. 77506 (March 4, 1981), pp. 43–44.
96. *Vjesnik*, January 29, 1981, p. 12.
97. *Preporod*, November 15, 1982, p. 2; and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 3, 1983, p. 5.
98. *Večernje novosti* (Belgrade), July 2, 1981.
99. "The Islamic Declaration," trans. in *South Slav Journal* 6, no. 1 (Spring 1983), pp. 68, 82.
100. *Archiv der Gegenwart*, August 20, 1983, p. 26903.
101. *Keston News Service*, no. 276 (May 28, 1987), p. 12, and no. 278 (June 25, 1987), pp. 4–5; and *Vjesnik*, June 6, 1987, p. 12.
102. *Borba*, October 10, 1970, p. 11, and October 21, 1970, p. 4.

CHAPTER 14

1. The best historical work on Romania is still R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934).
2. *Ibid.*
3. E.g., Keith Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality: Andrei Șaguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846–1873* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), especially chap. 7.
4. See, for example, Keith Hitchins, *The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780–1849* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), especially chaps. 5 and 6.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 113–20, 208–20; and Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality*, pp. 3–5, 200–205, 220–25.
7. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, chaps. 9–11.
8. For a thorough discussion of the uprising of Tudor, see Andrei Otetea, *Tudor Vladimirescu și Revoluția din 1821* (Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica, 1971).
9. Andrei Otetea, *Istoria Poporului Român* (Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica, 1970), pp. 475–87.

10. E.g., Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 60–65.
11. Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality*, esp. chap. 3.
12. *Ibid.*, esp. pp. 240–45.
13. *Ibid.*, chap. 8.
14. Hitchins, *Rumanian National Movement*, pp. 207–18. Another, earlier document of Romanian national thought was the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum*, reprinted in D. Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* (Bucharest: Bibliotheca Historica Romaniae, 1971).
15. The main sources utilized in this compilation are the two volumes by Hitchins (*Rumanian National Movement* and *Orthodoxy and Nationality*), with numerous references to the individuals throughout both volumes.
16. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, chap. 17.
17. For a discussion of this point, see Stephen Fischer-Galați, *Twentieth Century Romania* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 102–28. See also *Scinteia*, March 9, 1963, for a statement on the “Romanian road to socialism.”
18. Earl A. Pope, “The Contemporary Religious Situation in Romania” (paper presented at the Second World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Garmisch, Germany, 1980), pp. 1–5.
19. I have discussed this heterogeneity in my book *Modernization in Romania since World War II* (New York: Praeger, 1975), chap. 8.
20. For a discussion of this, see my “The Communist Party of Romania,” in *The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe*, ed. Stephen Fischer-Galați (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 284–86.
21. This support is demonstrated by the membership of the main political organs of the Romanian Communist party (PCR) as reported in *Congresul al X-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman* (Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1969), pp. 749–59.
22. A good example of this element of “Ceaușescuism” is found in his speech to the Congress of Political Education and Socialist Culture, reported in *Scinteia*, June 3, 1976.
23. *Ibid.*
24. This theme was sounded repeatedly by the general secretary in his speech to the twelfth PCR congress in November 1979. See *Scinteia*, November 20, 1979.
25. See, for example, *Scinteia Tineretului*, January 25, 1986.
26. This policy has not been appreciated by all Romanian writers and artists, however. See, for example, the literary critic Alex Stefanescu in *Convorbiri Literare* (Iași), no. 1981.
27. *Agerpres*, February 27, 1987.
28. An example of this ambivalence is the election of a new Orthodox patriarch in June 1977. The new church leader, Justin Moisescu (metropolitan of Moldavia and Suceava), was received by Nicolae Ceaușescu at the state council on June 18, 1977. See Romanian Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, June 22, 1977. The Uniates, on the other hand, are not as fortunate. Pope John Paul II, in consecrating nine new bishops, including the Romanian Traian Crisan, spoke about continued

- persecution of Uniates in Romania and the Vatican's concern over this practice. See UPI, January 4 and 6, 1982; and the discussion in *Radio Free Europe Research*, January 26, 1982.
29. The policy of church demolitions was defended by the "court poet" Vadim Tudor in the weekly *Saptamina* (Bucharest), January 10, 1986.
 30. Even the Orthodox church, which has traditionally had good relations with the regime, is now suffering under harsher restrictions. See, for example, Romanian Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, March 6, 1987, pp. 29-31.
 31. E.g., Ceaușescu's speech to the PCR Central Committee in 1971, establishing the ideological campaign, in *Scinteia*, January 6, 1971.
 32. For example, *Scinteia Tineretului*, December 21, 1985, attacked the Jehovah's Witnesses for this. In January 1986 there were trials of Evangelical Christians. See *Keston News Service*, no. 244 (February 20, 1986), p. 7.
 33. Regime policies against the Uniates, Roman Catholics, and various Protestant groups have been discussed in Peter J. Babris, *Silent Churches: Persecution of Religions in the Soviet-Dominated Areas* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Research Publishers, 1978), pp. 347-57.
 34. This cult pertains to Elena Ceaușescu as well. See the panegyrics to her on her birthday, e.g., Ilie Purcaru in *Luceafarul*, January 4, 1986; and Narcis Zarnescu in *Saptamina*, January 4, 1986.
 35. One of the most recent changes, involving a number of high party and government officials, occurred in November 1981. See Romanian Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, December 3, 1981.
 36. An example of this is Ceaușescu's speech to the second congress of Working People's Councils in 1981, in which he blasted cynicism, mismanagement, waste, and corruption. See *Scinteia*, June 26, 1981.
 37. Pope, "Contemporary Religious Situation." Marin Preda, a well-known Romanian writer who died in May 1980, described, in his last novel, *The Most Beloved of Earthlings*, the moral stultification of life under a restrictive political system.
 38. Pope, "Contemporary Religious Situation," esp. pp. 44-47.
 39. Emigration of ethnic Germans is being allowed (albeit on a small, controlled scale), because of Romania's need for good relations with West Germany. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, January 7, 1978, pp. 1-2; October 4, 1984, p. 3; October 30, 1984, p. 12; and March 21, 1986, p. 12; and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), December 24-27, 1987, p. 5.
 40. The views of some Protestants, as well as the regime's approach to them, have been discussed in Babris, *Silent Churches*, esp. pp. 355-57. For a discussion of the main manifestations of the Romanian dissident movement in the second half of the 1970s, see "Dissidents: Additional Signatories to Human Rights Document," *Radio Free Europe Research*, March 24, 1977.
 41. Pope, "Contemporary Religious Situation," pp. 6-7.
 42. *Era Socialista* (Bucharest), April 5, 1982.
 43. *Viata Studenteasca* (Bucharest), April 28, 1982.
 44. E.g., *Scinteia*, May 25, 1982.

CHAPTER 15

This is an extract from a study entitled *The Bulgarian Orthodox Church in Modern Times* presently being considered for publication. The research for this study was partly subsidized by the East Stroudsburg University.

1. Paisii Khilendarski, *Slaviano-bulgarska istoria*, ed. P. Dinekov (Sofia: Bulgarski pisatel, 1963), p. 29.
2. Quoted in Todor Subev, *Uchrediavane i diotsez na bulgarskata Ekzarkhia do 1878 g.* (Sofia: Sinodalno izdatelstvo, 1973), pp. 17–18.
3. Richard von Mach, *The Bulgarian Exarchate, its History and the Extent of Its Authority in Turkey* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907), p. 13; Kiril, Patriarkh Bulgarski, *Graf N. P. Ignatiev i bulgarskiat tsurkoven vupros, izsledvane i dokumenti* (Sofia: Sinodalno izdatelstvo, 1958), pp. 127–60; Thomas A. Meininger, *Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 1864–1872: A Study in Personal Diplomacy* (Madison, Wis.: State Historical Society, 1970), pp. 126–71.
4. Manuil I. Gedeon, *Engrafa patriarkhika ke sinodika peri tou vouglikou zitimatou, 1852–1873* (Constantinople: Patriarkhikou tipografou, 1908), pp. 427–32.
5. Quoted in Subev, *Uchrediavane i diotsez*, p. 71.
6. von Mach, *Bulgarian Exarchate*, pp. 80–81.
7. Iosif I. Ekzarkh Bulgarski, *Iubileen sbornik, 1877–1902*, izdava Bulgarskoto knizhovo druzhestvo (Sofia, 1904), p. 93.
8. Stefan Tsankov, "Bulgarskata pravoslavna tsurkva ot osvobozhdenieto do nastoyashte vreme," *Godishnik na Sofiyskiya universitet, Bogoslovski fakultet XVI* (1938–39) (Sofia: Pridvorna pechatnitsa, 1939), p. 129; Christ Anastassov, *The Tragic Peninsula* (St. Louis: Blackwell Wielandy, 1938), p. 245.
9. *Enquête dans les Balkans, Rapport* (Lyons: Dotation Carnegie pour la paix internationale, 1914), pp. 151–65; Arkhimandrit Evtimi, "Bulgarskata ekzarkhiya v Tsarigrad," *III Godishnik na Sofiyskiya universitet, Bogoslovski fakultet XI* (1933–34) (Sofia: Pridvorna pechatnitsa, 1934), pp. 55–56.
10. The decision to elect an exarch was taken by the Holy Synod on September 18, 1944. See *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 19 (July 1, 1980); Gerasimou I. Konidari, *E arsis tou vouglikou skhismatos, 1930–35 Kai 1945* (Thessalonica, 1950), pp. 127–95; "Naredba-Zakon za izmenenie i dopulnenie na ekzarkhuskiya ustav," *Durzhaven vestnik*, no. 11 (January 15, 1945), no. 22 (January 29, 1945); Tsankov, "Bulgarskata pravoslavna," pp. 175–79.
11. The documents on Stefan's resignation were published by the Holy Synod in *Tsurkoven vestnik*, September 21, 1948, and October 7, 1948. Following the resignation, the former exarch was arrested on December 20, 1948, and was kept incommunicado in a provincial town until his death in 1957. A spurious document, purporting to be his last testament, has surfaced in a publication of Keston College, England, *Religion in Communist Lands* 7, no. 2 (Summer 1979), according to which the downfall of the exarch was plotted by the government and the synod. For more on the subject, see Boncho Asenov, "Khameleoni v rasa," *Ateistichna tribuna* 5 (1983), pp. 73–77; and Spas T. Raikin, "How Not to Write History," *Free Agrarian Banner*, nos. 33–34 (December 1983), pp. 45–46.

12. Erich Weingartner, ed., *Church within Socialism: Church and State in East European Republics* (Rome: International Documentation Centre, 1976), p. 121. A different translation was published by Robert Tobias, *Communist-Christian Encounter in Eastern Europe* (Indianapolis: School of Religion Press, 1956), p. 355.
13. *Tsurkoven vestnik*, nos. 18–19 (1948). On the fall of Exarch Stefan, see more in Spas T. Raikin, "The Communists and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 1944–1948: The Rise and Fall of Exarch Stefan," *Religion in Communist Lands* 12, no. 3 (Winter 1984), pp. 281–92.
14. Vasil Vulkov, "Vurkhoven tsurkoven suvet na Bulgarskata Pravoslavna tsurkva," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 15 (May 15, 1978), p. 5. The new bylaws make up a weighty document of some 240 articles, published as a supplement of *Tsurkoven vestnik*, 1951.
15. Quoted in *Tsurkoven vestnik*, nos. 27–28 (1951).
16. *Naroden pastir*, nos. 29–30 (1950).
17. *Naroden pastir*, no. 28 (1951).
18. *Naroden pastir*, no. 35 (1951).
19. See Todor Subev, "Kiril, Patriarkh Bulgarski," *Slaviani*, no. 3 (March 1971), p. 38; Varnenski i Preslavski Iosif et al., "Istoricheskite izsledvania iziskvat obektivnost, nepredubedenost, etichnost. Po povod statiyata na Dr. Slavko Dimevski 'Svidetelstvo za natsionalno razvitie'," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 4 (February 1, 1979), p. 4. The same article appeared also in *Slaviani*, no. 5 (May 1979).
20. "Akt za izbora na Negovo Sveteishestvo Bulgarskiya Patriarkh Maxim," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, nos. 26–29 (September 11, 1971).
21. Protodiakon Vasil Veliyanov, "Kanonicheski izbor i intronizatsiya na Negovo Visokopreosveshtenstvo Slivenskiya Mitropolit Ioanikii," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 18 (June 21, 1980), p. 5.
22. Ibid.; T. Koev, "Smolenskiyat episkop Nestor," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 3 (February 1, 1981), p. 3; Arkhimandrit Neophit, "Putyat na episkopa kum suvrshenstvo," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 4 (February 11, 1981), p. 2; Todor Tochev, "Negovo Preosveshtenstvo Krupnishki episkop Gelassii," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 15 (May 15, 1978), p. 3; Khristo Khristov, "Novoizbraniyat Slivenski Mitropolit Ioanikii," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 6 (June 21, 1980), p. 8.
23. Slivenski Mitropolit Nikodim, "Oshte za neutronnata bomba," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 6 (February 21, 1978), p. 1.
24. On the international activities of the church, see Todor Subev, "Pogled vurkhu mezh-dunarodnoto polozhenie na Bulgarskata pravoslavna tsurkva v nai-novo vreme," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 19 (June 24, 1978), p. 3; Totiu Koev, "Evropeiskata sigurnost i prinosut na Bulgarskata pravoslavna tsurkva," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 15 (May 15, 1978), p. 6; Antony Khubanchev, "Predstoyashtiyat svetoven forum na khristiyan-skite mirotvortsi," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 19 (June 24, 1978), p. 6; and Branitski Episkop Gerasim, "Blagovestnitsi na mira," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 23 (August 1, 1977), p. 4.
25. Starozagorski Mitropolit Pankrati, "Razoruzhavaneto, poveleya na razuma i zov za khristiyanaska suvest," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 2 (January 11, 1980), p. 2.

26. Vrachanski Mitropolit Kalinik, "Prinos v izgrazhdaneto na mira," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 15 (May 21, 1979), p. 1.
27. Starozagorski Mitropolit Pankrati, "Izkazvane," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 1 (May 21, 1979).
28. Slavcho Vulchanov, "Na sveshtenna strazha na mira," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 2 (January 11, 1980), p. 7.
29. Pankrati, "Izkazvane."
30. Protodiakon V. Veliyanov, "Patriarshesko blagoslovenie na Akronska i Niuyorskka eparkhia," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 31 (December 11, 1978), no. 2 (January 11, 1979); no. 4 (February 1, 1979); no. 5 (February 12, 1979).
31. Todor Subev, "Deset veka Bulgarska patriarshiya," *Slaviani*, no. 5 (May 1978), p. 32; Starozagorski Mitropolit Pankrati, "Chetvurt stoletie vuzstanovena Bulgarska patriarshiya," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, nos. 17–18 (June 1, 1978), p. 4.
32. Chavdar Popov, "Religiozniyat zhivot v N. R. Bulgaria," *Slaviani*, no. 6 (June 1980), pp. 36, 41.
33. Marin Bonchev, "Interviyu na Bulgarskiya Patriarkh Maxim pred spisanie *Slaviani*," *Slaviani*, no. 9 (September 1977), p. 32.
34. *Naroden pastir*, no. 7 (1952).
35. Nevrokopski Metropolit Pimen, "Izkazvane po televisiyata v Mexico," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 12 (1978). Authoritative sources abroad consulted by this author estimate that the clergy of the Bulgarian Orthodox church today numbers no more than five hundred to six hundred individuals.
36. Varnenska i Preslavska Mitropolia, "Obyava," *Tsurkoven vestnik*, no. 16 (June 1, 1979).
37. Petar Nikov, *Vuzrazhdane na bulgarskiya narod. Tsurkovno natsionalni borbi i postizheniya* (Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo, 1971), p. 41.
38. Bulgarska Patriarshiya, Sv. Sinod, "Patriarshesko i sinodalno poslanie do dukhovnite cheda na Bulgarskata pravoslavna tsurkva po sluchaia 25 godishninata ot vuzstanovyavaneto na bulgarskata patriarshiya," *Tsurkoven vestnik* (May 5, 1978), p. 1.
39. Nevrokopski Mitropolit Pimen, "Pomosht i otplata," *Tsurkoven vestnik* (January 21, 1978), p. 2.
40. Starozagorski Mitropolit Pankrati, "V blagogoveen trepet pred groba na sveti Kiril Slavyanobulgarski," *Tsurkoven vestnik* (July 7, 1971), p. 1.
41. Emil Georgiev, "Za deloto na ravnoapostolite slaviano-bulgarski svettsi Kiril i Metodi," *Tsurkoven vestnik* (May 1, 1980), p. 1.
42. Veliyanov, "Patriarshesko blagoslovenie," no. 5, p. 3.
43. *Tsurkoven vestnik* (February 1, 1979), p. 2.
44. Bulgarska Patriarshiya, "Patriarshesko," p. 1.
45. Veliyanov, "Patriarshesko blagoslovenie," no. 2, p. 3.
46. Varnenski i Preslavski Iosif et al., "Istoricheskite izsledvania."
47. *Makedonskiyat vupros. Istoriko-politicheska spravka*. (Sofia: Institut za istoriya pri BAN, 1968), p. 4.
48. Joseph Rotschild, *The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development 1883–1936* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 246.

49. Elisabeth Barker, *Macedonia—Its Place in Balkan Politics* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980; reprint of 1950 ed. pub. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London), pp. 45–77, 88.
50. Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 173; Marshall Lee Miller, *Bulgaria during the Second World War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 130–31; Barker, *Macedonia*, pp. 84–87.
51. Barker, *Macedonia*, pp. 96–107.
52. *Makedonskiyat vupros*, n. 47 of this chap., p. 38.
53. Donald W. Treadgold, *Twentieth Century Russia* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), p. 464.
54. Figures quoted from Patrick Moore, "Macedonia: Perennial Balkan Apple of Discord," *The World Today* 35, no. 10 (October 1979), p. 423. See also George Klein and Milan J. Reban, eds., *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe*, esp. John George-off, "Ethnic Minorities in the People's Republic of Bulgaria" (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1981), p. 69.
55. Slobodan Stankovic, "Bulgarian CP Leader Tells Belgrade Paper Macedonians 'do not exist'," *Radio Free Europe Research* (December 19, 1975), p. 4. Whether one accepts or rejects the figures of 1946 and 1956, as well as those of 1965 or 1975, depends on the credence given to any claims of "free" expression of popular feelings under a communist system of government, be it Bulgarian or Yugoslav. Yugoslav writers are making much of the early Bulgarian censuses.
56. Tsola Dragoicheva, *Makedoniya—ne povod za razdori, a faktor za druzhba i sutrud-nichestvo* (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1979), p. 7.
57. Done Ilievski, *The Macedonian Orthodox Church* (Skopje: Macedonian Review Editions, 1973), p. 94.
58. *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers I* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 495–97. The British Aide-Memoire, addressed to the U.S. government, stated: "They [the British government] regard themselves in no way committed to the survival of the sovereign Bulgarian State." See also Miller, *Bulgaria*, p. 114.
59. Ivan Todorov, "Legenda za Diado Ivan," *Tsurkoven vestnik* (February 21, 1978), p. 5.
60. Vrachanski Mitropolit Kalinik, "Primer za blagoplodno purvosvetitelstvuvane," *Tsurkoven vestnik* (March 21, 1978), p. 1.
61. Vasil Velijanov, "Shestdeset godini ot vuzstanovyavaneto patriarshestvoto na Rus-kata pravoslavna tsurkva," *Tsurkoven vestnik* (June 24, 1978), p. 2.
62. Todor Zhivkov, "Slovo za Bulgaria proizneseno ot drugarya Todor Zhivkov na tur-zhestvenoto zasедание . . . posveteno na 1300 godishnina ot osnovavaneto na bul-garskata durzhava," *Zemedelsko zname*, October 21, 1981, p. 2.

CHAPTER 16

1. The best bibliography of secondary sources on Balkan Muslims has been compiled by Alexandre Popović, "Les Musulmans du sud-est européen dans la période post-

- ottomane—Problèmes d'approche," *Journal Asiatique* 263 (1975), pp. 317–60. The bibliography includes few sources for the postwar period.
2. Ahmed Smajlović, "Moslems in Yugoslavia," *Glasnik vrhovnog islamskoq star jesinstva u SFRJ* 29, no. 6 (June 1978) [hereinafter referred to as *Glasnik*], trans. in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), *East Europe Report*, no. 72907 (March 1, 1979), p. 72.
 3. Louis Zanga, "Report on Albanian Atheism," *Radio Free Europe Research*, March 25, 1982.
 4. *Recensuramintul 1966* (Bucharest: Republica Socialista Romania, 1967), p. 153.
 5. Wayne S. Vucinich, "Islam in the Balkans," in *Religion in the Middle East: Three Religions in Concord and Conflict*, ed. A. J. Arberry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), vol. 2, p. 236.
 6. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
 7. The question of a separate "Muslim" variant of Serbo-Croatian is dealt with at length in Salem Ćerić, *Muslimani srpskohrvatskog jezika* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1969). See also Leslie C. Tihany, *History of Middle Europe* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976), p. 96.
 8. Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Balkans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 33.
 9. Wayne S. Vucinich, "The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule," and Stanford Shaw, "The Aims and Achievements of Ottoman Rule in the Balkans," both in *Slavic Review* 21, no. 4 (December 1962), pp. 597–616 and 617–32.
 10. Shaw, "Aims and Achievements," p. 619.
 11. Between 1453 and 1629, out of forty-nine grand viziers, more than half were of Christian origin. L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (New York: Holt, 1958), p. 501.
 12. John V. A. Fine, Jr., *The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 18–20.
 13. Milan Ivšić, *Les problèmes agraires en Yougoslavie* (Paris: Rousseau, 1926), pp. 231–42, cited in William G. Lockwood, *European Moslems: Economy and Ethnicity in Western Bosnia* (New York: Academic Press, 1975), p. 26.
 14. Stavrianos, *Balkans since 1453*, p. 500.
 15. John Thirkell, "Islamization in Macedonia as a Social Process," *Islam in the Balkans/Persian Art and Culture of the 18th and 19th Centuries*, ed. Jenifer Scarce (Edinburgh: Royal Scottish Museum, 1979), p. 44.
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17. Article 37, Constitution of the People's Republic of Albania, in *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*, ed. Albert P. Blaustein and Gilbert H. Flanz (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1981), p. 8.
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134. *The Church and State under Communism*, vol. 2, p. 2.
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152. Seid Ramadan, "Islamsko Pravo," *Islamska Misao* 4, no. 42 (June 1982), pp. 19–22; and "Islam i Žena," *Preporod* (Sarajevo), January 15, 1982, p. 9.
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156. De Jong, "History and Present-Day Conditions," p. 137.

CONCLUSION

1. These terms are Peter Merkl's.
2. Dimitry Pospelovsky, in private correspondence, December 4, 1982. Yet Pospelovsky, like Alexander Schmemmann, distinguishes between religion and church, and considers the latter impossible without belief in the supernatural and life after death.
3. Even this elaborate definition may seem flawed to those who, like William James, consider the belief in personal immortality to be a critical element in religion. For James, in fact, the hope of personal immortality is the central feature of religion. See

- his "Conclusions on Varieties of Religious Experience," in *Essays in Pragmatism*, ed. Alburey Castell (New York: Hafner, 1948), pp. 115, 138.
4. See, for example, Irving Fletcher, "State Socialist Ideology as Religion?" in *Christianity and Socialism*, ed. Johann-Baptist Metz and Jean Pierre Jossua, Concilium: Religion in the Seventies (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), pp. 82-87.
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 6. M. M. Bober, *Karl Marx's Interpretation of History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1927), pp. 156, 341-49, 353-62.
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 12. Igor Smolitsch, *Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, 1700-1917*, vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964), pp. 99-120, 133-38, 171-74. See also Alexander Schmemmann, *The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy*, trans. from Russian by Lydia W. Kesich (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1963), pp. 292-339.
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 18. Bernhard Tönnies, "Religious Persecution in Albania," *Religion in Communist Lands* 10, no. 3 (Winter 1982), p. 249.
 19. On the troubles of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Khrushchev era, see

- Michael Bourdeaux, "Religion," in *The Soviet Union since the Fall of Khrushchev*, ed. Archie Brown and Michael Kaser (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 157-66; Michael Bourdeaux, "The Black Quinquennium: The Russian Orthodox Church, 1959-1964," *Religion in Communist Lands* 9, nos. 1-2 (Spring 1981), pp. 18-20; Michael Aksenov Meerson, "The Russian Orthodox Church, 1965-1980," *Religion in Communist Lands* 9, nos. 3-4 (Autumn 1981), p. 107; and Gerhard Simon, *Church, State, and Opposition in the USSR* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 74-91.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Religion and nationalism in Soviet and East European politics
edited by Pedro Ramet. — Rev. and expanded ed.

p. cm. — (Duke Press policy studies)

Bibliography: p. Includes index.

ISBN 0-8223-0854-1. ISBN 0-8223-0891-6 (pbk.)

1. Nationalism—Religious aspects. 2. Nationalism—Europe,
Eastern. 3. Europe, Eastern—Religion. 4. Religion and state—
Europe, Eastern. 5. Europe, Eastern—Politics and
government—1945— . I. Ramet, Pedro, 1949— . II. Series.

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